If India has to go for a two fronts war against China and Pakistan...
- Thread starter Sabir
- Start date
this what i wrote on same topic some days back...
I'm not sure if India will end up fighting two front war with china and Pakistan directly.But India sure can expect two front war from their Proxies i.e. Maoist in the east and Taliban/Al-Qaeda and other assorted groups in the west.With Afghanistan under its thumb Pakistan will be free to divert substantiative jehadi forces of suicide bombers into India from west and Chinese supported Maoist will join hands with Nepalese Maoist will keep pressure from east and north.Such a scenario will be more frightful then fighting Chinese and Pakistanis on two frontal war.
I'm not sure if India will end up fighting two front war with china and Pakistan directly.But India sure can expect two front war from their Proxies i.e. Maoist in the east and Taliban/Al-Qaeda and other assorted groups in the west.With Afghanistan under its thumb Pakistan will be free to divert substantiative jehadi forces of suicide bombers into India from west and Chinese supported Maoist will join hands with Nepalese Maoist will keep pressure from east and north.Such a scenario will be more frightful then fighting Chinese and Pakistanis on two frontal war.
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Today when India is struggling against all odds but still assuring Indians that she will keep its promise; the promise she made at the eve of Independence to all Indians. The promise guaranteed by our forefathers like Bhagat Singh, Chandrashekhar Azad, Ashfaqulla Khan, Neta Ji, Mahatma Gandhi and many more.
That same promise of prosperity and equality is today threatened by not only by the evil within but by the rough axis of Pakistan and China as well. We have eradicated many evils within in last 60 years but now we are facing another challenge.
I have no doubt at all by the way they talk, plan and boast that Indian will face sudden nuclear catastrophes or deleterious two front war raised by China and Pakistan against us.
Our survival depends on our preparedness and clear thinking.
I am happy to see our non assertive policy makers are now waking up. But I wish the message should be delivered to both that our evils within, may give these aggressors some advantage, but we are now strong enough to make a preemptive blow; efficient enough to challenge existence of them as well at the same time.
India must catch China (the real culprit) at any cost; militarily. Otherwise the so called economical fruits we are trying reap will become tasteless for sure.
India must end China's long honeymoon of unexplained favour of Pakistan; made at the cost of its proxy bitten India and its unchecked adventurous proliferation of WMD to Pakistan.
India has to raise its range to a realistic scale so that we can explain to anyone with confidence that we cover their total geography. China must buy this fact that after USA or Russia, India is also capable to strike her preemptive and can defend itself effectively.
edkaini753
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No doubt if China will opt to wage war with India, She would have to face a huge blow becasue we are very strong in terms of our Army & other armed forces factor.
SHASH2K2
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If its only one on one war aggressor country will suffer great loss. both countries have very strong army and will not be easy to overrun other easily. loss of human life and equipments will be immense . China is smart enough to not to get into a direct fight . It will always be fought by poxies.
China's String of Pearls and India's Enduring Tactical Advantage
Iskander Rehman
June 8, 2010
When in 2003 a team of Booz Allen consultants, in a report for the Pentagon, coined the term 'string of pearls' to describe China's attempts to gain a strategic foothold in the Indian Ocean, they were in all likelihood little aware of how rapidly their colourful image would gain currency in turn of the century geopolitical discourse. Amidst Delhi's vibrant strategic community, in particular, the expression has come to embody, occasionally more metaphorically than factually, India's innate, almost visceral fear of maritime encirclement. What, however, is the reality behind China's so-called string of pearls? And in what way does it pose such an existential threat to Indian security? It will be argued here that China's naval positioning in the Indian Ocean is not only legitimate to a certain degree, but also, paradoxically, to Delhi's tactical advantage in the event of a Sino-Indian conflict. This tactical edge can only be guaranteed, however, by the dogged pursuit of certain diplomatic and military measures.1
I. A String of Clouded Pearls
The term 'string of pearls' was coined to describe China's increasing forays into the Indian Ocean , discernible through its efforts to establish 'nodes of influence' in the region, via an assertive diplomacy primarily geared towards strengthening its economic and security ties with countries as diverse as Pakistan, Myanmar and Sri Lanka. In some cases this firming up of ties has led to joint port construction or enlargement deals, such as with Pakistan at Gwadar, or with Sri Lanka at Hambantota.2
When evoking its Indian Ocean Policy, Beijing tends to paint it in broader economic and maritime security-related terms. Increasingly dependent on foreign oil, China is to some extent a prisoner of its own geography, as it is positioned far from some of the world's most strategically salient shipping lanes, where the US and Indian Navies hold sway. It is in order to remedy this 'Malacca dilemma', argue Chinese strategists, that Beijing is compelled to venture further afield into the balmy waters of the Indian Ocean. For India, which has been entrapped in an often tension-fraught relationship with China for over half a century, China's strategy bears greater resemblance to a noose woven to encircle and constrict India within its own backyard rather than a sparkly, peace-imbued constellation of trade linkages. In short, it could be argued that both nations are imprisoned in a textbook security dilemma.
