F-35 Joint Strike Fighter

[omaebakabaka]

You'll have to wait for the Russian plasma stealth and chinese quantum radar then to get your mythical aura. The F-35 'fuck up' will just have to soldier in without your approval.

Ya, it soldiers on under the veil of permanent secrecy like it did so far.....f-35 super ninja

 

[StealthFlanker]

These are your words regarding deep inside enemy territory
"And yet, it was shot down once despite flying thousands of sorties of most dangerous mission deep in enemy territories."

There is a massive different between the territories area of Russia and Serbia, Iran, Iraq, Syria...etc. If you can't even acknowledge that then that simple fact then that really is your fault

Your summary basically is F-35 and F-22 are not a threat to Russia and if Russia sells something to other countries then they are not a threat to that country?

You seriously need to work on your reading skill.
F-35 and F-22 are not a threat to Russia due to the same reason that a Kirov and Su-57 are not the threat to USA. It is because:
1) Russia and US are nuclear superpower, meaning no country actually retarded enough to go drop bomb on their land. Because if the war escalate then anyone who retarded enough to attack these 2 countries gonna have to have to face ICBM.
2) The size of Russia is f*cking massive, no fighter have enough fuel to actually travel deep inside Russian

So now max speed's don't matter and max radar ranges don't matter either.

The only time max speed matter is on aircraft such as SR-71, why? Because it can actually maintain that speed for a long period of time.
If top speed actually matter then Rafale would be super trash given that its top speed is only Mach 1.8 compared to F-4 at Mach 2.23, F-15 at Mach 2.5, F-14A at Mach 2.4 ..etc.
in fact, follow your logic, Su-57 top speed of only Mach 2 would also make it worse than previous aircraft

I already clarified my position on s-300/400, no combat record so claims are taken with grain of salt.

So basically, not only you think F-35 is unproven, you also think the so called silver bullet against F-35 also unproven, so how exactly that make F-35 terrible?

I will disregard your different tangents on submarines, icbms and so on as they are a different argument and their purpose is different.

Ah no, you can't just simply decide to disregard argument that basically disprove your claims. That not how a discussion work. Your claim that "F-35 is nothing special without stealth" and that "F-35 is a one trick pony" can also be applied to a submarine. A submarine is slower than a surface ship, a submarine doesn't have long range radar coverage of a surface ship, a submarine doesn't have the air defense of a surface ship. Heck even the range of a diesel electric submarine when fully submerged is pathetic, take for example the Kilo submarine can only travel 740 km when full submerged, that is even worse than a fighter aircraft. Basically, the only redeem quality of a submarine is stealth. Following your logic, no country should make submarine since they will become useless the moment you strip off their stealth. And guess what ?everyone still making and buying submarine, everyone still buying and making stealth fighter.

Rafale and Su-35 do not claim anything special that is fundamentally different and most of those features are proven in combat.

How exactly Rafale and Su-35 proven themselves in combat?
Have Rafale and Su-35 ever shot down a 4.5 or 5 gen fighters? Nope
Have Rafale and Su-35 ever penetrated air space of countries with modern air defense system? Nope.
So how exact you considered them more proven than F-35.
If your argument is simply that agility have been proven in combat then stealth have been proven in combat as well given that aircraft such as B-2, F-117 have done thousands of sorties.

I am still waiting for stealth based 5th gen to make a significant kill.....for now its all claims. Isreal never confirmed its F-35 that took out the radar. These days they are not even flying in Syrian airspace after s-200 crippling of f-15 and IL-20 sabotage. They are north lebanon or under USAF shadow in Syria but mostly stand off.....Why would they expose any signature to Russians in Syria....I don't take these claims seriously.

And how would you distinguish between the so called "significant kill" and "claim"?. After all, these target such as JY-27 was actually destroyed, that a fact. SDB bombs was used, that a fact. So the only question is whether they actually used F-35 like they claimed or not. Besides, if you don't even know if Israel actually used F-35 or not, then how could you possibly know that they never entered syria air space or that they are north lebanon? Are those basically your baseless claims as well?. Besides, luneberg lens is a thing so really they could easily use F-35 yet still doesn't expose it true signature.

