India to set up Integrated Rocket Force

Neil

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The idea of an Integrated Rocket Force is a clear signal that India is wholeheartedly embracing the era of “non-contact” warfare in a joint force environment.

In September 2021, India’s Chief of Defense Staff (CDS), General Bipin Rawat, stated that India was looking to set up a “Rocket Force” of its own. This announcement was in many ways a belated recognition of a stark asymmetry that currently exists in the China-India military balance – the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) has the ability to mount a major conventional missile strike campaign against critical Indian military and civilian targets with New Delhi’s response options being limited in comparison. Such a missile strike campaign could inflict tremendous pain while remaining below the nuclear threshold. Naturally, the long standoff between Indian and Chinese forces along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) that began in summer 2020 has catalyzed New Delhi’s intention to appreciably reduce, if not remove, this asymmetry.

However, an Integrated Rocket Force (IRF) is not being advanced merely to serve as a deterrent to preemptive surface-to-surface (SSM) missile barrages or to trade salvos with the PLARF if it comes to that. In general, it is reflective of a worldwide trend toward exploiting strategic standoff strike opportunities against enemy centers of gravity such as command and control posts, air defense sensors and sites, force concentrations, staging areas, and logistics nodes presented by relatively hard to intercept ground-launched vectors. No longer are road-mobile SSMs seen as redundant or ineffective for prosecuting targets at strategic ranges – even by air forces.

In fact, the Indian Air Force (IAF), though engaging in “missiles vs aircraft” debates with the Indian Army (IA) in the past, has nevertheless operationalized SSMs of its own over the years. The IA, on its part, is now convinced more than ever of the need to enter the “deep battle” or strategic interdiction domain given what it sees as a change in the traditional stages of conflict. No longer will there be a gradual escalation to the launch of vectors such as ballistic missiles, instead it is the “rear” that is likely to be engaged first with such weapons. As India’s Chief of Army Staff, General Manoj Mukund Naravane, put it while speaking at a Delhi-based think-tank in August 2021 about emerging conflict scenarios:

Even while troops at the forward defended localities (FDLs) are all primed and in a state of high-alert, it is the command and control centers, airfields, depots, and strategic communication nodes in depth that take the first-hit from standoff vectors with precision targeting. Swarms of low-flying autonomous drones breach or overwhelm the air defense cover in the second wave, targeting the artillery guns, missiles bases, and tank concentrations. Rocket and missile attacks from standoff distances join battle to degrade conventional capabilities and soften the targets. Operations will unfold in “reverse linearity,” with the FDLs being the last to be addressed, if at all. .

While talking about actual recent conflicts such as the one between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Naravane further observe
One key lesson that emerged was that the concentration of aircraft, ships, and other forces to reinforce each other’s combat power made them sitting ducks. The tendency to converge to fight makes you vulnerable to the precision fires available to the adversary. There is, therefore, a need to aggregate fires rather than platforms.

Indeed, the IA may not be able to count on air support early on in a future conflict. Rather, the IA’s own long-range precision vectors may have a key role to play in enabling both offensive and defensive air operations. Essentially, the announcement to set up an IRF is a clear signal that India will use SSMs in both mass and precision during the course of a limited war and is wholeheartedly embracing the era of “non-contact” warfare in a joint force environment.


Ultimately, the growth of India’s own missile development and production ecosystem has enabled its military to envision a Rocket Force. As the chairman of the Defense Research & Development Organization (DRDO) Satheesh Reddy recently put it: India has “complete ‘Atmanirbharta’ [self-reliance] in the missile technology.” This statement is certainly true for ballistic missiles, with everything from solid-fuel rocket motors to inertial navigation systems (INS) to system-on-chip-based on-board computers and actuators being available from domestic supply chains. It will also be true for subsonic cruise missiles once the MANIK small turbofan engine currently being tested attains maturity through the Indigenous Technology Cruise Missile (ITCM) program. However, technology development remains to be done in the realm of liquid-fuel ramjet engines and even control systems for supersonic cruise missiles similar to the Indo-Russian Brahmos. Both hypersonic glide vehicles and scramjet- powered hypersonic cruise missiles are also under development at the moment.

