If India has to go for a two fronts war against China and Pakistan...

[Officer of Engineers]

still they were able to win war for us given the fact enemy was more well posed.

The infantry won that war.

although i was trying to mention that we be able to halt bellycrawler with the same.

What? The NLI was already entrenched. You were trying to kick them off their rock, not they're coming down from the mountain?

 

[hit&run]

well you were air lifting them before, and i had already neutralized or has scatred them to an ineffectual ability in mountain terrain. so for me there is no point to worry for a CONCENTRATED entrenched NLI.

 

[Officer of Engineers]

Do you even understand the reference, the NLI? The Northern Light Infantry Regiment?

 

[hit&run]

even if NLI is well entreched into then you are talking about a bloody war prolonging more then 2 months at least.

 

[Officer of Engineers]

Ok, you don't know a thing about the Kargil War.

 

[hit&run]

oh if you can nullify Inarmy against chines army as per cold start doctrine i can have privileges not to know about kargil and NLI.

 

[p2prada]

3 15ABC regts re-enforced Tibet during the 1980s with readied stocks in Tibet. During the earthquakes, they were the 1st responders, and during the Tibet riots, they gave up APCs to the China Armed Police Force.

They are very well expected to be the first responders being an airborne corps. So, does that mean the 15th airborne will be used to reinforce failing positions at times of war?

I expected you to say the 15th Ariborne was to open a new front elsewhere rather than reinforcement.

Any operation against India will require large scale mobilization which will take a long time to complete. A month or 2. 10000 or 20000 airlifted troops will not matter if they are up against superior numbers in well entrenched positions.

DFI has the honour of an Indian Brigadier who tries to think like a Chinese General. Why don't you try the same and see if the data matches your thinking? The Brigadier was not at the least surprised to find the PLA matches his expectations as a military man.

Honestly, I am no military man. Only a civvie.

Ok, how about 1962?

It was a brief border war and most of the soldiers and commanders are either retired or dead.

And they have the Tibettans, and no, the majority of the Tibettans are NOT on the Dali Lama's side.

*** sigh *** I do suggest you do some research on who made up the Tibettan Red Guards. I will give you a hint, it ain't Han-Chinese.

And you will see that the Tibetans have not fought any worthwhile enemy in a conventional conflict in the recent past. They are just people living on mountains and are subjugated. The small number of people who are still pro Dalai Lama will make some difference in a war. The propaganda will take its effect in the long run. The Tibetan soldiers may see a Tibetan flag and an Indian flag on our side of the border and wonder what's wrong.

Post 1980s, we have experience in Siachen, Kargil war, large scale COIN operations against ULFA in Assam, Bhutan and against Kashmiri terrorists. All operations on mountains. Our boys are battle hardened sir and our officers have laid out actual battle plans. The Chinese are still green. And you know the difference.

 

[Officer of Engineers]

oh if you can nullify Inarmy against chines army as per cold start doctrine

Do you even understand what I was trying to say?

i can have privileges not to know about kargil and NLI.

Doesn't help your case at all when you don't know about Indian artillery performances in the mountains in that war.

 

[hbogyt]

re

Badguy making good toys does not help nations win wars.

But they can utilise whatever they can find in those industrial capability. Like electricty, freight train, trucks, labour. These can be readily used in armament production. You know what India's electricity generation capacity is like compared o China.

 

[Yusuf]

How much electricity China generates to that of India? Are you thinking of a new concept of shock and awe in a war situation?

 

[p2prada]

Doesn't help your case at all when you don't know about Indian artillery performances in the mountains in that war.

Was there some problem we are not aware of?

 

[tharikiran]

Doesn't help your case at all when you don't know about Indian artillery performances in the mountains in that war.

I once read a detailed thesis paper done by a American soldier on the kargil war.
He stated that in the beginning it was difficult to aim because of the rarefied atmosphere.

But later attacks on the mountains by soldiers were launched only after continuous heavy shelling was done for hours together. The kargil victory belongs to the artillery team too.

 

[hit&run]

Do you even understand what I was trying to say?

Doesn't help your case at all when you don't know about Indian artillery performances in the mountains in that war.

it is a very generalized question i opt not to answer...!!?
I don't know whether your are trying to point out fire finder radars or some thing else...

 

[Officer of Engineers]

They are very well expected to be the first responders being an airborne corps. So, does that mean the 15th airborne will be used to reinforce failing positions at times of war?

