India military doctrine

[W.G.Ewald]

Already threads exist on this subject, here is an attempt to include more recent articles. Based on what I have seen on DFI for last two years, it would not be productive, in my opinion, to talk about traits of India's political leadership in the context of military doctrine. I'll try to find Indian sources as well as non-Indian ones.

The thread is intended to describe how armed forces of India would actually fight a war rather than what policy there is about nuclear weapons and their use. There is too much idle talk about using "nukes" on DFI from armchair tacticians, I think we can all agree, although a nuclear scenario could be considered as it applies to warfighting by India's military commanders. Maybe we don't even need to identify the nominal opposing forces.

I come at this from a background as a former US Army NCO with a fairly deep experience in chemical defense operations. I've also been a military policeman, a tanker, and an intel analyst. I have had a sincere interest in the subject of this thread subject and would like to see it develop. From now on, my posts on DFI will be limited to this thread.

Perhaps we can approach this from branch specific inputs, and then consider joint and combined operations. Obviously hearing from Indian defense professionals is essential, but nobody can be excluded.

 

[W.G.Ewald]

Indian Army Doctrine

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter 1- Geo-Strategic Environment and
The Indian Army 2
Section 1 : Doctrine, Concept and Strategy 3
Section 2 : Environment and Threat 5
Section 3 : The Indian Army 9
Chapter 2 - Understanding War 11
Section 4 : Peace, Conflict and War 12
Section 5 : Types of Wars 15
Section 6 : Principles of War 23
Chapter 3 - Operational Perspectives 25
Section 7 : Elements for Operational Success 26
Section 8 : Operational Readiness and Effectiveness 34
Section 9 : Surprise and Deception 38
Section 10 : Impact of Technology on Operations and 40
the Revolution in Military Affairs
Chapter 4 - Conduct of Operations 46
Section 11 : Offensive and Defensive Operations 47
Section 12 : Special Forces Operations 57
Section 13 : Joint Operations 60
Chapter 5 - Operations Other Than War 67
Section 14 : Low Intensity Conflict Operations and 68
Counter-Insurgency Operations
Section 15 : Non-Combat Operations 77
Section 16 : United Nations Peacekeeping Missions 81
Chapter 6 - Logistics 84
Section 17 : Function, Principles and Logistic 85
Support Systems
Section 18 : Future Trends in Logistics 89
Chapter 7 - Preparing For War 92
Section 19 : Force Structuring 93
Section 20 : Training 97
Section 21 : Professionalism and Military Ethos 103

 

[Mr.Ryu]

Hi this is the quote button just copy paste text from doc to forum editor and press that button. The doc is big and highlight of important points will help many i guess

 

[W.G.Ewald]

JSTOR: An Error Occurred Setting Your User Cookie

[End of preview]

 

[W.G.Ewald]

Indian Military Doctrine for 7 Dimensional Wars of 21st Century : Part - 3 - Frontier India

Another demand on the future soldiers will be a remarkable capability for innovation. This is especially true for a country like us. We have to do our best with the resources we have. Using systems for tasks other than what they were supposed to do will depend upon the innate intelligence and quick decision making. This is the key to the future wars. The scale in terms of manpower of the future wars will be less. A 2020 AD army brigade should be able to do what a division achieves today in terms of independent operations in attack and defense.

The real problems that will arise all over the world will be in terms of re-organization of armed forces. The rigid, top-down control should be loosened in the future organizations. Despite the remarkable Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3I) capabilities of the future, the command of operations should lie on the commander at the battlefield. The decisional authority should be pushed down to the lowest level possible. Are the armies willing to do so?

 

[W.G.Ewald]

Hi this is the quote button just copy paste text from doc to forum editor and press that button. The doc is big and highlight of important points will help many i guess

For some reason I had a problem with cut& paste from original Word 2007; I could do it this time.

 

[W.G.Ewald]

From Indian Army Doctrine

Like all other modern armed forces, the Indian Army has been considerably influenced by the Revolution in Military Affairs and the great strides being made in technology development. This has necessitated a transformation in strategic thinking along with a paradigm shift in organization and conduct of operations. As a consequence, military doctrines, weapon systems and force structures need to undergo a review. Our vision for the twenty-first century is to have a well equipped and optimally structured army, enabling it to respond effectively to varied situations and demands whilst it continually adapts itself to meet future challenges.

