India Pakistan conflict along IB and LoC (July 2021)

HariPrasad-1

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Well tbh, Bhutto fulfilled his promise, they are indeed eating grass since they do not have an economy now. All money went to fund terror activities, nuclear program (partly begged from Libya,Saudis).
But Bhutto has promised to eat grass for 1000 years. It is only 23 years since Pakistan made N bomb. So they will have to eat grass for rest 977 years.
 

JBH22

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But Bhutto has promised to eat grass for 1000 years. It is only 23 years since Pakistan made N bomb. So they will have to eat grass for rest 977 years.
What we see is that to re instate so called Muslim rule on Indian sub continent, they are willing to go to any extent.
Credits to Modi govt they have made public understood that it is not fight for Kashmir but rather existential threat to India and our present life style
 

Bleh

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Why are people laughing at this lmao, I am being serious!!!

Hindu population still today is like 40% there, this not mentioning we will get a sea access to the persian gulf area!!
Because it's insignificant & we have fatter fish to fry. But noooooooo... Kargil lene hag diye, owr chutiyo ko pura POK chaiye.

IMG_20210726_121112.jpg
 
Last edited:

Vishalreddy3

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Because it's insignificant & we have fatter fish to fry. But noooooooo... Kargil lene hag diye, par sab chutiyo ko POK chaiye.

View attachment 101918
This one
RW Hindus on twitter talking about annexing the entire PoK, but we need to understand that Azad J&K has a huge population with higher Fertility rates than us and will out breed us within a decade. All the advances we made in the kashmir Valley will go in vain.

Instead if there comes a scenario where we need to annex, then we should concentrate on Gilgit baltistan which has lower population and bigger area and instead of Azad J&K, we should concentrate on the entire Chitral District which also has lower population
View attachment 101859
 

Vishalreddy3

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There is no political will, nor will there ever be, for a military conquest of Gilgit.. Taking Gilgit means cutting off Pakistan from China.. which will entail serious pushback from China.. India has never had this big an appetite..
I really hope we change ourselves within the next 10 years!! Both diplomacy and military
 

iNorthernerOn9

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Source: Trishul-trident blog.

It has become fashionable for several retired armed forces veterans to glorify or whitewash or even refuse to acknowledge past shortcomings & deficiencies that, in reality, reduce India’s armed forces to the world’s laughing stock. Here is one such prominent example:


Claim: In the initial stages of the conflict, helicopters were planned to be used as the primary strike weapons against intruders housed at sangars (encampments made of rocks and boulders that could only be damaged by a direct hit.
Reality: Which IDIOT had come up with such a brain-wave? Did any other air force in the world ever even try to achieve such a feat at such forbidding altitudes? Were the 57mm or even 80mm rockets ever certified for such usage? If not, then did the IAF make any attempt to certify such firings during peacetime between 1972 & 1999?

Claim: The IAF had only about four or five CMDS kits available to be strapped on to the helicopters, and an equal number of armour plates to protect the cockpits. It was decided that the first helicopter would have both CMDS kit and armour plates, while others would have to do with some deficiency.
Reality: The utterly shameful reality is that despite all the lessons learnt from the Afghanistan civil war of the 1980s, the IAF never bothered to install CMDS kits on its vast inventories of the Canberra PR.57s MiG-21Ms, MiG-21Bis, MiG-23MFs, MiG-23BNs & MiG-27Ms. Only the Mi-25, Mi-35P, Jaguar IS/IM, Mirage-200H/TH, Su-30K & MiG-29B-12 fleets had CMDS for dispensing flares. CMDS kits should have become mandatory for installation from 1991 onwards, but this wasn’t done. Even personal locator beacons were procured in very small numbers from UK-based SARBER only after the mid-1990s & again they were not made mandatory for usage. Night-vision goggles attached to the pilot’s helmet, although well-proven during OP Desert Storm in early 19912, were never procured for armed helicopters like Mi-17. All Chiefs of Air Staff from 1991 till 1999 must be held accountable for such operational lapses.

