FOREIGN POLICY: New, Strong and Clear Outreach

Tshering22

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Indian think tank but seems got very much influence in our foreign policy as Ajit Doval is former director of this think tank -

This is where Vasudev Kutumbakam is discussed -

VIF is as close to a nationalist deep state as it can get.

It's composed of some of the smartest minds in the country. Most ideologues are from either IB, RSS and some other intelligence agencies and are creme-de-la-creme of these agencies and groups. RSS in itself might look like a clueless boy-scout association, but the folks that come in here are there because the traditional Sangh way does not let them break glass ceilings.

I met a gentleman from here in Delhi quite many years ago. We had a hearing of His Holiness and he was present there as a Sangh member. At that time, I had no idea about our commonality, these dangers that we face collectively, the Dharmic collective union against external forces, or what VIF was. His name was Jagat something and he gave some amazing insights on the kind of thinking we all need to have.

BTW This was before PM Modi Ji came to power.
 

Tshering22

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Israel is ‘our most trusted partner,’ says India’s foreign minister in Jerusalem

JERUSALEM: Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar lauded the business relationship between his country and Israel on Sunday, saying at a meeting with CEOs and government officials that India regards Israel “in many ways as perhaps our most trusted and innovative partner.”

“The degree of trust between us is very high,” said India’s top diplomat during the business roundtable at Jerusalem’s King David Hotel on Sunday night.

Jaishankar landed in Israel earlier in the day, ahead of his meetings on Monday with Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, President Isaac Herzog, Foreign Minister Yair Lapid, and Energy Minister Karine Elharrar.

India’s foreign minister will be in Israel until October 21.

He noted that it was no coincidence that his first substantive meeting on the trip was with Israeli business leaders. “I’m starting with the tachlis,” he said to laughs, using the colloquial Hebrew term — with roots in Yiddish — for getting down to brass tacks. Facing questions from the Israeli executives about India’s prodigious red tape, Jaishankar stressed that India was involved in a major effort to improve ease of doing business and cut down on bureaucracy.

Ron Malka, the Economy Ministry director-general and a former ambassador to India, said that Israel’s ties with India are “the biggest achievement we have done with any country in international affairs.” He called the relationship “a key strategic partnership.”

On January 30 of next year, Israel and India will mark 30 years of diplomatic relations.
Jaishankar began his visit Sunday afternoon with a visit to the Indian cemetery in the Jerusalem neighborhood of Talpiot, where some of the 900 Indian World War I soldiers interred in the country lie.

“I am deeply honoured to pay homage to the valiant sons of India who fought with bravery and courage in this land during WWI, bringing glory to themselves, their comrades and their motherland,” he wrote in the guestbook, according to The Indian Express.

Other highlights of Jaishankar’s trip will include joining Elharrar as she signs on to Israel’s accession to the International Solar Alliance; observing the Blue Flag international air combat exercise; and taking part in a Zoom meeting Monday evening with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Lapid, and UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed. The four diplomats are expected to discuss environmental issues, energy, and trade, during their virtual meeting.

Water and agriculture technology are expected to feature prominently in talks during the visit. Mashav, Israel’s international development organization, has a permanent water expert in India, an indication of how important Israeli expertise in this field is to the relationship.

Israeli officials will also seek to advance an emerging free trade agreement with India, which has been in discussions for years. They will also seek to conclude an agreement on opening a Green Passport agreement with India, so that Israelis can travel there once the country opens to tourists on November 15.

The visit is the first by an Indian minister in two years, and the first since the Bennett-Lapid government came to power. The two countries will sign a series of agreements on trade, culture, and technology.

High-level ties between the two countries have been especially warm in recent years. Bennett’s predecessor Netanyahu and Indian PM Narendra Modi are close personal friends who often showered each other with public praise and good wishes. Netanyahu placed a framed photograph of himself with the Indian premier strolling barefoot on an Israeli beach in his Jerusalem office, where all visiting leaders can see it.

Modi visited Israel in 2017, the first Indian leader to do so. Modi’s jam-packed itinerary included political talks with the government and the leader of the opposition, and secret talks on improving counterterrorism coordination. Netanyahu visited India in 2018, where he was feted by enthusiastic crowds.

Looks like we are going to sign an FTA with god's chosen people. 😁
 

ajay7322

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India to host meet on Romas in Croatia announces DG
@iccr_hq

@DineshKPatnaik
. Romas are Indian origin nomadic people, found in large parts of the world, esp Europe. Famous members of the community include Pablo Picasso, Charlie Chaplin, Elvis Presley.

