India China LAC & International Border Discussions

[sesha_maruthi27]

China now claims Vladivostok as it's territory......

 

[another_armchair]

China now claims Vladivostok as it's territory......

Bat munchers will claim the whole galaxy one day.

Time to neuter them for good.

 

[The Indian Hawk]

Arriving at a new normal in India-China relations: An Opinion
The ongoing stand-off between the Indian and Chinese forces in eastern Ladakh is a fork in the road, fundamentally reshaping the direction of the bilateral relationship. Over the last few years, the architects of the gradual thaw and developing partnership between the two sides, which began in 1988, had been warning about the withering of old mechanisms that had kept the peace on the disputed boundary.

 

[Aaj ka hero]

Somehow I won't count on this assurance. Last year we thought so, but Pakistan used their F-16s to launch PGMs as well as BVRs at us. At the end of the day, if F-16 gets positive publicity taking on Russian jets, Americans will be happy.

I think they will not be happy if pakis try to enter with their f-16 because for USA their main concern is China.
they are happiest if someone else take down china PLAAF ,so I think if war start INDIA just have to do one thing.... GO straight to USA ambassador and say "we can't bang chinese if PAF interfere with their f-16 " and lo and behold AATMI QUWAAT will again become DOG on the face of their jihadi mard-e-momin.

 

[Aniruddha Mulay]

 

[Blue Water Navy]

If ever war happened I don't think we will do it for just restoring status quo. It will certainly look stupid and the CHICOMS too know ,they will not stop neither we.
I want to say if ever war starts we must PROLONG it because chinese have always done one thing whole in their communist history ,they have always tried to gain upper hand and then leave,bastards know they can't do that with India that's why gobar times CHINESE ARE SUPERMAN dialogue.

You are exactly correct. And pin pointed the thing.

India will fight for Aksai Hind now. GT mouthing too much is the proof of it. May be PLA will want a short conflict. But that will be not the case for India. India will make it a chewing gum.

Meanwhile sealing the entire Indian Ocean will be the strategy here. And everybody knows what shall happen if done.

 

[muralidon924]

Koi ek aur glass juice de do bechare ko

 

[ARVION]

Yes I have also knew that L & T is proposing a Tank based on the hull of the Vajra's hull's independently's and it may weight as much as T 72's with a 120 MM Smoothbore gun's and a engine package of 1200 hp's with a auto turret with a rounds of 48 with three layer of armour's and a APS's and one machine gun auto work station of 12mm gun platform and ATGM's for the FRCA's contractor's they have already moved to the prototype stage's

 

[BangaliBabu]

Mr Parathsarthy says in 1986. India dropped the Para Brigade behind the Chinese and surrounded them in Sumdorong Chu ??
Is it so ... my God how come I do not know it... ... does any one know this ..
This is 2020 ... and it should not be a secret anymore...
Did Sunderjee really do it ?????

the sauce, sir??

 

[Sanglamorre]

Wasn't there a CCS meet today?

 

[The Indian Hawk]

We’re bringing modern technology from around world for armed forces’: PM Modi at Ladakh

On a surprise visit to Ladakh in the midst of heightened tension between India and China, Prime Minister Narendra Modi on Friday told soldiers that modernisation of the armed forces is a priority and that the spending on border infrastructure has almost tripled.

 

[tarunraju]

Interestingly, after the 1989 skirmish, a proposal had come up to give the Sarath platform a 105 mm main gun, a French turret, and a slightly up-tuned engine. Babus shoved it up their ass.

Unlike humans, IAS officers have backwards digestive tracts. They shove good ideas up their asses, digest them, and regurgitate bad ideas from their mouths.

 

[ARVION]

Interestingly, after the 1989 skirmish, a proposal had come up to give the Sarath platform a 105 mm main gun, a French turret, and a slightly up-tuned engine. Babus shoved it up their ass.

Unlike humans, IAS officers have a backwards digestive tract. They shove good ideas up their asses, digest it, and regurgitate bad ideas from their mouths.

