India China LAC & International Border Discussions

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Tuco

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This is by no means over, at best this is an Interlude. The Chinese may not have got what they want this time but you can be certain they will be back and in force. We have had the Americans completely supporting us this time, maybe the Chinese will wait to see the result of the American election before trying again. They may want to test and see if Joe Biden (assuming he wins) will take on the Chinese early on in his term. We need to prepare hard for the next scene in this play, you can bet it will be staged soon enough.
Agreed they will be back with more of everything. Watch out for there navy fleet circumventing the usual sea lanes. It will be logistical nightmare but hey they are Chinese with the recent Iran agreement its very well possible. We are strong but will be a nightmarish scenario if we dint go full throttle in our preparations.
 

garg_bharat

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True, you are right that our bambs are kept in secrecy. We also have boosted fission and thermo-nuclear..

I was thinking of this scenario today, because of our love to Nehrus and Gandhis, we have adopted no first use policy and no use against non nuclear enemy.

Having, said that let me devils advocate for the moment and pretend that i am china or pakistan and one fine morning after doing sandaas and all.. i decided that death to all baniyas and death to hindustan.

Since i am striking first and I would want to make sure that india is completely destroyed and also i want to make sure that it cannot retaliate. So I launch nukes in all major cities and highly populated areas. I also launch nukes at all known and suspected millitary installation. Etc

I pretty much take out india in one strike.

That being said, india will now try to avenge and retaliate. Since we are retaliating second, we want to make sure that our enemy is equally destroyed too. (Mutually assured and equal destruction). We need to have weapon that can produce yield in MEGATON. Kiloton weapons will not help to retaliate if we are already stuck by nuclear weapon first.

If we all only kiloton weapon then it is equallent to someone dropping 1000lb jdam ordinance in my bedroom and in revenge i drop shivakasi made mirchi bomb on my enemy front yard.

Our enemies have already tested megaton bombs multiple times.. i won't be surprised if china give porkis such bombs to use it against india.

We had opportunity to test only 2 times, and the results are equally controversial.

That's why i want to know, if we have megaton bombs or if we have materials and technology to assemble such bombs quickly within a day if such needs arise.


(Lets not consider the nuclear winter or global extinction scenario here)
India is far from concept of MAD. It takes a lot of work and expense to get at the level of USA or Russia.

India's concept is retaliation rather than MAD.
 

utubekhiladi

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India is far from concept of MAD. It takes a lot of work and expense to get at the level of USA or Russia.

India's concept is retaliation rather than MAD.
so does it mean, the enemy can annihilate all our mega and metro cities while in retaliation we can only destroy few small towns? the enemy will be happy to trade all our mega and metro cities for few of their villages:facepalm:
 

Indrajit

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An argument against the raising of Mountain Strike Corps as currently conceived.




REIMAGINING THE MOUNTAIN STRIKE CORPS
Author: Lt Gen (Dr) Prakash Menon, PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd)