@SIDHANT/ twitter

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India's Indian Council for Cultural Relations(ICCR) will be doing a conference on Roma people in Croatia in April of 2022. The conference will be about the linkage of Roma people with India.
Romas are an ethnic group, an Indian origin minority found in large parts of the world, including Europe and the Americas. They are traditionally nomadic people who are descendants of people who came from Northern India in the 5th century BC.


Director General ICCR Dinesh K. Patnaik said, "We are doing a conference on Romas...they have strong links with India - genetics, culture, language. They are in a large part of the world. We are doing the first-ever conference on Romas in Croatia in the month of April and bringing together everybody".

In Europe, there are around 30 million Romas. Romas are known by different names in different countries, such as 'Zigeuner’ in Germany, 'Tsyiganes’ or 'Manus' in France, 'Tatara’ in Sweden, ‘Gitano’ in Spain, and ‘Tshingan’ in Turkey and Greece.


Interestingly, April 8 is observed as International Romani Day dedicated to celebrate Romani culture and raise awareness of the issues faced by them.

Romas are also referred as Romani people. They have faced persecution and discrimination in large parts of Europe including sterilisation. The Roma community has given the world distinguished painters like Pablo Picasso, famous comedian Sir Charlie Chaplin, singer-performer Elvis Presley, twice Oscar-winner Sir Michael Cain among others.

In the past, the Indian government has taken interest in highlighting links with Romas. In 2016, MEA had organized a conference regarding the Roma community. A total of 14 International speakers and 14 Indian scholars participated in the conference whose aim was to re-establish cultural and linguistic links with the Roma community.

Former Indian PM Atal Bihari Vajpayee during a 2001 event meet on Roma had said, "The belief that the Romani people once upon a time belonged to northern India and continued to show various similarities in their customs and manners with the cultural heritage of India and its people offers scope for a very interesting study in human development and migration of people from one part of the world to another."
Romas have been keen to get Indian diaspora status and even PIO cards. It is still under evaluation by the Indian government. Other than the Roma conference, ICCR also plans to open a cultural centre in Saudi Arabia and plans to give special certificates to Indian restaurants with the largest footfall of locals.

 

ezsasa

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India moves to take advantage of Abraham Accords, joins Israel, UAE, US in new Quad

Read more at: https://www.deccanherald.com/nation...-joins-israel-uae-us-in-new-quad-1041900.html

Key new India-Israel-US-UAE alliance in Middle East & why some call the Quad to India’s west


Remember that caspian report video on India's attempt at creating new trade routes, one of which passes thru UAE and Israel.

could it be possible that this new grouping has something to do with that?
 

ezsasa

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For once the lady didn't allow her ideological bent overpower her professional competence.
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INDIA IS NOT SITTING ON THE GEOPOLITICAL FENCE
TANVI MADAN


In early 2019, Gen. David Petraeus and S. Jaishankar, now India’s external affairs minister but then in his private capacity, appeared together on a panel. The former U.S. Central Command commander asserted that China was “the defining issue of our age” and, seemingly in frustration, added that countries such as India “have to decide.” Asked if India could indeed take a stand and choose a side, Jaishankar retorted, “India should take a stand and should take a side — our side.”

Petraeus’s comments were not unusual. They reflect a prevailing view — shaped by India’s stated non-alignment during the Cold War — that Delhi will walk a middle path and avoid taking sides in the geopolitical competition between China and the United States. They also flow from an assumption that India’s broader geopolitical approach involves maintaining equidistant relationships and not making difficult choices.

But this is a misunderstanding of India’s foreign policy strategy in general, and of its recent decisions in particular.

India does make choices and, increasingly, those are in alignment with the United States and its allies. Delhi’s embrace of the Australia-India-Japan-United States Quad, despite objections from friends and foes, makes this clear. That decision, evident in last month’s leader-level summit, in turn reflects other choices policymakers have been making in the context of India’s intensifying competition with China. Faced with Beijing’s increasing assertiveness and the recognition that it cannot tackle this challenge on its own, Delhi has chosen to deepen ties with partners that can help it build Indian capabilities, offer alternatives in the Indo-Pacific, and maintain a favorable balance of power in the region. The United States is seen as particularly useful, with former Indian national security adviser Shivshankar Menon noting that even though the two countries do not have a commitment to mutual defense, “India and the United States are … moving toward a partnership that increasingly has some of the characteristics of an alliance.”


This is a trend in Indian foreign policy that the United States and its partners should continue to be attentive to, nurture, and not take for granted. Just as Beijing’s choice to confront India at the border has made Delhi more interested in cooperating with the United States, Washington’s choices can shape the scope of that cooperation — for better or worse.