Actually the proposal was made by an L & T's engineer in pune way back in 2016 while every one was shocked if even it is possible to create a platform based on the Vajra's platform as it is not a intecuall property but the team head had given a go ahead and they returned with a proposal within four month's for the concept impressed by the proposal they were given a go ahead but the proper internal funding actually started only in the 2019, but now the project has reached to the initial stage's EMTD stage's

 

[ninja hattori]

Lessons from Somdurong Chu Incident






April 26, 2013

The 4057 km long Line of Actual Control (LAC) is the largest undemarcated and disputed land border in the world. It has the unique distinction of being the most 'peaceful' border with not a shot being fired over the last 46 years, save a standoff at Nathu La in 1967, when a display of resolve by the Indian Army prevented further escalation. However, there have been some serious incidents of escalation of tension between the two nuclear powered neighbours which were successfully diffused by a combination of adroit diplomacy, ‘show of force’ and political statesmanship. The most notable among these was the Somdurong Chu incident, sometimes called the Wangdung incident, in 1986-87 in the state of Arunachal Pradesh on the LAC.​

On 26 June, 1986, the Government of India (GOI) lodged a formal protest with the Chinese government that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) had intruded in the Thandrong pasture on the banks of the Somdurong Chu (river) under the Zimithang circle of Tawang district. This was days before the seventh round of border talks which was due between the two countries. The area of intrusion, in the vicinity of the Thag La ridge, had seen bloody conflict in 1962. Considered neutral since 1962-63, it was not monitored till 1980. Patrolling resumed in 1981 and by the summer of 1984, India established a post in the area manned by the Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB), a para-military force , which was vacated in winters. On 16 June 1986, a patrol of 12 ASSAM regiment of the Indian Army noticed Chinese presence in the area and construction of a few permanent structures. The Chinese soldiers were initially identified to be 40 and were soon reinforced by 200 more troops. They were being maintained by mules along a seven km mule track. By August, they had constructed a helipad and were being air supplied.1​

The GOI, made an offer to China to withdraw from the area with an understanding that India would not reoccupy the vacated area, the following summer. This was rejected by the Chinese. At the Seventh round of border talks that were held from 21-23 July 1986, despite the standoff, the issue was discussed “intensively” with no solution, resulting in acrimony and tension.2 Meanwhile, the Chinese 'dug in' to prepare to stay through the winter of 1986. The Indian Army then air lifted a Brigade from 5 Mountain Division to Zimithang and occupied the ridges dominating the Somdurong Chu. Deng Xiaoping took a tough stand and said that it was time to "teach India a lesson”, a message conveyed through the visiting US Secretary of Defence, Caspar Weinberger during a stopover at New Delhi from Beijing. Simultaneously, the PLA moved 20,000 troops of the 53 Group Army and 13 Group Army along with guns and helicopters. There were reports that unemployed Tibetan youth were recruited at RMB 300 per month, essentially for administrative duties.3 Tibetans also reported movement and mobilisation of PLA in the areas around Lhasa and parts of the Tibetan plateau. The Indian Army moved up to three divisions into the positions around Wangdung, maintaining them by air. In addition as many as ten divisions were mobilised to the Eastern sector with almost 50,000 troops in Arunachal Pradesh alone with substantial assets from the Indian Air Force. Simultaneously, the Indian Army conducted a massive air- land exercise called 'Chequerboard ' which commenced in October, 1986 and continued till March 1987.4 This was in conjunction with another major military exercise called ‘Brasstacks’ on the western borders. These exercises demonstrated the will and capability of the Indian armed forces to fight a war on both fronts. ​

Soon after, hectic diplomatic parleys between the two countries worked towards defusing the situation. In April 1987, defence minister K.C Pant made a scheduled transit halt at Beijing and delivered a message of peace. In May 1987 the external affairs minister N.D Tiwari visited China reaffirming the desire of the GOI to continue border talks and lower tensions. In August, the field commanders met on the ground and agreed to move their posts apart. By November, the eighth round of border talks were held which called for an end to ‘military confrontation’ and laid the ground work for the pull back of the militaries. Subsequently, China extended an invitation to Rajiv Gandhi to visit China in 1988. ​

What were the lessons learnt?

