India Nepal Relations

[ezsasa]

#BREAKING: Nepal's parliament passes constitutional amendment bill to update the country's map, which includes Indian territories of Lipulekh Pass in Uttarakhand and also highly strategic areas of Limpiyadhura and Kalapani. India likely to react sharply soon.


Buggers did it,

even if pro india government take over nepal,foreign players like china still stoke friction between the countries using this amendment.

looks like nepali communists are better nationalists than Indian communists.

 

[daya]

looks like nepali communists are better nationalists than Indian communists.

Yahan waale kameenist hain..

 

[Assassin 2.0]

Bihar man released day after India-Nepal border firing, says ‘troops dragged him from Indian side’


Published June 13, 2020 | By admin SOURCE: ZEE NEWS A Bihar resident, who was detained by Nepal’s security personnel on Friday (June 12) after firing near India-Nepal border, returned to the Sitamarhi district of the state after being released by them. An unprecedented incident took place on June 12 morning in which one Indian was killed and two others were injured when Nepal’s Armed Police Force opened fire on a group near Lalbandi-Janki Nagar border following an altercation. “We ran to return to our when they (Nepal APF) started firing, but they dragged me and hit me with a rifle butt and later took me to Nepal’s Sangrampur. They told me to confess that I was brought there from Nepal. I told them you can kill me but I was brought there from India,” Lagan Kishore, the Bihar resident, who was detained by the Nepal armed police, told ANI. He said that he along with his son had gone at the border to meet his daughter-in-law, who is a Nepali national. He claimed that Nepali security personnel hit his son, and when he retorted, they asked him to stay silent. “They called up 10 more security personnel who came to the border and fired bullets in air,” he added. One Indian, identified as Vikesh Yadav (22) received bullet injury in the air firing by Nepali security personnel and died on the spot; whereas two others, Umesh Ram (18) and Uday Thakur (24) were wounded.

 

[Mikesingh]

India has rejected outright Nepal's ratification of a new map which includes areas belonging to India.
Another flashpoint as if the Paki and Chinese shenanigans weren't enough.
We could have done without this pinprick from the only other Hindu nation on earth! But Chinese communism is more important to Oli and his gang as there's loads of dosh to be had! It's all about the money but these ungrateful Nepalis will regret when they realise they've sold their country to Communist China.

 

[yourgodisweak]

i think next sri lanka is gonna poke its finger.

Never heard about 1st class students bullying a 10th class guy. If the 10th class guy is a handicap, mute, malnourished then maybe its possible.

 

[Assassin 2.0]

Indian Govt Sources on India Nepal Border row: Nepal has encroached on Indian territory in Narsahi & Susta area in Bihar by settling its own population and through various construction activities

 

[Assassin 2.0]

Indian Govt Sources on India Nepal Border row: Nepal has encroached on Indian territory in Narsahi & Susta area in Bihar by settling its own population and through various construction activities

 

[Assassin 2.0]

Is this the end of the ‘special relationship’?
Anti-Indianism has fuelled Nepali politics for seven decades. It now needs to decide the future of bilateral ties.
Is this the end of the ‘special relationship’?
Post File Photo

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Amish Raj Mulmi
Published at : June 11, 2020Updated at : June 11, 2020 16:02
At the very outset, I want to make it clear that like most of us, I am a beneficiary of the ‘special relationship’ between India and Nepal: I have studied and worked in India, my partner is Indian, and I continue to work with Indian authors and companies. Even then, as a former boss likes to tell me, those who don’t live on the border will probably never understand the true mechanisms of what the special relationship means on the ground. For, the India-Nepal border is a complex one, perhaps the most complex of borders in our part of the world. The open border is at the heart of this ‘special relationship’ continually invoked by India, and increasingly rejected by Nepal. And as much as the Twitterati berated the tone of the Hindustan Times editorial that suggested a reset of bilateral ties will have ‘clear costs’ for Nepal, the fact is, Nepali citizens will have to swallow a few bitter pills if bilateral ties between the two are to be revised, notwithstanding whatever implications it has for Indian citizens.