All my readings indicate that they are to die before they can re-enforce anyone. This is on par with para/air assualt doctrines of the East Bloc.

I expected you to say the 15th Ariborne was to open a new front elsewhere rather than reinforcement.

In the context of the 1980s, they were the only formation capable of striking through Pakistan.

Any operation against India will require large scale mobilization which will take a long time to complete. A month or 2. 10000 or 20000 airlifted troops will not matter if they are up against superior numbers in well entrenched positions.

In context, 3 PLA regiments and 6 InA brigades already moved. From what I can gather, warning orders were issued to two Military Regions (none of them activated) but the whole thing died down before anymore signifcant military movements got underway. No shooting was involved.

If my understanding was right, the Indians want to take all of Askin Chin while the PLA was preparing a two front all out war. Both armies were thankful that cooler heads prevailed.

It was a brief border war and most of the soldiers and commanders are either retired or dead.

It is strange that I found a Chinese article listing all the Chinese regiments and their COs involved in that war with also all the Indian brigades and their CO. Have any Indian historian or journalist ever found the name of a single Chinese regiment in that war?

My point here is that the Indian side still got a lot to learn from that war, least of all the Chinese commanders involved.

And you will see that the Tibetans have not fought any worthwhile enemy in a conventional conflict in the recent past. They are just people living on mountains and are subjugated.

They fought each other. The Black Hats against the Yellow Hats is a well know Tibettan fued.

The small number of people who are still pro Dalai Lama will make some difference in a war. The propaganda will take its effect in the long run. The Tibetan soldiers may see a Tibetan flag and an Indian flag on our side of the border and wonder what's wrong.

Check out the CAPF border guards. They ain't Han-Chinese.

Post 1980s, we have experience in Siachen, Kargil war, large scale COIN operations against ULFA in Assam, Bhutan and against Kashmiri terrorists. All operations on mountains. Our boys are battle hardened sir and our officers have laid out actual battle plans. The Chinese are still green. And you know the difference.

And yet, they've done far more work in modernization than the Indian Army and I mean doctrine and technique wise. In the past 30 years, I've seen first units (company level modernization), brigadization (reduced divisions), battalion size battle groups. In essence, they have moved from a traditional east bloc regiment-division-army to a very unique Chinese battalion-brigade-group army model and one I don't know if it would work or not (I'm seeing a lot of mistakes). At the same time, we've only seen the Indian Cold Start Integrated Battle Group announced and still, I have yet to see the TOE of that echelon.

One thing I have learned in my military career. Expect the other guy to be smarter than you are but learn his limitations. The one thing the Chinese are doing more than the Indians is that they are learning more about their own limitations than the Indians are learning about their own.

 

[macintosh]

General k. Sundarji the general who once said IA is ready to take on both pakistan and china simultaneously.

General Krishnaswamy Sundarji




PVSM, ADC
COAS, 01 Feb 1986 - 30 April 1988
Infantry, Mahar Regiment



General Krishnaswamy Sundarji (formal name was Krishnaswamy Sundararajan) assumed charge of the Indian Army, as the 14th Chief of Army Staff, on 01 February 1986. Born on 28 April 1930 at Chenglepet in Tamil Nadu, he joined the Madras Christian College only to leave it before receiving a degree. Dr A.J. Boyd, who was then the highly distinguished principal of the college, was sorry to see him leave. He was commissioned into the Mahar Regiment in April 1946 and saw action in the North-West Frontier of Undivided India and later on in Jammu & Kashmir. In 1963, he served in the UN Mission in the Congo, where he was Chief of Staff of the Katanga Command and was mentioned in dispatches for his bravery. Later, he commanded the 1st Mahar from November 1963 to November 1965 and his battalion saw action in the plains during the 1965 Indo-Pak War.

During the 1971 Indo-Pak War, General Sundarji was the Brigadier General Staff of a corps in the eastern theatre and made valuable contribution in operations culminating in the liberation of erstwhile East Pakistan into Bangladesh. In March 1974, he was promoted to the rank of Major General and took over command of an infantry division in the plains. He was chosen by General KV Krishna Rao to be part of a small team for reorganizing the Indian Army, especially with regard to technology. He came to head the Mechanised Infantry regiment, which he had himself shaped, by inducting various battalions from the Indian Army's premier regiments. He was then appointed as the Deputy Chief of Army Staff in August 1981, where he threw himself into the Indian Army's modernisation activities.