India’s Quad Choice

India has come a long way on the Quad in a very short period. Four years ago, the coalition did not even exist. A year ago, the Indian government would neither use the word “Quad” in statements nor agree to a joint statement. This was partly due to a desire not to provoke rival China or upset partner Russia. By March 2021, however, Delhi had agreed to elevate the grouping from the ministers’ to the leaders’ level, with a virtual summit on March 12 resulting in a joint statement, joint op-ed, and joint vaccine initiative. This was particularly striking because, at the time, Delhi was engaged in sensitive negotiations with Beijing to resolve the worst Sino-Indian border crisis in decades. Traditionally, at a moment like that, India would not have taken any steps that could rock the boat with Beijing. But — this time — it chose to take that risk.

Subsequently, Prime Minister Narendra Modi made only his second international trip since November 2019 for the first in-person Quad leaders’ summit in Washington on Sept. 24. The Australian ambassador to the United States remarked, “India has really, I think, driven a lot of the elevation of the Quad in recent times.”

This Indian choice to align with Australia, Japan, and the United States centers on a shared vision of a free, open, inclusive, secure, and prosperous Indo-Pacific. These partners can help tackle challenges to that vision — whether that challenge is China’s assertiveness, COVID-19, or climate change. And, thus, Delhi has been willing to consult, coordinate, and cooperate with them to build both a balancing coalition and resilience in the region.

Delhi is choosing to do this despite the trade-offs it entails. It has revived and elevated the Quad and persisted with its Indo-Pacific concept in the face of Russian unhappiness, as well as criticism and potential blowback from China. Beijing and Moscow have both dismissed the Quad as a destabilizing U.S.-led clique, with Russia even more vocal than China in its opposition. But the Indian external affairs minister countered his Russian counterpart’s statements against the Quad, and by doubling down on cooperation via the coalition, Delhi has made clear that it will not let Moscow or Beijing veto its partnerships.

Some have argued that India’s embrace of the Quad is not a meaningful geopolitical choice because it is also a member of the Sino-Russian promoted Shanghai Cooperation Organization. But India’s motivations for membership in — and level and kind of engagement with — the Shanghai Cooperation Organization are not equivalent to its involvement in the Quad. Delhi participates in the former to keep Russia from drifting even closer to China, and to maintain its ties with Central Asian countries. It also does not want to leave the mechanism to its rivals, China and Pakistan, which are both members. Moreover, India participates because it wants to have a voice at the table when issues such as Afghanistan are discussed. Finally, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization provides a platform for India and its rivals to discuss their divergences. But there is little doubt that those rivalries and contradictions can spill over and limit the group. For instance, India’s national security advisor walked out of a meeting due to his Pakistani counterpart’s background display of a map that showed Kashmir as part of Pakistan, and India withdrew from a Russian military exercise with Shanghai Cooperation Organization partners in 2020 due to Chinese and Pakistani participation.

The Quad, on the other hand, is based on convergence on what kind of region the members would like to see and shared concerns about China’s assertiveness. Moreover, its members are not just like-minded on key issues — they also have no major disputes with each other.

What’s Driving India’s Decisiveness

The deterioration of ties with China is increasingly shaping India’s geopolitical choices. Border tensions have been a feature of Sino-Indian relations since General Secretary Xi Jinping came to power in 2012. After two and half decades of relative calm, there were major military stand-offs in 2013, 2014, and 2017. A far more serious one began in 2020, with India accusing China of unilaterally attempting to change the status quo at several locations along their border. This crisis has resulted in the first fatalities and first known shots fired at the border in decades, and the stand-off continues to this day. It has brought Sino-Indian relations to their lowest point since the two countries fought a war in 1962.

Many external observers have underestimated the extent to which Indian perceptions of China have hardened over the last year and a half. India already viewed China competitively, with some concern and mistrust. However, the border crisis and the killing of 20 Indian soldiers, as well as Beijing’s COVID-era approach, have intensified this perception of China as a challenge. This has not only resulted in India’s well-known TikTok ban, but also affected India’s posture at the border, its policies at home, and its partnerships abroad. This is evident from its acquisition of additional military equipment, increased forward deployment of troops, bolstered border infrastructure, improved intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, progress with regards to the implementation of long-pending military reforms, and restrictions or extra scrutiny on Chinese activities in various sectors (economic, technology, telecommunications, civil society, and education). And Delhi is making choices in each of those realms (e.g., India’s decision to reorient one of its strike corps away from a sole and primary focus on Pakistan, or to exclude Chinese companies from India’s 5G trials).

The deterioration of India’s relationship with China has also contributed to Delhi overcoming one of its earlier hesitations about the Quad — that the grouping would be provocative to China and result in blowback. The increased scale and intensity of Chinese pressure that India is facing have changed its cost-benefit calculation about the Quad. There is also a sense that China seems perennially provoked regardless of India’s actions. Moreover, India holding back on the United States or the Quad or the inclusion of Australia in the annual India-Japan-United States Malabar maritime exercise did not deter Beijing from salami-slicing efforts at the border last year. And it did not stop Russia from deepening its ties with China and Pakistan either.