Such a vision places emphasis on the ability to augment existing strengths, develop new skills, think imaginatively and attempt innovative approaches to cope with the emerging environment. The challenges that we will be confronted with require us to visualize what our Army of the future should look like and accordingly develop suitable approaches to structures, equipping and training to emerge with flying colours in future conflict situations. The impetus for change must come from within and flow through the entire Army.

The Indian Army has to maintain a high level of readiness for war in varied terrain conditions and should have the capability to operate in the complete spectrum of conflict. The Indian Army Doctrine (hereinafter referred to as the 'Doctrine') outlines a framework for a better understanding of the approach to warfare and provides the foundation for its practical application.

 

[W.G.Ewald]

WAR AND GAMES

Indian military planners have their own war-game outcomes, some not dissimilar to those Sam Gardiner has described. Some of them yield very different outcomes. The issue, however, is not the games, but their sheer unreliability. For years, Indian strategists comforted themselves with the thought that in the event of a war, the 40,000-strong Rashtriya Rifles would protect their lines of communication and supplies from terrorist attacks in Jammu and Kashmir. Made up of troops posted on deputation from the Army, the Rashtriya Rifles was meant to ensure that India's LoC divisions could do their job, engaging Pakistan, unhindered by guerilla action. But during the Kargil War India was forced to pull out the overwhelming bulk of its counter-insurgency forces, and even bring in 6 Corps from Bareilly, the reserve corps intended for use in only the direst of emergencies. Jammu and Kashmir was left open to terrorists and the costs had to be paid the next year with troops' lives. Now, 12 more Rashtriya Rifles battalions are being raised. Meanwhile, much of the Jammu region has been left unsecured again.

Those who advocate war have a simple line of argument: India cannot indefinitely tolerate a war of attrition in Jammu and Kashmir, which claims thousands of lives, civilian and military, each year. They are right, but their answers are not. For years, Indian intelligence experts, and the more perceptive members of the military establishment, have advocated the creation of an offensive covert capability, which would inflict real punitive costs on Pakistan without provoking a war. The problem is that a covert capability must be exactly that. It cannot win elections. And so, troops continue to be massed on the border, not to fight a war but to pretend that the BJP and its allies have answers to the challenges that Pakistan is posing.

 

[W.G.Ewald]

-----s in the armour

Here are some insights into what might happen if politicians actually took their own polemic seriously, and India actually went to war.

Infantry troops along the LoC would suffer horrendous casualties, as they are still short of almost 2,50,000 bullet-proof jackets - standard issue in any modern army that cares for soldiers' lives. The ammunition and ordnance that they would use would be of dubious quality, stored as they are in unsafe facilities, which have recorded 13 major accidents over the last decade. Units in Jammu and Kashmir would be harried by insurgents, whose communications they would be unable to disrupt as 10 of the 13 signal-jamming units, bought from a now-defunct British company, no longer work.

Indian troops would also suffer the consequences of inadequate armour support. Crisis in the Arjun Main Battle Tank programme and the slow induction of the modern T-90 tanks mean that India will fight with ageing and technologically inferior armour. In an emergency, this tank-fleet would have to make do with defective shells, which on at least one occasion have blown up during exercises, killing a tank driver and critically injuring a commander and a gunner. The Army would go to war short of 16,000 officers, while the Air Force would be making do with pilots who have not had the benefit of training on an Advanced Jet Trainer.

And one more unbelievable fact: More than 37,000 soldiers could go into the battle protected by bullet-proof vests if the Ministry of Defence (MoD) chose to collect and effectively utilise the dues of a single upmarket Chennai Club operating from publicly owned defence land.

[Article title censored for reasons of political correctness. Omitted word begins with ch and rhymes with "drink."]

 

[W.G.Ewald]

http://www.tata.in/company/articlesinside/K!$$$$!eTgOPo3J0=/TLYVr3YPkMU=

Stronger, faster, smarter that's what modern military forces have become, or seek to be. The foundation of such power is laid by technology, with the development of new materials, new production methods, new forms of communication and new ways of marshalling forces. They are also becoming leaner and meaner.

Strategy and tactics, not brute force, usually won wars in the past. But they have changed over the years as new technologies enabled armed forces to do new things and to do old things in new ways. The biggest thrust in recent times, as one might well expect, has come from IT and telecom technologies. These technologies have dramatically altered the way in which war is waged, while precision engineering, electronics and special materials have transformed battlefield equations.

 

[W.G.Ewald]

Defence News - Does India really need Attack Helicopters ?