Even though technology is not a constraint to building up a rocket force, debates about an eventual IRF’s composition in terms of the mix of vectors and the size of its inventory across categories are still active. In terms of the mix, there will be a question as to whether rocket artillery systems capable of prosecuting targets at the outer limits of operational ranges (less than 300 kilometers in the Indian military’s conception of things) should be put under its control. Also, a section of the bureaucracy remains skeptical about investing beyond a point in what it sees as “fixed assets,” i.e. vectors that it believes can only ever be used in a major war (as opposed to fighter aircraft or main battle tanks). Indeed, it is precisely this outlook that has to date served to keep India’s ballistic missile inventory limited, with existing ballistic missiles having a nuclear role only.

Issues related to co-mingling with nuclear armed assets may also arise for particularly long-ranged vectors until hypersonic systems become available. Then there is the matter of training and actually standing up the IRF. Once the IRF matures, issues related to deterrence stability, especially with respect to Pakistan, may have to be addressed.

The Aggregation Principle

While the broader reasons for creating an IRF – such as the need to create a symmetric counter to the PLARF and embracing standoff warfare – are readily understood, the question arises as to why India is opting for a separate “Rocket Force” type structure. After all, ground-launched vectors capable of strategic strike already exist in the Indian arsenal, albeit distributed across various services. That, however, is precisely the point. The idea behind the IRF is to consolidate these capabilities under a single command and control structure for optimal exploitation in a joint force environment, rather than leaving them scattered across services and subject to individual service plans. Any IRF requires both mass and precision and aggregating existing assets from the three services would serve that purpose in the immediate.

Given that theaterization remains a work in progress, it is probably felt that prizing the relevant capabilities out from service-based silos would be the best way to promote the development of strategic standoff strike as a discipline within the Indian military. This would prevent inter-service rivalries from stymying the development of a proper doctrine for employment while fostering greater inter-service dependency. After all, an IRF would require the IA’s logistics while leveraging ISR inputs from the IAF and the Indian Navy (IN) until its own integral capabilities in these realms mature. Rather, the emergence of the IRF’s own network, which would be connected with that of the three services, could serve as a lodestone for deeper jointness in the Indian military. Such jointness would also extend to the realm of procurement, since the IRF would seek to exploit economies of scale in terms of orders for both strike vectors as well as ISR assets such as satellites.

Such views are echoed by former DRDO Chairman V.K Saraswat (currently a member of NITI Aayog) who observed to this writer that a separate IRF would “lead to economies of scale, evolution of a suitable doctrine of employment and aggregation necessary for massed fires.” An old proponent of an IRF-type entity, Saraswat believes that an IRF could truly catapult India into the era of non-contact warfare.

The Potential Force Mix

However, this aggregation principle will in all likelihood remain limited to ground-launched vectors. The IN, it seems, believes that it is more of a platform-centric force and will not relinquish control of its vessel-borne land attack cruise missiles (LACMs) to any IRF. Similarly, it is unclear whether the IAF would be willing to do the same for its own air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs). Such systems will likely remain dovetailed to the doctrinal rubric of these services. While the IRF per se could get control of future long-ranged ALCMs carried by IAF fighters, the service would be loath to cede control of any of its multirole fighters itself. Naturally, having control of the vector but not the platform that launches it may reduce the usefulness of the former to the IRF.

With the IN unlikely to cede control of its ship-launched long-range vectors, one can safely rule out the long-range land attack cruise missile (LRLACM) under development, which is meant to be carried by its principal surface combatants, from the IRF mix. On the other hand, coastal batteries armed with the Brahmos anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) may feature in the IRF. So too will future land-based long-range ASCMs derived from the subsonic Nirbhay cruise missile and even anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), which are also under development. These types of systems are likely to feature heavily in any future anti-access/area denial architecture set up by India in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Be that as it may, the IA’s and the IAF’s own existing Brahmos regiments will also become part of the IRF.

But the Brahmos, though highly accurate and capable of prosecuting even time critical targets when equipped with a MMW seeker, is also made up of a lot of imported content. While in recent years, India has indigenized the INS, airframe, booster, and even the front-end seeker of the baseline model, the control and propulsion systems of this missile continue to be Russian. Moreover, owing to the terms of the Indo-Russian joint venture that builds the Brahmos, these subsystems will continue to be imported for the baseline Brahmos. The imported content of Brahmos in turn serves to make the missile a tad expensive. The missile’s 200 kg warhead also make it ill-suited for attacking large area targets.

