Lockheed-Martin F-35 Lightning II
Joint Strike Fighter
Assessing the Joint Strike Fighter
Technical Report APA-TR-2007-0102
by Dr Carlo Kopp, SMAIAA, MIEEE, PEng
January, 2007
Updated April, 2012Text, Line Art © 2004 - 2012 Carlo Kopp
First flight of SDD JSF Prototype AA-1 in December, 2006. This aircraft is a 'non-representative prototype' which predates in construction a series of structural and systems weight reduction measures. The aircraft is equipped with a dummy EOTS fairing under the nose (Imagery via Air Force Link).
"Given what is known about both the JSF and F-22A, Department of Defence assertions claiming 'the really big difference is in cost' are little more than nonsense."
Background
In late 2003 testimony to the Joint Standing Committee of Federal Parliament on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade the Canberra Defence Department leadership asserted that the 'the really big difference [between the F-22A and Joint Strike Fighter] is in cost'. This remarkable statement, and others of a similar ilk, explains much of the euphoria surrounding the Joint Strike Fighter in Canberra Defence leadership circles - the Joint Strike Fighter is incorrectly perceived to be a 'single engine F-22A clone'. Given the design aims, development histories and characteristics of these aircraft, this belief is not supportable by available evidence.
This analysis will delve deeper into the differences between the JSF and its more capable generational sibling, the F-22A Raptor, and explore recent developments in the JSF program, with the aim of separating myth from fact.
This analysis is an updated and expanded version of the original 2004 analysis.
Resources
- Kopp C. and Goon P.A., Review of Defence Annual Report 2002-03: Analysis of Department of Defence Responses, Submission to the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, January, 2004, Parliament House, Australia.
- Goon P.A. - ADA Defender - Winter 2005 - Affordability and the new air combat capability
- HeadsUp Newsletter - Issue 318 - HEADSUP SPECIAL - Is the JSF really good enough? analysing the ASPI paper
- HeadsUp Newsletter - Issue 322 - HEADSUP SPECIAL - F/A-22As, JSFs and 21st Century air combat
- Australian Aviation - November 2004 - JSF = Thunderchief II? (PDF)
- Defence Today - March/April 2006 - LtGen D.A. Deptula Interview, Maintaining Air Dominance in the Pacific
- Kopp C., May 1998 - Replacing the RAAF F/A-18 Hornet Fighter, Strategic, Operational and Technical Issues -Submission to the Minister for Defence
- Air Power Australia - January 2007 - GBU-39/40/42 Small Diameter Bomb
- Australian Aviation - April 2004 - Is the Joint Strike Fighter Right for Australia? Pt.1
- Australian Aviation - May 2004 - Is the Joint Strike Fighter Right for Australia? Pt.2
- Australian Aviation - April/May 1991 - The Advanced Tactical Fighter
- Air Power International - September 1998 - JUST HOW GOOD IS THE F-22 RAPTOR? Carlo Kopp interviews F-22 Chief Test Pilot, Paul Metz
- Air Power Australia - January 2007 - Sukhoi Flankers - The Shifting Balance of Regional Air Power
- Air Power Australia - December 2006 - Almaz S-300PT/PS/PMU-1/2, S-400 Triumf, S-400M Samoderzhets
- Air Power Australia - December 2006 - Antey S-300V and S-300VM
Joint Strike Fighter vs F-22A - A Comparative Assessment
Both the JSF and F-22A reflect a process of strategic and technological evolution which began during the 1980s. This was a period during which the Soviet empire reached the peak of its military power before its economic and political collapse, a period during which the high performance Sukhoi Su-27 and Mikoyan MiG-29 entered large scale production, and massive Soviet tank armies presented the benchmark of land power worldwide.
During this period the US Air Force relied upon its fleet of F-15A/C Eagle air superiority fighters, supported by the smaller but highly agile F-16A/C, as the means of breaking the back of Warpac air forces in the pivotal Central European theatre. Soviet land forces were to be broken by a mix of F-111, A-7D, A-10A and later, F-16C strike aircraft.
