Gilgit-Baltistan The Forgotten Kashmir

[Hellfire]

Got it. Agree 100%

So your style is to disrupt and then educate

Disruptions lead to people reading (hopefully) and 'educating themselves'. I tried to have the member read up so that he could debunk my assertions/claims or add value. I too need to revise stuff at times.

Not going to educate. Will continue to pose questions. Bear with me.

 

[aghamarshana]

By accepting the military defeat of the garrison at Skardu, who we could not relieve in time, we will start being honest with ourselves.

Even if we look at recent perspectives, we withdrew from certain areas in Aksai after '62. Happens in war. Doesn't make our claims any weaker.

One has the enemy not recognizing that J&K acceded to India, the other, recognizing enemy's rights over Tibet.

Agreed, here. Been blaming our contradictory approach since the beginning, do have another quick glance at previous posts.

Well, we did kick out their, the Tibetan, taxmen, from Tawang in 1951.

And invited the Dalai Lama later.
Point here is our stubborn adherence to the Macmahon line as boundary with no regard to Tibet officials' stance.

Again, a contradictory approach! It is precisely what I am pointing to - the contradiction we have in our approach in dealing with China, which allows them the flexibility to have a go at us, at will

The day we accepted One China, we lost our end of bargain with whatever tricks we could pull. A bad move which shouldn't have happened. But if we were supporting Tibetan govt in exile and at the same time accepting De Facto Chinese occupation, that's purely a cataclysmic foreign policy sh*tup of successive govts. Atleast now we should reiterate that only their commitment to One India would give them reciprocal treatment.

 

[Mikesingh]

You claim GB, even when you emphatically lost it in military confrontation in 1948 and de-facto accepted the status as such by signing Karachi Agreement in 1949

So according to you, the Indian army lost GB in a military confrontation with Pak? Really? Which world are you living in dude? Or are you living in an alternative universe where India was defeated in GB? A little bit of history is imperative here....

There was NO military confrontation by the Indian Army in GB either with the Pak tribals or the Pak Army's 7 Infantry Division that was ordered into the fray after their setbacks. This division Headquartered in Rawalpindi had three brigades i.e. 10 Brigade (Abbottabad area), 101 Brigade (Kohat) and the 25 Brigade (Rawalpindi).

The Indian plan for rescuing Kashmir from the Pak Army and the tribal onslaught started with the landing of a Battalion of the SIKH Regiment in Srinagar on 27 October, five days after Pakistan had launched Op Gulmarg and was able to repulse the Pakistani-backed forces in quick time from the outskirts of Srinagar. This Op was named Operation JAK.

India's 161 Infantry Brigade using armored cars, counterattacked, surprising the Pakistani forces and successfully broke through their defenses. The momentum of the Indian counterattack forced the Pakistani forces into a full retreat allowing elements of 161 Infantry Brigade to retake Baramulla and Uri.

The United Nations ultimately introduced UN Observers in June 1948 and a UN brokered cease-fire went into effect on Jan. 1, 1949.

The position occupied by the respective armies at that juncture was then referred to as the CFL (Cease Fire Line) now known as the LoC (Line of Control or LC in Army parlance).

Now get hold of a map and check out where the LoC runs where the Indian Army was forced to halt its advance due to the ceasefire. It is nowhere near GB. So stop peddling fiction and misrepresenting facts that the India Army 'emphatically lost GB in a military confrontation in 1948', when the army wasn't there at all!

The small company size garrison of Kashmir State Forces and reinforced with cobblers, drivers, cooks and masalchis at Skardu which withdrew under orders in the face of heavy odds of over 2000 Pak tribals and muslim elements of the KSF under the command of Brig (Later Major General) Akbar Khan as well as parts of Pak 7 Infantry Division doesn't constitute an 'emphatic' defeat of the Indian Army by Pakistan!! Nope! Not by a long shot!

Your hyperboles are pretty amusing!


.

 

[Hellfire]

So according to you, the Indian army lost GB in a military confrontation? Really? Which world are you living in dude? A little bit of history here....