The Attack Helicopter has value for money in a relatively benign environment for short, swift Special Operations where the opposition has restricted ability to interdict the AH. Other countries have huge air arms for each Service, some of which are now closing down.

There is no justification for India to mimic defunct, untried and indeed failed strategies developed for European and Middle East scenarios. This approach may mislead us into a weapons procurement minefield. Thereafter, wasteful expenditure will hamper us from getting what we really need for India's safety and security.

It is with much trepidation that one reads about acquisition of Attack Helicopters (AH) for the Armed Forces. Ground Force commanders have always demanded dedicated air borne offensive fire power placed directly under their command as they are convinced these are indispensible for victory.

The commander equates airborne firepower with armour, artillery, combat engineers that are under command and integral to the Division or Corps. He believes, incorrectly, that under-command airborne fire, he will win the land battle. He ignores the inherent flexibility of airborne weapons which precludes limiting that firepower within restricted areas. Why squeeze that flexible and swiftly re-locatable capability?

The Indian Air Force (IAF), on the other hand, appears to be averse to let airborne weapons systems be with anyone except themselves. Their fear is that when one such weapon system goes outside their command and control, there will be an exodus of other similar airborne weapons. Precedents are awful to deal with.

There is also a separate thread on the subject of IA helicopters.

 

[W.G.Ewald]

..:: India Strategic ::.. Indian Army: Modernizing Artillery

The Cold Start doctrine enunciated by the Indian Army rests on rapid mobilization, concentration and launch of operations in a seamless continuum. The other planks of the doctrine are:

Multiple thrusts with divisional sized integrated battle groups.
Broad front, shallow depth, limited objectives.
Pivot corps offensives supplemented with available Integrated Battle Groups from Strike Corps resources.
Strike reserve largely uncommitted.
Aims at attrition and capture of territory.
Cognizant of possible nuclear thresholds.
All weather, day night operations; air drops and heliborne operations; IW and EW; massed firepower ('100 guns' concept); operational fires.

Massing of accurate and heavy volume of firepower, coordinated with combined arms operations including the air support would be a necessary condition for achieving the objectives of a Cold Start doctrine in real-time. The Artillery doctrine no doubt will flow out of the conceptual and doctrinal issues for combined arms operations emanating from the Cold Start precepts.

Lack of adequate artillery firepower would definitely restrict the freedom and movement of own forces whereas enhanced enemy artillery fire power will also add to difficulties of own forces' manoeuvre. The Cold Start doctrine requires a massive artillery support ab initio to neutralise the enemy defences in the shortest possible time without giving him much reaction time.

Further, the India Army Chief has recently talked about the changing geo-political and strategic environment and the need to be prepared for a range of security threats and challenges including the possibilities of a need to deal with two fronts. He also reflected upon the Out of Area Contingencies which may necessitate employment of forces. Therefore the gaping voids in our field artillery need to be filled up in a hurry to meet the likely threats to the defence of the realm.

The artillery rationalization plan's key objective was to standardize the equipment profile from a multitude of caliber of guns to a single caliber.

There are advantages to be gained in terms of streamlined logistics, easy maintenance and repairs including standardization of ammunition.

While, this plan was outlined at the turn of the century with ambitious goal of implementing it in three to four plan periods of Five Year Defence Plans, no progress could be made due to several contextual factors. The major factor being the ghost of Bofors (payoff allegations in their mid-1980s deal) exacerbated further by allegations of corruption in some of the subsequent potential artillery acquisition deals.

However, as a first step towards modernization of field artillery almost over a decade after enunciation of FARP, there is silver lining on the cloud. Finally, the government has decided to buy 145 M777 ultralight howitzers from the US-based entity of the BAE Systems through the government-to-government Foreign Military Sales (FMS) route. The FMS route avoids all the ills and impediments associated with India's Defence Procurement Procedure which has been continually revised but has not delivered especially on the artillery procurement.

 

[W.G.Ewald]

China's Defence White Paper 2013: Lessons for India | Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses

India will need to ponder over the implications of this assertion in the White Paper in the context of the current standoff with China on the western sector of the Line of Actual Control. China can be expected to be hard on issues involving its territorial integrity, as can be seen in the South China Sea and East China Sea where the PLA navy is playing an increasingly assertive role. At the same time, China is also conscious of projecting a clean and benign image to the world. It will be watching the quality of the Indian response. India will need to seize the opportunity and respond to the latest crisis in a firm manner which balances diplomacy with appropriate measures on the ground. A weak response may hurt India's national security interests.