Although four Brahmos regiments with a hundred missiles each are currently in the IA’s inventory and an undisclosed number with the IAF, any future IRF would ideally like to have in its ambit a much cheaper ballistic missile of similar range with a much larger warhead. Such a missile called the Pralay, which according to sources boasts a range of 400-500 km and can carry at least a 700 kg warhead, has already been developed by the DRDO, although it is yet to be tested. The Pralay leverages advances in domestic solid rocket propulsion technology, on-board computing, and guidance systems to deliver a large explosive package despite being relatively compact in size. Two Pralays will be carried on a truck-based launcher than can navigate even mountain roads.

Induction of the Pralay will free up Brahmos units to prosecute fleeting targets as well as those where collateral damage is more of a concern
, while larger area targets such as logistic nodes and force concentrations will be attacked by the Pralay. Apart from the Pralay, the IRF may have in its ambit the Prahar 2/Pranash SRBM as well. Although the SRBM is an operational range system, the IRF will likely claim it from the IA’s Artillery Corps on account of its guidance package, warhead size (200 kg), and the fact that its maximum range far exceeds the limit to which a traditional IA formation headquarters has the ability to “see,” “plan,” and “execute.” It would be interesting to observe whether any IRF looking to build itself up quickly would also lay claim to future artillery rockets of 250-300 km range that are under development and can be launched from existing Pinaka multi-barrel launchers. If the IRF does that, then the old issue of whether it will get hold of the vector but not the launcher will likely arise.

Even the Pralay SRBM, though an attractive proposition, would be barely of strategic range. And while it can provide mass on account of being cheaper than the Brahmos, there is apparently a need for systems that can prosecute targets 1,000-2,000 km away. In order to impose prohibitive costs on the Chinese leadership and push them toward conflict termination, India will have to create the ability to launch precision conventional attacks on targets deep inside China. It is here that the IRF is expected to rely mainly on a pool of LACMs. While a 800-km range Brahmos is currently under development and may be extended further, the mainstay will be the Nirbhay Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) variant, set to enter IAF service in sizeable numbers in the next few years. Interestingly, it is the IAF rather than the IA that is likely to be the first operator of a subsonic GLCM.

GLCMs, however, will not obviate the need for longer-ranged ballistic missiles (until new generation hypersonic systems become available) than the Pralay that can be used for conventional purposes. Such ballistic missiles would be able to reach their targets much faster, deliver a larger warhead and will be more difficult to intercept. After all, an IRF concept of operations will necessarily involve presenting the enemy with a varied missile defense challenge in terms of trajectories, speeds, payloads, and guidance packages. An obvious candidate complementing GLCMs would be the medium-range canisterized road-mobile Agni-Prime, tested recently.

Naturally, if systems such as the Agni-Prime also end up being allocated a conventional role, issues related to pre-launch ambiguity and entanglement would become sharper, since this system is meant to join India’s Strategic Forces Command (SFC), the custodian of the country’s nuclear deterrent. While no country in the world has the technology to definitively distinguish between incoming nuclear and conventional warheads, Pakistan’s ability to differentiate between different kind of ballistic missiles launched at it is unclear as far as Indian planners are concerned. This is a key reason why the Pralay’s testing had been kept on hold till recently, since Indian nuclear planners were still wrestling with the deterrence stability issues systems like the Pralay – and, by extension, an IRF that uses it – might present. However, the PLARF threat to India, which is any case is co-mingled, has eliminated such self-constraining views. Pakistan’s own development of nuclear-armed short-range rockets such as the Nasr alongside operational range MLRS means that India will not exercise asymmetric restraint anymore.

Now even as issues related to the actual mix of systems that will be put under the control of the IRF are resolved, debates about the extent of the mass it should gain would also have to be worked out. Mass is of course the key to the deterrent value of an IRF, because it credibly signals the ability and willingness to employ the systems under its ambit. During the recent Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, it has been proposed that both sides refrained from using the SRBMs in their possession due to these being prize assets. The IRF would naturally build mass and for this traditional bureaucratic bean counting in India will have to be overcome.