My Dear Sir.

You clearly missed my this statement:

By accepting the military defeat of the garrison at Skardu, who we could not relieve in time, we will start being honest with ourselves.


Military loss is a military loss, irrespective of whether you had contact with enemy in strength or not. Please correlate with the date the Instrument of Accession was signed, and when Skardu fell. That was almost 10 months time.

Point to be noted is when the first relief column, sent to reinforce Skardu, reached Skardu. The moment IoA was signed, all forces of J&K became Indian responsibility. To reinforce them, became Indian responsibility.

Just quoting an extract:

Srinagar, in the meanwhile, was also making efforts to rush as many troops as they could muster to reinforce Skardu. As a result, the first reinforcements from the State Forces, comprising 2 companies left Srinagar on 15 Jan, 1948, reaching Sonamarg on 20 Jan. In a desperate undertaking, showing exemplary courage and determination, the column crossed Zojila in the thick of winter on 30 Jan, 1948. After that, keeping up a steady pace through frozen heights of Matyan and Pindras, they first reached Dras and then Kargil. Due to difficult terrain, narrow tracks and lack of shelter after crossing Zojila, the column got split in several parties, with the leading column under Parbat Singh reaching Bagicha on 7 Feb. The last column to enter Skardu was 0n 10 Feb.


Nice read:

https://www.vifindia.org/sites/default/files/1947-48-indo-pak-war-fall-of-gilgit-and-siege-and-fall-of-skardu.pdf

Pertinent to note, a temporary airfield was also made there.

 

[Hellfire]

A little bit of history is imperative here....

There was NO military confrontation by the Indian Army in GB either with the Pak tribals or the Pak Army's 7 Infantry Division that was ordered into the fray after their setbacks. This division Headquartered in Rawalpindi had three brigades i.e. 10 Brigade (Abbottabad area), 101 Brigade (Kohat) and the 25 Brigade (Rawalpindi).

The Indian plan for rescuing Kashmir from the Pak Army and the tribal onslaught started with the landing of a Battalion of the SIKH Regiment in Srinagar on 27 October, five days after Pakistan had launched Op Gulmarg and was able to repulse the Pakistani-backed forces in quick time from the outskirts of Srinagar. This Op was named Operation JAK.

India's 161 Infantry Brigade using armored cars, counterattacked, surprising the Pakistani forces and successfully broke through their defenses. The momentum of the Indian counterattack forced the Pakistani forces into a full retreat allowing elements of 161 Infantry Brigade to retake Baramulla and Uri.

The United Nations ultimately introduced UN Observers in June 1948 and a UN brokered cease-fire went into effect on Jan. 1, 1949.

The position occupied by the respective armies at that juncture was then referred to as the CFL (Cease Fire Line) now known as the LoC (Line of Control or LC in Army parlance).

Now get hold of a map and check out where the LoC runs where the Indian Army was forced to halt its advance due to the ceasefire. It is nowhere near GB. So stop peddling fiction and misrepresenting facts that the India Army 'emphatically lost GB in a military confrontation in 1948', when the army wasn't there at all!

The small company size garrison reinforced with cobblers, drivers, cooks and masalchis at Skardu which withdrew under orders in the face of heavy odds of over 2000 Pak tribals and muslim elements of the Kashmir State Forces under the command of Brig (Later Major General) Akbar Khan as well as parts of Pak 7 Infantry Division doesn't constitute an 'emphatic' defeat of the Indian Army by Pakistan!! Nope! Not by a long shot!

Your hyperboles are pretty amusing!

Strangely, Operation Duck has gone missing. Wonder why!

Let us indulge in doing away with inconveniences which do not suit our narrative.

 

[Mikesingh]

My Dear Sir.