While Nepal has chafed at unequal ties and India’s regional hegemony in the past, the new Kalapani chill is an outcome of the 2015 blockade and Kathmandu straining at Indian micro-management of Nepali politics. You can see strains of anti-Madhes politics tying into anti-Indianism when a parliamentarian is insulted as a ‘bharatiya cheli’. Nepal’s resolve has been toughened because of closer ties with China and the possibilities of economic delinking with India. But while Beijing affords a shield, its limitations in resolving discordant India-Nepal issues was made clear during the Kalapani dispute. Successive Nepali governments have insisted the special relationship cannot exist on India’s terms—a fair enough observation—but Kathmandu has relied on street protests and bitter ripostes (while back-channel talks continue) to convince India to its point of view. Only this time, India has hardened its stance as well.

The eternal paradox of the special relationship is that while it allows freedom of movement across both countries and other extraterritorial and economic benefits, it is also at the heart of Nepal’s anxiety vis-a-vis its sovereignty (one only needs to look at our citizenship laws to be convinced of this). The Kalapani dispute has, as difficult as it is to realise, shown Kathmandu’s limitations in convincing Delhi under Narendra Modi to come to the table, but the intransigence is also an example of what happens when foreign policy gets overtaken by politicians with partisan interests and harsh words from both sides. As our ambassador in Delhi has said, back-channel talks have continued with the Indian establishment unlike it has been made out in Kathmandu. Unfortunately, anti-Indianism is the flavour of the month, and the ambassador’s comments will disappear under the flurry of nationalist rhetoric.

It has become increasingly clear that Nepal wants out of the ‘special relationship’, even if it hasn’t come out and said it openly. It has stopped invoking the term even though India continuously does; there is certain posturing against Delhi from this government that is reminiscent of its electoral victory on the plank of nationalism, and Kathmandu has been blaming Delhi for not agreeing to talks. But if the special relationship is to go, what would be the outcome?

The first effect would be on the freedom of movement between the two countries. Nepalis will no longer be able to work or study in India without a visa, and Indians cannot do so in Nepal. It will also mean the Gorkha regiments will have to be disbanded; the regiments serve in the Indian Army (and the British) on the basis of a tripartite agreement made as the British left India, and is at the heart of what makes India-Nepal ties special. It will mean an end to any existing preferential trade and economic relations between the two countries. And it will mean ending the fixed exchange rate system. The implications on the border aren’t discussed here, but surely the effects will be felt more intensely by border citizens. And there will be the accompanying rethinking of security and diplomatic ties.

All of this is perfectly okay—after all, this is how normal bilateral ties are conducted. The question before Kathmandu, therefore, is whether it is ready to escape the special relationship.

Nepal’s predicament to ensure absolute sovereignty while retaining the status quo on other implications of the existent relationship is not new. The current issue isn’t a one-off either; almost every decade since 1950 has seen serious strains that have slowly eroded away India’s influence in Nepal. But there was more leeway in the past from both sides, and there were also better-placed interlocutors who could defuse tensions between the two. What has changed this time around is that the Narendra Modi government does not have any legacy ties to Nepal, unlike past Indian governments. And, already bruised from its ill-placed policy actions in 2015, it seems determined to not reciprocate the way Kathmandu wants. There is also a hardening from the Indian government that was not noticed in the past; already there are indications India, too, is thinking about a reset in ties. Indian commentators would earlier call for specific policy revisions while retaining the special relationship, but this time around, a series of articles have asked for existing ties to be reset. That leads one to think, perhaps Delhi too wants the special relationship to be revisited.



It’s easy to raise a storm on social media and say Nepali pride will allow us to face anything as long as our sovereignty is not compromised, but the truth of the matter is rather more delicate. Ask the nearly 750,000 Nepalis who have returned from India during the lockdown (and one knows there are more Nepalis in India still), or for whom the open border is a lifeline. But if Nepal is clear it wants to replace existing ties with a new normal, it has to think beyond immediate political gain and chest-thumping. It cannot expect Delhi to accede to the status quo while it argues against the special relationship. Anti-Indianism has fuelled Nepali politics for seven decades; it now needs to decide the future of bilateral ties.