Of course, “mass” will not merely be a function of adding capital assets. Just as important would be the need to create a technically sound and dedicated group of cadres equally well-versed in the identification, planning, and execution of operational and strategic standoff strikes. It is believed by DRDO insiders that a dedicated cadre for the IRF drawn from the three services will take three to four years to develop. It is further expected that the Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System (IRNSS) would have expanded sufficiently by then to obviate any dependence on GPS or GLONASS to remove accumulated errors from the INSs onboard Indian missiles.

With a mature IRF in place, India’s adversaries will naturally start worrying about whether New Delhi would be in a position to implement a conventional counterforce mission against their nuclear forces. Such worries will probably be particularly acute in the minds of Pakistani planners. As such, there is a growing need for India, China, and Pakistan to engage in dialogue to reduce the risks that the standoff era will bring forth. India, it seems, wants to do this from a position of strength by standing up a credible IRF.


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Lengthy read - But good read
 

Okabe Rintarou

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I seriously hope they don't mean a fourth service arm. What now? Army-Navy-AirForce-RocketForce? That would be beyond stupid. If they go ahead with that, I'd completely lose my confidence in current military leadership.

A new force is required when a new domain of warfare opens up. So we can have a Space Force or a Cyber Force, as those are new domains. But a Rocket Force? Thinking of something this retarded would require one to snort some ganja. Yes snort, not smoke. Deep artillery strikes are almost the same as air interdiction and neither of these are a new "domain" of warfare.

So assuming that they don't mean a new force, and only mean a new tri-services organization, lets dive into the reasons for the IRF as espoused by the article:-
  1. Reason 1: As a symmetric counter to PLARF, to embrace stand-off warfare.
    • Having a systematic counter to an enemy capability can be accomplished without copying the enemy's exact command structure.
    • IAF, IN and IA already have embraced stand-off warfare. The modernization is the limiting factor, not doctrinal inertia.
    • Naturally, commanders on the ground have to stay grounded to reality. The reality is that Indian Armed Forces don't have a lot of stand-off weaponry in stock. Which forces ground commanders to not take rely on this capability in their plans too often.
  2. Reason 2: To centralize them under one C2, instead of having them distributed across services.
    • Fair reason, but is it practical?
    • Will one organization decide the number of missiles procured for Navy ships or Air Force jets? No. Only missiles fired from ground based SSM launchers will be decided by this organization.
    • Which ground based missile launchers don't fall under the Army? The Coastal Defence Batteries of the Navy and the Air Force's missile units.
    • So isn't the obvious solution of the problem to put all ground-based SSM launchers under command of the Army? But nope, because turf wars. Bull$hit! We are creating theater commands, if we still can't resolve turf wars over such issues, theaterization itself is unlikely to succeed since it entails more turf wars than just one SSM launcher control issue.
  3. Reason 3: Indian Army's concept of depth of Operational Area is less.
    • Seriously? You create a new force for this?
    • Can be simply done by placing all SSM units under the theater commander, if you are that concerned about lower level commanders at Corps or Div level not having ISR assets to persecute targets that deep behind the front. Or are you telling me that the Theater Commander wouldn't have that depth perception? In that case, prepare the white flag, we aren't winning in that case.
  4. Reason 4: An Indian Rocket Force can help fosterenforce Theaterization
    • My God! Are we in such dire straits that we now have to resort to such methods to resolve turf wars?
    • Is the current CDS unable to implement his mandate otherwise?
    • If we have use such tricks to force the three services to work together, we had better drop the idea of Jointness altogether.
    • A similar concept was created in Andaman Nicobar Command, thinking it would "foster jointness". Did jack all in real life. So if we do this "Rocket Force" nonsense to "foster theaterization", it would be similarly ineffective.
  5. Reason 5: "A section of the bureaucracy remains skeptical about investing beyond a point in what it sees as “fixed assets,” i.e. vectors that it believes can only ever be used in a major war"
    • Really? I don't see well-equipped Infantry and Special Forces despite the fact that they are used even in peacetime, let alone wartime. If the babus really believe the aforementioned reason, then why is the average Infantry soldier still walking around in a flak jacket?
    • If we have to change military administrative and oeprational structures due to whims of babus who've never attended a single military course (yeah I notice the irony), then we had better stop thinking about military reforms and reform the babus first instead.
If you really truly want a doctrinal shift and focus on a Rocket Force, what really needs to happen is all ground-launched SSM beyond a specific range be removed from the administrative control of the Regiment of Artillery, Air Force and Naval Coastal Batteries and place them in a separate "Regiment of Missiles". A clear range needs to be defined for this, probably should be the range beyond the operational depth considered by a Corps during planning. Position of MLRS needs to be made clear. And then, the Theater Commander needs to be granted control of the assets of the Regiment of Missiles in his theater, and he needs to place these assets under another commander in the Theater HQ that looks after ALL deep strikes beyond a Corps' depth perception.