F-35 single engine at that weight is not very promising in terms of upgradeability. The naval ones are even more miserable......so basically F-35 and F-22 are for bombing some shit hole weak ass countries? For that F-16 and F-15 would also do the job.....actually they are conceptualized for Russia thinking it would not survive but nevertheless its not possible anymore. As I said, lets see the record of F-35 displaying its claims regarding stealth or any ECM superiority.....

I have just showed you earlier that if you load the exact same quantity of fuel and weapon on Rafale and F-35 then Rafale will end up having lower T/W, so if F-35 doesn't promise upgradeability then the case is even worse for Rafale.
F-22 and F-35 are not supposed to be used against weak ass countries only, but if you think they gonna use any fighter whether it is Su-57, F-22, F-35 or Rafale to bomb the territories of massive countries with thousands of nuclear ICBM then you clearly being delusional. There is pretty good reason why Russia and US never have direct confrontation and basically supply their weapons to others countries and let these countries fight each others.

Regarding OTH, they detect but its too far to act on it and pretty much useless but if threat is anticipated during war times then all that info is shared with other more focussed radars and eventually firecontrol radars of AD if threat moves towards AD sectors, at least that was what was implied in that article. You don't have to explain the oth and lack of fire control...its fairly obvious.

If you eliminate Russia from US 5th gen fighter purpose then its kinda targeted towards weak countries.....there are really Russia and to a distant 2nd China now that threatens US capabilities.

OTH-B radar are useless against tactical aircraft in most case because of the blind area surrounding the radar ( a circle with 2000-3000 km radius), even if it let you know aircraft coming from that direction, it wont be very helpful for your fire control radar unless enemy decided to keep moving in the straight line at the same altitude for 2000-3000 km
For your other point, let me put it this way, F-22, F-35 supposed to be use to counter the air defense system that Russia will be selling to others countries. Let say for example: if Russia selling S-400 to Iraq then US selling F-35 to Israel will be the counter to that.

 

[StealthFlanker]

It is not as they are planning to extend life of all 16s and 15s and even going for 15ex.....anyway I will close this from my side by saying that I like 35 and 22 from looks, concepts like super cruise, best aesa radars and some degree of sensor fusion. But whole 5th gen is not going to be very useful and will be replaced by 6th Gen before these claims are undeniably proved against 1st or 2nd rated peer countries. Bombing libya/iraq/syria does not count. I am yet to see bvr at claimed distances and that is hard to come by....if we are lucky we might finally see some Rafale acion against 5th gen and 4.5 gen planes against a major air force

The fact that F-16 and F-15 are being upgraded have nothing to so with the particular capability of F-35 but rather the fact that they can't produce F-35 quick enough. Oh and guess what these co called "6 gen fighter" have in common ? They are all designed to be stealthy
https://www.airforcemag.com/article/keeping-4th-gen-fighters-in-the-game/

Russian's are developing but it is not based totally on F-35 and actually closer to F-22 concept if any with some refinements and enhancements.....they are not necessarily compromising a lot or making it too complex like F-35. They are using stealth as part of whole equation to make a better plane not a fuck up like 35

Su-57 not too complex? Do you even pay attention to how many radar and sensor it has? And how could you possibly know whether Su-57 will be a fuck up or not? There are like what? 3 su-57 prototype at the moment, and when there are nearly thousand of F-35 produced we have around 25 su-57.

 

[Flying Dagger]

Rafale is a balanced time tested configuration where stealth is one attribute but not the defining one, so there are not many surprizes or claims to challenge or doubt. F-35's ace is stealth as it is inferior in pretty much most aspects to 4.5 gen planes in other characteristics and needlessly complex. If everything about F-35 is secret then it is hard to accept claims unless they are against rated power about its stealth abilities. Russia claims OTH radars detect from 3000 km and there is no such thing as stealth for them, it is just one of the plus points in minimizing certain risks but trade off as heavy as F-35 is not very attractive now (probably better when F-22 arrived) but chances are they are detected now.