The String of Pearls has become one of the most widely commented subjects in contemporary strategic debate, despite the fact that it is also one of the most factually opaque. This paradox is especially blatant in India, where there seems to be an increasing disconnect between strategic commentary and official declarations,3 with the latter taking great pains to emphasise that China has currently no naval bases in the Indian Ocean. Regularly stories surface in the press that are subsequently disavowed or contested, ranging from the supposed presence of a Chinese submarine base at Marao in the Maldives to conflicting accounts of the extent of Chinese military presence in the Coco Islands off Burma.
What is clear, however, is that there is no compelling evidence yet to suggest that the PLAN has engaged in basing activities of an overtly military nature. Nevertheless, this does not mean that it has no future intention to do so. Chinese naval commanders have said as much, recently stating that China may also seek to obtain a base in the Gulf of Aden. The deep-sea water port of Gwadar, of which the first phase of construction has been completed, is projected to undergo militarization by the Pakistani Navy, which means that Chinese surface and sub-surface platforms could easily be stationed there. Most of the ports the PRC is helping to develop, be at Hambantota or Chittagong, can have a dual use, by hosting both merchant and military vessels. And the absence as yet of Chinese warships at berth does not mean that China is not busy conducting naval espionage be it via the alleged SIGINT facilities it is erecting in places such as the Coco Islands or via discreet hydrographic research.
It seems clear that China's string of pearls strategy is still very much in a nascent, or even embryonic, phase. If it were to take on a decidedly military nature, however, what would be the security implications for India?
II. Why China's String of Pearls will ultimately be to India's Tactical Advantage?
While many in India lament the supposed military emasculation induced by the presence of permanent Chinese bases in the region, it will be argued here that such a development would actually be to India's tactical benefit provided it takes certain preparatory measures that will be detailed later on.
The unresolved land border issue and Tibet, both of which are intrinsically linked, are the focal points of Sino-Indian tension and are likely to remain so in the future. This means that if a conflict between these rising powers does occur, it would most likely be a largely land war, most probably in the Himalayan Northeast. As of now, the Indian Navy can only be expected to play a minor role in such a conflict. With the future presence of Chinese naval bases in the region however, this could change, by providing the Indian Navy with a novel warfighting role.
A cursory review of the tactical options available to the Indian fleet in the event of a Sino-Indian war reveals the tactical flexibility on offer:
Tactical Option number 1: A strategy of commodity denial, either via sea-lane blockade or through the targeted interdiction of Chinese shipping
This option would require a long, protracted conflict in order to be effective. This effectiveness is likely to take ever longer to attain as China continues to build up its strategic oil reserves over the next decade, until it reaches its avowed goal of six months self-sufficiency.4 Furthermore, as the recent tragedy off the coast of Gaza starkly brought to light, naval blockades can be messy affairs, resulting in collateral civilian casualties. This risk would be further compounded if Chinese merchant ships started to provide their crew members with small arms to fend off Somali pirate attacks. Finally, such a blockade would severely disrupt international trade, and would put into question India's role as a responsible stakeholder in the international system.
Tactical Option number 2: An expeditionary force into the South China Sea
Not only would this escalate the conflict into a full-spectrum war, it would also result in disaster for the Indian fleet. Even if by 2020 the Indian Navy can boast two immediately deployable carrier groups, they would not be able to withstand a sustained aerial assault from Chinese fighters stationed on the mainland or on Hainan, especially when combined with a salvo of DF-21 anti-ship ballistic missiles. In addition, the Indian Navy would have to face down the rapidly expanding South China Sea Fleet, as well as the latest Jin class SSBNs and Shang Class SSNs stationed at Sanya.
Tactical Option number 3: Breaking China's String of Pearls
If one looks at a potential naval conflict between both powers in the Indian Ocean, it makes no sense to compare each force in its totality, ship for ship, missile for missile. Theatre dominance is all that matters, and in this respect India will display two unalterable advantages:
Firstly, by virtue of India's immense geographical advantages in the region, it is difficult to imagine China ever being able to wield as much military clout in the region as India can. India's natural peninsular formation means that it has been described by some as akin to an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" jutting out into the Indian Ocean. Any naval taskforce venturing into the Bay of Bengal with hostile intentions would have to contend with India's airforce and naval aviation, operating not only from the mainland, but also from the Andaman and Nicobar archipelago in the Andaman Sea, whose airstrips are currently being extended, and which is slated to eventually host Sukhoi squadrons, and possibly MiGs and Mirages.5
Secondly, China's naval presence in the region will be dispersed along the several, often distant, nodal points that constitute its string of pearls. Assuming that these forces together are superior in both quantity and quality to the Indian Navy, which is, all in all, most unlikely, India will still have the immediate advantage of force concentration and hence superiority if it decides to conduct a rapid strike at an isolated group of Chinese vessels. A direct attack on a naval base would be highly undesirable, as it would trigger a severe crisis with the hosting country. A massive naval deployment outside one such base could have the desired effect however, by compelling the Chinese to de-escalate their land assault, much as the Indian Navy's stationing of its fleet 13 nautical miles outside Karachi during the Kargil War prompted, some claim, the Pakistani Army to accelerate the withdrawal of its forces from the disputed areas.6
III. Necessary Preparatory Measures
Reinforcing the ANC
The Andaman and Nicobar Command, which was inaugurated as India's first joint command structure in 2001, is of absolutely vital strategic import. Separated from the mainland by almost 1200 kms of sea, the island chain, which lies only 18 km from the Coco Islands, constitutes India's first eastern maritime defence perimeter. It has been also been described by certain Chinese analysts as a 'metal chain' which could lock China out of the Indian Ocean.7 It goes without saying that the command will play a first-line role in the event of a Sino-Indian naval clash in the Indian Ocean. Although measures have been taken to strengthen India's force presence on the islands, most notably by enlarging airstrips for Sukhois, or by announcing the stationing of India's first full-bodied joint amphibious force and the ramping up of its existing 3000 strong 108 Mountain Brigade to a division level force of 15000 troops, the ANC is still having to making do with an assortment of fast offshore patrol vessels, LSTs and aging Dornier-228 Maritime Patrol Aircraft.8 More needs to be done to accelerate the strengthening of India's military deterrent in the Andaman Sea. This can be done by stationing one or two large warships there on a permanent basis, by setting up Brahmos cruise missile silos on some of the larger islands, and by providing the ANC with its own separate budget so that its platform acquisition efforts no longer fall victim to inter-service turf wars.