General Sundarji was a graduate of the Defence Services Staff College (DSSC) at Wellington, the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth in the US in 1967-68, the Senior Officers Preventive Maintenance Course at Fort Knox, Kentucky and the National Defence College in New Delhi. He held an Master of Arts in International Studies from Allahabad University and a Master of Science in Defence Studies from Madras University. After graduating from Wellington, he held various command and staff appointments, including that of Chief of Staff, Katanga Command and took part in combat as part of the UN forces in the troubled African state of Congo. He was Mentioned-in-Despatches for his distinguished UN tenure. He was also awarded the PVSM in 1978 in recognition of his distinguished service of the most exception order. He took over as the GOC Western Command in 1984 and was involved in the politically-sensitive Operation Bluestar, to flush out Sikh militants holed up in the Golden Temple at Amritsar.

General Sundarji was amongst the most farsighted armoured corps commanders in the Indian Army. Despite being commissioned in the infantry, he was a keen student and admirer of tank warfare. He pioneered various operational guidelines, challenged his commanders to push the men & machines to the limits. In various exercises, he is known to have ordered tanks full speed up sand dunes in the Thar desert at 70º degrees Celsius. Amongst other things, he designed the flamboyant all-black uniform of the Indian Armoured Corps. Post his transformation of the Armoured Corps, he went on to create the Mechanised Infantry. With emphasis on speed, technology and mobile weaponry it is now an integral part of the Indian Army's Strike Corps. He is also credited for shaping modern Indian Army thinking. In his stint as the Commandant of the College of Combat in Mhow, he practically rewrote the Indian Army war manual with emphasis on speed, decisive action, technology and his abiding love - armour.

As Army Chief, his operations at Sumdorong Chu in 1986 - known as Operation Falcon - has been widely praised. The Chinese had occupied Sumdorong Chu and General Sundarji used the Indian Air Force's new air-lift capability to land a brigade in Zimithang, north of Tawang. The Indian Army took up positions on the Hathung La ridge, across the Namka Chu river, where India had faced a s humiliating defeat in 1962. The Chinse responded with a counter build-up and adopted a belligerent tone. Western diplomats predicted war and some of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's advisers blamed General Sundarji's recklessness. But General Sundarji stood by his steps, at one point telling a senior aide, "Please make alternate arrangements if you think you are not getting adequate professional advice." The confrontation petered out.

Among the Indian Army's most articulate Generals, he guided and conducted the Indian Army's largest military exercise for its time, codenamed Operation Brasstacks, near the Indo-Pakistan border in Rajasthan. Conducted between December 1986 and January 1987, the exercise involved two armoured divisions, one mechanised division and six infantry divisions. The stated objective of Operation Brasstacks was to test new concepts of mechanization, mobility, and air support devised by General Sundarji. A man of immense wit, charm and style, he was also known as the 'scholar warrior' and a visionary with a brilliant mind. Handsome with high cheekbones and a pugnacious jaw, and with his cap worn at a rakish angle, he fitted the glamorous image of the soldier and was married to Vani Sundararajan. He was afflicted by an ailment of the central nervous system and was hospitalised during March 1998. He passed away on 08 February 1999, at the age of 69.

Wikepedia link:-
Krishnaswamy Sundarji - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

 

[Officer of Engineers]

I once read a detailed thesis paper done by a American soldier on the kargil war.
He stated that in the beginning it was difficult to aim because of the rarefied atmosphere.

But later attacks on the mountains by soldiers were launched only after continuous heavy shelling was done for hours together. The kargil victory belongs to the artillery team too.

You have a readied resource right here in the Brigadier Ray. He fought in that war at the Brigade/Division level. Why you have not exploited this resource, I do not know.

 

[Officer of Engineers]

General k. Sundarji the general who once said IA is ready to take on both pakistan and china simultaneously.

He is way above my pay grade but that is neither here nor there. The General understands the Pakistanis and the Chinese. How many of you do?

 

[tharikiran]

http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2003/Jun/03Jun_Acosta.pdf

I found that thesis. Guys, have a look at it.

Office of Engineer. I am not aware of source by Brigadier Ray. I am new to the forum.

 

[Officer of Engineers]

Then please ask him. A very brave and a very astute combat veteran.

 

[Yusuf]

Brig Ray is a retired Indian Army Officer. He served in the Kargil war. And we have him on this forum. You can learn a lot from him.