India and the United States: A Different Cost-Benefit Calculation

India’s Quad choice also reflects — and has been made possible by — a recalibration of Indian views about the United States and its utility regarding China.

This recalibration toward a more positive view of the United States did not happen overnight — it has been occurring over two decades — but American support during the crisis with China in 2020–2021 has further fueled the shift. From the 1970s through perhaps the 1990s, the dominant view in Delhi was that American power was a problem, and its presence in the region was unwelcome and needed to be deterred. Moreover, there was a sense that Washington sought to contain India’s rise. That perspective has not entirely disappeared in India, but the dominant view today is that, with Chinese power and the Chinese-Indian capabilities gap growing, American power is part of the solution. Now there is a perception that the U.S. presence in the region is desirable, if not essential, and it can help facilitate India’s rise. Thus, unlike both Chinese and Russian officials, Indian policymakers have pushed back against the notion that the United States is a destabilizing outsider, and have emphasized that the Indo-Pacific is also home to the United States. And they have deepened ties with the United States across the spectrum, but particularly on defense and security issues.

Indian policymakers have also pushed back against the idea of American decline. The external affairs minister recently asserted that the United States is “the premier power of our times and will remain so” and cited its “extraordinary capacity to really reinvent itself, re-energize itself.”

This sentiment is not a partisan one. In July 2020, as the United States struggled with COVID-19, Menon dismissed the idea of America as a declining power and noted its capacity for reinvention. A recent task force, which included scholars and former officials who were involved in the 2012 Non-Alignment 2.0 report, concluded that “it is in India’s interest that the U.S. remains engaged in the Indo-Pacific and continental Asia, and for India to work with the U.S. to keep the area open, plural and free of single-power domination.” While the current Bharatiya Janata Party-led government elevated India’s relationship with the Quad, it is worth noting that it was a Congress-party-led coalition government that first joined the Quad in 2007, as well as the India-Japan-U.S. trilateral in 2011. Perhaps more notably, that government signed a civil nuclear agreement with the United States during the Bush administration despite Chinese and Russian disapproval.

This does not mean that Delhi likes all aspects of American power. For instance, Washington’s use of sanctions has constrained India’s options and decision-making space vis-à-vis Iran and Russia. And while today there’s not much of a China debate in India, there continues to be a debate on how far and fast to cooperate with the United States.

At the moment, however, India worries more about the potential decline of U.S. power or any moves toward retrenchment. Unlike many in Beijing and Moscow, Delhi did not want to see an American withdrawal from Afghanistan, even as policymakers understood the drivers for the move and expected it. Indian observers have not just been upset about the flawed execution of the withdrawal, but also concerned about Pakistan and anti-India terrorist groups taking advantage of the vacuum in the region. In addition, there is apprehension that this could potentially require a diversion of Indian resources and attention from addressing China-related challenges. At the same time, however, Delhi will assess how Washington deals with Chinese influence in Afghanistan, and whether the withdrawal from Afghanistan does lead to more American focus on or investment in the Indo-Pacific. In this regard, the Biden administration’s continued high-level attention to India, the Quad leaders’ summit, and even the new Australia-U.K.-U.S. security partnership (or AUKUS) are likely to have been reassuring to Delhi.

In turn, Delhi’s decisiveness on the Quad is part of India’s investment in a partnership with the United States and even a bet on American power. Simultaneously, the grouping is a mechanism to encourage a U.S. presence in the Indo-Pacific and to keep Washington interested and engaged in the region. This was particularly the case during the Trump administration, but the uncertainty about America’s commitment to the region hasn’t dissipated. The Quad helps make the case to Washington that it has like-minded partners in the Indo-Pacific theater willing to share the burden of regional security and resilience. At the same time, it also facilitates Delhi’s pursuit of partnerships with Canberra and Tokyo, which help hedge against overreliance on the United States and uncertainty about the future of U.S. foreign policy.

India’s Ties With Australia and Japan Are Better Than Ever

India is also choosing to balance China through closer partnerships with Japan and Australia, which, in turn, made the Quad choice possible. While the deepening of the Indian-Japanese relationship goes back further, in recent years the development of their defense and security ties has been an added focus. But it is really the transformation of India’s ties with Australia that has bolstered the Quad.