Signing an Intelligence Sharing Agreement with the US involving the sharing of maritime satellite-based surveillance
As the Chinese Navy extends its presence into the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf, the region will be witness to a growing strategic congruence between both Washington and Delhi in their desire to carefully monitor the PLAN's comings and goings. Both navies already share very strong ties and have begun to display an ever increasing degree of interoperability, in large part thanks to the Malabar bilateral or multilateral exercises held each spring. India and the United States have recently upgraded their intelligence sharing in the field of counter-terrorism. In future, both states may well find that the surveillance of China's naval activities in the region is an equally pressing concern.
It would be in India's interest to press for a maritime intelligence sharing agreement, which would result in the linking of India's new ocean surveillance satellite with the US's own satellite-based surveillance system. India could also offer to share radar and sonar data compiled in the Andaman Sea with US Naval Intelligence in exchange for US satellite imagery, thus gifting the Indian Navy with a bird's eye view of everything that goes on in the Indian Ocean. This would be a good stop-gap measure while waiting for India's own burgeoning satellite-based surveillance system to attain the capability of covering the entire region in real time. In order to not make the measure appear too overtly directed against China, both countries could 'sell' the initiative as being part of their larger effort to ensure maritime security in the region, and help protect maritime shipping from non-traditional threats.
Sustain and Reinforce Indian Maritime Diplomacy in the Indian Ocean Region
While much has been said of China's inroads into the Indian Ocean, India's own charm offensive in the region has also been bearing fruit over the past two to three years, whether it be through the establishment of electronic monitoring systems in Madagascar in 2007, or more recently, in August 2009, in the Maldives. Indian officials have also become more reactive to the attempt of their Chinese counterparts to woo small but strategically placed nations such as the Seychelles or Mauritius. For example, Delhi reacted to Beijing's offer of military assistance to the Seychelles by rapidly bestowing on its minute navy one of its own patrol aircraft.9 This sort of rapid, reactive diplomacy, when combined with more long-term institutionalized efforts such as the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium launched in 2008, will help sustain the strength and visibility of India's presence in the region.
Conclusion
China's so-called string of pearls strategy, the degree of advancement of which has frequently been overstated, is not likely to immediately put Indian maritime security in jeopardy. Nevertheless, there will inevitably come a time when India will have to face the reality of a Chinese naval presence in its own backyard. Beijing cannot afford for its Achilles heel, i.e. its acute vulnerability to any interruption of its overseas trade, to be bared for much longer.
Only when India's strategic community grasps that India is already squarely poised over China's energy jugular, will they be able to break with an acutely ingrained sense of vulnerability. Not only would the presence of Chinese vessels present no real existential threat to Indian naval dominance in the region, it would also, paradoxically, provide the Indian Navy with a far greater degree of tactical flexibility in the event of a future conflict with China, be it on land or at sea. This advantage can only be guaranteed, however, if India undertakes certain preparatory measures designed to effectively lock down its control of its maritime surroundings, and curb Chinese influence among certain key oceanic 'swing' states.
Finally, as China edges its way into the Indian Ocean over the course of the next few decades, both nations would do well to agree to draft a "Sino-Indian Incidents at Sea Agreement", which could be loosely modelled on the Cold-War era INCSEA, and which helped prevent routine US-Soviet naval encounters from spiralling out of control. The quest for adequate military readiness and tactical flexibility does not, after all, render the prospect of a future Sino-Indian naval conflict any less dire.
INDIA CHECKMATES CHINESE MOVES
Ranjit B Rai
Vice President Indian Maritime Foundation
Former DNI and DNO in the Indian Navy
Small contentious issues in history are harbingers that tend to shape the larger power plays between nations. The naked truth in international affairs as articulated by strategist Paul Kennedy, is that India and China are two rising military and economic powers who will cooperate with each other for trade, and in competition for the same markets and influence, in the coming decades. Such countries are dubbed 'competitive friendly enemies'. China is India's largest trading partner, and has entered the Indian Ocean region with its PLA Navy via anti piracy patrols. It has also planted its footprint in India's neighbourhood and Africa, with its chequebook diplomacy. Pakistan and China are proclaimed all weather friends, and China has built the deep-water port at Gwadar, and plans to transfer military supplies and nuclear plants to Pakistan.