Just quoting an extract:

Srinagar, in the meanwhile, was also making efforts to rush as many troops as they could muster to reinforce Skardu. As a result, the first reinforcements from the State Forces, comprising 2 companies left Srinagar on 15 Jan, 1948, reaching Sonamarg on 20 Jan. In a desperate undertaking, showing exemplary courage and determination, the column crossed Zojila in the thick of winter on 30 Jan, 1948. After that, keeping up a steady pace through frozen heights of Matyan and Pindras, they first reached Dras and then Kargil. Due to difficult terrain, narrow tracks and lack of shelter after crossing Zojila, the column got split in several parties, with the leading column under Parbat Singh reaching Bagicha on 7 Feb. The last column to enter Skardu was 0n 10 Feb.

Yep! But remember, these reinforcements consisted of the rag tag Kashmir State forces as well as (as I mentioned earlier) mostly cobblers, barbers, cooks, masalchis, or what were called non combatants but commanded by an officer of the Indian Army! The real action started with the landing of regular battalions of the Indian Army commencing with airlifting of 1 SIKH ex 161 Infantry Brigade to Srinagar on 27 October, five days after Pakistan had launched Op Gulmarg.

As mentioned in the interesting link you posted about Brig Sher Jung Thapa, MvC, it concludes: 'But the government and the nation at large, by and large forgot him. He passed away in Aug 1999, unsung and unwept'.

But then, old soldiers never die, they simply fade away!

Now let's get back to the topic of this thread!

 

[Hellfire]

The real action started with the landing of regular battalions of the Indian Army commencing with airlifting of 1 SIKH ex 161 Infantry Brigade to Srinagar on 27 October, five days after Pakistan had launched Op Gulmar

Now let's get back to the topic of this thread!

Was very much on the topic, before everything was taken off track.

27 October 1947 - 1 SIKH landed at Srinagar.
14 August 1948 - Skardu surrendered.
Almost 10 months of war fighting by Indian forces in the State of J&K before Skardu fell........

I rest my case.

PS: I know my Mil History. Thanks.

 

[IndiaRising]

Yep! But remember, these reinforcements consisted of the rag tag Kashmir State forces as well as (as I mentioned earlier) mostly cobblers, barbers, cooks, masalchis, or what were called non combatants but commanded by an officer of the Indian Army! The real action started with the landing of regular battalions of the Indian Army commencing with airlifting of 1 SIKH ex 161 Infantry Brigade to Srinagar on 27 October, five days after Pakistan had launched Op Gulmarg.

As mentioned in the interesting link you posted about Brig Sher Jung Thapa, MvC, it concludes: 'But the government and the nation at large, by and large forgot him. He passed away in Aug 1999, unsung and unwept'.

But then, old soldiers never die, they simply fade away!

Now let's get back to the topic of this thread!

he dont know that Indian military works on orders from civilian govt, not the other way around.

 

[Hellfire]

he dont know that Indian military works on orders from civilian govt, not the other way around.

Perhaps you do not know that the troop allocation and changing the direction of attack during ongoing offensive operations are purely the domain of military commanders and not the politician. No one says that you need to reinforce this point or take that GTI. Politicians only give you broad objectives, not specify the troop strength or number of troops to send/allocation of air sorties for reinforcement of troops.


Hope it is clear to you.

 

[IndiaRising]

Perhaps you do not know that the troop allocation and changing the direction of attack during ongoing offensive operations are purely the domain of military commanders and not the politician. No one says that you need to reinforce this point or take that GTI. Politicians only give you broad objectives, not specify the troop strength or number of troops to send/allocation of air sorties for reinforcement of troops.


Hope it is clear to you.

military strategy is derived from the political goals laid out, not the other way around. Also, political goals change as war goes on. Military doesn’t work in isolation.

hope you understand this simple concept.

 

[Hellfire]

military strategy is derived from the political goals laid out, not the other way around. Also, political goals change as war goes on. Military doesn’t work in isolation.

hope you understand this simple concept.

Read what I wrote and what have you responded to:

Perhaps you do not know that the troop allocation and changing the direction of attack during ongoing offensive operations are purely the domain of military commanders and not the politician. No one says that you need to reinforce this point or take that GTI. Politicians only give you broad objectives, not specify the troop strength or number of troops to send/allocation of air sorties for reinforcement of troops.

