Show some logic or facts on how we become a vassal by having a large diaspora.
history proves the contrary. At least know Indian history before claiming to be a stalwart representative of India’s interests
Read again, and take off your Red, white and blue tinted glasses.
"America has always used aid and foreign investment to advance its own foreign policy objectives and agendas. Much like China."
This is seriously something for which you require proof?
Most of the aid debt burden was owed to the United States, or at least was denominated in U.S. dollars as, for example, World Bank loans financed by
dollar borrowings abroad. According to the World Bank’s 1970 Annual Report, as of 1969 the external governmental debt of eighty less developed countries stood at $59.3 billion, exceeding by more than $40 billion the $18.8 billion in private U.S. direct investment in these countries.
Official debt service of these countries amounted to $5 billion, compared with $2.9 billion remitted on U.S. direct investments. Latin America alone owed
$17.7 billion on governmental capital account and paid $2.2 billion in official interest and amortization charges on these debts, compared with $13.8 billion of U.S. direct investments in Latin America and an associated $1.2 billion flow of income remittances to U.S. private investors in 1969.
Statistics for other regions are comparable. Government borrowings had come to exceed liabilities on direct investment account throughout the whole of the world’s less developed areas. This was true in even greater degree of U.S. official obligations to the developed nations.
These statistics point up the shift of inter governmental capital loans since World War II, from productive reconstruction lending to Europe toward less productive consumption loans to less developing countries, and from credits by the United States to credits from the United States.
A growing portion of intergovernmental claims since World War II has represented the debt owed by aid-borrowing countries for such foreign assistance as P.L. 480 food aid and arms support. Many of these loans are not for directly productive purposes as is generally connoted in the business
sense of the term.
Toward the underdeveloped countries, lending policies of the United States, and of the IMF and World Bank which the United States created, have assumed a character not dissimilar from that of the
United States after World War I toward its wartime allies.
It is impossible for the developing countries indefinitely to continue servicing their accumulating debts to the United States and to the international lending institutions. They do not possess even nominal reparations payments on which to rely for part of their debt-service needs.
And their borrowings have not been essentially autonomous decisions. Much of their borrowing has been for debt service recycling, increasing their capital obligations and magnifying the interest cost burdens as their debts have grown and interest rates have risen.
The proposal that all countries help amortize this dollar debt to the United States was a request for a net foreign exchange transfer from other developed nations, specifically from Europe and Japan, to America. Foreign governments were asked to realign their aid policies in such a manner as to help the United States recoup the costs of its investment in past programs of bilateral aid, including the cost of U.S. armaments.
The entire world was to pay the economic cost of the American drive toward world domination. The Peterson Report rightly observed that “keeping these countries on a short leash by emergency debt rescheduling operations does not show the necessary foresight. Countries with serious debt problems, in trying to avoid default, are likely to impose more internal and exchange restrictions
and thereby intensify their future difficulties.”
Yet the Report effectively insisted that these countries be kept on a leash, and that any given country’s debt be rescheduled only if it demonstrates “by its plans and policies that it is pursuing a coherent development program of appropriate fiscal and financial policies,” i.e., deflation and a dismantling of whatever protectionist trade and monetary policies these countries might have enacted.
They must open their economies to foreign trade and investment and must “show determination to develop” by reducing growth in their populations.
The Peterson Commission sought to prevent the African countries from accepting Associate Membership in the Common Market, urging the
United States to retaliate by offering special tariff preferences to Latin America, foreclosing U.S. markets to Africa in commercial competition
with Latin America.
“If the United States cannot reach agreement with
other industrial countries on this nondiscriminatory approach, it should unilaterally extend such tariff preferences to all developing countries except those that choose to remain in existing preferential trade
agreements with industrial countries.”
As early as 1962 Frank Coffin, a State Department aid administrator, testified before a congressional subcommittee that the “aid efforts of other donor countries have an important indirect beneficial effect on the U.S. balance of payments that is probably roughly proportional to the amount
of their aid.”
This benefit to the U.S. balance of payments by foreign countries’ multilateral aid, extended via the World Bank and other institutions, was now to be made more direct. In February 1971, U.S. officials
asked that a World Bank loan to finance a Brazilian steel mill be tied to the purchase of 25 per cent U.S. goods and services, i.e., in proportion to the U.S. Government’s 25 per cent stock ownership in the Bank.
The U.S. Government sought to use the World Bank much in the manner it had wielded bilateral aid, as a lever against foreign moves against U.S. investments.
U.S. foreign aid is bilateral in nature, increasingly tied to U.S. balance-of-payments aims. Its function no longer is to put U.S. dollars into the treasuries of foreign governments, but to dispose of surplus food and other exports produced in the United States and to obtain for the U.S. Government and its agencies cash payment in return.
In 1970 the U.S. Government earned $1.3 billion on its foreign aid programs, the amount by which its hard currency interest and principal repayments of $2 billion exceeded the $0.7 billion balance-of payments cost of its new aid extensions.
Toward the end of further aiding the U.S. balance of payments, the U.S. Government, in keeping with the Peterson Report’s suggestion, moved once again toward multilateral forms of aid.
But this time the organization of world aid was to be much different from that which had followed World War II. It became a program of compulsory burden-sharing by Europe, Japan and Canada in America’s aid domination and militarization of the Third World.
This time there was no balance-of-payments cost to the U.S. Government of its aid, which was tied to the greatest extent possible. In effect, multilateralization of U.S. foreign aid in the 1970s meant foreign governments paying the cost of American aid. Specifically, the flow of multilateral aid payments was to flow from the developed nations outside of the United States, to Latin America and other less developed countries, and from them to the United States.
I can go on and on about Bretton Woods, Lend-Lease, GATT, IMF, World Bank and how all of those are dominated and used as a tool by US to advance its own objectives in the form of monetary imperialism.
Like I said, Death to America.