Period: April - June 2020

The Ladakh crisis has triggered calls for resurrection of the Mountain Strike Corps (MSC), whose raising had been put on hold in 2018, due to lack of finances. Freezing the raising, was no surprise as it was always gasping for financial support, starting from 2011, when the case was first forwarded for consideration of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS). The proposal was rightly justified as a major measure for countering the increased threat from China. It involved adding 90000 personnel and projected to cost approximately Rs 65000 crores. This figure did not consider the cost of infrastructure at that time and therefore underestimated the total costs. However, there was a need for reviewing the very idea of raising the MSC. The main issue that was contested was whether the final product, the MSC will serve its purpose of deterring China.
The MSC was to provide deterrence by creating the capability to launch a counter-offensive if China carried out a largescale invasion. This logic was potholed with operational irrationalities. Firstly, such rationale based on deterrence through attempted counterpunch required at least three Strike Corps across an approximately 3500 kms border. Perhaps, China could then be deterred. Secondly, with one Strike Corps, coupled with the distances, terrain and lack of infrastructure, there is very little possibility of application as an integral offensive formation. Thirdly, if only some major elements of the Strike Corps managed to launch a successful offensive across the Himalayas, it would be a logistic nightmare to maintain the force. Fourthly, if we do find a solution to the logistic problem, China’s interior line of communications on the Tibetan Plateau could facilitate a concentration of Chinese forces that could threaten the survival of the Indian forces. Fifthly, unless the elements of the MSC are prepositioned well forward and spread across the long border, they would not be able to quickly react speedily even to the most probable threat- Salami Slicing.
It was obvious that the Army planners were up the wrong deterrence tree. For the capability that was in dire need was the strengthening of the ability for a Quid Pro Quo, by speedily seizing defendable but unoccupied territories, a capability that exists and could certainly be strengthened further along with better Intelligence and Surveillance resources. A swiftly executed action during the early stages of the present crisis would have turned the tables on the Chinese and forced on them the highly complex decision to escalate. As long as the forward deployed Corps has sufficient offensive and defensive resources, the decision for Quid Pro Quo must be delegated to the Corps Commanders. A recently published book Watershed 1967 by Probal Dasgupta illustrates the prudence of such delegation.
Notice that there is no room for the MSC and even if some MSC elements are utilised, there is no role for the Corps Commander and his HQ. Any large offensive by the Chinese, is in fact unlikely, as it does not fit into China’s strategy of using the border as a political pressure point, coupled with the fact of both being nuclear powers. Even if it launches a big offensive, which pierces India’s forward defences, it would be vulnerable due to logistics difficulties imposed by terrain and such vulnerability could be exploited both by Air and land power. It should be obvious, that reallocation of the resources of MSC to strengthen the Forward Corps is the way forward.
Granting that these operational arguments could be countered, the issue to be examined was whether there was a better way to strengthen military capability on the Northern borders. So, in 2011, the case was returned to the Chiefs of Staff Committee for a holistic examination. It was no surprise that the Army had not kept the other two Services on the loop. It followed a pattern set earlier when the Army got CCS sanction for raising South West Command with the Chiefs of the sister services being informed through the morning newspapers. Fortunately, with the creation of the CDS and the Department of Military Affairs, planning will hopefully be joint from the initial stage itself.
Military planning has been blinded due to lack of long-term commitment of fiscal resources. The lack of a military strategy ignores the logic, that strategy is a bridge between means and political objectives. Worse, without integrated planning, the fifteen and the five-year plans are stitched without the thread of financial availability. The MSC was adding nearly the strength of the Navy to the Army. There was no consideration of long-term implications, due to year-on-year sustenance needs, and there were several. Firstly, it would entail a decrease in allocation to the IAF and Navy unless the political leadership gave assurance of increased budget availability. Secondly, in the long term, already unsustainable pension burden after OROP would leave very little for modernisation and even impact maintenance. Thirdly, it required a commitment for additional financial resources which could not be guaranteed by the political leadership and therefore the route taken to solve the problem was to stretch the raising to ten years (and the infrastructure to twenty years). That solution reached its point of no return when the raising had to be put on hold in 2018.
The Chiefs of Staff Committee after deliberating for nearly a year recommended the MSC. The delay was attributed to IAF and the Navy being unenthusiastic to support the proposal. However, the COAS, finally managed to get it through. Meanwhile, there was also narrative put out that the Manmohan Singh Government, was putting the national security at risk by delaying the raising of the MSC. The narrative found its mark in July 2013 during the Depsang crisis and Government quickly sanctioned the MSC. Fiscally, without assured budgetary support, it was doomed from the start.
The alternate to the MSC lies in rebalancing India’s military power from the West to the North and reallocation of MSC resources. It is paradoxical, that despite China being the larger threat, India’s military posture privileges the weaker adversary. The nuclear factor should have retired India’s operational plans for deep ground thrusts and instead morphed into the ability for speedy shallow thrusts. This change in operational concept would free resources for deployment to the North and facilitate the creation of offensive capabilities against China that could be based on brigade sized formations that can be airmobile. This coupled with Force Multipliers (FM) by way of accretion in artillery, missiles, armed helicopters, UAVs, Intelligence and Surveillance assets etc which could be far more affordable.
The invocation of the MSC demand in the midst of the present crisis and the inevitable budget squeeze, the end of which cannot be seen right now, as a military solution to the China’s threat, is an emotionally loaded one and could also become a handy tool to blame the previous and the present governments. The MSC was dead on arrival and even if resurrected, is likely to be an operational and financial albatross around India’s security neck.