Let me know if your post above is any different other than paraphrasing?

Anyways.

Military strategy entails, broadly, defining of objectives that can be attained through military means, that 'enable' the furtherance of political objectives as defined by the dispensation in power at the time.

Military tactics, are dynamic in nature, and play the major role in actual execution of the strategy to attain those military goals.

Political Objective on 26th Oct 1947:

Defend the newly merged State of J&K against Pakistani Hordes and secure the territory

Military Strategy on 27th Oct 1947:

Secure and defend the sole air strip in Srinagar in order to enable air induction of troops till as such time:

1. Land routes could be secured.
2. Reinforcement of defences within valley could be undertaken
3. After securing point # 1 & 2, consolidate hold over the Kashmir Valley to provide a staging area for further operations to clear the territories of J&K

The whole derailment took place when members here failed to appreciate the fact that Indian Army and through it, Union of India, failed (and seeing here, still fail) to accept that Skardu was lost militarily due to failure to relieve them in time. Who decides which areas need to be strengthened/relieved/repositioned? The Politician? Or is it the battlefield commander?

Thanks

 

[cereal killer]

Gilgit Baltistan indeed is a area of geopolitical importance to India. But I highly doubt without a full fledged war we will ever recover it. Also reclaiming these portions won't be easy as Pak army is on the advantage there. Giving back Haji pir pass is the biggest mistake India ever committed. Shastri to blame here. Reclaiming it may require us to reassure China that CPEC will not be endangered diplomacy should be at its highest. US is anyways unreliable. Public sentiment of GB is more favourable than occupied Kashmir portion aka Muzzafarabad. It is very tough since we are talking about a huge area but with proper planning & timing it is doable.

 

[Hellfire]

@IndiaRising @Mikesingh

Interesting tidbits:

Quoting Mr Dwarka Nath Kachru (from Nehru’s Pacifism and the Failed Recapture of Kashmir by Sandeep Bamzai)
:

“I discussed the Skardu situation with Gen Cariappa and Gen Kalwant Singh. They were of the opinion that air operations must be carried out in Skardu when and if necessary. This to me is a serious handicap for an Army Commander charged with the responsibility of fighting a war. The operation in Skardu particularly must to a great extent be carried on from the air. The road to the area is long and hazardous and even civil supplies may have to be carried by air. Under the existing arrangement there is great deal of coordination between the Army and the Air Force and generally air action is carried out at the request of the Army Commander. But in a war the Commander who has overall charge of the entire operation can function much more effectively and quickly if he could exercise some control over the air arm and have assistance of the Air Force at his disposal whenever he wanted it...”

Probably the most significant dispatch from Kachru came on 3 April 1948, marked secret and personal to Prime Minister Nehru. This was a gist of his conversations in Delhi with the army chiefs involved in Kashmir operations:

“Gen Cariappa with whom I spent a couple of hours on the night of March 29 talked at length about Kashmir operations and the consequences arising out of our actions. He was quite hopeful that ultimately we would succeed in driving out the raiders from the State, but he was rather worried about the long border line between Kashmir and Pakistan and about the situation in Gilgit and Skardu. He was of the opinion and—and in this he was supported by the C-in-C also—that we should withdraw on the Gilgit and Skardu fronts and take up our positions at Kargil. In other words, he thinks we should give up Gilgit and Skardu and hold onto Ladakh which is easy to keep and defend. He had during his recent visit to Kashmir gone to Handwara and Uri and also spoken to the peasants and locals there. He was moved by the effect of the salt scarcity on the civilian population and he himself distributed small packets of salt. He discovered that the masses on the whole were fond of Sheikh Saheb and referred to him with great respect. He was impressed with the morale of the people in Srinagar and other towns. Gen Bucher, C-in-C, elaborated on the inadvisability of resorting to excessive air bombing. This he felt would needlessly destroy property, stiffen the resistance against us and at places increase the volume of opposition.”