Claim: Upon their return, they were told about the ejection of Squadron leader Ajay Ahuja, the MiG-21 pilot who had kept orbiting in search of Nachiketa: a SAM had brought down his aircraft. SAMs were being fired at each helicopter in the formation, but the CMDS flares deflected them–except for Pundir’s helicopter, the only one in the formation that did not have a CMDS. It got hit and crashed with four brave Indians on board.
Reality: Nachiketa’s MiG-23BN & the MiG-27Ms were never certified for dropping ordnance or firing their six-barrel GsH-30 cannons from such forbidding altitudes at high angles of attack. Yet why was such a suicidal attack profile authorised by IAF HQ? Why were CMDS kits not installed on those Mi-17s, MiG-21Ms, MiG-21Bis, MiG-23BNs & MiG-27Ms that were earmarked for OP Safed Sagar? And why were such aircraft then committed into battle for strike missions, knowing fully well that this was suicidal? The then CAS of the IAF, ACM A Y Tipnis, must be held accountable for displaying criminal negligence.

Several other questions remain unanswered till this day. For instance:

1) Despite the IA’s ground formations throughout northern J & K reporting highly increased sortie generation by the Pakistan Army’s SA.330 & Mi-17 helicopters all the way to Turtuk since April 1999, why did the IAF not launch MiG-25R recce sorties in April & May that year to find out what was going on, especially at the PA’s major logistics base at Oltinthang?

2) Why did the IAF fail to deploy an airspace surveillance radar north of the Zoji La Pass at this time?

3) The IAF had already procured second-hand Searcher Mk.1 MALE-UAVs from Singapore back in 1996. Why were such UAVs not pressed into service for airborne recce?

4) What was the reason given by the IAF’s then CAS, ACM A Y Tipnis, for his reticence to employ offensive airpower without political authorisation when he knew very well that such airpower was reqd for usage well within India-controlled airspace & not anywhere along the LoC?

5) Why did the IAF insist on maintaining its own fleet of SA.315B lama/Cheetah light observation/search-n-rescue helicopters when the IA’s Army Aviation Corps (AAC) was perfectly capable of doing such jobs? Shouldn’t the IAF have long ago (after 1986) transferred such helicopters to the IA’s AAC & in their place procured armed Mi-17s capable of undertaking combat search-n-rescue (CSAR) operations? Is it not a matter of shame for the IAF that even on the morning of February 27, 2019 the IAF could not launch a single CSAR sorties for safely recovering Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman from within hostile territory? Is that why Abhinandan wasn’t carrying any personal locator beacon?

6) All of the above only go on to prove the intellectual bankruptsy of the contents of the KARGIL Review Committee’s report, while the contents of the Lt Gen A R K Reddy Committee’s report (he was then the Chief of Staff of the IA’s HQ Northern Command) on the lessons learnt from OP VIJAY remain confidential till this day, and no one knows if a similar committee had been constituted by the IAF’s HQ Western Command to learn lessons from OP SAFED SAGAR.

MORAL of the Story: If mistakes continue to be brushed under the carpet & are glossed over for the sake of false glory & mutual back-patting, then such mistakes will continue to be repeated, but next time with far greater negative repercussions.

Bipin Rawat everytime after Modi delivers his pronouncements 👇

tenor.gif
 

FalconSlayers

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Source: Trishul-trident blog.

It has become fashionable for several retired armed forces veterans to glorify or whitewash or even refuse to acknowledge past shortcomings & deficiencies that, in reality, reduce India’s armed forces to the world’s laughing stock. Here is one such prominent example:


Claim: In the initial stages of the conflict, helicopters were planned to be used as the primary strike weapons against intruders housed at sangars (encampments made of rocks and boulders that could only be damaged by a direct hit.
Reality: Which IDIOT had come up with such a brain-wave? Did any other air force in the world ever even try to achieve such a feat at such forbidding altitudes? Were the 57mm or even 80mm rockets ever certified for such usage? If not, then did the IAF make any attempt to certify such firings during peacetime between 1972 & 1999?

Claim: The IAF had only about four or five CMDS kits available to be strapped on to the helicopters, and an equal number of armour plates to protect the cockpits. It was decided that the first helicopter would have both CMDS kit and armour plates, while others would have to do with some deficiency.
Reality: The utterly shameful reality is that despite all the lessons learnt from the Afghanistan civil war of the 1980s, the IAF never bothered to install CMDS kits on its vast inventories of the Canberra PR.57s MiG-21Ms, MiG-21Bis, MiG-23MFs, MiG-23BNs & MiG-27Ms. Only the Mi-25, Mi-35P, Jaguar IS/IM, Mirage-200H/TH, Su-30K & MiG-29B-12 fleets had CMDS for dispensing flares. CMDS kits should have become mandatory for installation from 1991 onwards, but this wasn’t done. Even personal locator beacons were procured in very small numbers from UK-based SARBER only after the mid-1990s & again they were not made mandatory for usage. Night-vision goggles attached to the pilot’s helmet, although well-proven during OP Desert Storm in early 19912, were never procured for armed helicopters like Mi-17. All Chiefs of Air Staff from 1991 till 1999 must be held accountable for such operational lapses.