Dude even if stealthy jet will be identified at 100 km + say in next 10 yrs or so then the 4th gen jets will be identified much before at a much bigger range.

Here again advantage will be with stealthy jets as they will be able to identify and fire 150-200 km range bvr much before they are identified.

 

[BON PLAN]

Have Rafale and Su-35 ever shot down a 4.5 or 5 gen fighters? Nope

At least F35 succeed : it shoot down a KC 130 J !!!!

 

[BON PLAN]

Dude even if stealthy jet will be identified at 100 km + say in next 10 yrs or so then the 4th gen jets will be identified much before at a much bigger range.

Not sure.
A multistatic or low band radar may not have a better range on a non (X band only) steath fighter.

 

[Manticore]

At least F35 succeed : it shoot down a KC 130 J !!!!

Not a shoot down, a collision. Happens to most fighters.

 

[StealthFlanker]

Not sure.
A multistatic or low band radar may not have a better range on a non (X band only) steath fighter.

It is a myth that stealth aircraft are X-band only, they are actually stealth over very wide range of frequency
The total radar reflection of a complex body such as aircraft made from several different kinds of reflections:

• Specular return: this is the most significant form of reflection in optical region (when structure size > 10 times wavelength) ,surface acts like a mirror for the incident radar pulse. Most of the incident radar energy is reflected according to the law of specular reflection ( the angle of reflection is equal to the angle of incidence).This kind of reflection can be reduced significantly by shaping
• Traveling/Surface wave return: an incident radar wave strike on the aircraft body can generate a traveling current on surface that propagates along a path to surface boundaries such as leading edge, surface discontinuous …etc, such surface boundaries can either cause a backward traveling wave or make the wave scattered in many directions .This kind of reflection can be reduced by radar absorbing material, radar absorbing structure, reduce surface gap or edges alignment ( so that their lobes occur in low priority region )
• Diffraction: wave striking a very sharp surface or edge are scattered instead of following law of spectacular reflection.
• Creeping wave return: this is a form of a traveling wave that doesn’t face surface discontinuous and not reflected by obstacle when traveling along object surface , thus it is able to travel around the object and come back at the radar. Unlike normal traveling wave, creeping wave traveled along surface shadowed from incidence wave (because it has to go around the object). As a result, the amplitude of creeping wave will reduce the further it has to travel because it can’t feed energy from the incident wave in the shadow region. Creeping wave mostly traveled around a curved or circular object. Hence, stealth fighters and stealth cruise missiles do not use tube fuselage. Nevertheless, the creeping wave return is much weaker than the specular return.

The percentage which each type of return will contribute to the total RCS value of an object depending on which region that object located in
A high-frequency regime (or optical region) applies when the circumference of the object is at least 10 times longer than the wavelength of the incident radar wave. In this regime, specular mechanisms dominate the radar reflection ,(the angle of reflection equals the angle of incidence), like billiard balls colliding. Reflection towards the emitting radar – is reduced by angling surfaces so that they are rarely perpendicular to radars and suppressing the reflections from re-entrant structures such as engine intakes and antenna cavities with combinations of internal shaping, radar-absorbent material (RAM) or frequency selective surfaces. In this regime, “surface wave” mechanisms are small contributors to RCS, but are still present. If the wavelength is small relative to the surface, these waves are weak and their overlap will generate maximum backscatter when the radar signal is at grazing angles. When these currents encounter discontinuities, such as the end of a surface, they abruptly change and emit “edge waves.” The waves from different edges interact constructively or destructively due to their phases. The result is that they can strengthen the reflection in the specular direction and create “sidelobes” – a fan of returns around the specular reflection which undulate rapidly and weaken as the angle deviates from the specular direction. Surface wave reflections are generally very small in the optical region.
Mie region or also known as the resonance region : applies when radar wavelength*0.1 ≤ object circumference ≤ radar wavelength*1 in this region the surface wave can also swing around a structure’s back side, becoming “creeping waves” that shed energy incrementally and contribute to backscatter when they swing back toward the threat radar. This creeping wave can interferes constructively or destructively with the specular backscatter to produce a variation in the object’s RCS. Creeping wave doesn’t follow mirror like reflection rule, thus the common angular shape of stealth aircraft doesn’t help deflect them away from the threat radar.