More interesting read

Section Seven: The War in the Valley, Baltistan and Ladakh

Meanwhile, the enemy remained active and occupied Bhatgiran in the south of the Indian post of Ashok and blocked the axis to Haji Pir. Since this was a direct threat to his defences at Uri, Sen decided to dislodge the enemy from his dominating position. 1 SIKH, under Lieutenant Colonel Sampuran...

www.indiandefencereview.com

If this is not a military failure, I really do not know what is!

 

[Hellfire]

There was an Operation planned - Operations Snipe, which was aimed at securing Skardu using Gurez as a launchpad. This was envisaged to be a brigade sized operation. But IA faced difficulty in launching from Tragbal across Shamshabari in Gurez Valley, and then faced difficulty in securing Taobat, which could not be taken.

 

[Mikesingh]

@IndiaRising @Mikesingh

If this is not a military failure, I really do not know what is!

I'll tell you what is.

Why are you trying to clutch at straws? The issue was about your statement that the Indian Army was EMPHATICALLY defeated in GB.

Which needless to say is patently false!

The fact is that the forces positioned at Skardu did not belong to the Indian Army but to the J&K State Forces. The Gilgit region’s security of which Skardu was part, was the responsibility of a force called the Gilgit Scouts, which was officered by the British. Thapa who was ordered to leave for Skardu on 23 Nov 1947 reaching there in Dec was with a company ex 6 J&K State Forces.

It was only the higher direction of war of the Indian Army that was involved which tried unsuccessfully to reinforce Skardu, but again, this was not by elements of the Indian Army but by J&K State Forces which consisted of a company which was dispatched on 17 Feb 48. Another State Forces platoon joined the column, nick named ‘Biscuit Column’, at Kargil, under Brig Faqir Singh.

The first Indian Army contingent which set foot in J&K, which was airlifted to Srinagar by Dakotas of No. 12 Squadron, was 1 SIKH on 27 Oct 47 as part of 161 Inf Bde five days after Pakistan had launched Op Gulmarg.

So it is not only surprising but intriguing too as to why you keep insisting that the Indian Army lost emphatically in GB when there was NO Indian Army there to begin with.

Col SJ Thapa, MvC, the hero of Skardu was not in the Indian Army then but in the J&K State Forces. He was commissioned into the Indian Army only in 1957 and eventually rose to become a brigadier.

Now don't keep whipping a dead horse. The facts are clear and that is the Indian Army was never defeated in GB as you insist but it was the J&K State Forces who fought that battle at Skardu as well as the reinforcements sent thereafter. These State Forces came under command of the Indian Army after the Instrument of Accession was signed.

Now leave this be and move on.

 

[Hellfire]

Why are you trying to clutch at straws?

So, basically, the citations are 'clutching at straws'? Is this forum a place where DS Solutions are the only solutions and the adage 'never fight the whites' is being perpetuated by you after hanging up your boots?

The issue was about your statement that the Indian Army was EMPHATICALLY defeated in GB.

My Statements were:

The inherent contradiction comes to fore then. You claim GB, even when you emphatically lost it in military confrontation in 1948 and de-facto accepted the status as such by signing Karachi Agreement in 1949,

And this:

By accepting the military defeat of the garrison at Skardu, who we could not relieve in time, we will start being honest with ourselves.

Care to tell me where did you find me make the statement with words used as in your statement attributing the statement to me?

Would you be kind enough to first to look up and understand the difference between defeat and lose? Then perhaps, you shall be able to appreciate what is being said.

Which needless to say is patently false!

A premise which you hold, being declared false, by yourself.


And it is reiterated, from 27 Oct 1947 till fall of Skardu on 14 Aug 1948, it was Indian Army which had command of all forces, irrespective of whatsoever they may have been/had been, and all operational plans were executed on orders of the Indian Army. Tomorrow you may as well claim that it was British Indian Army or Divided Indian Army or claim FM Cariappa was a colonial hangover when he advocated withdrawal of troops from Skardu.