The Indian-Australian dyad was perhaps the weakest link in the first version of the Quad in 2007–2008. The two countries had a relationship, but the common quip was that it only involved cricket, curry, and the Commonwealth. On strategic issues — particularly China — Canberra and Delhi were not on the same page. Indeed, while it remains hotly debated, many in India pointed to Australia’s desire to deepen its relations with China as significantly contributing to the demise of the first iteration of the Quad. This also made Indian policymakers hesitant first to revive and then to elevate the grouping.

However, over the last few years, Delhi and Canberra have invested in the Indian-Australian relationship, and this helped change Indian minds about the Quad. Strategic convergence on China helped fuel the closer bilateral relationship. And greater familiarity, in turn, helped India better understand that Canberra has become more concerned about China than it had been five or 10 years ago.

That has led to a closer defense and security partnership. Today, Australia is one of only a handful of countries with which India has signed a logistics sharing agreement, holds a 2+2 ministerial, and conducts military exercises of increasing sophistication. Delhi also overcame its initial reluctance (based in part on concern about China’s potential reaction) and finally invited Australia to the Malabar exercise. Australia is one of only seven countries that has a liaison at India’s Information Fusion Center for the Indian Ocean region, and Delhi and Canberra’s discussions have included sensitive issues like resilient supply chains and cyber security. Australia is also perhaps India’s favorite partner for trilaterals — they have ones with France, Indonesia, and Japan. It has also supported India’s stance during recent crises.

India’s Pivot to Plurilaterals

India’s Quad choice would also not have been possible without its recent embrace of coalitions — or plurilaterals, as Delhi calls them. It was not that long ago that Indian observers criticized the plurilateralism — and the departure from multilateralism (i.e., working through established international organizations) — that the Trans-Pacific Partnership represented. But it has come around for much the same reason many Trans-Pacific Partnership (now the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership) members turned to that approach. As the Indian external affairs minister put it: “Multilateralism has fallen short. And bilateral delivery is not what it used to be.”

There is another benefit for India. Coalition membership does not require joining an alliance, but it does facilitate alignment and deeper cooperation on issues or shared interests with like-minded states. The Quad, for instance, allows India to do more with the United States and two American allies, providing a mechanism that is less than an organization but more than ad hoc meetings. Moreover, it does so without locking Delhi into commitments with which it is not yet comfortable.

In the Indo-Pacific, this kind of coalition helps fill the gaps left between India’s bilaterals, the Association for Southeast Asian Nations, and the American hub-and-spoke alliance system. Delhi does not see these coalitions as a replacement for its bilaterals or for the Association for Southeast Asian Nations, but a supplement. Thus, India participates in the Quad, as well as several trilaterals: India-Japan-United States, India-Maldives-Sri Lanka, Australia-India-Japan, Australia-India-Indonesia, Australia-India-France, and India-Italy-Japan. The latter two serve as a bridge between European and Indo-Pacific partners. There have also been Track II dialogues of India-Japan-South Korea since 2012 and India-Japan-Russia in 2021 — this last one is in part an effort to wean Russia away from the Chinese position on the Indo-Pacific.

Much like India’s partnerships are not all equal, these coalitions are not all alike. They involve different issues and levels of investment, move at different paces, and include members with different threat perceptions (on the basis of which countries can pick specific coalitions to join). From Delhi’s perspective, in an ideal world, these interlocking coalitions — and its like-minded partners’ other minilaterals — would pull in the same direction. India, for instance, hopes that the Australia-U.K.-U.S. security partnership will supplement the efforts of the Quad. However, the fallout with France after the announcement of that initiative also made evident that managing coalitions will be a delicate task — not just for Washington, but for Delhi as well.

The Possibilities and Limits of India’s Choices

This is not the first time that India is making clear strategic choices. For instance, it decided to align with like-minded partners in 1962–1963 (with the United States) and 1971 (with the Soviet Union). In both cases, the objective was internal and external balancing vis-à-vis China, and now that is the case again. The choices won’t necessarily be heard in India’s rhetoric, but they will be seen in its actions, as the Quad summit demonstrates.

It will be important to have realistic expectations about India’s choices, which will not be all-encompassing. Delhi will opt to align with the United States to balance China, but not to isolate Russia. Furthermore, its choices and the related shifts will need to be measured not against, say, what the United States does with an ally like Australia, but rather what India does with various countries or what India was previously willing to do with the United States (though these days, arguably non-ally India is more aligned with Washington on China than many American allies).

Delhi’s preference for strategic autonomy (i.e., the freedom to make independent judgments based on India’s interests) will also persist. But its foreign policy decisions do reflect a recognition that its desire for autonomy has to be balanced with the need for alignment to protect India’s security. They also reflect an acknowledgment that an assertive China, with an expanding footprint in South Asia, could be one of the most significant constraints on Indian autonomy — and partnering with like-minded states might not just help protect India’s security interests, but also help preserve and even enhance Delhi’s decision-making space.