Opinion | Is this the end of the ‘special relationship’?

Anti-Indianism has fuelled Nepali politics for seven decades. It now needs to decide the future of bilateral ties.

kathmandupost.com

(pleasant article by probably some non commii nepali)

 

[Coalmine]

Cant let go of nepal. Propaganda and Hindutva is need of hour. Communists need to fall

 

[Hijibiji]

Oli is another example of sold politician. He knows what he is doing. He has his escape route already sorted out. His country men (both the people of the hills and the madheshis) will suffer.

There are so many Nepalis working in India with a good reputation. India should show to the Nepalis through TV channels/ online / social media etc, how their Oli is going to harm the interest of Nepalis.

But then i totally get that "Rich & Powerful" Nepalis who stay in Nepal don't care for their brethren who work in India honestly.

On a lighter note, some Indians where rejoicing about giving a separate "Gorkhaland" to people of WB and NOW, those Indians can cherish that Nepal has given something to India

 

[Bhadra]

looks like nepali communists are better nationalists than Indian communists.

Ha ha ... but the coordinator of Nepali communists is Sita Ram yachuri. And many of the communist leaders are straight from JNU...

 

[Gshvar]

China has exposed it's cards and sphere of influence around India. And this is exactly what India wants, let them expose more cards. Once all cards are exposed, then India can play the next step. Let people of Nepal and other countries also know how far has China influenced into their governments and leaders.

 

[here2where]

This shows how money always upsets the 'friendship' cart. The carrot of Chinese investments have worked its magic.

 

[cereal killer]

Is this the end of the ‘special relationship’?
Anti-Indianism has fuelled Nepali politics for seven decades. It now needs to decide the future of bilateral ties.
Is this the end of the ‘special relationship’?
Post File Photo

bookmark
1.05K
facebook
twitter
mail
Amish Raj Mulmi
Published at : June 11, 2020Updated at : June 11, 2020 16:02
At the very outset, I want to make it clear that like most of us, I am a beneficiary of the ‘special relationship’ between India and Nepal: I have studied and worked in India, my partner is Indian, and I continue to work with Indian authors and companies. Even then, as a former boss likes to tell me, those who don’t live on the border will probably never understand the true mechanisms of what the special relationship means on the ground. For, the India-Nepal border is a complex one, perhaps the most complex of borders in our part of the world. The open border is at the heart of this ‘special relationship’ continually invoked by India, and increasingly rejected by Nepal. And as much as the Twitterati berated the tone of the Hindustan Times editorial that suggested a reset of bilateral ties will have ‘clear costs’ for Nepal, the fact is, Nepali citizens will have to swallow a few bitter pills if bilateral ties between the two are to be revised, notwithstanding whatever implications it has for Indian citizens.

While Nepal has chafed at unequal ties and India’s regional hegemony in the past, the new Kalapani chill is an outcome of the 2015 blockade and Kathmandu straining at Indian micro-management of Nepali politics. You can see strains of anti-Madhes politics tying into anti-Indianism when a parliamentarian is insulted as a ‘bharatiya cheli’. Nepal’s resolve has been toughened because of closer ties with China and the possibilities of economic delinking with India. But while Beijing affords a shield, its limitations in resolving discordant India-Nepal issues was made clear during the Kalapani dispute. Successive Nepali governments have insisted the special relationship cannot exist on India’s terms—a fair enough observation—but Kathmandu has relied on street protests and bitter ripostes (while back-channel talks continue) to convince India to its point of view. Only this time, India has hardened its stance as well.

The eternal paradox of the special relationship is that while it allows freedom of movement across both countries and other extraterritorial and economic benefits, it is also at the heart of Nepal’s anxiety vis-a-vis its sovereignty (one only needs to look at our citizenship laws to be convinced of this). The Kalapani dispute has, as difficult as it is to realise, shown Kathmandu’s limitations in convincing Delhi under Narendra Modi to come to the table, but the intransigence is also an example of what happens when foreign policy gets overtaken by politicians with partisan interests and harsh words from both sides. As our ambassador in Delhi has said, back-channel talks have continued with the Indian establishment unlike it has been made out in Kathmandu. Unfortunately, anti-Indianism is the flavour of the month, and the ambassador’s comments will disappear under the flurry of nationalist rhetoric.