So, my dear sir, do not try to tell me about my military history. If you want to shirk away from accepting the failure to establish air corridor to protect and consolidate Skardu as a launch pad to clear Northern Areas, be my guest.

 

[Hellfire]

Col SJ Thapa, MvC, the hero of Skardu was not in the Indian Army then but in the J&K State Forces. He was commissioned into the Indian Army only in 1957 and eventually rose to become a brigadier.

I missed this.

So please, can you really explain this to me?

Why would a Gazette Notification (dated 14 April 1951) issued by Government of India granting him Short Service Commission wef 01 Nov 1947 in 6 JAK be existing if he was not in Indian Army? May I seriously know the reason? (Now please don't say there was a delay. Even in routine there is a delay in actual Gazette Notification intimating the commissioning of an officer by few years, and this was a newly independent nation fighting a war)

source: http://egazette.nic.in/WriteReadData/1951/O-2306-1951-0015-107783.pdf


And he moved from Leh on 23 Nov 1947 for Skardu. So, was he Indian Army or not? And if he was not, the GoI is lying, right?

Like I said, I know my Mil History.

 

[Mikesingh]

For God's sake now stop clutching at straws as I mentioned earlier. The plain fact is that there was NO Indian Army in J&K before 27 Oct 47 when 1 SIKH landed in Srinagar. It were the J&K State Forces. It's beyond anyone's comprehension except yours why you can't or don't want to agree/understand this simple fact.

And Lol! Your argument is funny. Why did Thapa retain his commission in the J&K State Forces? Because a Short Service commission in the Indian Army was temporary. Short Service Commissions are not permanent Commissions. I presume you know the difference between Short Service Commission and a permanent commission? Look it up.

I reiterate for your understanding. J&K State Forces were NOT the Indian Army. So attributing a defeat or loss of/at Skardu to the Indian Army is patently false. Period. Now, move on.

End of discussion.

 

[Hellfire]

For God's sake now stop clutching at straws as I mentioned earlier.

Please, deflecting!

I am yet to see you prove a rebuttal which stands scrutiny to points put forth. But sure, thanks for exhibiting the point I was making - failure on our part to accept our shortcomings. Precisely being played out.

The plain fact is that there was NO Indian Army in J&K before 27 Oct 47 when 1 SIKH landed in Srinagar.

So, am I talking of period preceding it? I am speaking of time period from 27 Oct 1947 till fall of Skardu on 14 Aug 1948 (1947 is followed by 1948, right?), with Princely State of J&K, acceding to and becoming a part of Dominion of India as legally formed under the Indian Independence Act of 1947. India became sovereign over the State of J&K thence on. J&K became India's responsibility.

So, what is your point here? And this is reply to what?

It were the J&K State Forces. It's beyond anyone's comprehension except yours why you can't or don't want to agree/understand this simple fact.

On the contrary, it is beyond any professional's comprehension how, when a Legal Nation State incorporated the State of J&K under the relevant law which gave it the legality, the said legal state can absolve itself of any responsibility of the military forces at the disposal of the new state incorporated into its dominion.

Other than you, no one, not in Indian Army, not in GoI, abdicates responsibility over State Forces and TA units in action in the war subsequent to accession.

So, if the military authority which commanded these forces of the State of J&K which was no more a sovereign state, was a military authority of Dominion of India, which rule keeps them out of the ambit?

So please, get your facts correct. It is akin to Pakistanis claiming that India only captured a handful of Pakistani PoWs in Bangladesh War with remaining being Razakars not part of Pakistani Forces.

And Lol! Your argument is funny. Why did Thapa retain his commission in the J&K State Forces? Because a Short Service commission in the Indian Army was temporary. Short Service Commissions are not permanent Commissions.

LOL back at you. When did the Constituent Assembly dissolve which gave the J&K Constitution, specifically removing the "Head of State" and replacing it with 'Sadr-I-Riyasat', as also declaring 'The State of Jammu and Kashmir is and shall be an integral part of the Union of India' come into being?
LOL, LOL & LOL.