 

[W.G.Ewald]

RMA and India's Military Transformation | Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses

Dilemma Of Indian Military

A survey of India's immediate and strategic neighbourhood highlights the following types of conflicts/violence which are likely to affect security and stability around India, and which may impact on the Indian military's employment and deployment in the future are: Limited conventional conflicts and border wars against traditional adversaries due to territorial disputes and unsettled boundaries, ethnic and sectarian violence, insurgencies, narcotics/drug wars, illegal immigration, religious fundamentalism, terrorism (local and international variety), conflicts which may arise due to big power rivalries, proliferation of nuclear weapons, WMD falling in the hands of terrorists, wars to secure resource areas, and piracy and terrorism at sea, on land and in the air.

Organisational structures for conventional wars/limited conflicts under nuclear over hang already exist but they need to be remodeled, reequipped & reoriented to conduct joint/integrated battles in digitized battle space and to have the necessary flexibility to undertake other types of operations which lie at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict, at short notice. Additionally India faces serious internal challenges, many of which have risen through bad governance, poor administration, inadequate law and order and rampant corruption. The military may well be required to aid civil administration to stabilize situations arising due to the above reasons. In essence the Indian military faces greater challenges than any other military in the world and hence needs to study the transformation concepts carefully to cater for the enlarged spectrum of warfare contextually.

 

[W.G.Ewald]

Official Website of Indian Army

The Infantry School is the repository of infantry's tactical doctrines, drills, procedures and skill at arms. Through its vast assets, it is systematically grooming junior leaders to enable them to handle various combat situations in professional manner. All Indian infantry officers receive their first institutionalised training at this School.

http://indianarmy.nic.in/Site/FormT...yJ/obBvpQ==&ParentID=Anabwb7esgCH/3sXHB6iTQ==

It is a registered journal and has more than 10,000 life members from the officer community and has 800 units registered for life membership. All infantry officers commissioned since 1981 are on its permanent life membership list. The journal is popular not only in India but in various foreign countries as well. It is also dispatched to India's Defence and Military Attaches posted abroad. A digitized version of the Journal was released on 10 July 2003 by the then Chief of the Army Staff, General NC Vij, during the 27th Infantry Commanders' Conference. The CD has been designed for easy and fast search of all articles and features published till date.

The contents can be searched from a common index covering all the issues, by the year of publication, title of the articles, and author of the article or subject of interest. The digitization is one more step in the efforts of the highly competent editorial team to provide international standard facilities to the large readership towards the furtherance of their knowledge. This digitized version is updated every two years.

 

[W.G.Ewald]

Military Doctrines: Next steps | Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses

Services are bidding to pursue 'parallel wars'. While campaigns, though interdependent, can be relatively distinct from each other, separate Service-specific 'parallel' wars are difficult to concede in principle.

Firstly, this amounts to suboptimal use of military power. Synergy that raises the whole to a level higher than the sum of its parts would be missing. Mere co-ordination would not suffice. Secondly, against a nuclear armed opponent, even if action of each Service is individually below assessed nuclear thresholds, the cumulative impact of the three both physically and psychologically could yet trigger off a nuclear threshold. Besides, levels of diplomatic coercion and covert intelligence operations also need factoring in. Thirdly, political control would be difficult since each Service will vie for the lead role in the multiple campaigns.

With the integrating document missing, it is only political aims and the limiting parameters set in the run up or at the outset of a war that would bring about a unity of effort. While conceding that military doctrine formulation is a specialised activity, it can no longer be done in individual bureaucracies respectively or by the military independently. The sphere of autonomy of the military having been considerably attenuated by nuclearisation, there is a case for greater political oversight and bureaucratic participation.

 

[W.G.Ewald]

..:: India Strategic ::.. Indian Army: Future Indian Army Soldier will be Tech smart

Night-fighting capability was needed by all the three services, particularly the air force. Warfighting has changing so fast that there was no option but to have the best of the sensors and target acquisition and destruction capability day and night, 24 x 7, and always, irrespective of the terrain.

He disclosed that night-fighting devices were extensively being put on all the Indian Army's Armoured Fighting Vehicles (AFVs) like tanks and BMPs while the soldiers were being given night vision goggles, handheld image intensifiers and thermal imagers, GPS position locaters and computer connectivity to give still and streaming video pictures of one's own and enemy locations.

Lighter weapons, some with laser capabilities, were also being acquired.