The F-15A was primarily aimed at air superiority, although the weapon system supported a range of modes for dumb bomb delivery, used extensively by the Israelis in combat. The enhanced F-15C gained Conformal Fuel Tanks (CFT) to push internal fuel up from 13,455 lb to 23,200 lb, and avionics/engine enhancements. The F-16A was like the F-15A aimed at air superiority, but limited by radar to mostly day VFR combat. While exceptionally agile, the 6,800 lb internal fuel capacity severely limited this aircraft.
Growing Soviet air power, especially the new Sukhoi Su-27 and Mikoyan MiG-29, provided the impetus for further air superiority fighter development. The US Air Force launched the Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF) program aimed at replacing the F-15 with an aircraft providing an overwhelming capability margin over the Su-27/MiG-29 - similar to that held by the F-15A over the MiG-21 and MiG-23. A key feature of the ATF was the addition of a supersonic cruise or 'supercruise' capability - the ability to remain supersonic on dry thrust as long as the fuel payload permitted. Supercruise was intended to provide an unbeatable total energy advantage over fighters with conventional propulsion which are limited to mere minutes in full afterburner before exhausting their fuel. A side benefit was the ability to transit from runways in Holland and the UK to the FEBA in half the time the F-15 required. Considerable R&D investment was made very early into the supercooled turbine engine technology required to support this regime of flight - stealth became a feature of the ATF program only after the F-117A proved to be viable.
The ATF flyoff saw the stealthier, more agile and faster Northrop/MDC YF-23A pitted against the Lockheed/Boeing/GD YF-22A, with P&W and GE bidding their respective YF119 and YF120 engines. By 1991, the respective winners were the Lockheed led team and P&W, in a large part due to their more conservative and thus lower risk designs.
The then YF-22A ATF had evolved into the technological flagship of the 4th/5th generation fighter class - now embodied in the technologies in the F-22A and JSF. The F-22A aircraft, now known as the Raptor, has supersonic cruise engines, thrust vectoring, all aspect stealth capability, a large active phased array radar, and the innovative Pave Pillar avionics architecture, which shifted all signal and data processing into a group of centralised multiple processor chip computers. It is an all weather, day/night, 24/7 air dominance air combat capability aircraft which, by definition, is multi role.
As the Soviet empire collapsed the role of the F-22A evolved to encompass the 'deep strike' role of the current F-117A (and earlier the F-111) - destroying heavily defended ground targets using smart bombs. With the current phase out of the F-117A, the Holloman FW will be one of the first to deploy the Raptor.
The 250 lb class GBU-39/B Small Diameter Bomb came into existence as a weapon to increase the internally carried firepower of the F-22A, limited then to a pair of internal 1,000 lb GBU-32 JDAMs, as well to address the increasing rules of engagement and laws of armed conflict based pressures for minimising collateral damage. The current F-22A is a genuine multirole fighter, with high resolution Synthetic Aperture Radar capability and to be tasked as much with air superiority as with killing SAM sites, radars, airfields, bunkers, command posts and other high value assets. The planned US Air Force Global Strike Task Force (GSTF) will comprise 48 F-22As and a dozen B-2As and is intended to break the back of any opponent, globally.
Penetrating defences at 50,000 ft and sustained supersonic speeds, the F-22A defeats most SAMs by kinematic performance alone - its stealth capability defeating the top tier S-300/S-400 series systems. The F-22A will remain the most survivable strike fighter in existence for decades to come - and the most lethal air superiority fighter.
The JSF evolved from a completely different set of needs and strategic pressures, and occupies a completely different niche in the US force structure. While the JSF program has its origins in the early 1990s, the philosophical thinking in many of its key design features dates to a similar era to that of the ATF program.
