Thread by Dhruva Jaishankar on what the western thinktank crowd is thinking..
As expected there is no consensus among the west, if history repeats itself they will wake up only after it is too late, and over react.
and by the way, this was missing in Indian foreign policy, we had no one who could give neutral assessments of Washington DC thinking so far. congi planted coconuts in DC have denied us this insight, ulta they spent most of their time reforming us heathens.
======
THREAD: I spent the last week attending several international conferences (all Chatham House Rule) in Washington DC, meeting over 100 people from >30 countries.
A few takeaways on: (1) Russia-Ukraine, (2) the global economy, (3) China, (4) U.S. power, (5) emerging tech:
I. Russia-Ukraine. The general consensus is protracted conflict as long as both sides see potential for gains. West's continued isolation of Russia indicated by Bulgaria's refusal of overflight, Sweden/Finland joining NATO, and Switzerland/Singapore joining sanctions.
At the same time, things to watch out for: - Ukraine "fatigue" among Western publics - much tighter China-Russia relations - more cyber activity, which takes months even years to plan and execute
Very different assessments of the February 4 Russia-China "no limits" joint statement: how thought out it was, and how it's been assessed in China. A few grumblings from both Moscow and Beijing, but it's unlikely that too much should be read into that.
II. Global Economy. There's a general consensus that a sharp downturn to the global economy is imminent, possibly the sharpest slowdown in 80 years given buoyant post-Covid recovery.
Added factors: - high energy prices - volatile markets - tighter public spending - tight labor markets (in some economies)
Also: Very real worries about monkeypox. South Africa's experience with public disclosure around the omicron variant of Covid-19 (and the consequences it paid) has led to a further chilling effect, with few rewards for governments to reveal information about emerging diseases.
III. China. Traditional U.S. foreign policy elites are still in denial, more likely to blame the failure of global institutions on Trumpism, lack of U.S. trade, etc. than China's institutional capture, weaponized interdependence, and lack of transparency.
This view is generally not shared by the U.S. government (and younger analysts). USG is actively tightening investment, and understand that many Chinese advantages (e.g. in facial recognition, hypersonics) were made possible only with access to U.S. investment and technology.
Non-Quad Asian elites are also (surprisingly?) still somewhat buying into China's globalist credentials (BRI, Xi's Davos speech). They do have concerns about China, but few ways of making their voices heard in Beijing, enforcing rules, or taking counter-measures.
There's been a significant conceptual shift on China among Europeans, even if policy hasn't always followed. There's no talk of a Beijing Consensus anymore, beginnings of talk about what decoupling might look like, and concern about Chinese influence in European politics.
IV. U.S. Power. I was left with the strong impression that traditional U.S. elites are still very preoccupied with their domestic politics, and haven't internalized the enormity of the geopolitical challenge they face. They're trapped in the 1990s.
There's a reluctant acknowledgment that the neoliberal model is discredited, but the answers to how to address inequality, immigration, and trade is...more neoliberalism, immigration, and trade. There's a grudging understanding that state management might be back.
At the same time, many others are noting an absence of U.S. presence, whether in the Pacific, in SE Asia, in Africa. One Latin American leader confided that the U.S. had not been this powerless in the region in recent memory (see: Mexico not attending the Summit of the Americas).
V. Emerging technology. Finally, there are some very interesting tech trends emerging that foreign policy, security, and banking elites are having trouble wrapping their heads around. Many lack a basic understanding of the underwriting tech or capability to analyze it.
If AI and robotics were the topics du jour 3-5 years ago, today one of them is digital financial assets. Many countries (including most G20 countries) are developing central bank digital currencies (CBDCs).
Developing countries are particularly interested in CBDCs for direct cash transfers, remittances, and other forms of government-to-public exchange. The U.S. is lagging in this regard, with more faith in USD-backed stablecoins.
Another emerging set of technologies eliciting both excitement and concern is the metaverse. At its best, it could result in advantages of both the digital and real worlds. But plenty of questions about governance, regulations, and implications. Developers still seem a bit naive
Some more 'traditional' tech concerns are also pronounced. One is how closely hardware and software are connected in an era of AI and blockchain. This will have inevitable implications for U.S.-China decoupling, although - as mentioned earlier - that's not necessarily appreciated
Finally, hints of 'backlash' to misinformation and hate speech, with a grudging acknowledgement that these have become so broad as to encompass nearly everything. More precise definitions would better inform regulation, whether private or public. END.