When I say "ALL", I mean that one commander (who reports directly to the Theater Commander) should be responsible for planning not just precision fires from SSMs, but also Air Interdicition and any long range drone swarm strikes. As a result he will work closely with the Theater SEAD/DEAD offense planner and the Theater level ISR assets. There will be a turf war between Air Force and Army for this position. To avoid that give this position to an Air Force officer and create a similar position for Close Air Support (called Battlefield Air Support in Indian parlance) and give that position to an Army Officer.
 

The Shrike

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I seriously hope they don't mean a fourth service arm. What now? Army-Navy-AirForce-RocketForce? That would be beyond stupid. If they go ahead with that, I'd completely lose my confidence in current military leadership.

A new force is required when a new domain of warfare opens up. So we can have a Space Force or a Cyber Force, as those are new domains. But a Rocket Force? Thinking of something this retarded would require one to snort some ganja. Yes snort, not smoke. Deep artillery strikes are almost the same as air interdiction and neither of these are a new "domain" of warfare.

So assuming that they don't mean a new force, and only mean a new tri-services organization, lets dive into the reasons for the IRF as espoused by the article:-
  1. Reason 1: As a symmetric counter to PLARF, to embrace stand-off warfare.
    • Having a systematic counter to an enemy capability can be accomplished without copying the enemy's exact command structure.
    • IAF, IN and IA already have embraced stand-off warfare. The modernization is the limiting factor, not doctrinal inertia.
    • Naturally, commanders on the ground have to stay grounded to reality. The reality is that Indian Armed Forces don't have a lot of stand-off weaponry in stock. Which forces ground commanders to not take rely on this capability in their plans too often.
  2. Reason 2: To centralize them under one C2, instead of having them distributed across services.
    • Fair reason, but is it practical?
    • Will one organization decide the number of missiles procured for Navy ships or Air Force jets? No. Only missiles fired from ground based SSM launchers will be decided by this organization.
    • Which ground based missile launchers don't fall under the Army? The Coastal Defence Batteries of the Navy and the Air Force's missile units.
    • So isn't the obvious solution of the problem to put all ground-based SSM launchers under command of the Army? But nope, because turf wars. Bull$hit! We are creating theater commands, if we still can't resolve turf wars over such issues, theaterization itself is unlikely to succeed since it entails more turf wars than just one SSM launcher control issue.
  3. Reason 3: Indian Army's concept of depth of Operational Area is less.
    • Seriously? You create a new force for this?
    • Can be simply done by placing all SSM units under the theater commander, if you are that concerned about lower level commanders at Corps or Div level not having ISR assets to persecute targets that deep behind the front. Or are you telling me that the Theater Commander wouldn't have that depth perception? In that case, prepare the white flag, we aren't winning in that case.
  4. Reason 4: An Indian Rocket Force can help fosterenforce Theaterization
    • My God! Are we in such dire straits that we now have to resort to such methods to resolve turf wars?
    • Is the current CDS unable to implement his mandate otherwise?
    • If we have use such tricks to force the three services to work together, we had better drop the idea of Jointness altogether.
    • A similar concept was created in Andaman Nicobar Command, thinking it would "foster jointness". Did jack all in real life. So if we do this "Rocket Force" nonsense to "foster theaterization", it would be similarly ineffective.
  5. Reason 5: "A section of the bureaucracy remains skeptical about investing beyond a point in what it sees as “fixed assets,” i.e. vectors that it believes can only ever be used in a major war"
    • Really? I don't see well-equipped Infantry and Special Forces despite the fact that they are used even in peacetime, let alone wartime. If the babus really believe the aforementioned reason, then why is the average Infantry soldier still walking around in a flak jacket?
    • If we have to change military administrative and oeprational structures due to whims of babus who've never attended a single military course (yeah I notice the irony), then we had better stop thinking about military reforms and reform the babus first instead.
If you really truly want a doctrinal shift and focus on a Rocket Force, what really needs to happen is all ground-launched SSM beyond a specific range be removed from the administrative control of the Regiment of Artillery, Air Force and Naval Coastal Batteries and place them in a separate "Regiment of Missiles". A clear range needs to be defined for this, probably should be the range beyond the operational depth considered by a Corps during planning. Position of MLRS needs to be made clear. And then, the Theater Commander needs to be granted control of the assets of the Regiment of Missiles in his theater, and he needs to place these assets under another commander in the Theater HQ that looks after ALL deep strikes beyond a Corps' depth perception.