The problem of breaking Soviet ground forces increased in difficulty during the 1980s. As the Soviets introduced night vision equipment on tanks, and fielded the highly mobile SA-12 (S-300V), SA-11 (9K37), SA-15 (9K330) battlefield air defence weapons, it became evident that the existing fleet of A-10A and A-7D close air support and battlefield interdiction (CAS/BAI) aircraft would be hard pressed to survive, let alone provide the numbers to break the Soviets in the Fulda Gap. While the USAFE F-111E/F deep strike force was being supplemented with 200 of the new Dual Role Fighter (F-15E 'Beagle') and the 60 F-117A stealth fighters, Tactical Air Command's CAS/BAI force was sorely in need of improvement. A fly-off was started between an upgraded A-7D Corsair II, the YA-7F with the F-16's P&W F100 afterburning fan, and an enhanced F-16B variant. Concurrently, trials commenced with dual seat YA-10Bs fitted with the then new LANTIRN package of pods - one pod carrying a terrain following radar and look into turn steered thermal imager, the other laser / thermal imager pod most akin to a miniaturised Pave Tack.
This ambitious plan for enhancing the CAS/BAI fleet collapsed as the Soviets collapsed, but important lessons were learned, all reflected now in the JSF program. The A-7F was found to have inadequate fuel capacity for the role though its mildly supersonic speed was suitable, while the A-10A's low speed remained a problem. The F-16 equipped with the LANTIRN system was found to be cumbersome - the pod set was designed for the deep strike F-15E / F-16E (XL) intended for strikes on prebriefed targets rather than searching for difficult to spot ground targets in proximity to friendly troops. Perhaps the most significant technology then trialled on the F-16B was a head steered thermal imaging turret mounted in front of the windshield. This was found to be very effective, as the pilot could look around the aircraft, in any direction, to find targets and spot incoming SAMs and gunfire. In conventional low level close support work, fighters ended up orbiting the area of interest while ground Forward Air Controllers relayed the enemy force position. Being able to look over the shoulder to locate targets proved invaluable.
This experience was prominent in the minds of US force planners during the early 1990s, as the JSF was born, and LANTIRN equipped F-16CGs absorbed the role performed by the A-7D. The A-10A soldiered on, only recently acquiring Israeli built Litening II targeting pods.
During this period the US Air Force deep strike fleet retained the F-111F, the new F-15E and the stealthy F-117A, backed up by the B-52G/H, and the new B-1B and B-2A heavy bombers. The then recent Desert Storm campaign illustrated that the key weakness in the force structure was the battlefield strike fleet - not only was the survivability of the slow A-10A a problem, but the range/endurance of the F-16C was inadequate even for the modest 400 to 600 NMI radius needed. The US Navy and Marines experienced similar troubles with the F/A-18s, while the Marines' AV-8B Harriers suffered disproportionate losses to heatseeking SAMs.
As the JSF program materialised from the JAST technology demonstration effort, each of the respective US players brought their own wishlists to the table.
The US Air Force wanted a better CAS/BAI package than provided by the existing mix of F-16CG and A-10A, one which absorbed all of the valuable lessons of the late 1980s and Desert Storm. This meant more fuel and weapon stations than the F-16C, stealth optimised to beat radar guided battlefield SAMs and AAA, all round night vision to improve survivability against ground defences and the ability to find immediate ground targets hidden from the view of a FAC. The F-16 community insisted on good close-in air combat capability - a hedge against enemy fighters breaking through top cover CAP defences. While early proposals were devoid of an expensive radar, intended to rely on ground target coordinates provided by E-8 JSTARS, UAVs and satellites, the demand for air combat capability and more autonomy saw this idea die very quickly.
The politically vocal and influential US Marines wanted a replacement for their F/A-18s and AV-8B Harriers, which meant a V/STOL capability, but faster and more survivable. The Marines, like the F-16C community, insisted on close-in air combat capability, and wanted an all weather day night avionic package better than their two seat F/A-18D fleet had. Tasked with close air support, the Marines needed an aircraft capable of surviving SAM and AAA defences at low level, and capable of autonomous target acquisition, in the absence of capabilities like the E-8 JSTARS.