Short Service Commission was temporary? Obviously, it still is. But do you give short service commission to non-citizens? Am curious.

Last I remember, a Gazette Notification was a legal declaration by the Government. No? It's not?

And if an officer is appointed to any armed forces of the nation through such a notification, it is the legal document of legitimacy to the individual of being an officer of the forces of India.

So, the government is a fool that they issued such a certification to State Forces? Were State forces foreign forces upon signing of Instrument of Accession? Or were they forces of State of J&K which were immediately & legally forces of India?

Now I am amused at your logic here.

I reiterate for your understanding. J&K State Forces were NOT the Indian Army. So attributing a defeat or loss of/at Skardu to the Indian Army is patently false. Period. Now, move on.

End of discussion.

So, State Forces were not under command of Indian Army in the period of 27 Oct 1947 to 14 Aug 1948 (the day Skardu fell)? And these were stateless forces as J&K was an Indian state wef 27 Oct 1947 as far as we all know, yet you claim these were state forces.

I am confused. So basically we had stateless army fighting for us? Is that what you are trying to say?


Again defeat. Strange you are, trying to make a narrative on my behalf patently false, deflecting from matter, and failing to rebut.

Let me list out Questions for you:

1. Was J&K State of India, legally, on 27 Oct 1947? Is 1947 followed by 1948 or not? (Since you keep harping on Indian forces only coming in on 27 Oct 1947 and not before, and I am still trying to understand what rationale does that hold)
2. Were all State Forces of J&K fighting against Pakistani invaders, automatically also forces of India on 27 Oct 1947? Or were they not automatically Indian?
3. If they were not automatically Indian Forces, were they 'stateless forces'?
4. Were these forces under operational command of Indian Army in a territory which was legally Indian territory?
5. Can you absolve military leadership of responsibility of forces operating at their command?
6. Was failure to establish an air bridge, akin to that established in defence of Srinagar, with an existing airfield at Skardu, with absence of PAF and employment of might of IAF in J&K ops, a military failure or not?
7. Did Gilgit fall to Pakistani forces (see, even their tribals are called their forces) in Nov 1947 (which comes after Oct 1947 before you post that 1 SIKH sentence again) or not? Was J&K the State of Dominion of India at the time or not?
8. Did Skardu fall in August 1948? Was J&K part of Dominion of India in August 1948 or was it a State of J&K which was not part of Dominion of India?

Try and answer.

Thanks

 

[Hellfire]

@Mikesingh Singh

The logic put forth by you so far, as far as I can understand is best extrapolated by the analogy as under (assuming you are from Infantry):

For a tactical reverse, Brig Bhoop Singh, from A Regiment, blames Col Bhoop Singh, CO of B Regiment, who, in turn, blames Maj Bhoop Singh of Alpha Company, which is of community Z, same as Maj Bhoop Singh's but different from Col Bhoop Singh's. In turn, Maj Bhoop Singh blames Nb Sub Bhoop Singh, Commander of his No 3 Platoon, who is from another State to that from Maj Bhoop Singh.

Nb Sub Bhoop Singh, in turn, blames Hav Bhoop Singh of No 2 Section, who is from a particular District different from his Platoon OC's who, as luck would have it, in turn blames Rifleman Bhoop Singh, who is from a different village than the Sectoin Commander's.

All this does not change the fact that all of the above are under 1 operational command and are fighting for the same country and at the end of the day, have suffered a Tactical Reverse.

You are a professional. Accept that all the forces that fight under your command, are yours. Accept also the fact that on Indian Army's overall operational command, loss of Gilgit (in Nov 1947) and Skardu (in Aug 1948), took place, and Indian Army failed to recapture these territories not for the want of trying, but failing to appreciate the importance of Skardu Airstrip, which was long enough for Dakotas to land after establishing an air bridge. You simply can not make an excuse of State forces etc. IA had the operational command, had the means, and the resources. It did not or failed to, make use of them.

That, is a military failure.