It has become increasingly clear that Nepal wants out of the ‘special relationship’, even if it hasn’t come out and said it openly. It has stopped invoking the term even though India continuously does; there is certain posturing against Delhi from this government that is reminiscent of its electoral victory on the plank of nationalism, and Kathmandu has been blaming Delhi for not agreeing to talks. But if the special relationship is to go, what would be the outcome?

The first effect would be on the freedom of movement between the two countries. Nepalis will no longer be able to work or study in India without a visa, and Indians cannot do so in Nepal. It will also mean the Gorkha regiments will have to be disbanded; the regiments serve in the Indian Army (and the British) on the basis of a tripartite agreement made as the British left India, and is at the heart of what makes India-Nepal ties special. It will mean an end to any existing preferential trade and economic relations between the two countries. And it will mean ending the fixed exchange rate system. The implications on the border aren’t discussed here, but surely the effects will be felt more intensely by border citizens. And there will be the accompanying rethinking of security and diplomatic ties.

All of this is perfectly okay—after all, this is how normal bilateral ties are conducted. The question before Kathmandu, therefore, is whether it is ready to escape the special relationship.

Nepal’s predicament to ensure absolute sovereignty while retaining the status quo on other implications of the existent relationship is not new. The current issue isn’t a one-off either; almost every decade since 1950 has seen serious strains that have slowly eroded away India’s influence in Nepal. But there was more leeway in the past from both sides, and there were also better-placed interlocutors who could defuse tensions between the two. What has changed this time around is that the Narendra Modi government does not have any legacy ties to Nepal, unlike past Indian governments. And, already bruised from its ill-placed policy actions in 2015, it seems determined to not reciprocate the way Kathmandu wants. There is also a hardening from the Indian government that was not noticed in the past; already there are indications India, too, is thinking about a reset in ties. Indian commentators would earlier call for specific policy revisions while retaining the special relationship, but this time around, a series of articles have asked for existing ties to be reset. That leads one to think, perhaps Delhi too wants the special relationship to be revisited.



It’s easy to raise a storm on social media and say Nepali pride will allow us to face anything as long as our sovereignty is not compromised, but the truth of the matter is rather more delicate. Ask the nearly 750,000 Nepalis who have returned from India during the lockdown (and one knows there are more Nepalis in India still), or for whom the open border is a lifeline. But if Nepal is clear it wants to replace existing ties with a new normal, it has to think beyond immediate political gain and chest-thumping. It cannot expect Delhi to accede to the status quo while it argues against the special relationship. Anti-Indianism has fuelled Nepali politics for seven decades; it now needs to decide the future of bilateral ties.

Opinion | Is this the end of the ‘special relationship’?

Anti-Indianism has fuelled Nepali politics for seven decades. It now needs to decide the future of bilateral ties.

kathmandupost.com

(pleasant article by probably some non commii nepali)

We should not live in a delusional world like Nepalis love India because we are Hindus. I once read an article where it was claimed only Madhesis & Terai people have some goodwill for India. Rest of Nepalis people living in Mountainous regions don't like India at all especially after Madhesi protests in 2015. They consider themselves of superior race LMAO.

 

[varun9509]

i think next sri lanka is gonna poke its finger.

Never heard about 1st class students bullying a 10th class guy. If the 10th class guy is a handicap, mute, malnourished then maybe its possible.

They did already, all they got at the end was a sea port that doesn't have any profitable cargo, an airport that doesn't have many people travelling, a debt they can't repay and people's hostility against the Chinese which ensures any future Chinese investment will receive the same anger.
I say close all ties with Nepalis, financial, cultural, social, everything. Bloody let them put their butt on the Chinese frying pan, let's see for how long they will enjoy a burnt butt. Stop employing any more Gurkha regiment, we have enough Garhwali, Kumaoni, Assamese and Naga warriors that are much more badass, and these are just mountain regiments.
These times are the beginning of the rivalry which we will see throughout the century. You are either with us or you are not.
Besides there is nothing Nepalis bring to the table that is actually beneficial to us, strategically.