The US Navy at that time suffered significant losses in the budgetary game. The A-12A Avenger II (Dorito) died at the hands of DepSec Cheney, in an acrimonious dispute over performance and price, leaving them without a replacement for the deep strike A-6E Intruder fleet. With much investment in a collapsed A-6 upgrade and the A-12A avionic suite, the Navy wanted a bomber which could absorb as much as possible of the capability planned for the A-12A. What is significant is that the US Navy had a large investment in air-ground radar technology. The capability for simultaneous Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) high resolution groundmapping and Ground Moving Target Indicator (GMTI) mobile target tracking had its origins in a Norden radar planned for the A-6, and later becoming the basis of the APG-76 radar fitted to Israeli F-4Es. This capability was to be absorbed in the A-12A's active phased array which also collapsed. It has rematerialised now in the JSF's radar system - the higher power rating of this radar against the F/A-18 radars reflecting the power-hungry GMTI mode.
These diverse needs coalesced in the JSF program, which attempts to reconcile them with further and much broader aims. The stated service needs for the JSF are thus (JSF website):
- USN -- first day of war, survivable strike fighter aircraft to complement F/A-18E/F (This provides the stealth capability lost in the A-12A bomber, the strike radius capability and the all-weather strike avionics capabilities lost in the A-6/A-12A).
- USAF -- multirole aircraft (primary-air-to-ground) to replace the F-16 and A-10 (This absorbs the existing capabilities of the F-16CG, A-10A but incorporating the CAS/BAI avionics lessons of the late 1980s).
- USMC -- STOVL aircraft to replace the AV-8B and F/A-18 (This replaces the capabilities in the basic and radar equipped AV-8B variants, the night strike F/A-18D and basic F/A-18C).
All three primary users plan to fly their JSFs with stealthy internal weapons during the initial phase of a conflict, shifting to larger payloads of non-stealthy external weapons once the primary radar directed air defences are broken.
Two other factors had a decisive influence on the JSF as we see it today. The first is that much of the avionic, stealth and engine technology first seen in the F-22A program was absorbed, but adapted for higher volume production and lower costs where achievable. The second was the adoption of a Cost As an Independent Variable (CAIV) design philosophy, intended to trade off capabilities and performance as required to achieve very ambitious cost aims - the simplest US Air Force model was originally to come in at US$38M unit flyaway cost each, including ECO and non-recurring costs.
The common thread running through all of the US service roles is a primary strike optimisation, reflected in the avionics and airframe design of the aircraft. Single service roles have been clearly traded down to achieve commonality. The JSF will not provide the payload-radius of the Navy A-6/A-12A deep strike aircraft, nor will it provide the relative agility advantages of the Air Force F-16A against its original Soviet opponents. The aircraft has a more complex and expensive avionic suite than would be required for any of the single service roles, as it rolls all three requirements into one package. The JSF's stealth capabilities are more narrowly optimised than those of the F-117A and F-22A, reflecting the need to survive mobile battlefield and littoral defences rather than penetrating an Integrated Air Defence System in depth.
The JSF is thus a radically different aircraft to the F-22A, in its primary design aims, capabilities and performance. Against its mid 1990s role definitions, the JSF is a very good fit, but with the evolution since 2001 toward persistent battlefield strike tactics, the JSF falls short in both fuel capacity and weapon payload. Were the JSF defined and sized today, the CTOL/CV variants would be larger twin engine fighters closer in size to the F-111 - the only viable commonality with the VSTOL roles would be in avionics and engine cores.
While the CTOL/CV JSF carries an 18,000 lb class and the F-22A a 20,650 lb internal fuel load, the now 29,000 to 32,000 lb class empty weight JSF at design configuration 240-4 employs a single engine rated in the 40,000 lbf wet thrust class, against the F-22A's pair of 35,000 lbf wet thrust class engines, the latter totalling 70,000 lbf. This results in an enormous difference in achievable thrust/weight ratio, both dry and wet, as the much larger and and only marginally heavier F-22A has almost twice the engine thrust available. Engine optimisations are also quite different, as the JSF's F135 uses a larger low(er) altitude optimised fan, compared to the high altitude optimised fan of the F-22A's F119-PW-100. The JSF trades away high altitude supersonic engine performance to achieve better cruise and loiter burn, and extract as much thrust as possible at lower altitudes, essential for its primary design role of battlefield strike.