Recent incidents at the naval encirclement of India, at Hambantota and Gwadar, and possibly Bangladesh, dubbed as China's 'string of pearls,' put an end to the rapidly improving relations with India. China dismissed the theory, arguing that India built ports with ADB and World Bank loans, which some developing countries find difficult to obtain. China's naval analyst, Zhang Ming, contends that India's Andaman and Nicobar islands could be used as a 'metal chain' to block Chinese access to the Straits of Malacca, known as China's 'Malacca Dilemma' and argues India is building an 'Iron Curtain' with its influence in the Indian Ocean islands, and ganging up with US on a defense framework. During the Second World War the Japanese built airfields in the Andaman Islands, and China worries that India could emulate this strategy, as well.
Ray Cline, a former Deputy Director of the CIA, had predicted that nations with geography and population would gain ascendancy in the 21st century. He juxtaposed it with maritime strategist Mahan's prediction that the future may well be decided on the waters of the Indian Ocean. The first signals came when India and China clashed in Bahrain on 2 June 2010, at the monthly SHADE (Shared Awareness and De confliction) anti-piracy conference jointly chaired by the EU and US-led Combined Maritime Force. India stalled China's bid for co-chairmanship. All 18 naval delegates, Interpol, and shipping reps around the table which have ships deployed and interests for anti piracy patrols in the Horn of Aden, supported China's long standing bid, but the Indian delegate, Deepak Bisht, was the lone objector. He stated that before China takes the chair, the terms of the reference of chairmanship of SHADE needed to be laid down. Senior Col, Zhou Bo PLA(N), was taken aback.
A visibly surprised Chairman, Cmde Adrain Vander Linde, the EU Task Force Commodore from the Netherlands, asked if India wished to bid for a rotating chair. Only then, would a subcommittee attempt the terms of reference. India's delegate contented, India would consider the option to chair only if India knew the terms, and this upturned China's bid, which was accepted at the last meeting. Murmurs round the table were heard, as this writer was present with Foreign Service reps in the audience. India had successfully blocked China on this minor issue.
Currently the IMO has marked a 400-mile International Recognised Transit Corridor (IRTC) off Aden for the safe transit of ships to and from the Red Sea. Indian Navy's single ship deployment on patrol since 2008 (presently INS Bhahmaputra) has successfully escorted 1,000 Indian and other flagged ships, and INS Brahmaputra is on station. The Navy promulgates the convoy schedule through India's DG Shipping, as on 2 June, 17 ships were in captivity in Somali waters. Russia plans to replace the Udaloy-class guided-missile destroyer Marshal Shaposhnikov that stormed and rescued MV Moscow University by Admiral Levchenko Neustrashimy and Yaroslav Mudry. Dutch Defence Minister, Eimert van Middelkoop, announced its Navy will deploy a submarine in the area and Singapore has increased its patrol strength with two Puma helicopters.
Unwritten in China's bid is an attempt to break up the 400-mile IRTC into patches, and allocate it to national navies amounting to parcelling the Indian Ocean. China could stipulate Chairmanship criteria to make number of ships multiplied by hours on patrol to count and India may not qualify with one ship on patrol.
The Chinese and Indian swords are sheathed for the time being, but India has to be prepared for the Pearls versus the Iron Curtain competition. India has banned Chinese firms from partaking in projects and placed restrictions on Huawei, which has supplied communications gear to India's mobile operators. India has geography and a large young population on its side and will have to cope with the meteoric rise of China. It has been said, 'India is like boiling water, steam and froth on top but rather calm below'. 'China is like boiling oil, calm above but violent and seething below.' If an eruption does take place in one nation, it could be violent. The jury is out whether the Chinese top down approach will prevail over India's rather slower and democratic bottom-up approach. But the competition for influence in the Indian Ocean region has begun.
neo29
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China India war is a remote possibility and will happen only with first blood strike from china. Both cant afford a war knowing each others capabilities which is very different from 1962. India China have a multi billion dollar trade industry which either cant afford to loose. China and India will just play psychological games like supporting each others rivals and show some muscle flexing in the region because both aim to be a regional power and there is just one seat to it.
So a war with china is almost not possible unless a very very serious reason for either of them to get provoked. In that case it will be either country crossing the LAC and holding some territories. A war with pak will not get china into war with india, but yes they will openly supply logistics to pak army during that time. Its not a reason enough for India to get provoked to attack China.
So a war with china is almost not possible unless a very very serious reason for either of them to get provoked. In that case it will be either country crossing the LAC and holding some territories. A war with pak will not get china into war with india, but yes they will openly supply logistics to pak army during that time. Its not a reason enough for India to get provoked to attack China.
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India Readies for China Fight
By Nitin Gokhale.
Last May, just days before India's general election results were announced, the country's highest policy making body for security matters was convened by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. Its mandate: Find ways of enabling India's military to take on an increasingly powerful (and belligerent) China.