 

[Assassin 2.0]

India had offered dialogue to Nepal on row over map. Why PM Oli ignored it


Published June 14, 2020 | By admin SOURCE: HT On Saturday, the lower house of the Nepali Parliament passed the constitutional amendment bill updating the so-called “political map of Nepal”. The “updated map” includes territories that are parts of the Indian states of Uttarakhand and Bihar. The bill will now go through Nepal’s upper house before receiving presidential assent. According to experts, that is a mere formality. In Nepal, a question that continues to be raised among the intelligentsia, public, politicians is why India has been silent on diplomatic dialogue. But first, lets focus on the ongoing political context in Nepal A screen shot of public debate within Nepal would reveal a widespread belief that the constitutional amendment was being used by Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli to hold on to his position within the Nepal Communist Party, which was highly shaky in early May when pressure on him to vacate the Prime Minister’s post had become unbearable. There were saner voices in Kathmandu that advised him not to bring the constitutional amendment. On the contrary, PM Oli was told, that the constitution amendment bill would close the channels of diplomatic communication with India. On the diplomatic dialogue to discuss the outstanding boundary issue, Nepal seems to have adopted a twin approach. A public call for dialogue combined with an active private effort to scuttle it. In public pronouncements, including in response to questions of lawmakers in Parliament on the status of dialogue with India, Foreign Minister Pradeep Kumar Gyawali had expressed surprise that India was sitting down for talks with China but was ignoring Nepal’s offer for talks. Why indeed has India not offered to sit down for talks? Has it actually snubbed Nepal’s request, as Pradeep Kumar Gyawali seems to claim. A top foreign ministry source in Kathmandu, however, told Hindustan Times that this wasn’t accurate. The source said India had made a clear-cut offer of a foreign secretary-level phone call; to be followed by a video conference between the two foreign secretaries and then, a visit of Nepal’s foreign secretary to India to discuss the boundary issue. External affairs ministry sources in New Delhi confirmed that this offer was available with foreign minister Gyawali and Prime Minister Oli even before the constitution amendment bill was tabled. This offer was made a full one week before foreign minister Gyawali stated that India has been snubbing Nepal’s requests for talks on the border issue. Only foreign minister Gyawali can answer if an offer of a phone call, a video conference and exchange of visits a snub as he described it. Nepal’s foreign ministry sources confirmed that Prime Minister Oli seemed disinterested in India’s offer. For reasons best known to him, he was neither ready to halt nor take a step back on the constitutional amendment despite knowing that the constitutional amendment is viewed by India as an irrevocable step which predetermines the outcome of any future negotiations. Indeed, according to some interlocutors, in his private meetings, Prime Minister Oli has reportedly conveyed that he would proceed ahead with the amendment irrespective of the impact it might have on people-to-people relations between India and Nepal. What we seem to have here is a carefully crafted pattern of deceit and deception where the Indian offer is not shared with Parliamentarians; and public and lawmakers are misled – all so that PM Oli can damage the special relationship that the people of the two countries continue to nurture. Given that PM Oli has ignored that offer of diplomatic dialogue and gone ahead with amending the constitution, it is now up to him to create, if he so wishes, a conducive atmosphere in case he is interested in a bilateral dialogue on the boundary issue. A leader of PM Oli’s experience and wisdom would know well that the time for verbal fudging is over; he now needs to walk the talk.

 

[Flint]

How strong is RSS in Nepal? Need to make solid inroads there and make sure the people are proud Hindus first.

 

[HawkisRight]

How strong is RSS in Nepal? Need to make solid inroads there and make sure the people are proud Hindus first.

Can we stop this bs plz it's becoming irritating

 

[Bhadra]

 

[Bhadra]

Above Picture - Napalese Chamber Of Commerce Lhasa. 1955