The design optimisations of the 460 sqft (CTOL/STOVL) and now 668 sqft (CV) JSF wings and the 830 sqft class F-22A wing also differ radically. With a leading edge sweep of around 34 degrees, the JSF wing sits between the F-16 and F/A-18, and is nearly identical to the battlefield strike optimised A-7D/E series. The F-22A's wing at around 40 degrees sweep is closer to the F-15 and Su-27/30 series - a tradeoff between supersonic drag and turning performance. Unlike the F-22A which is designed around supersonic agility, the JSF wing trades away supersonic performance to maximise subsonic cruise/loiter efficiency - classical bomber optimisation rather than air combat optimisation.
The basic aerodynamic and propulsion optimisations of the JSF against the F-22A reflect their original airframe design aims - the F-22A to kill other fighters and penetrate air defences at supersonic speeds, the JSF to hunt battlefield ground targets, and evade missiles and fighters. Like the F-15, the F-22A can be swung to strike roles without sacrificing its supersonic performance, but the JSF's wing and engine optimisations preclude it from ever achieving high supersonic performance, vital for running down supersonic opponents like the Su-27/30, or supersonic cruise missiles, or supersonic cruise missile launch platforms like the Tu-22M3 Backfire.
The stealth design optimisations of the F-22A and JSF also differ markedly. The deep penetration and air dominance roles of the F-22A dictated all aspect capability, resulting in the expensive edge aligned thrust vector nozzle design, which provides good 'wideband' frequency capability. The JSF is optimised for best stealth in the forward sector, sharing general airframe shaping rules common to the F-22A. The notable difference is in the serrated edge circular nozzle of the JSF, which is clearly optimised for best performance in the X and Ku-bands, typical of fighter radars, SAM/AAA tracking systems and missile seekers. To achieve lower costs the JSF accepts notable aft sector stealth limitations, especially when tackling deep or layered air defences with fighter threats - an acceptable tradeoff for shallow littoral and FEBA area battlefield strikes against predominantly short range mobile air defence systems. The aim in the JSF is to use newer materials technology than the F-22A does to reduce stealth costs, although we are likely to see this technology migrate across to the F-22A in later blocks.
The core avionic systems of the JSF and F-22A share a common architectural model - sensors are 'dumbed down' and signal/data processing is migrated from specialised hardware to software running on general purpose high performance computer processors in central processing boxes. This very powerful model permits rapid evolution in signal and data processing techniques, within the limitations imposed by the sensors used to gather information. Both the F-22A and JSF are to now use cheaper commercial processing chips and optical bus technology. The distinctions in onboard computing power between both types will be given by the immediate block upgrade configuration at that time - both using multiple COTS PowerPC chips.
The sensor suites of both fighters differ strongly, reflecting their different roles. The F-22A's APG-77 active array radar with 1500 modules of higher power rating than the 1200 module APG-81 radar of the JSF achieves significantly better detection range against airborne targets, and by default greater stand-off range in SAR groundmapping - and any growth GMTI/MMTI modes. The APG-77 also has growth provisions for sidelooking cheek arrays. The JSF APG-81 radar is conversely designed around simultaneous SAR/GMTI strike capability, but providing air-air detection capabilities much better than the F/A-18A-D and F-16C-F. The fundamental differences between the radar packages lie not only in the F-22A's much superior air-to-air range performance, but also in their long term growth potential. While radio-frequency modifications and software growth permit the APG-77 to acquire the capabilities in the JSF APG-81, the JSF's nose size, power generation capacity and cooling capacity will set limits on the achievable air-air and air-ground range growth in the JSF. Recent reports indicate that a second generation F-22A antenna, using common modules to the JSF but of higher power rating, will be phased into later block production of the F-22A.