Lt Gen (Dr) Prakash Menon, PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd) is Director, Strategic Studies Programme, Takshashila Institute, Bangalore. He commanded a battalion, brigade and CI Force in Central, North and South Kashmir. He was also MGGS Northern Command, Commandant NDC and Military Adviser in the National Security Council Secretariat.
Article uploaded on 24-06-2020
Disclaimer: The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the o
rganisation that he belongs to or of the USI of India.
 
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Bhadra

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There is a thaw in War on our LAC and both sides seems to be preparing for the next round which may be dependent on further developments in SCS. Howevr the window of preparation is hardly about two months :

India has to make up criticality of ammunition as reflected in RFI of 2018 :

20,000 units of 125mm ammunition for T-90 and T-72 tanks;
500,000 units of 23mm ammunition for Strella air defense systems;
300,000 units of 40mm ammunition for grenade launchers;
500,000 units of 40mm ammunition for multi-grenade launchers;
5,000 units of ammunition for Grad multi-barrel rocket launchers;
600,000 fuses for 155mm M-46 howitzers; 1
88,600 units of 30mm ammunition for the BMP armored vehicles;
100,000 units of ammunition for 155mm FH77/B howitzers.

Indian private sector companies that participated in the manufacturing of ammunition for the first time include both leading industrial houses — Chowgule Group,
Kalyani Group,
Reliance Defence Engineering Limited,
Godrej & Boyce
Indtech Construction Private Limited,
HYT Engineering Company Private Limited,
Micron Instruments,
Premier Explosives Limited,
Solar Industries India Limited,
Himachal Futuristic Communications Limited
Continental Defence Solutions Private Limited.

Foreign Comapnies that supply ammunitions :
Expal of Spain,
Nexter of France,
Rosoboronexport of Russia,
Chemring Group of the United Kingdom,
Saab of Sweden,
Elbit of Israel,
Rheinmetall Defence of Germany,
Diehl Defence of Germany,
Denel of South Africa,
Yugoimport of Serbia,
Bumar of Poland,
Orbital ATK Armament Systems of the United States
Arsenal of Bulgaria

Any idea anyone has if this ammunition requirement has been fulfilled ??
 

utubekhiladi

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India Did Its Best To Reply To China's "Aggressive Actions'': Mike Pompeo

Washington:

US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said on Wednesday that Indians have done their best to respond to China's "incredibly aggressive actions", asserting that Beijing has a pattern of "instigating" territorial disputes and the world shouldn't allow this bullying to take place.

"I've spoken with Foreign (External Affairs) Minister (S) Jaishankar a number of times about this (Chinese aggressive actions). The Chinese took incredibly aggressive actions. The Indians have done their best to respond to that," Mr Pompeo told reporters at a news conference here.

read more

 

Tridev123

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True, you are right that our bambs are kept in secrecy. We also have boosted fission and thermo-nuclear..

I was thinking of this scenario today, because of our love to Nehrus and Gandhis, we have adopted no first use policy and no use against non nuclear enemy.

Having, said that let me devils advocate for the moment and pretend that i am china or pakistan and one fine morning after doing sandaas and all.. i decided that death to all baniyas and death to hindustan.

Since i am striking first and I would want to make sure that india is completely destroyed and also i want to make sure that it cannot retaliate. So I launch nukes in all major cities and highly populated areas. I also launch nukes at all known and suspected millitary installation. Etc

I pretty much take out india in one strike.

That being said, india will now try to avenge and retaliate. Since we are retaliating second, we want to make sure that our enemy is equally destroyed too. (Mutually assured and equal destruction). We need to have weapon that can produce yield in MEGATON. Kiloton weapons will not help to retaliate if we are already stuck by nuclear weapon first.

If we have only kiloton weapon to retalite then it is equivalent to someone dropping 1000lb jdam ordinance in my bedroom and in revenge i drop shivakasi made mirchi bomb on my enemy front yard.

Our enemies have already tested megaton bombs multiple times.. i won't be surprised if china give porkis such bombs to use it against india.

We had opportunity to test only 2 times, and the results are equally controversial.