Claim: Upon their return, they were told about the ejection of Squadron leader Ajay Ahuja, the MiG-21 pilot who had kept orbiting in search of Nachiketa: a SAM had brought down his aircraft. SAMs were being fired at each helicopter in the formation, but the CMDS flares deflected them–except for Pundir’s helicopter, the only one in the formation that did not have a CMDS. It got hit and crashed with four brave Indians on board.
Reality: Nachiketa’s MiG-23BN & the MiG-27Ms were never certified for dropping ordnance or firing their six-barrel GsH-30 cannons from such forbidding altitudes at high angles of attack. Yet why was such a suicidal attack profile authorised by IAF HQ? Why were CMDS kits not installed on those Mi-17s, MiG-21Ms, MiG-21Bis, MiG-23BNs & MiG-27Ms that were earmarked for OP Safed Sagar? And why were such aircraft then committed into battle for strike missions, knowing fully well that this was suicidal? The then CAS of the IAF, ACM A Y Tipnis, must be held accountable for displaying criminal negligence.

Several other questions remain unanswered till this day. For instance:

1) Despite the IA’s ground formations throughout northern J & K reporting highly increased sortie generation by the Pakistan Army’s SA.330 & Mi-17 helicopters all the way to Turtuk since April 1999, why did the IAF not launch MiG-25R recce sorties in April & May that year to find out what was going on, especially at the PA’s major logistics base at Oltinthang?

2) Why did the IAF fail to deploy an airspace surveillance radar north of the Zoji La Pass at this time?

3) The IAF had already procured second-hand Searcher Mk.1 MALE-UAVs from Singapore back in 1996. Why were such UAVs not pressed into service for airborne recce?

4) What was the reason given by the IAF’s then CAS, ACM A Y Tipnis, for his reticence to employ offensive airpower without political authorisation when he knew very well that such airpower was reqd for usage well within India-controlled airspace & not anywhere along the LoC?

5) Why did the IAF insist on maintaining its own fleet of SA.315B lama/Cheetah light observation/search-n-rescue helicopters when the IA’s Army Aviation Corps (AAC) was perfectly capable of doing such jobs? Shouldn’t the IAF have long ago (after 1986) transferred such helicopters to the IA’s AAC & in their place procured armed Mi-17s capable of undertaking combat search-n-rescue (CSAR) operations? Is it not a matter of shame for the IAF that even on the morning of February 27, 2019 the IAF could not launch a single CSAR sorties for safely recovering Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman from within hostile territory? Is that why Abhinandan wasn’t carrying any personal locator beacon?

6) All of the above only go on to prove the intellectual bankruptsy of the contents of the KARGIL Review Committee’s report, while the contents of the Lt Gen A R K Reddy Committee’s report (he was then the Chief of Staff of the IA’s HQ Northern Command) on the lessons learnt from OP VIJAY remain confidential till this day, and no one knows if a similar committee had been constituted by the IAF’s HQ Western Command to learn lessons from OP SAFED SAGAR.

MORAL of the Story: If mistakes continue to be brushed under the carpet & are glossed over for the sake of false glory & mutual back-patting, then such mistakes will continue to be repeated, but next time with far greater negative repercussions.

Bipin Rawat everytime after Modi delivers his pronouncements 👇

View attachment 101940
 

Jimih

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This is coming from a General under whose tenure, Chinese made motorable roads in the Finger areas at Pangong Tso. :)

During 1999's war, China took the opportunity to build 5 km of road inside Indian territory along the lake’s bank. The 1999 road added to the extensive network of roads built by the Chinese in the area, which connect with each other and to the G219 Karakoram Highway.
 

Ayushraj

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Operational victory of kargil was declared on 26 july.
Untill 26 july one of infiltrated sector was not known to indian army.
On this date porki got ready to vacate the left over post about 20-25 % of initial area captured
But battle of kargil was still not over untill September.
These 2 months were living hell for porki army.
Indian Army captured vacated postion on top and retreating porki soldiers were constantly targeted by indian artillery fire and from post.
Out of 1000 porki killed (about 550) were killed due to constant bombardment when they were retreating.Total casualties of porki was 3000.
Point 5353 is lost by indian army during war thats the fact
 

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