So why is stealth less effective at low frequency? As the radar wavelength of radar grows, the intensity of specular reflections is reduced but its lobes width are widened (the same phenomenon also happened to radar, if aperture size remained the same, the reduction in frequency will increase radar beamwidth). Because the specular reflection lobes are widen ,shaping become less effective because it will be harder to deflect radar wave away from the source ( it is important to note that, while this lobe widening phenomenon making shaping less effective, it also reduce the intensity of the reflection because the energy will be distributed over a wider volume )

Specular reflections from flat surfaces decrease with the square of the wavelength but widen proportionally: at 1/10th the surface length(approaching Mie region) they are around 6 deg. wide.

At lower frequency, the effect of traveling wave and diffraction is also more pronoun. For flat surfaces, traveling waves grow with the square of wavelength and their angle of peak backscatter rises with the square root of wavelength: (at 1/10th the surface length, it is over 15 deg). As the power of surface wave grow, the power of creeping wave return also grow. Tip diffractions and edge waves from facets viewed diagonally also grow with the square of wavelength. The end result is that the net value of stealth aircraft’s RCS often increases in Mie region. Maximum RCS is often reached when the wavelength reaches the circumference of the structure
There is a common misconception that any low-frequency radar can render stealth aircraft useless regardless of their transmitting power or aperture size (Ex: Tikhomirov NIIP L-band transmitter on the leading edge of Flanker series are often cited by enthusiasts as a counter stealth system) , that is wrong however. While it is true that stealth aircraft will often have higher RCS in Mie region. It is important to remember that given equal radar aperture area, lower frequency radars will have much wider beam compared to high-frequency radars, thus, the concentration of energy is much lower making them more vulnerable to jamming, lower gain also result in lower accuracy. Moreover, as mentioned earlier lower frequency also resulted in wider reflection beamwidth, hence weaker reflection. As a result, most low-frequency radars have much bigger transmitting antenna compared high-mid frequency radar (to get narrow beamwidth) ,it is also the reason that fighters fire control radar still work in X-band, because a L-band, VHF band radars of similar size would be too inaccurate for any purpose others than early warning.

So, is there any way for modern stealth aircraft to reduce their return even in Mie region?. The answer is YES

To begin with, the negative effect of traveling wave and diffraction can be reduced by: aligning discontinuities to direct traveling waves towards angles of unavoidable specular return, such as the wing leading edge, thus limit their impact at other angles.

Example: serrated edges are used in place where there is current discontinuity such as weapon bay door so that traveling wave return reflected toward less important angle

Another common method to reduce the effect of surface wave is designing airframe facets with non-perpendicular corners and so radars view them along their diagonals, at low angles and across from the facets’ smallest angles, limits the area of edge-wave emission. Surface wave diffraction can also be reduced by blending facets. The first stealth aircraft, the F-117, was designed with a computer program that could only predict reflections from flat surfaces, necessitating a fully faceted shape, but all later stealth aircraft such as B-2 , F-35 , F-22, X-47 use blended facets. Shapes composed of blended facets are not only more aerodynamic but also allow currents to smoothly transition at their edges, reducing surface-wave scattering. Therefore, blended bodies have the potential for a lower RCS than fully faceted structures, especially at low-frequency regime. And blending the curves around an aircraft in a precise mathematical manner can reduce RCS around the azimuth plane by an order of magnitude. The penalty is often a slight widening of the specular return at the curves, but in directions at which threat radars are less likely to be positioned. This was one of the great discoveries of the second generation of stealth technology.