The passive electronic detection suites in both aircraft differ, although few details have been disclosed. The JSF system is claimed to incorporate a passive emitter location capability (passive rangefinding of threat radars), effectively absorbing the role of the F-16CJ. Given the F-22A's demand for higher operating altitudes and threat radar geolocation for deep penetration, we can safely assume that its ALR-94 passive detection system will be much more sensitive - the radar horizon at 50,000 ft is much further away than at 25,000 ft.
The F-22A was to have been fitted with the Advanced Infra-Red Search and Track (AIRST) system, provisioned for in the avionics. This has not materialised as yet for funding reasons. The JSF on the other hand is equipped from day one with two optical systems - the Electro-Optical Targeting System (EOTS) and the DAS (Distributed Aperture [InfraRed] System).
The EOTS is a repackaged growth derivative of the latest LM Sniper XR laser / TV / thermal imaging pod, fitted inside a faceted sapphire window chin fairing. It will provide TV and midwave IR imaging with multiple fields of view, and increased range laser designation and ranging capability over most existing podded systems.
The JSF's DAS is a radically new idea, using six fixed thermal imagers to provide spherical coverage around the aircraft, and digital processing to provide not only missile threat warning, but also a look anywhere Helmet Mounted Display System (HMDS) capability for the pilot. The DAS combines the ideas trialled in F-16 head steered FLIRs for battlefield strike, with an all aspect IR Missile Approach Warning System (MAWS) capability - the latter reflecting ongoing losses of A-10s and AV-8Bs to low level IR MANPADS and mobile SAMs. While an EOTS equivalent for the F-22A has been repeatedly discussed in the US press, it is unlikely to be added until later blocks due to existing cost caps.
The JSF cockpit is newer technology to that of the F-22A, using a single panel redundant projector rather than individual AMLCD display panels. Production cost pressures may see the JSF display technology absorbed in later blocks of the F-22A. Integrated capabilities for networking with other platforms are similar for both, driven by the need for intra-type, and intra and inter service interoperability - with the caveat that the larger sensor footprint of the F-22A makes it a very much better 'information gatherer' compared to the JSF.
The technological design features of a fighter can be divided by the rate at which they evolve over time. The smartest long term choices are always those which put the highest priority on design features which cannot be altered once the aircraft is in service, accepting that rapidly changing technologies will be replaced over the life of the aircraft. The most attractive aspects of the JSF are all in areas which rapidly evolve, whereas its least attractive aspects are in areas which cannot evolve. From a technological strategy perspective the JSF is a very poor choice long term compared to the F-22A (Author).
JSF Growth Potential Issues
For Australia another key long term issue will be the growth potential of the JSF design. Additional engine thrust for a given core technology is usually achieved by increasing engine massflow - informed sources indicate the current inlet design has only a very modest growth margin in available massflow. Whether a 50,000 lb class F135/F136 derivative can be used with this inlet has not been disclosed to date.
Another growth issue will be available internal volume for avionics, and especially waste heat management capacity. Any increases in ICP capacity and AESA power rating will be reflected in significantly greater waste heat to be dumped from the systems, already reported to be an issue at this stage. Again, for US users targeting interdiction and support roles avionic growth limits may be largely irrelevant - more radar range and a larger information gathering footprint are not critical factors. For Australia, competing with Sukhoi growth in air combat roles, and using the JSF to provide ISR and long range strike capabilities, growth will be a decisive issue.
The design of the EOTS window fairing and nose radomes will impose hard limits on any aperture size growth in these key sensors, in turn setting bounds on achievable sensitivity growth. This is especially a problem for advanced IRST capabilities, which require also an expensive replacement of the Sapphire windows with a longwave transmissive material.
There are many as yet unresolved technological risks in the JSF, and many of these may not be manifested until later this decade or, with slippages in the integrated flight test program, early in the next decade - potentially impairing the performance of the JSF in precisely those areas where Australia needs to be highly competitive longer term.
Build Numbers, Timelines and Costs
Other major risks will arise in relation to build numbers, delivery timelines and costs. We have already observed a 12 month delay introduced into the program to manage risks, while US$5B was shifted from the LRIP budget into the development budget late 2003. While full scale production is almost a decade away, any schedule slippages will impact production costs. Flyaway costs of aircraft are highest at the start of full scale production, and progressively reduce as cumulative build numbers accrue, production investment is amortised, and component manufacture matures.