When I say "ALL", I mean that one commander (who reports directly to the Theater Commander) should be responsible for planning not just precision fires from SSMs, but also Air Interdicition and any long range drone swarm strikes. As a result he will work closely with the Theater SEAD/DEAD offense planner and the Theater level ISR assets. There will be a turf war between Air Force and Army for this position. To avoid that give this position to an Air Force officer and create a similar position for Close Air Support (called Battlefield Air Support in Indian parlance) and give that position to an Army Officer.
That we are trying to copy cat the PLA is a little worrying IMO. From the statements of the service chief it seems like they have clearly understood that the nature of warfare has changed, but they are giving these statements now with 20/20 hindsight, they were sleeping while the actual change was happening, and have woken-up suddenly. Yet to hear any forward thinking ideas coming out of the top brass - we still seem to be in reaction mode even in our thinking.

BTW the other force that is massively investing in missiles now is the US Army, now that they are free of limiting treaties. Initially there was some objections from the USAF (who along with the Navy were the sole custodians of long range precision fires) but the Army is going ahead anyways. May be there are some lessons to be learned.
 

Okabe Rintarou

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That we are trying to copy cat the PLA is a little worrying IMO. From the statements of the service chief it seems like they have clearly understood that the nature of warfare has changed, but they are giving these statements now with 20/20 hindsight, they were sleeping while the actual change was happening, and have woken-up suddenly. Yet to hear any forward thinking ideas coming out of the top brass - we still seem to be in reaction mode even in our thinking.

BTW the other force that is massively investing in missiles now is the US Army, now that they are free of limiting treaties. Initially there was some objections from the USAF (who along with the Navy were the sole custodians of long range precision fires) but the Army is going ahead anyways. May be there are some lessons to be learned.
Exactly! Its extremely worrying that they suddenly found so many gaps. I still remember the statements veterans used to give regarding PLARF, about how its not a viable strategy and how it would take PLARF 220 missiles to shut down just one airfield on our side.

Anyways, lets see what they do now. I just hope they don't end up completely copying PLA as a knee-jerk reaction. I'd really start sweating if that happens. No joke.
 

pipebomb

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GLCMs, however, will not obviate the need for longer-ranged ballistic missiles (until new generation hypersonic systems become available) than the Pralay that can be used for conventional purposes.
What does this means exactly. Is it that we can't deploy ballistic missile beyond certain range without diluting strategic deterrence unless we itself move our nuclear payloads from ballistic missile to HGVs or MAVs
 

Tshering22

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Demonstration of Iran's missile capability (part propaganda of course).
People might mock Iran, but you got to give them credit; With 0 outside support they still manage to hold off practically 30 Allied countries. Sure, their economy is shit but the sanctions against them started right after the revolution even when the official position of Khomeini (lived in Paris, unlike other Mullahs) was unknown.

They not only managed to create a domestic arms industry, but also hold the regional fort and keep NATO/client states on the edge. It is just that if they brought some balance to their foreign policy, they would be even more powerful. Remaining reclusive does not help their people.
 