It is, however, important to remember that, even though a blended body shape can benefit stealth characteristics because they reduce surface scattering compared to sharp facet design. A full circular (tube) body is extremely bad for stealth application, the reason is that the surface wave doesn’t get scatter but will travel a full circle around the object and come back to the source (also known as creeping wave return).

While it is possible to reduce the number of sharp edges with blended edge design, it is not possible to get rid of them all, for example an aircraft will always have wing and inlet edges. Thus, there are the need for trailing edge and leading edge treatment. As mentioned earlier, the edge diffraction is more pronoun at lower frequency. To reduce the effect of edge diffraction, the wing and inlet leading edge can be made to be a soft electromagnetic surface, to achieve this, a tapered resistive sheet can be stuck or painted on the edge. Additionally, the edge can be made from bulk absorber to improve the result. Similar to the previous example, the resistivity of the sheet will reduce from the maximum at the front tip of the edge to near zero at the rear. The resistivity of the sheet can be increased by adding holes and reduce by adding metal particles in it. This allows the surface current to transition slowly rather than abruptly as well as be absorbed and thus reduce the edge diffraction as well as surface wave

As mentioned earlier, the resistive strip/tape must have a width at least half the wavelength of the lowest frequency of interest to be effective, so it is plausible to estimate the lowest frequency where the edge treatment can remain effective.
For example the inlet edge strip/tape treatment of F-35 has a width between 22- 25.4 cm, which would indicate the lowest frequency where the treatment can still be effective is around 0.5-0.7 GHz

Rayleigh Region applies when the circumference of the object is smaller than the radar wavelength. A common misconception is that the lower the operating frequency of the radar ( longer wavelength ), the better it would perform again stealth assets. That is wrong, however. It is important to remember that aircraft RCS does not necessarily grow linearly with increase in frequency. Once the radar wavelength grows past the target’s circumference, the specifics of target geometry cease to be important and only its general shape affects reflection. The radar wave is longer than the structure and pushes current from one side of it to the other as the field alternates, causing it to act like a dipole and emit electromagnetic waves in almost all directions. This phenomenon is known as Rayleigh scattering. At this point, the RCS for aircraft will then decrease with the fourth power of the wavelength and can get exponentially smaller as the frequency reduce.

 

[Fonck83]

Eglin F-35 Crash Blamed on Landing Speed, but Software, Helmet, Oxygen Also Faulted
https://www.airforcemag.com/eglin-f...peed-but-software-helmet-oxygen-also-faulted/