India’s decisions can and will be shaped by other countries’ choices. Beijing’s recent moves at the Sino-Indian boundary, for instance, have affected Delhi’s decisions regarding the United States and other partners worried about China. The longer the crisis continues, the more time those choices will have to solidify. Canberra’s altered stance on China has made it a more attractive partner for Delhi. Even as Russia remains relevant for Delhi — especially when it comes to Afghanistan or defense equipment — Moscow’s choice to deepen ties with Beijing has limited its utility for India and increased Delhi’s willingness to take actions that might displease it. On the other hand, Washington’s choice to compete with China and partner with India have facilitated Delhi’s decisions to deepen ties with the United States.

India is also persuadable. Partners can get Delhi to yes. To do so, they should understand that India often makes choices — as it did with the Quad — in a step-by-step way. This stems from Delhi wanting to assess the initiative or the commitment of the partners involved, and needing to build internal support if not consensus, including within government. Such an approach might be too high-maintenance for some countries, but for those seeking to develop a partnership with India, it’s worth keeping in mind that persistence and patience can pay off. Initially, Delhi might say no to a proposal — perhaps even multiple times. But when the time is right and a window of opportunity opens, it does reconsider its options and make choices about which it was previously reluctant.

This raises the question of whether India can be persuaded to reverse a choice. For instance, if Beijing moves to resolve the current Sino-Indian boundary crisis, will Delhi change course with China and the United States? It might change pace, but its direction will likely remain the same.

From Delhi’s perspective, Beijing didn’t just choose to grab some territory at the border — it chose to violate the agreements that made a broader Sino-Indian relationship possible. Moreover, it did so in a brutal way when India was particularly vulnerable during the pandemic. Thus, while Delhi might revisit some specific policies (e.g., restrictions on Chinese investment in non-sensitive sectors), it is unlikely in the near future to trust that Beijing will respect its commitments broadly and at the boundary in particular. That lack of trust means that Delhi will continue to seek a little help from its friends.

What’s likely to have a greater effect on India’s willingness to make choices regarding the United States is its assessment of American willingness and ability to play the role that Delhi envisions for it in Asia. That could be affected by U.S. developments at home (e.g., political polarization, economic setbacks, retrenchment) and abroad (e.g., accommodating China, rehyphenating India and Pakistan, sanctions directed against Russia that end up targeting India, a stalled pivot to the Indo-Pacific, greater skepticism of India). If Delhi believes Washington may become a more uncertain or unreliable partner, its risk-reward calculation will change accordingly. And so will its foreign policy choices.
 

ezsasa

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==========
Flash: Indian Air Force Airlifts 100,000 Kg of Nano Nitrogen fertilizer to Sri Lanka. The supplies were requested by Sri Lankan Govt. The development comes after Sri Lanka detected contaminated Chinese organic fertilizer.


Background :

 
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ezsasa

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Our political leadership is yet to overcome the mental blockade of 9ft tall Chinese soldiers. Not once have they mentioned China in their speeches let alone make formal ties with Taiwan
it doesn’t work that way. I see this sentiment coming up again and again.

what seems to be happening is that people are comparing US diplomacy to Indian diplomacy. Because people see US commenting on global affairs on a daily basis, there is an assumption that Indian diplomacy should behave the same way.
US foreign office has been spending billions of $ on foreign policy for decades, both within their foreign office and outside thru think tanks , NGOs and academia. moreover they set the narrative decades in advance, a there are multiple groups of people well versed in all eventualities of a particular foreign policy paradigm. since lobbying is legal in murica, if state institutions fail to recognise any fundamental changes outsiders will pitch in and set policy direction(major or minor). Because of all this, Murugan foreign policy always looks active.

In India’s case, we are not there yet. we are at an early stages. It all depends on type of governments people elect for next 30 years.
 
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Covfefe

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it doesn’t work that way. I see this sentiment coming up again and again.

what seems to be happening is that people are comparing US diplomacy to Indian diplomacy. Because people see US commenting on global affairs on a daily basis, there is an assumption that Indian diplomacy should behave the same way.
US foreign office has been spending billions of $ on foreign policy for decades, both within their foreign office and outside thru think tanks and NGOs. moreover they set the narrative decades in advance, a there are multiple groups of people well versed in all eventualities of a particular foreign policy paradigm. since lobbying is legal in murica, if state institutions fail to recognise any fundamental changes outsiders will pitch in and set policy direction(major or minor). Because of all this, Murugan foreign policy is always looks active.