For China, it appears the standoff diverted the focus of attention from Aksai-chin to the Eastern sector, linking the two to any future solution of the border dispute. China also realized the futility of conflict with a determined, well prepared and well-equipped Indian Army. According to Keshav Mishra, "Overt display of military power had effectively neutralised any adventurist step" by China.5 Moreover, it was China that extended the ‘olive branch’ inviting Rajiv Gandhi to visit China in a bid to normalise the relations. In retrospect, the firm will of the GOI may have been instrumental in shaping China’s strategy of ‘a face saving pull out’ from Somdurong Chu.​

For India, it was a wakeup call. The GOI immediately shifted focus on infrastructure development, logistic management, redeployment of additional resources and construction of airfields and advanced landing grounds in the North East, changing its policy of years of neglect of the erstwhile North East Frontier Agency (NEFA).6 As a beginning, India voted for statehood for NEFA and the new state of Arunachal Pradesh was created in December 1986. It would be pertinent to quote Rajiv Gandhi in his speech to Parliament on 3rd March 1987. ​

He said:​

"There has been tension on our border with China. We want a peaceful settlement of the border issue. It will need wisdom and statesmanship. It will need vision and firmness. Firmness is included in wisdom….. It is this perspective that should guide our countries in seeking a solution to the problem".7 ​

The recent Chinese intrusion at Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO) on 15 April this year and the ongoing standoff with the PLA is in many ways similar to the Somdorung-Chu incident. India could do well to learn from the past while chalking out strategies for an amicable solution to the present.​

​

[/QUOTE]

 

[another_armchair]

Interestingly, after the 1989 skirmish, a proposal had come up to give the Sarath platform a 105 mm main gun, a French turret, and a slightly up-tuned engine. Babus shoved it up their ass.

Unlike humans, IAS officers have a backwards digestive tract. They shove good ideas up their asses, digest it, and regurgitate bad ideas from their mouths.

If IA is serious about equipment, they should follow the foot steps of IN and fund projects from their own budget.

Baby steps taken now will ensure Babu's have little maneuvering room when prototypes are built in direct collaboration with DPSU's and R&D arms of Govt+DRDO.

Will be better than drawing up requirement specifications which take 5 years and by the time the prototype is rolled out in 20 years, the landscape has changed making the doctrine and the system obsolete junk.

 

[ninja hattori]

Lessons from Somdurong Chu Incident






April 26, 2013

The 4057 km long Line of Actual Control (LAC) is the largest undemarcated and disputed land border in the world. It has the unique distinction of being the most 'peaceful' border with not a shot being fired over the last 46 years, save a standoff at Nathu La in 1967, when a display of resolve by the Indian Army prevented further escalation. However, there have been some serious incidents of escalation of tension between the two nuclear powered neighbours which were successfully diffused by a combination of adroit diplomacy, ‘show of force’ and political statesmanship. The most notable among these was the Somdurong Chu incident, sometimes called the Wangdung incident, in 1986-87 in the state of Arunachal Pradesh on the LAC.​

On 26 June, 1986, the Government of India (GOI) lodged a formal protest with the Chinese government that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) had intruded in the Thandrong pasture on the banks of the Somdurong Chu (river) under the Zimithang circle of Tawang district. This was days before the seventh round of border talks which was due between the two countries. The area of intrusion, in the vicinity of the Thag La ridge, had seen bloody conflict in 1962. Considered neutral since 1962-63, it was not monitored till 1980. Patrolling resumed in 1981 and by the summer of 1984, India established a post in the area manned by the Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB), a para-military force , which was vacated in winters. On 16 June 1986, a patrol of 12 ASSAM regiment of the Indian Army noticed Chinese presence in the area and construction of a few permanent structures. The Chinese soldiers were initially identified to be 40 and were soon reinforced by 200 more troops. They were being maintained by mules along a seven km mule track. By August, they had constructed a helipad and were being air supplied.1​

The GOI, made an offer to China to withdraw from the area with an understanding that India would not reoccupy the vacated area, the following summer. This was rejected by the Chinese. At the Seventh round of border talks that were held from 21-23 July 1986, despite the standoff, the issue was discussed “intensively” with no solution, resulting in acrimony and tension.2 Meanwhile, the Chinese 'dug in' to prepare to stay through the winter of 1986. The Indian Army then air lifted a Brigade from 5 Mountain Division to Zimithang and occupied the ridges dominating the Somdurong Chu. Deng Xiaoping took a tough stand and said that it was time to "teach India a lesson”, a message conveyed through the visiting US Secretary of Defence, Caspar Weinberger during a stopover at New Delhi from Beijing. Simultaneously, the PLA moved 20,000 troops of the 53 Group Army and 13 Group Army along with guns and helicopters. There were reports that unemployed Tibetan youth were recruited at RMB 300 per month, essentially for administrative duties.3 Tibetans also reported movement and mobilisation of PLA in the areas around Lhasa and parts of the Tibetan plateau. The Indian Army moved up to three divisions into the positions around Wangdung, maintaining them by air. In addition as many as ten divisions were mobilised to the Eastern sector with almost 50,000 troops in Arunachal Pradesh alone with substantial assets from the Indian Air Force. Simultaneously, the Indian Army conducted a massive air- land exercise called 'Chequerboard ' which commenced in October, 1986 and continued till March 1987.4 This was in conjunction with another major military exercise called ‘Brasstacks’ on the western borders. These exercises demonstrated the will and capability of the Indian armed forces to fight a war on both fronts. ​

