Sir,
Of whatever I have read, the 15th ABC role is similar to that of the U.S. Army’s 82nd Airborne Division. The 82nd Airborne Division's mission ability is to begin executing a strategic airborne forcible entry into any area of the world within 18 hours of notification. Their primary mission is airfield and seaport seizure. Once on the ground, they provide the secured terrain and facilities to rapidly receive additional combat forces. The Division is America's strategic offensive force, maintaining the highest state of combat readiness. As the largest Aiirborne force in the world, the 82nd Airborne Division is trained to deploy anywhere, at any time, to fight upon arrival and to win. From cook to computer operator, from infantryman or engineer, every soldier in the 82nd is airborne qualified. Almost every piece of divisional combat equipment can be air dropped onto the battlefield.
All airborne operation aim at capturing an airhead by parachuting troops who seize the airhead and then the airlanded operation begins. Once the requisite number of troops and equipment has been mustered, the actual operation begins.
The Chinese, as per my information,have the military airlift capability of the PLAAF of 10 IL 76, heavy lift Yu 8 and Yu 7 transport. Of course, they also have adequate commercial aircraft i.e. about 500 Boeings and Airbuses and I believe there has been acquisition of US military transport aircraft, though I am not aware of the exact number. They have 200 transport helicopters.
The Airborne Corps consists of 43rd Brigade located at Kaifeng in the Henan Province under the Jinan Military Region. The 44th and 45th are located at Yingshan in the Hubei Province and under the Guangzhaou Military Region.
They are equipped with BMD 2 Air Combat Vehicles, SP Artillery, RCL guns, 82 mm Mortars and such like. I am not too sure about tanks. I believe they have ELINT capability.
Be that as it may, AB operations of this magnitude would require air superiority and a favourable air situation would not be adequate. As you are aware, success in combat and combat support hinges on air superiority and threat avoidance. A very accurate and timely intelligence regarding threats along the ingress and egress routes and over the target area is but essential since the operation is to be behind the enemy lines and will be vulnerable till link up is made or resupply is assured. Once delivered to the target area, the inserted force will be totally dependent upon subsequent airlift operations for sustainment, movement, withdrawal, or redeployment.
Large operations require neutralisation or suppression of enemy air defences. This will require SEAD, radar jamming, and fighter aircraft in addition to transport and CAS sorties. After the initial airdrop, the sustained combat power of airborne forces depends on resupply by air. Any interruption in the flow of resupply aircraft can cause a potential weakening of the airborne force. Enemy air defence fires against resupply aircraft and long-range artillery and mortar fires on the DZ can hamper the delivery, collection, or distribution of critical supplies. Once on the ground, the airborne force has limited tactical mobility. That mobility depends on the number and type of vehicles and helicopters that can be brought into the objective area.
Another important aspect of combat employment and sustainment is the concept of forcible entry. In performing this mission, airlift forces are usually matched with airborne, air assault, light infantry, or ranger forces specifically designed for delivery by air. This mission normally involves the insertion of airborne forces via airdrop; however, carefully planned airlanded assault operations can be equally effective.
Airborne forces execute parachute assaults to destroy the enemy and to seize and hold important objectives until linkup is accomplished. The parachute assault enhances the basic infantry combat mission: to close with the enemy by fire and manoeuvre, to destroy or capture him, and to repel his assaults by fire, close combat, and counterattack.
However, there are five disadvantages with airdrop. First, and probably the largest concern, is the condition in which the cargo and supplies will land. Next, the cargo may not arrive at the desired location because of many possible variables, including enemy interdiction, a parachute malfunction, or a possible disruption or malfunction of the GPS signal. For example, US forces destroyed six Iraqi devices designed to jam signals from the GPS satellite navigation and weapon-guidance system. Third, retrograde of unserviceables is not possible. Fourth, the amount of cargo that can be delivered is reduced because of the configuration required to prepare the load to be dropped. And finally, the items must be dropped well in advance to allow support personnel to retrieve and deliver the cargo to the customer at the required date and time.
Therefore, while it appears a very potent concept, it is not that easily deliverable, especially when the adversary is capable of interdicting and not a push over.
One might recall that only seven jumps were conducted following the end of World War II. The airborne operations in Panama in 1989 were the only instance since 1951 of Brigade-sized operations. Two brigade airdrops were conducted with good results during the Korean War, and there were three battalion-sized airdrops in Vietnam. In 1983 a Ranger battalion conducted a combat airdrop into Grenada, and in 1989 two Ranger battalions conducted combat airdrops into Panama. On 20 December 1989 the three battalions of the Division Ready Brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division conducted a combat airdrop into Panama, the first 82nd combat jump since Operation MARKET-GARDEN in September 1944. Brigade-sized airdrops were planned for the Dominican Republic in 1965 and Haiti in 1994, but in both cases the airdrops were cancelled shortly before they were scheduled to begin. A Ranger battalion conducted a combat jump in October 2001 in southern Afghanistan. Parachute operations by smaller units are far more common, but almost impossible to document, particularly since most are clandestine Special Operations activities.
The 26 March 2003 jump by the 173rd Airborne Brigade into Northern Iraq was advertised as "the largest airborne assault since D-Day" but that was manifestly untrue. Operation MARKET, which followed D-Day, was larger than the Normandy assault, and operations in Korea and Panama were larger than the 2003 airdrop. In early 2004 the 26 March 2003 jump was classified as a combat jump, even though the Kurdish controlled drop zone was in friendly hands and little resistance was anticipated.
It may be noted that the AB operations that I have mentioned were mostly against nonexistent opposition in the air!
Therefore, it is a moot point that the 15th Airborne Corps of the Chinese would be successful against India! And what could be their targets? Wherever is a target, the opposition that they will encounter would be formidable.
Therefore, the use of the 15th Airborne of the Chinese against India is a pipedream!