At the end of a marathon meeting, the Cabinet Committee on Security initiated a comprehensive, well-funded plan to bolster India's land, air and naval forces to counter China's rising military prowess. The plan is historic, coming after years of dithering by an Indian establishment seemingly paralysed by memories of the country's humiliating defeat at the hands of the Chinese in a brief but brutal war in 1962.
Since the CCS plan was launched, there have been significant and wide-ranging signs that Indian policymakers are finally willing to realistically assess possible military responses to China's rise. One clear example is a new division of troops aimed exclusively at the border region of the two great powers. India is now mid-way through raising two mountain divisions for the north-eastern border area with China, with the two divisions pencilled in to be ready for deployment by the middle of next year.
The goal is to plug existing gaps in India's preparedness along the Arunachal Pradesh-China frontier, and the two divisions, consisting of about 20,000 well-armed troops, will include a squadron of India's armoured spearhead—Soviet-built T-90 tanks and a regiment of artillery. They will be backed by enhanced command, control, communications and intelligence (C4I) capabilities aimed at covering the Tibet region.
But that's certainly not all.
The Indian Air Force has over the past year deployed 36 Su-30MKI, its most advanced multi-role fighter aircraft, to Tezpur in the country's north-east in response to the People's Liberation Army Air Force's seven airbases in Tibet and southern China.
Meanwhile, the Indian Navy is working to counter the growing clout of the PLA Navy. The current thinking at Indian naval headquarters is that China will move to aggressively increase its presence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) to secure its extended energy supply lines (despite its name, military planners in Beijing don't feel India has ownership of this expanse of water).
As a consequence, the Indian Navy's plans are based on the premise that it needs to be a fully-networked and flexible force capable of meeting any 'out of area' contingency. Successive Indian naval chiefs since 2004 have spoken about the need for the Navy to have 'longer sea legs' by 2020 and to be capable of influencing the outcome of land battles. The importance of the Navy's role was underscored during the 1999 Kargil skirmish between India and Pakistan, when the Indian Navy played a crucial but silent role in blockading Pakistan's sea lanes, putting Islamabad under significant pressure to end the conflict quickly.
Since then, India's naval leadership has been working to break free of its traditional 'continental construct' mindset and start looking at the bigger picture, taking into account the full gamut of geo-strategic and geo-political realities. After all, 90 percent of India's trade by volume and 77 percent by value transits through the IOR.
But trade considerations aside, countering China remains the country's biggest (but officially largely unstated) objective, a fact Beijing no doubt saw as underscored when India held a joint exercise in the area with the US, Australian and Singaporean navies in 2007.
These joint exercises apart, the Indian Navy is working to build and acquire new, varied and potent platforms including an aircraft carrier, nuclear submarines, stealth frigates and long-range maritime reconnaissance planes. By 2014, it hopes to have 160 ships in its fleet, up from its current strength of 136.
But the most surprising revelation to many analysts was India's public admission that it was inducting a Russian Akula-class Type 971 nuclear submarine into its forces, in addition to an indigenously designed and built submarine, earlier called the advanced technology vessel but now officially named the INS Arihant (The Destroyer).
'Together, the two vessels would constitute the third leg of India's sea-based strategic deterrence,' Adm Sureesh Mehta, former chief of the Indian navy, announced at the time—the first time a high-ranking Indian military official had gone on record about the country's plans to have a three-pronged nuclear deterrence.
The induction of the nuclear submarine has brought India closer to securing its nuclear deterrence based on a second, retaliatory strike option that is built on a triad of strategic weapons (the other two options—delivery by an aircraft and mobile, land-based launchers—were already available).
In addition, in recent months, India has also successfully test fired its long range Agni-III strategic missile, capable of hitting targets deep inside China, while the head of India's missile building programme, VK Saraswat, announced in May that India will go one step further by testing the 5,000-kilometre range, nuclear-capable Agni IV missile in 2011.
But there's more to an effective defence force than an offensive capability for a country the size of India. Communication and transport lines are essential, especially in far-flung regions, so 72 tactically important roads are also being built in the tough, mountainous terrain along the China border in the Eastern and the Western sectors. The roads are being built by the quasi-military Border Roads Organisation to enhance connectivity, and come on top of the reopening of three major airstrips in Ladakh (Nyoma, Fukche and Daulat Beg Oldie).
The airstrips are being upgraded to allow medium and heavy-lift transport aircraft such as the Russian-built AN-32 aircraft and soon to be inducted US-made C-130J Hercules transport planes to land. The hope behind these developments is that once the facilities are fully functional (expected to be by the end of next year), these assets will offer India the ability to insert a large number of troops in forward areas at short notice, a capacity that Indian policymakers hope will right the current poor connectivity in the forward areas along the Line of Actual Control.
Indeed, it's this boundary that is the biggest irritant in Sino-India relations, as neither country agrees with the other's perception about where exactly the line should be drawn. India believes that for all China's professed desire to find a peaceful and mutually acceptable solution to the festering boundary issue, the country has not budged from its more than three-decades position, and they note that despite frequent meetings of special representatives of both the countries over the past half decade on the issue, the deadlock has yet to be broken.