Even the older tanks like T 55, which were still with the army, were being refurbished with newer weapons and night sensors.

Gen Singh said that UAVs were a very potent source of information as they provided excellent images day and night, and the armed forces were already trying out night fighting capabilities in periodic exercises with aerial support components like UAVs, helicopters and aircraft. The Indian Air Force (IAF) was involved in these exercises as coordination between the Army and IAF was particularly required.

Information and intelligence about an adversary was important, and equally so was its absorption and dissemination at the command and operational levels, including to the man on the front. Satellites and UAVs for instance, he pointed out, gave excellent imagery, and this input could be tremendous force multiplier to direct precision and destructive fire power.

Terrain knowledge helps in execution of war plans.

Operational readiness 24 x 7, night fighting capability and highly motivated officers and men had been his key result Areas (KRAs), the outgoing Chief said.

The ongoing Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) meant that technology played "a decisive role" in conflicts and that "as future battlefields are likely to be fluid and fast-paced, requiring quicker responses, we are revamping our communication systems to achieve true networking."

"Based on the Joint Doctrine, the Army has already published its doctrine, as have the other two services. All other doctrines, like the one on Sub-Conventional Operations released recently, take into account the imperatives of jointness. The Army is increasingly focusing on the need for increased cooperation while operating in conjunction with the Navy and Air Force."

The Army chief pointed out that conduct of joint operations was "an aspect being given due importance by us and that towards this end, efforts at evolving inter-operable systems, doctrines and concepts are already underway."

As for tomorrow's soldier, Gen J J Singh added, he will look like a "hi-tech man-machine system."

 

[W.G.Ewald]

..:: India Strategic ::. Army: Role of private sector in Defence

BENEFITS OF ENTRY OF INDIGENOUS PRIVATE SECTOR

Besides national security requirement of availability of military hardware during times of crisis, ability to buy much more with the allocated defence kitty, achievement of self-sufficiency for the country's defence and autonomy of decision making on vital national issues, which have already been discussed in the earlier part of this paper, there are a host of other benefits of bringing in the indigenous private sector in to defence.

First and foremost, it would bring in competitiveness resulting in lesser costs, better quality equipment and adherence to laid down delivery schedules.

Secondly, it would lead to enhancement of indigenous production capacity which is vitally needed to overcome the chronic deficiencies which the military is currently suffering from. In fact, surplus capacity, if created, can be beneficially used to take advantage of in the lucrative defence exports industry.

Thirdly, it would lead to generation of additional jobs and employment opportunities within the country. Fourthly and lastly, impetus would be given to the field of research in defence equipment sector indigenously. DRDO is way behind expectations of the nation in coming up with technological advances while a revolution in military affairs is taking place across the globe. The examples of Arjun tanks for the army, trainer aircraft for the air force and modern submarines for the navy cast a shadow over the ability of the DRDO to deliver. To remain relevant, the Indian military needs to have modern, state-of-the-art weapon systems and platforms. Entry of private sector would add to the overall research capability of the nation.

 

[W.G.Ewald]

Indian Review : What Should Be India's National Security Doctrine by Harekrishna Deka

When we use a concept we have to be clear about it. Though the concepts "Strategy" and "Doctrine" are often used interchangeably, in effect, the latter guides the former and so they are inter-related and not interchangeable. The American Heritage Dictionary gives two meanings for Strategy, (a) the science and art of using all the forces of a nation to execute approved plans as effectively as possible during peace and war, (b) the science and art of military command as applied to the overall planning and conduct of large-scale combat operations. The first definition will cover the national strategy and the second one the military strategy of a country.

What is the difference between a Strategy and a Doctrine? In relation to military strategy, it is an "overall statement of principles as to how forces are used at any stage." The US Department of Defense describes the relationship between military strategy, military tactics and military doctrine in the following terms, "The levels of wars are doctrinal perspectives that clarify the links between strategic objectives and tactical actions. Though there are no finite limits between them, three levels are strategic, operational and tactical." That means doctrine guides the actions at both strategic and operational levels. Thus Doctrine is applied through strategy and tactics as well as through specific operations. 'Approved Plans' as mentioned in the American Heritage Dictionary in its definition of Strategy have to issue from the Doctrine i.e. a set of national principles, 'a statement of Government policy.' The Merriam Webster Online Dictionary defines a political Doctrine as a "fundamental Government policy especially in international relations." From this conceptual framework the National Security Doctrine should emerge.

 

[Srinivas_K]