Current Defence planning sees Phase 1/2 JSF deliveries starting around 2012 and ending later that decade. If the JSF production schedule is delayed significantly, Australia buys more expensive JSFs sitting earlier on the production cost curve. In plain dollar terms, buying JSFs in 2020 is cheaper than buying them in 2012.
Cost related risks fall into three broad categories. The first is that resolution of technological problems drives up the build cost. The second is that schedule delays put any Australian buy into an earlier portion of the cost curve, assuming current planning schedules for F/A-18A replacement. The third is that US and export clients buy lesser numbers.
The third is potentially the most problematic, as it is driven by overseas budgetary politics and evolving strategic needs. It could manifest itself very late in the program. Since Australia joined SDD we have seen the US Navy and Marines trim back their buys, with the current total sitting around 2,500 aircraft. Only the Marines and the UK are technologically locked into the JSF as they use STOVL carriers. The US Navy could bail out and buy more F/A-18E/Fs if the going gets too tough for them at any stage.
The early February, 2007, release of US budgetary figures saw this risk materialise, with a constrained US budgetary environment forcing a reduction in the sustained JSF production rate from 110 aircraft annually to 48 annually, for the US Air Force. While the US Air Force would like to buy 1763 aircraft, it is capped by the budget to a figure, which if these restrictions are sustained, will be around 720 aircraft in total.
The US Air Force is F-22A centric in its thinking, for good strategic reasons. The JSF provides a mechanism to drive down the cost of radar, engine and avionic technology used in the F-22A, like the high volume F-16A drove down engine costs for the F-15A. No less importantly the JSF presents a big chunk of reserved funding for the ACC fighter fleet, one which might be redirected at a future date into funding more F-22As. Given the choice of putting the money into more F-22As, or JSFs, there is no contest once the US Air Force has covered its most critical replacement needs in close air support tasked A-10As and older F-16s. USAF planning of the current A-10C spiral upgrade program for which Lockheed Martin is the prime contractor is providing new capabilities to the A-10 fleet which is not intended to be operational beyond 2028.
Shifting strategic needs over the longer term could have the greatest impact on US Air Force numbers, as their targeting model is reoriented from predominantly static to mostly mobile ground targets. Even at the JSF's nominal 600 NMI radius, a lot of tanking is required to achieve significant persistence. An F-111 sized FB-22A works much better as a battlefield interdiction asset than a JSF does, and if the FB-22A does materialise it will subsume over time much of the battlefield interdiction role, driving the JSF into the specialised lower altitude close air support role which it is superbly adapted to.
As the Quadrennial Defence Review early in 2006 indicated, encroachment on the core JSF battlefield interdiction role by other platforms is an ongoing issue.
As yet an unknown is the pricing and numbers impact arising from any move by the US Air Force aimed at splitting its JSF buy into CTOL and STOVL variants - a proposal revived by SecAF James Roche at the 2004 AFA (Air Force Association) symposium in the US and intended to bolster CAS/BAI strength in expeditionary forces. If this occurs, build numbers of CTOL JSF go down further driving up flyaway costs, and build numbers of STOVL go up, driving down flyaway costs. Out of a finite budget a smaller total number of JSFs is bought for the US Air Force, in turn impacting flyaway costs across all three variants. The US Air Force started hedging its bets on JSF timelines by planning engine and avionic upgrades, and wing structural rebuilds, for most of the A-10As in their fleet, in 2004, upgrading them to A-10Cs with improved avionics, new cockpit, HOTAS system, upgraded electrical power capacity, new low level NAV/Targeting capabilities, MIL-1760 weapons bus upgrade, capability to carry electro-optical targeting pods and the latest 'J' series weapons.