Suspicion of China runs deep among Indian analysts. 'China's demonstrated policies of strategic encirclement of India and its use of India's other arch-enemy Pakistan as a proxy for her designs"¦is proof enough that you can never trust Beijing's intentions,' says former Maj. Gen. Sheru Thapliyal, who commanded a frontline division responsible for handling China. 'Until a visible change is demonstrated by China, there's no excuse for any Indian Government to ignore or soft-pedal the imperatives of strong defensive preparations along the India-Tibet Border'.
But such preparations haven't gone unnoticed by China. When news of last May's plans went public, China reacted strongly, with the semi-official Global Times editorializing: 'India's current course can only lead to a rivalry between the two countries. India needs to consider whether or not it can afford the consequences of a potential confrontation with China"¦Any aggressive moves will certainly not aid the development of good relations with China. India should examine its attitude and preconceptions; it will need to adjust if it hopes to cooperate with China and achieve a mutually beneficial outcome.'
This year's annual report by the Indian Defence Ministry stated: 'India remains conscious and alert about the implications of China's military modernisation. Rapid infrastructure development in the Tibet Autonomous Region and Xinjiang Province has considerably upgraded China's military force projection capability and strategic operational flexibility"¦Necessary steps have been initiated for the upgrading of our infrastructure and force structuring along the northern borders.'
This kind of urgency, lacking for far too long in New Delhi, is a refreshing indication that Indian policymakers are taking the need to prepare for potential conflict with China seriously. China cannot—and should never be—taken lightly. And India should always be mindful of the fact that military preparedness and trying to improve diplomatic relations are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
Nitin Gokhale is Defence & Strategic Affairs Editor with Indian broadcaster, NDTV 24×7.
http://theasiandefence.blogspot.com/2010/07/india-readies-for-china-fight_17.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed:+blogspot/YyaK+(ASIAN+DEFENCE)
By Nitin Gokhale.
Last May, just days before India's general election results were announced, the country's highest policy making body for security matters was convened by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. Its mandate: Find ways of enabling India's military to take on an increasingly powerful (and belligerent) China.
At the end of a marathon meeting, the Cabinet Committee on Security initiated a comprehensive, well-funded plan to bolster India's land, air and naval forces to counter China's rising military prowess. The plan is historic, coming after years of dithering by an Indian establishment seemingly paralysed by memories of the country's humiliating defeat at the hands of the Chinese in a brief but brutal war in 1962.
Since the CCS plan was launched, there have been significant and wide-ranging signs that Indian policymakers are finally willing to realistically assess possible military responses to China's rise. One clear example is a new division of troops aimed exclusively at the border region of the two great powers. India is now mid-way through raising two mountain divisions for the north-eastern border area with China, with the two divisions pencilled in to be ready for deployment by the middle of next year.
The goal is to plug existing gaps in India's preparedness along the Arunachal Pradesh-China frontier, and the two divisions, consisting of about 20,000 well-armed troops, will include a squadron of India's armoured spearhead—Soviet-built T-90 tanks and a regiment of artillery. They will be backed by enhanced command, control, communications and intelligence (C4I) capabilities aimed at covering the Tibet region.
But that's certainly not all.
The Indian Air Force has over the past year deployed 36 Su-30MKI, its most advanced multi-role fighter aircraft, to Tezpur in the country's north-east in response to the People's Liberation Army Air Force's seven airbases in Tibet and southern China.
Meanwhile, the Indian Navy is working to counter the growing clout of the PLA Navy. The current thinking at Indian naval headquarters is that China will move to aggressively increase its presence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) to secure its extended energy supply lines (despite its name, military planners in Beijing don't feel India has ownership of this expanse of water).
As a consequence, the Indian Navy's plans are based on the premise that it needs to be a fully-networked and flexible force capable of meeting any 'out of area' contingency. Successive Indian naval chiefs since 2004 have spoken about the need for the Navy to have 'longer sea legs' by 2020 and to be capable of influencing the outcome of land battles. The importance of the Navy's role was underscored during the 1999 Kargil skirmish between India and Pakistan, when the Indian Navy played a crucial but silent role in blockading Pakistan's sea lanes, putting Islamabad under significant pressure to end the conflict quickly.
Since then, India's naval leadership has been working to break free of its traditional 'continental construct' mindset and start looking at the bigger picture, taking into account the full gamut of geo-strategic and geo-political realities. After all, 90 percent of India's trade by volume and 77 percent by value transits through the IOR.
But trade considerations aside, countering China remains the country's biggest (but officially largely unstated) objective, a fact Beijing no doubt saw as underscored when India held a joint exercise in the area with the US, Australian and Singaporean navies in 2007.
These joint exercises apart, the Indian Navy is working to build and acquire new, varied and potent platforms including an aircraft carrier, nuclear submarines, stealth frigates and long-range maritime reconnaissance planes. By 2014, it hopes to have 160 ships in its fleet, up from its current strength of 136.
But the most surprising revelation to many analysts was India's public admission that it was inducting a Russian Akula-class Type 971 nuclear submarine into its forces, in addition to an indigenously designed and built submarine, earlier called the advanced technology vessel but now officially named the INS Arihant (The Destroyer).
'Together, the two vessels would constitute the third leg of India's sea-based strategic deterrence,' Adm Sureesh Mehta, former chief of the Indian navy, announced at the time—the first time a high-ranking Indian military official had gone on record about the country's plans to have a three-pronged nuclear deterrence.