That's why i want to know, if we have megaton bombs or if we have materials and technology to assemble such bombs quickly within a day if such needs arise.


(Lets not consider the nuclear winter or global extinction scenario here)
It is not beyond our capability to successfully design an Megaton level hydrogen bomb. The Indian nuclear research and industry is the most advanced in the Third World barring China. We have done seminal research in fast breeder reactor technology using thorium and probably lead the world. The US is aware of our capability.

BARC probably has a few designs of 1 megaton bombs ready. But the main problem is Government sanction for testing. The Government does not want to alarm the Yankees who may impose economic sanctions. The Indian economy is still vulnerable to sanctions.

But without testing we cannot claim to have a high yield thermonuclear bomb. Testing allows us to validate designs and refine it. Indispensable. An enemy may not believe a lab simulated(on supercomputer) 1 megaton claimed capability.

Fear of US sanctions holds us back.
 

Sehwag213

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Can someone inform how much are PLA soldiers paid in comparison to IA soldiers?
Also how much pension are they paid ?
I would like to compare the quality of our defense expenditure with their.
 

utubekhiladi

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Can someone inform how much are PLA soldiers paid in comparison to IA soldiers?
Also how much pension are they paid ?
I would like to compare the quality of our defense expenditure with their.

china is always not honest and forthcoming about salaries to its soldiers.

but i have some 2 year old data

According to a document seen by the South China Morning Post, the new payments will appear in bank accounts this month.

No reason was given for the increases but a military source said the backdated rises were in part an attempt to placate officers who are due to be retrenched and whose compensation packages are determined by their exit salary.

The increases vary but average about 6 per cent, with a major general taking home 1,250 yuan (US$197) more a month and a corporal 400 yuan, according to the document. After the rises, a major general will be paid about 23,000 yuan a month and a corporal more than 13,000 yuan.
Every retrenched officer, ranging from a lieutenant to a senior colonel, is entitled to a one-off payment of about 1 million yuan, as well as a pension of at least 70 per cent of their exit salary every month for the rest of their life, according to PLA policy.

The payments will be funded by an expanding defence budget, which Beijing said would grow by 8.1 per cent to 1.1 trillion yuan this year.


read more


https://www.scmp.com/news/china/dip...efends-defence-spending-rise-low-proportional

 
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Mikesingh

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An argument against the raising of Mountain Strike Corps as currently conceived.




REIMAGINING THE MOUNTAIN STRIKE CORPS
Author: Lt Gen (Dr) Prakash Menon, PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd)

