A good articulation on India's foreign policy balancing by Kunal Singh
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A thread on Indian position on Russian invasion of Ukraine. Why it is not a puzzle and actually eminently defensible. First, the near-term pragmatism: presence of thousands of Indian students in Ukraine.
We saw this in Yemen. Good relations with both parties in the conflict, and especially the aggressor, helped in the evacuation of Indian citizens. If required, India would try to leverage its relationship with Russia to do the same.
Second-- and everyone and their uncle have already said this-- Russia is India's pre-eminent arms supplier. It is not just any commercial relationship that can be easily substitutable. Russia supplies to India stuff that is not offered by anyone else: SSN, S-400, you name it.
The US would like India to buy less from Russia but wouldn't offer the top of the line technology. New Delhi has also sees how other states who have relied on America have seen their security decline: South Korea and Taiwan come to top of mind. Want to add Ukraine?
Third, this is how India does its foreign policy regardless of who is in power. This Yogesh Joshi thread shows how India has repeatedly sided with Russia/Soviet Union even though it has expressed displeasure privately.
Want more evidence? Look at India's position on the coup in Myanmar. It continues to engage the Tatmadaw because significant Indian interests are at stake-- insurgents in the Northeast. India also thinks private persuasion is more effective than publicly calling out.
Fourth, the current party in power is BJP, a right-of-centre party. Its opposition, mostly to its left, consists of parties which oppose America, not Russia. Rahul Gandhi has only tweeted saying that the govt should bring back Indian citizens from Ukraine.
Except for Shashi Tharoor, who is often a lone wolf in his own party, no body is really asking the Modi govt to condemn Russian invasion of Ukraine. Contrast that to the pressure Vajpayee govt felt during US invasion of Iraq. When the govt demurred in condemning the US a top Congress leader called India "a lap-dog" of the US. Vajpayee was forced to come clean when he said: "India will never become a lackey of even the most powerful country in the world." No such domestic political pressure exists today on non-condemnation of Russia.
The fifth, and final, one may not be so much what the Indian govt is thinking but these are my half-developed thoughts. If the US is so heavily invested in stopping Putin, then it might not be the best partner in balancing China. There is a massive debate in the US that President Biden will have to eventually choose between Russia and China. If he chooses to fight Russia, America's utility to India will be served by status quo-- military exercises, some arms supply, intelligence sharing.
If Biden chooses to fight China, India's position on Ukraine wouldn't matter much once the news cycle has changed.
I am writing all this as someone who has always advocated close India-US ties. But the US position on some of this is unreasonable: getting distracted in Europe and not focusing on Indo-Pacific, asking India to not buy Russian hardware but not offering comparable systems. One can understand why Indian leaders would be afraid of taking the big leap. END