The induction of the nuclear submarine has brought India closer to securing its nuclear deterrence based on a second, retaliatory strike option that is built on a triad of strategic weapons (the other two options—delivery by an aircraft and mobile, land-based launchers—were already available).
In addition, in recent months, India has also successfully test fired its long range Agni-III strategic missile, capable of hitting targets deep inside China, while the head of India's missile building programme, VK Saraswat, announced in May that India will go one step further by testing the 5,000-kilometre range, nuclear-capable Agni IV missile in 2011.
But there's more to an effective defence force than an offensive capability for a country the size of India. Communication and transport lines are essential, especially in far-flung regions, so 72 tactically important roads are also being built in the tough, mountainous terrain along the China border in the Eastern and the Western sectors. The roads are being built by the quasi-military Border Roads Organisation to enhance connectivity, and come on top of the reopening of three major airstrips in Ladakh (Nyoma, Fukche and Daulat Beg Oldie).
The airstrips are being upgraded to allow medium and heavy-lift transport aircraft such as the Russian-built AN-32 aircraft and soon to be inducted US-made C-130J Hercules transport planes to land. The hope behind these developments is that once the facilities are fully functional (expected to be by the end of next year), these assets will offer India the ability to insert a large number of troops in forward areas at short notice, a capacity that Indian policymakers hope will right the current poor connectivity in the forward areas along the Line of Actual Control.
Indeed, it's this boundary that is the biggest irritant in Sino-India relations, as neither country agrees with the other's perception about where exactly the line should be drawn. India believes that for all China's professed desire to find a peaceful and mutually acceptable solution to the festering boundary issue, the country has not budged from its more than three-decades position, and they note that despite frequent meetings of special representatives of both the countries over the past half decade on the issue, the deadlock has yet to be broken.
Suspicion of China runs deep among Indian analysts. 'China's demonstrated policies of strategic encirclement of India and its use of India's other arch-enemy Pakistan as a proxy for her designs"¦is proof enough that you can never trust Beijing's intentions,' says former Maj. Gen. Sheru Thapliyal, who commanded a frontline division responsible for handling China. 'Until a visible change is demonstrated by China, there's no excuse for any Indian Government to ignore or soft-pedal the imperatives of strong defensive preparations along the India-Tibet Border'.
But such preparations haven't gone unnoticed by China. When news of last May's plans went public, China reacted strongly, with the semi-official Global Times editorializing: 'India's current course can only lead to a rivalry between the two countries. India needs to consider whether or not it can afford the consequences of a potential confrontation with China"¦Any aggressive moves will certainly not aid the development of good relations with China. India should examine its attitude and preconceptions; it will need to adjust if it hopes to cooperate with China and achieve a mutually beneficial outcome.'
This year's annual report by the Indian Defence Ministry stated: 'India remains conscious and alert about the implications of China's military modernisation. Rapid infrastructure development in the Tibet Autonomous Region and Xinjiang Province has considerably upgraded China's military force projection capability and strategic operational flexibility"¦Necessary steps have been initiated for the upgrading of our infrastructure and force structuring along the northern borders.'
This kind of urgency, lacking for far too long in New Delhi, is a refreshing indication that Indian policymakers are taking the need to prepare for potential conflict with China seriously. China cannot—and should never be—taken lightly. And India should always be mindful of the fact that military preparedness and trying to improve diplomatic relations are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
Nitin Gokhale is Defence & Strategic Affairs Editor with Indian broadcaster, NDTV 24×7.
http://theasiandefence.blogspot.com/2010/07/india-readies-for-china-fight_17.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed:+blogspot/YyaK+(ASIAN+DEFENCE)
actually we should be more pragmatic with two and a half front that incl Pak , China and maoist which has emerged as a malignant problem. with indian polity having trump card of inducting army for the finale even as a stop gap i think China would have achieve her aim of stretching our arms pointing inward and syphoning our efforts for internal matters with a pinch of J & K unrest (everything is at place like a chess board with indian king reaching a stalemate soon if proactive appch not taken)
youngindian
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India to now procure special mountain radars for borders with China.
http://idrw.org/?p=2575
good to see India is preparing for the chinese threat along eastern borders.
http://idrw.org/?p=2575
good to see India is preparing for the chinese threat along eastern borders.
SANJAY AKKARA
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China will not risk cruise missile salvos. I mean that makes it open to Indian strikes on its cities. Cruise missile strikes over India with conventional warheads will not make sense and not do enough damage either. Chinese cruise missile inventory of about 300 odd with conventional warheads will not incapacitate Indian Military. China cannot start a border war like 62 as it will not make sense. A full bloody war will again not make any sense to it as it too will be bloodied. Its peculiar situation. It would be fascinating to see how it all unravels. One thing is for sure, India will not fire the first bullet.
vikramrana_1812
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neo29
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China cant attack India because its not 1962. Our army is well prepared compared to the pathetic conditions in 1962. Even a CIA report stated that India was badly prepared on the eastern front and if well prepared would have well resisted the invasion.