In India’s case, we are not there yet. we are at an early stages. It all depends on type of governments people elect for next 30 years.
What Muricans do isn't the cue for India to take, the Chinese military belligerence has been against us and not them. Our governments have, both Cong and BJP, gone out of the way to not displease the Chinese even at the expense of active state-led adversarial stance by them. Somehow this notion of "Chinese can choke our economy","Chinese are too powerful conventionally" have always stayed in our planners' minds. This Asian solidarity keeda hasn't gone off the minds here.
 

ezsasa

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What Muricans do isn't the cue for India to take, the Chinese military belligerence has been against us and not them. Our governments have, both Cong and BJP, gone out of the way to not displease the Chinese even at the expense of active state-led adversarial stance by them. Somehow this notion of "Chinese can choke our economy","Chinese are too powerful conventionally" have always stayed in our planners' minds. This Asian solidarity keeda hasn't gone off the minds here.
Firstly I disagree with the assumption that Indian foreign policy planners think Chinese as some sort of giants. there are enough books written by retired diplomats who were posted in china. at best they are acknowledging the gap in starting points in economic revival in china and India. they acknowledge that up until recently, US was primary focus of Chinese foreign policy, China wants to become the next US. They also acknowledge the institutional backing that is available to foreign policy in major economies.

And I am saying these perceptions you mention don’t change in a matters of months. If you want to see a foreign policy outcome today, preparations should have started take years and decades in advance, and are mostly based on ground realities.

Our diplomats play safe, that part is true. In their defence, the national party that has singed a political MOU with CCP might come back to power any day, they have to cater to that eventuality as well.
 

Covfefe

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Firstly I disagree with the assumption that Indian foreign policy planners think Chinese as some sort of giants
Actually, a lot of them do. UPA, both I and II, and for the most of NDA I virtually did nothing to keep any economic autonomy by even attempting to decouple from China. The economic hegemony was accepted with bowed-down heads because there was not an iota of hope that we can take on them even while Vietnam and others were preparing well for grabbing a chunk of the market.
Our diplomats play safe, that part is true. In their defence, the national party that has singed a political MOU with CCP might come back to power any day, they have to cater to that eventuality as well.
Yes, they do. This Congress-CCP MoU was the same Asian Solidarity/Hindi-Cheeni bhai bhai keeda. They wanted to hand over this country to the Chinese the way Indira handed it over to the Soviets in 70s and 80s.
If you want to see a foreign policy outcome today, preparations should have started take years and decades in advance, and are mostly based on ground realities.
Cannot have that luxury every time when things are changing so fast. Even when little Turkey comes meddling with your sovereign interests and it takes 3-4 major leadership level(President, Turkish UNGA President) escalations to bring out your response, you know that there is too much toothlessness in your foreign policy.
The state-sponsored media and the Chinese Government officials have been slandering India, a response through the government channels(ministers, Army officials, something that is not a PIB circular) could have been the response, if not an outright callout by PM/MEA/RM.
 

ezsasa

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Actually, a lot of them do. UPA, both I and II, and for the most of NDA I virtually did nothing to keep any economic autonomy by even attempting to decouple from China. The economic hegemony was accepted with bowed-down heads because there was not an iota of hope that we can take on them even while Vietnam and others were preparing well for grabbing a chunk of the market.

Yes, they do. This Congress-CCP MoU was the same Asian Solidarity/Hindi-Cheeni bhai bhai keeda. They wanted to hand over this country to the Chinese the way Indira handed it over to the Soviets in 70s and 80s.

Cannot have that luxury every time when things are changing so fast. Even when little Turkey comes meddling with your sovereign interests and it takes 3-4 major leadership level(President, Turkish UNGA President) escalations to bring out your response, you know that there is too much toothlessness in your foreign policy.
The state-sponsored media and the Chinese Government officials have been slandering India, a response through the government channels(ministers, Army officials, something that is not a PIB circular) could have been the response, if not an outright callout by PM/MEA/RM.
I can only reiterate that, if you want fast reactions to fast changing changing events, those eventualities and options have to be studied with consensus on approach, years in advance.

If something is not happening now, it only means homework has not been done years prior.
 

Tshering22

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I can only reiterate that, if you want fast reactions to fast changing changing events, those eventualities and options have to be studied with consensus on approach, years in advance.

If something is not happening now, it only means homework has not been done years prior.
Well then entire UPSC needs to be re-structured. There has to be an Indic-leaning deep state institution created that tells the world our narrative, rather than the model of UPSC that our babus follow since Colonial times. India's foreign policy is changing slowly, but too slowly.

Vivekananda International Foundation (VIF) is the closest thing we have to that shadow deep state. Unfortunately, even with someone as powerful & influential as NaMo on top, the changes in the IFS/IAS circles is difficult - simply because NaMo is unwilling to leverage his power in true sense of the word. He can do a lot to render the babus toothless over time & simply break them into following VIF's narrative. But for some reason, he is hesitant.