Period: April - June 2020

The Ladakh crisis has triggered calls for resurrection of the Mountain Strike Corps (MSC), whose raising had been put on hold in 2018, due to lack of finances. Freezing the raising, was no surprise as it was always gasping for financial support, starting from 2011, when the case was first forwarded for consideration of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS). The proposal was rightly justified as a major measure for countering the increased threat from China. It involved adding 90000 personnel and projected to cost approximately Rs 65000 crores. This figure did not consider the cost of infrastructure at that time and therefore underestimated the total costs. However, there was a need for reviewing the very idea of raising the MSC. The main issue that was contested was whether the final product, the MSC will serve its purpose of deterring China.
The MSC was to provide deterrence by creating the capability to launch a counter-offensive if China carried out a largescale invasion. This logic was potholed with operational irrationalities. Firstly, such rationale based on deterrence through attempted counterpunch required at least three Strike Corps across an approximately 3500 kms border. Perhaps, China could then be deterred. Secondly, with one Strike Corps, coupled with the distances, terrain and lack of infrastructure, there is very little possibility of application as an integral offensive formation. Thirdly, if only some major elements of the Strike Corps managed to launch a successful offensive across the Himalayas, it would be a logistic nightmare to maintain the force. Fourthly, if we do find a solution to the logistic problem, China’s interior line of communications on the Tibetan Plateau could facilitate a concentration of Chinese forces that could threaten the survival of the Indian forces. Fifthly, unless the elements of the MSC are prepositioned well forward and spread across the long border, they would not be able to quickly react speedily even to the most probable threat- Salami Slicing.
It was obvious that the Army planners were up the wrong deterrence tree. For the capability that was in dire need was the strengthening of the ability for a Quid Pro Quo, by speedily seizing defendable but unoccupied territories, a capability that exists and could certainly be strengthened further along with better Intelligence and Surveillance resources. A swiftly executed action during the early stages of the present crisis would have turned the tables on the Chinese and forced on them the highly complex decision to escalate. As long as the forward deployed Corps has sufficient offensive and defensive resources, the decision for Quid Pro Quo must be delegated to the Corps Commanders. A recently published book Watershed 1967 by Probal Dasgupta illustrates the prudence of such delegation.
Notice that there is no room for the MSC and even if some MSC elements are utilised, there is no role for the Corps Commander and his HQ. Any large offensive by the Chinese, is in fact unlikely, as it does not fit into China’s strategy of using the border as a political pressure point, coupled with the fact of both being nuclear powers. Even if it launches a big offensive, which pierces India’s forward defences, it would be vulnerable due to logistics difficulties imposed by terrain and such vulnerability could be exploited both by Air and land power. It should be obvious, that reallocation of the resources of MSC to strengthen the Forward Corps is the way forward.
Granting that these operational arguments could be countered, the issue to be examined was whether there was a better way to strengthen military capability on the Northern borders. So, in 2011, the case was returned to the Chiefs of Staff Committee for a holistic examination. It was no surprise that the Army had not kept the other two Services on the loop. It followed a pattern set earlier when the Army got CCS sanction for raising South West Command with the Chiefs of the sister services being informed through the morning newspapers. Fortunately, with the creation of the CDS and the Department of Military Affairs, planning will hopefully be joint from the initial stage itself.
Military planning has been blinded due to lack of long-term commitment of fiscal resources. The lack of a military strategy ignores the logic, that strategy is a bridge between means and political objectives. Worse, without integrated planning, the fifteen and the five-year plans are stitched without the thread of financial availability. The MSC was adding nearly the strength of the Navy to the Army. There was no consideration of long-term implications, due to year-on-year sustenance needs, and there were several. Firstly, it would entail a decrease in allocation to the IAF and Navy unless the political leadership gave assurance of increased budget availability. Secondly, in the long term, already unsustainable pension burden after OROP would leave very little for modernisation and even impact maintenance. Thirdly, it required a commitment for additional financial resources which could not be guaranteed by the political leadership and therefore the route taken to solve the problem was to stretch the raising to ten years (and the infrastructure to twenty years). That solution reached its point of no return when the raising had to be put on hold in 2018.
The Chiefs of Staff Committee after deliberating for nearly a year recommended the MSC. The delay was attributed to IAF and the Navy being unenthusiastic to support the proposal. However, the COAS, finally managed to get it through. Meanwhile, there was also narrative put out that the Manmohan Singh Government, was putting the national security at risk by delaying the raising of the MSC. The narrative found its mark in July 2013 during the Depsang crisis and Government quickly sanctioned the MSC. Fiscally, without assured budgetary support, it was doomed from the start.
The alternate to the MSC lies in rebalancing India’s military power from the West to the North and reallocation of MSC resources. It is paradoxical, that despite China being the larger threat, India’s military posture privileges the weaker adversary. The nuclear factor should have retired India’s operational plans for deep ground thrusts and instead morphed into the ability for speedy shallow thrusts. This change in operational concept would free resources for deployment to the North and facilitate the creation of offensive capabilities against China that could be based on brigade sized formations that can be airmobile. This coupled with Force Multipliers (FM) by way of accretion in artillery, missiles, armed helicopters, UAVs, Intelligence and Surveillance assets etc which could be far more affordable.
The invocation of the MSC demand in the midst of the present crisis and the inevitable budget squeeze, the end of which cannot be seen right now, as a military solution to the China’s threat, is an emotionally loaded one and could also become a handy tool to blame the previous and the present governments. The MSC was dead on arrival and even if resurrected, is likely to be an operational and financial albatross around India’s security neck.