China's attack will have consequences. It will risk loosing Billion dollar trade industry with India and US Europe's angry reaction and not to mention Russia's reaction too. Overall world reaction would not be good for China.
China knows that the current Indian army will pose a tough challenge to them and if they fail will bring about downfall of moral among the communist ideological country. China knows its not worth fighting for a piece of land and loose so much. Hence it is doing what a communist regime usually does, Muscle Flex.
Pakistan has its own problems in its backyard. For the next 10 years they need to fly squat in the backyard and concentrate on its pathetic economy. All they can do is show dreams to its youth and send them across as terrorist. They cant afford war especially when its currently in the lap of US who is feeding them.
China's attack will have consequences. It will risk loosing Billion dollar trade industry with India and US Europe's angry reaction and not to mention Russia's reaction too. Overall world reaction would not be good for China.
China knows that the current Indian army will pose a tough challenge to them and if they fail will bring about downfall of moral among the communist ideological country. China knows its not worth fighting for a piece of land and loose so much. Hence it is doing what a communist regime usually does, Muscle Flex.
Pakistan has its own problems in its backyard. For the next 10 years they need to fly squat in the backyard and concentrate on its pathetic economy. All they can do is show dreams to its youth and send them across as terrorist. They cant afford war especially when its currently in the lap of US who is feeding them.
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For any Nation to start a war, there has to be some reason.
What could be the reason for China or India to start a war?
Surely, it could not be for a small piece of territory adjoining the border. There has to be a worthwhile terminal objective, be it military/ political or both.
The 1962 War apparently had an objective – to occupy Aksai Chin. It was possibly for two aims in mind. One, to send a message to the international community that Tibet is solely that of China and two, to have a wasteland to test her nuclear programme. Lop Nor is within this area. NEFA was a diversion since they were well aware that the underdeveloped area would be a logistic nightmare and would be impossible to defend in case of an Indian riposte. None knew that the IA was not geared for any riposte and so the status quo remained and the Chinese aware of the lack of defensibility (at that moment of time) withdrew will all fanfare that China had 'taught India a lesson'!
Presently, the Chinese have no scope to undertake any worthwhile military operations as India is not only prepared but also are a nuclear capable nation that can strike into Tibet and China. The activities of the recent military exercises in Tibet were only a show of force to deter the civilian population of India. To the Indian military it was a boon to carry out appraisal of China's military preparedness and worth. In this context, it must be remembered that a much weaker Vietnam gave China a bloody nose when she invaded Vietnam.
China has established herself as one of the reckonable international powers. It will not barter her reputation whimsically, more so, since that would unnerve the other Asian Nations to her South and they might be encouraged to enter into an US defence umbrella, which would put China to great disadvantage. China is seized with the notion, rightly or wrongly, that India has a working relationship with the US in many matters including defence pertaining to keeping China under check. Therefore, China would not do anything that would make the other Asian nations become wary of China's intention by attacking India.
In so far as the so called ally of China i.e. Pakistan is concerned, in the current state is talking to India, looking at Washington. In short, totally confused and breaking! It cannot attack India since there is no reason to do so and if it does, she will open up the floodgates both in the East and in the West. Pakistan is well aware that should she touch the nuclear button, history would remember that there was a Nation called Pakistan! And it would not be India who will retaliate! Many are just waiting in the wings!
What could be the reason for China or India to start a war?
Surely, it could not be for a small piece of territory adjoining the border. There has to be a worthwhile terminal objective, be it military/ political or both.
The 1962 War apparently had an objective – to occupy Aksai Chin. It was possibly for two aims in mind. One, to send a message to the international community that Tibet is solely that of China and two, to have a wasteland to test her nuclear programme. Lop Nor is within this area. NEFA was a diversion since they were well aware that the underdeveloped area would be a logistic nightmare and would be impossible to defend in case of an Indian riposte. None knew that the IA was not geared for any riposte and so the status quo remained and the Chinese aware of the lack of defensibility (at that moment of time) withdrew will all fanfare that China had 'taught India a lesson'!
Presently, the Chinese have no scope to undertake any worthwhile military operations as India is not only prepared but also are a nuclear capable nation that can strike into Tibet and China. The activities of the recent military exercises in Tibet were only a show of force to deter the civilian population of India. To the Indian military it was a boon to carry out appraisal of China's military preparedness and worth. In this context, it must be remembered that a much weaker Vietnam gave China a bloody nose when she invaded Vietnam.
China has established herself as one of the reckonable international powers. It will not barter her reputation whimsically, more so, since that would unnerve the other Asian Nations to her South and they might be encouraged to enter into an US defence umbrella, which would put China to great disadvantage. China is seized with the notion, rightly or wrongly, that India has a working relationship with the US in many matters including defence pertaining to keeping China under check. Therefore, China would not do anything that would make the other Asian nations become wary of China's intention by attacking India.
In so far as the so called ally of China i.e. Pakistan is concerned, in the current state is talking to India, looking at Washington. In short, totally confused and breaking! It cannot attack India since there is no reason to do so and if it does, she will open up the floodgates both in the East and in the West. Pakistan is well aware that should she touch the nuclear button, history would remember that there was a Nation called Pakistan! And it would not be India who will retaliate! Many are just waiting in the wings!