Excessive landing speed primarily caused the May 19 crash of an F-35A at Eglin Air Force Base, Fla., though faulty flight control logic, issues with helmet-mounted display, the jet’s oxygen system, and ineffective simulator training and were all contributing factors, according to an Air Force investigation.
An Accident Investigation Board found the main reason for the crash was the pilot setting a “speed hold” of 202 knots indicated airspeed for the landing, which was 50 knots too fast, while the jet’s approach angle was also too shallow, according to the report released Sept. 30.
The second main cause was the tail flight control surfaces “conflicting” with the pilot’s apparent correct efforts to recover the jet after it bounced on the runway, a problem the Air Force said was a “previously undiscovered anomaly in the aircraft’s flight control logic.” The plane and pilot “quickly fell out of sync” as the flight computer commanded nose down while the pilot commanded nose up, attempting to abort the landing and go around. Sensing that he was being “ignored” by the airplane, the pilot ejected,
sustaining significant but non-life-threatening injuries.
Furthermore, the helmet-mounted display was misaligned and “distracted the pilot during a critical phase of flight,” the AIB determined. The aircraft’s breathing system also caused excessive fatigue—leading to “cognitive degradation,” while ineffective simulator instruction meant the pilot lacked sufficient knowledge of the aircraft’s flight control system.
The 58th Fighter Squadron aircraft rolled after the ejection and struck runway. was declared a total loss. The jet valued at almost $176 million as declared a total loss. The pilot had shards of the canopy and other foreign objects lodged in his eye and arm, and a spinal compression injury.
The report did not discuss corrective actions or flight safety restrictions as a result of the accident. The Air Force and Lockheed Martin referred all queries to the F-35 Joint Program Office, which did not offer immediate comment. Air Education and Training Command did not immediately respond to questions.
The crash occurred at the end of a night mission in which the pilot, an instructor, was coaching a student on air combat techniques. Upon returning to base, he set the excessive speed hold at 202 knots—which the investigation said is “not an authorized maneuver”—and a shallow angle of attack of 5.2 degrees, vice the desired 13 degrees. The pilot failed to disengage speed hold at the appropriate time, and there are no “audible warnings” for this dangerous configuration, the report said.
The jet touched down nearly simultaneously on all landing gear with such force that the nose gear pushed back up, causing the jet to become airborne again. As the pilot tried to recover, the jet and pilot got out of sync due to “multiple conflicting flight control inputs.”
The control software “became saturated and unresponsive, and ultimately biased the flight control surfaces toward nose down,” when the pilot was going to afterburner and trying to raise the nose and gain altitude. “Feeling confused, helpless and ignored,” the pilot ejected.
The investigation determined that three seconds of pilot input “was not enough time to overcome that saturation” and the flight control system failed to re-orient the aircraft for a go-around. The entire mishap occurred within five seconds of the initial touchdown.
The F-35 senses when its weight is on the wheels, and this biases the flight controls to keep the nose down. This aspect of flight control laws is not in the flight manual or syllabus, and “the flight control system is complex; there are too many sub-modes of the [control laws] to describe” in courseware. “Nevertheless, there exists a deficiency in the depths of the [control laws] logic and flight control systems knowledge in F-35A baseline manuals and academics,” the report states.
During the attempted landing, the pilot experienced a helmet-mounted display misalignment at night for the first time, with the HMD “misaligned low as opposed to high.” This caused the jet to come in too high for landing, conflicting with inertial landing system data and visual cues.
The pilot “fought his own instincts to push further into the darkness short of the runway to correct his trajectory,” the report stated. While crews train for HMD-out situations, they don’t train for misalignments, according to the Air Force.
Instead of easing workload, the helmet seems to have added to it in this instance.
“The focus required to mentally filter the degraded symbology, green glow of the HMD projector, visually acquire nighttime runway cues, correct and then set an aimpoint, fight the … darkness short of the runway, and monitor glide path trends, distracted the [pilot] from engaging the [approach power compensator] or slowing to final approach speed,” the AIB said. The “green glow” worsens due to feedback as the aircraft descends, and the pilot reported having to “squint through” it to pick environmental cues.”
The jet was from Low-Rate Initial Production Lot 6—the only one from that batch at Eglin. There were some corrective technical orders for the helmet system, but they were not deemed urgent and required depot assistance to make, the report said.
The pilot reported that flying the jet was more “draining” than his previous aircraft, the F-15E. The report said the F-35’s unique air
system, which requires a “work of breathing,” has that effect on many pilots. The pilot’s experience is “supported by emerging research” on the F-35A’s systems that “there appears to be a physiological toll taken on a pilot’s cognitive capacities as a result of breathing through the on-demand oxygen system,” the report said. The pilot reported that on a scale of one to ten, his cognitive degradation was “four out of ten on a routine basis.”
The report said flying the F-35A in instrument landing system mode is “not a mundane task,” which “could have been made more challenging” in the May mishap “by the reported level of cognitive degradation” from distractions, stress, lack of sleep, and the work it took the pilot to breathe. These factors could have contributed to the pilot’s “vulnerability to distractions” during the mishap landing, according to investigators.
On the issue of simulators, the report states that the systems “do not accurately represent the aircraft flight dynamics seen in this scenario.” In the simulator, the aircraft can be recovered after a hard bounce, and “two members of the AIB team were also able to land” in the simulator under the same conditions.
Lockheed Martin’s own report on the incident “verified the disjoint between actual [mishap aircraft] performance and the simulator model” adding that “the pitch rate sensitivity evident in flight was not observed in piloted simulation or initial attempts to match the maneuver with offline simulation.”
If the mishap pilot “did not have the negative learning from the simulator, he might have been able to recover the aircraft despite the high speed landing, which is why this is a contributing factor,” the report stated.