Lt Gen (Dr) Prakash Menon, PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd) is Director, Strategic Studies Programme, Takshashila Institute, Bangalore. He commanded a battalion, brigade and CI Force in Central, North and South Kashmir. He was also MGGS Northern Command, Commandant NDC and Military Adviser in the National Security Council Secretariat.
Article uploaded on 24-06-2020
Disclaimer: The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the o
rganisation that he belongs to or of the USI of India.
100% agree with his contention. The main operational issues are:

> With one Strike Corps, coupled with the distances, terrain and lack of infrastructure, there is very little possibility of application as an integral offensive formation.

> It would be a logistical nightmare to maintain such a force during an offensive into Tibet.

> China’s interior lines on the Tibetan Plateau could facilitate a concentration of Chinese forces in quick time that could threaten the survival of the Indian forces there.

> Maintaining a favourable air situation for any length of time to provide cover to the MSC in Tibet would be unviable.

> Small fast self contained brigade size IBGs tailor made according to the terrain they are to operate over and spread across the 3500 kms of the LAC would be a far better proposition.




.
 

utubekhiladi

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Gautam Bambawale: ‘China is trying to show I am the superpower… India has shown we will not take it lying down’

Gautam Bambawale is a former Indian Ambassador to China. In an E-Xplained event before a nationwide audience on Zoom, he interpreted China’s intentions in the build-up on the Line of Actual Control, and the implications of the stand-off.

some extracts from the article

When the PLA comes after having planned and prepared, it is not an accidental face-off between smaller groups of troops who may be patrolling that same area. So you have to ask yourself the question, why is he doing it? What is his message to us? And I think that there are two reasons. One is a tactical reason, one is a strategic reason. The tactical reason is very simple, he is trying to move his ground positions, where his troops actually are right up to the point, which he considers to be his LAC. Now, remember that there is no agreed boundary between India and China; also we have great differences of opinion… Now, what he is doing is, he wants to define this line unilaterally, bring his troops right up to the line and present us with a fait accompli.

On the strategic side, he knows very clearly that maintaining peace on the India-China border is a prerequisite for the relationship to move ahead. So if he undermines peace on the border, he says I do not want to have the current kind of relationship I have with India. So he is trying to browbeat us, trying to bully us, trying to show I am the superpower in Asia and you just have to take that lying down. India has shown, tactically on the ground, that we will not take this lying down. In Galwan we have blocked him at the LAC and our bottom line for the negotiations is the Chinese must restore status quo, which means they must go back to the situation as it existed before they started all these movements.
.
.
.
.
.
full article is worth a read.

 

Cheran

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Just wondering if Oli looses support of party but calls for Chinese help in the form of boots on the ground....
 

A chauhan

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so does it mean, the enemy can annihilate all our mega and metro cities while in retaliation we can only destroy few small towns? the enemy will be happy to trade all our mega and metro cities for few of their villages:facepalm:
I think Megaton warheads are not needed and are a waste of nuclear material. They used to be good options when CEP of delivering vehicles were higher or chances of missing the targets were higher. Now with improved 2x200kt warheads you can deliver more damage than a single 1mt warhead.
 

Belagutti

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I think Megaton warheads are not needed and are a waste of nuclear material. They used to be good options when CEP of delivering vehicles were higher or chances of missing the targets were higher. Now with improved 2x200kt warheads you can deliver more damage than a single 1mt warhead.
I agree with you sir. MIRV's are better than a single warhead, I want to ask a question are we developing a manurable vehicle to overcome Missile Defence's System's.
 

rock127

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Can someone inform how much are PLA soldiers paid in comparison to IA soldiers?
Also how much pension are they paid ?
I would like to compare the quality of our defense expenditure with their.
On another note.

Even if PLA "soldier" is paid 10 times and end up not being recognized as martyr and burned up like among 100,000 COVID patients or buried in some unmarked grave in barren Tibet it's of no use.

If their families cry for even the remains and can't even protest....... it's of no use to be a "soldier" for a so called nation!

It's even worse than some mercenaries/ expendables who die for few $$$ since they don't wear the Army dress/badge/flag etc! PLA soldier's life is nothing more than a insect!

:truestory:

^^^
And how much a major general,corporal is paid in India ?
Here it is janab.... it's a BIG honor to be a Indian soldier apart from good pay. :salute:

Honor which Chini soldiers don't get!

indian-army-officer-pay.jpg

screenshot-1-cdc7.jpg
 
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