Long term export numbers for the JSF remain unclear. Many EU F-16 operators will simply opt to swap their existing fleets for incrementally better JSFs, in a truly benign post Soviet local strategic environment. With the cost increases resulting from the reduced US Air Force build rate, we might see partner nations bailing out, and will see reductions in buy sizes to fit within constrained national defence budgets.
With similar internal fuel loads in production models (differing from demonstrators), the larger but cleaner F-22A provides similar combat radius to the JSF. Both types will suffer combat radius loss with draggy external payloads, and both types require extensive aerial refuelling support to compete with the existing F-111 in both range/payload and on station persistence.
What Next for Australia?
The Defence leadership's interest in using the JSF for air control / air dominance roles, and long range strike roles, does not fit well with the basic design optimisations of the JSF, or the outcome of likely CAIV driven downstream performance/cost tradeoffs in the JSF program. In distant historical terms it is akin to using a P-40 to do the jobs of a Beaufighter and P-38.
In its core role of 'classical' battlefield interdiction and close air support, the production JSF is apt to be a superb performer, more lethal and survivable than the F-16C, F/A-18A-D, A-10A and AV-8B it replaces. Its effectiveness in the air combat role, against the ever evolving capabilities of the Sukhoi fighters and newer Russian missiles, is very much open to debate and clearly problematic. In the long range strike role, around 60 JSFs with generous tanking could match the aggregate punch of the existing F-111 fleet, but the 'narrowband' stealth optimisations of the design will not provide the kind of unchallenged survivable deep strike capability Australia gained in 1973 with the F-111, pitted against then available regional capabilities.
The big question for Australia is whether the JSF is suitable as a single type replacement for the F/A-18A and F-111. Aside from the fractional battlefield interdiction and close air support roles, the JSF falls well short in the prime air control and deep strike roles, compared to the alternative F-22A and likely future FB-22A. The JSF is clearly no match for the F-111 as a basic 'bomb truck'.
Even from an early stage in the NACC/AIR 6000 program an overwhelming case could be made for restructuring the program to focus on the F-22A rather than JSF, with a decision deferred past 2008. While the F-22A was slightly more expensive, it is also more mature and much more capable permitting smaller numbers to achieve better combat effect. A package of 36 F-22As is more lethal and survivable than a package of 72 JSFs, especially in the critical air control and deep strike roles.
An 'F-22A-centric' NACC solution involves a mature production fighter after 2010 and incurs none of the schedule, technology and cost structure risks, or longer term strategic and technological risks associated with the JSF - an 'F-22A-centric' NACC is a very safe solution, strategically, fiscally and politically.
The current plan for early retirement of the F-111 is particularly unhelpful in terms of providing long term options for the NACC program. Retention of the F-111s past 2020 would permit spreading the expense of F-22A, JSF or mixed buys over a longer timeline, without any capability gaps arising. The current plan simply forces the replacement buys into an earlier and more expensive time window, while incurring a large capability gap and wastage of prior taxpayer's investment.
Indeed, the cost disparity between Australian Industry proposals for an F-22A/F-111 force mix, against the current Defence plan centred in the expensive rebarrelling of the F/A-18A/B HUG fleet, acquisition of F/A-18F 'interim fighters' and later the JSF, is over A$11 billion - in favour of the Industry Proposal - and rising as long standing, previously identified risks materialise in the HUG and JSF programs.
The intended acquisition of F/A-18F 'interim fighters' simply offsets the reduced availability of the F/A-18A/B HUG fleet resulting from increasing downtime of aircraft due to structural rebuilds and does not result in recovering any of the capability lost through premature and unwarranted F-111 retirement.
The stark reality is that whatever aircraft is chosen by the then incumbent Defence leadership group, Australia will have to live with it into the 2040 to 2050 timescale. Choices which might look just good enough against the region today will not be competitive within the decade let alone two to three decades hence, as a wealthier Asia invests increasingly in modern air power.
The current JSF-centric plan for the RAAF's future is simply not good enough, and the band-aid acquisition of the F/A-18F Super Hornet only exacerbates its problems.
Imagery Sources: US Air Force, Author
Line Artwork: © 2005, 2007 Carlo Kopp