 

[BON PLAN]

Eglin F-35 Crash Blamed on Landing Speed, but Software, Helmet, Oxygen Also Faulted
https://www.airforcemag.com/eglin-f...peed-but-software-helmet-oxygen-also-faulted/

Excessive landing speed primarily caused the May 19 crash of an F-35A at Eglin Air Force Base, Fla., though faulty flight control logic, issues with helmet-mounted display, the jet’s oxygen system, and ineffective simulator training and were all contributing factors, according to an Air Force investigation.
An Accident Investigation Board found the main reason for the crash was the pilot setting a “speed hold” of 202 knots indicated airspeed for the landing, which was 50 knots too fast, while the jet’s approach angle was also too shallow, according to the report released Sept. 30.
The second main cause was the tail flight control surfaces “conflicting” with the pilot’s apparent correct efforts to recover the jet after it bounced on the runway, a problem the Air Force said was a “previously undiscovered anomaly in the aircraft’s flight control logic.” The plane and pilot “quickly fell out of sync” as the flight computer commanded nose down while the pilot commanded nose up, attempting to abort the landing and go around. Sensing that he was being “ignored” by the airplane, the pilot ejected,
sustaining significant but non-life-threatening injuries.
Furthermore, the helmet-mounted display was misaligned and “distracted the pilot during a critical phase of flight,” the AIB determined. The aircraft’s breathing system also caused excessive fatigue—leading to “cognitive degradation,” while ineffective simulator instruction meant the pilot lacked sufficient knowledge of the aircraft’s flight control system.
The 58th Fighter Squadron aircraft rolled after the ejection and struck runway. was declared a total loss. The jet valued at almost $176 million as declared a total loss. The pilot had shards of the canopy and other foreign objects lodged in his eye and arm, and a spinal compression injury.
The report did not discuss corrective actions or flight safety restrictions as a result of the accident. The Air Force and Lockheed Martin referred all queries to the F-35 Joint Program Office, which did not offer immediate comment. Air Education and Training Command did not immediately respond to questions.
The crash occurred at the end of a night mission in which the pilot, an instructor, was coaching a student on air combat techniques. Upon returning to base, he set the excessive speed hold at 202 knots—which the investigation said is “not an authorized maneuver”—and a shallow angle of attack of 5.2 degrees, vice the desired 13 degrees. The pilot failed to disengage speed hold at the appropriate time, and there are no “audible warnings” for this dangerous configuration, the report said.
The jet touched down nearly simultaneously on all landing gear with such force that the nose gear pushed back up, causing the jet to become airborne again. As the pilot tried to recover, the jet and pilot got out of sync due to “multiple conflicting flight control inputs.”
The control software “became saturated and unresponsive, and ultimately biased the flight control surfaces toward nose down,” when the pilot was going to afterburner and trying to raise the nose and gain altitude. “Feeling confused, helpless and ignored,” the pilot ejected.
The investigation determined that three seconds of pilot input “was not enough time to overcome that saturation” and the flight control system failed to re-orient the aircraft for a go-around. The entire mishap occurred within five seconds of the initial touchdown.
The F-35 senses when its weight is on the wheels, and this biases the flight controls to keep the nose down. This aspect of flight control laws is not in the flight manual or syllabus, and “the flight control system is complex; there are too many sub-modes of the [control laws] to describe” in courseware. “Nevertheless, there exists a deficiency in the depths of the [control laws] logic and flight control systems knowledge in F-35A baseline manuals and academics,” the report states.
During the attempted landing, the pilot experienced a helmet-mounted display misalignment at night for the first time, with the HMD “misaligned low as opposed to high.” This caused the jet to come in too high for landing, conflicting with inertial landing system data and visual cues.
The pilot “fought his own instincts to push further into the darkness short of the runway to correct his trajectory,” the report stated. While crews train for HMD-out situations, they don’t train for misalignments, according to the Air Force.
Instead of easing workload, the helmet seems to have added to it in this instance.
“The focus required to mentally filter the degraded symbology, green glow of the HMD projector, visually acquire nighttime runway cues, correct and then set an aimpoint, fight the … darkness short of the runway, and monitor glide path trends, distracted the [pilot] from engaging the [approach power compensator] or slowing to final approach speed,” the AIB said. The “green glow” worsens due to feedback as the aircraft descends, and the pilot reported having to “squint through” it to pick environmental cues.”
The jet was from Low-Rate Initial Production Lot 6—the only one from that batch at Eglin. There were some corrective technical orders for the helmet system, but they were not deemed urgent and required depot assistance to make, the report said.
The pilot reported that flying the jet was more “draining” than his previous aircraft, the F-15E. The report said the F-35’s unique air
system, which requires a “work of breathing,” has that effect on many pilots. The pilot’s experience is “supported by emerging research” on the F-35A’s systems that “there appears to be a physiological toll taken on a pilot’s cognitive capacities as a result of breathing through the on-demand oxygen system,” the report said. The pilot reported that on a scale of one to ten, his cognitive degradation was “four out of ten on a routine basis.”
The report said flying the F-35A in instrument landing system mode is “not a mundane task,” which “could have been made more challenging” in the May mishap “by the reported level of cognitive degradation” from distractions, stress, lack of sleep, and the work it took the pilot to breathe. These factors could have contributed to the pilot’s “vulnerability to distractions” during the mishap landing, according to investigators.
On the issue of simulators, the report states that the systems “do not accurately represent the aircraft flight dynamics seen in this scenario.” In the simulator, the aircraft can be recovered after a hard bounce, and “two members of the AIB team were also able to land” in the simulator under the same conditions.
Lockheed Martin’s own report on the incident “verified the disjoint between actual [mishap aircraft] performance and the simulator model” adding that “the pitch rate sensitivity evident in flight was not observed in piloted simulation or initial attempts to match the maneuver with offline simulation.”
If the mishap pilot “did not have the negative learning from the simulator, he might have been able to recover the aircraft despite the high speed landing, which is why this is a contributing factor,” the report stated.