If he breaks the Babus, he will have to rely on politicians; something he doesn't trust. If he breaks both Babus and manhandles all politicians, he will have a global spotlight on him, the way Putin has. He doesn't want that, as it concentrates USA's, China's, Russia's, etc. attention only on the top leadership. That's risky.

Barring exceptions like Motabhai, Yogi, Himanta, Goyal, Gadkari, Doval & Ninda Turtle, he does not place too much trust on anyone else.

For the uninitiated, VIF is like an entire brigade of Ajit Dovals + Jaishankars; some of the smartest, proudest people you'll come across. Basically what you expect from RSS in domestic policy & what we fantasize here about foreign policy.
 

ezsasa

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Well then entire UPSC needs to be re-structured. There has to be an Indic-leaning deep state institution created that tells the world our narrative, rather than the model of UPSC that our babus follow since Colonial times. India's foreign policy is changing slowly, but too slowly.

Vivekananda International Foundation (VIF) is the closest thing we have to that shadow deep state. Unfortunately, even with someone as powerful & influential as NaMo on top, the changes in the IFS/IAS circles is difficult - simply because NaMo is unwilling to leverage his power in true sense of the word. He can do a lot to render the babus toothless over time & simply break them into following VIF's narrative. But for some reason, he is hesitant.

If he breaks the Babus, he will have to rely on politicians; something he doesn't trust. If he breaks both Babus and manhandles all politicians, he will have a global spotlight on him, the way Putin has. He doesn't want that, as it concentrates USA's, China's, Russia's, etc. attention only on the top leadership. That's risky.

Barring exceptions like Motabhai, Yogi, Himanta, Goyal, Gadkari, Doval & Ninda Turtle, he does not place too much trust on anyone else.

For the uninitiated, VIF is like an entire brigade of Ajit Dovals + Jaishankars; some of the smartest, proudest people you'll come across. Basically what you expect from RSS in domestic policy & what we fantasize here about foreign policy.
while this nuance exists, this is not exactly where i was going for.

There seems to be an assumption that just by government issuing an order or a minister making a statement, the system will align itself to that goal and achieve it. most times it is a series of preparatory activities, that are years in making with varying complexities. even if babudom are not indic leaning, it can be mitigated with alterations in the strategy itself. except in authoritarian states like China, Russia or Iran, you won't find all of bureaucracy aligned to a achieve national goals in their countries.

syed akbaruddin has recently authored a small book on what it took to get an Indian judge on ICJ panel of judges for Kulbushan Jadhav case. troubles they have gone thru to get it done are still rooted in post-WW2 world order, infact argument can be made that our issues with china and pakistan continue to persist, because shadow of cold war hasn't faded away.

in this scenario, Indian foreign policy has to cater to both i.e dealing with cold war relics and whichever system the world is moving forward into for rest of the century.

observers like us who want to form a firm opinion on foreign policy just as a hobby, have to expand the time frame of data point observations to years and decades not days and months, if the intention is to make personal assessments as accurate as possible.

it's a patience game, but that's where the fun is.
 

ezsasa

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CCP's reasoning for current aggressive posturing with rest of the world is premised as a response to "Opium wars" and "century of humiliation".

How the Century of Humiliation Influences China’s Ambitions Today

I usually gauge any country's foreign policy with three different paradigms in mind.


- Diplomatic Rhetoric
- Diplomatic Actions
- Strategic Intent

the ability to recognise the discrepancy between these three paradigms of a particular country guides most of my assumptions and prognosis of a developing situation.

In India's case typically what we say, what we do and what we want are in sync with each other, whether this is a good thing or a bad things is subjective. it could also be the case that this is happening because of lack of bandwidth within India's diplomatic corps or lack of consensus among Indian establishment on what exactly constitutes "India's Self Interest".

But when it comes to the big global players, you will routinely find that all three paradigms are rarely in sync on most issues.
 

ezsasa

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This year gallantry awards were given for the brave who were engaged against both our adversaries, including two events of extra ordinary circumstances on each from west and the north.

is this year an inflection point of sorts for the babudom thought process?
will the foreign policy babus (civil & military) finally start writing their own scripts or keep reacting to someone else’s script?
 
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Holy Triad

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will the foreign policy babus (civil & military) finally start writing their own scripts or
Nope

keep reacting to someone else’s script?
Yes,


In other countries foreign ministries act like a brain or an R&D for new policy decision, they absorb inputs from political, intel agencies and biziness community and dissect it in way that benefits their respective countries.

But In India MEA acts as an glorified post office sending memos and budget allocation for our foreign missions.

That's it nothing more nothing less.
But they call themselves career diplomats lol
 

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