Soon after, hectic diplomatic parleys between the two countries worked towards defusing the situation. In April 1987, defence minister K.C Pant made a scheduled transit halt at Beijing and delivered a message of peace. In May 1987 the external affairs minister N.D Tiwari visited China reaffirming the desire of the GOI to continue border talks and lower tensions. In August, the field commanders met on the ground and agreed to move their posts apart. By November, the eighth round of border talks were held which called for an end to ‘military confrontation’ and laid the ground work for the pull back of the militaries. Subsequently, China extended an invitation to Rajiv Gandhi to visit China in 1988. ​

What were the lessons learnt?

For China, it appears the standoff diverted the focus of attention from Aksai-chin to the Eastern sector, linking the two to any future solution of the border dispute. China also realized the futility of conflict with a determined, well prepared and well-equipped Indian Army. According to Keshav Mishra, "Overt display of military power had effectively neutralised any adventurist step" by China.5 Moreover, it was China that extended the ‘olive branch’ inviting Rajiv Gandhi to visit China in a bid to normalise the relations. In retrospect, the firm will of the GOI may have been instrumental in shaping China’s strategy of ‘a face saving pull out’ from Somdurong Chu.​

For India, it was a wakeup call. The GOI immediately shifted focus on infrastructure development, logistic management, redeployment of additional resources and construction of airfields and advanced landing grounds in the North East, changing its policy of years of neglect of the erstwhile North East Frontier Agency (NEFA).6 As a beginning, India voted for statehood for NEFA and the new state of Arunachal Pradesh was created in December 1986. It would be pertinent to quote Rajiv Gandhi in his speech to Parliament on 3rd March 1987. ​

He said:​

"There has been tension on our border with China. We want a peaceful settlement of the border issue. It will need wisdom and statesmanship. It will need vision and firmness. Firmness is included in wisdom….. It is this perspective that should guide our countries in seeking a solution to the problem".7 ​

The recent Chinese intrusion at Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO) on 15 April this year and the ongoing standoff with the PLA is in many ways similar to the Somdorung-Chu incident. India could do well to learn from the past while chalking out strategies for an amicable solution to the present.​

[/QUOTE]


Incident started in june 1986 and ended in april 1987.
Clears the picture exactly how they play.
And also how we are dealing with it.
Same modus operandi

 

[Raj Malhotra]

Also Junior Officers of Army were told to grap what ever Area they could intrude into. Hence China really got a black eye in 1986-87.

In 1986 we had better Infra & Equipment then Chinese. Lots of time Chinese Officers would pop across the border for a meeting just for some good food, drinks, relaxing

 

[muralidon924]

 

[ARVION]

If IA is serious about equipment, they should follow the foot steps of IN and fund projects from their own budget.

Baby steps taken now will ensure Babu's have little maneuvering room when prototypes are built in direct collaboration with DPSU's and R&D arms of Govt+DRDO.

Will be better than drawing up requirement specifications which take 5 years and by the time the prototype is rolled out in 20 years, the landscape has changed making the doctrine and the system obsolete junk.

But the L & T and the DRDO's proposal to get a tank would not be possible until 2022 due to the DRDO'S funding only started in late 2019's and the proposal is still only in a initial stage of prototype's stage

The hull's would be raised and the turret would be auto turret with better armor ror the hull and with an a targeted weight of 42 tonne's with much better speed and endurance and range's

 

[another_armchair]

Incident started in june 1986 and ended in april 1987.
Clears the picture exactly how they play.
And also how we are dealing with it.
Same modus operandi

China had deployed M-11 missiles at several places and there were cries of war breaking out any moment.

Operation Brasstacks happened around the same time https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Brasstacks

The possibility of an Indo-Pak war was at its highest. Those who were old enough then and lived close to the Western border would know.

So what you see playing out currently is an old script and the possibility of a two front war was quite real then.