Hari Sud

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Here is a run down on Chinese rocket force;

China’s current ballistic missile inventory apparently includes about twenty DF-41 (range of 14,000 kilometers), about eighty DF-31 - 50 (8,000 kilometers), thirty DF-5 - (14,000 kilometers), thirty DF-4 (5,500 kilometers), about a thousand DF-26 (4,000 kilometers), 600 DF-21D Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (1,500 kilometers), 700 DF-21 (1,700 kilometers), 500 DF-16 (800 kilometers), 300 DF-15B (800 kilometers), 500 DF-15A (900 kilometers), at least 1,200 DF-11A (700 kilometers). The only cruise missile is the CJ-10A (1,500 kilometers). There are several hundred other short-range ballistic missiles as well, some of them still in development.



https://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htart/articles/20220113.aspx
 

Tshering22

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Here is a run down on Chinese rocket force;

China’s current ballistic missile inventory apparently includes about
twenty DF-41 (range of 14,000 kilometers),
about eighty DF-31 - 50 (8,000 kilometers),
thirty DF-5 - (14,000 kilometers),
thirty DF-4 (5,500 kilometers),
about a thousand DF-26 (4,000 kilometers),
600 DF-21D Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (1,500 kilometers),
700 DF-21 (1,700 kilometers),
500 DF-16 (800 kilometers),
300 DF-15B (800 kilometers),
500 DF-15A (900 kilometers),
at least 1,200 DF-11A (700 kilometers).

The only cruise missile is the CJ-10A (1,500 kilometers). There are several hundred other short-range ballistic missiles as well, some of them still in development.
https://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htart/articles/20220113.aspx
I am now tempted to know what are the approx. missile numbers we got in comparison. This is a massive missile-focused arsenal that is designed to lay waste to the American CBGs, landing groups of US Marines, and decimate military bases in Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Guam and also the support troops in Taiwan.

Let's hope that our missiles are not Pakistan-centric in the last few years.
 

no smoking

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Here is a run down on Chinese rocket force;

China’s current ballistic missile inventory apparently includes about twenty DF-41 (range of 14,000 kilometers), about eighty DF-31 - 50 (8,000 kilometers), thirty DF-5 - (14,000 kilometers), thirty DF-4 (5,500 kilometers), about a thousand DF-26 (4,000 kilometers), 600 DF-21D Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (1,500 kilometers), 700 DF-21 (1,700 kilometers), 500 DF-16 (800 kilometers), 300 DF-15B (800 kilometers), 500 DF-15A (900 kilometers), at least 1,200 DF-11A (700 kilometers). The only cruise missile is the CJ-10A (1,500 kilometers). There are several hundred other short-range ballistic missiles as well, some of them still in development.

https://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htart/articles/20220113.aspx
It missed the relatively new one: DF-100 cruise missile which showed up in 2019 national military parade:

1642130917775.png
 

Tshering22

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Any news on the Integrated Rocket Forces as to when we can expect to see this new division? There are just speculative articles doing rounds, with ex-COAS MM Naravane saying that the IRF should be under the IA only to streamline operations and ensure common command.

I truly hope that it is a dedicated service with an independent command, that can work in different integrated theatres along with other forces but otherwise is distinct. Also, the IAF needs to transfer all their CAS attack helicopters to the Army Aviation Corps. This would completely streamline the forces for dedicated roles.
 

samsaptaka

तस्मात् उत्तिष्ठ कौन्तेय युद्धाय कृतनिष्चय
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Any news on the Integrated Rocket Forces as to when we can expect to see this new division? There are just speculative articles doing rounds, with ex-COAS MM Naravane saying that the IRF should be under the IA only to streamline operations and ensure common command.

I truly hope that it is a dedicated service with an independent command, that can work in different integrated theatres along with other forces but otherwise is distinct. Also, the IAF needs to transfer all their CAS attack helicopters to the Army Aviation Corps. This would completely streamline the forces for dedicated roles.
AFSOD, CDS role, Theatre commands, separate SF regiment, IRF....list is endless on which armed forces are dithering, despite evidence to the contrary that these are urgently required. We should consider ourselves extremely lucky that no enemy (despite us being surrounded by them) has seriously thought of taking advantage of the current weak state of our armed forces and attack us with full force.
 

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