Is there something that run nicely on that jet ?

 

[BON PLAN]

The jet valued at almost $176 million as declared a total loss.

It is the double that some are boasting on this forum....

 

[BON PLAN]

The control software “became saturated and unresponsive, and ultimately biased the flight control surfaces toward nose down

LOL.
So many computing power and the FBW are out.... incredible.

 

[Immanuel]

Eglin F-35 Crash Blamed on Landing Speed, but Software, Helmet, Oxygen Also Faulted
https://www.airforcemag.com/eglin-f...peed-but-software-helmet-oxygen-also-faulted/

Excessive landing speed primarily caused the May 19 crash of an F-35A at Eglin Air Force Base, Fla., though faulty flight control logic, issues with helmet-mounted display, the jet’s oxygen system, and ineffective simulator training and were all contributing factors, according to an Air Force investigation.
An Accident Investigation Board found the main reason for the crash was the pilot setting a “speed hold” of 202 knots indicated airspeed for the landing, which was 50 knots too fast, while the jet’s approach angle was also too shallow, according to the report released Sept. 30.
The second main cause was the tail flight control surfaces “conflicting” with the pilot’s apparent correct efforts to recover the jet after it bounced on the runway, a problem the Air Force said was a “previously undiscovered anomaly in the aircraft’s flight control logic.” The plane and pilot “quickly fell out of sync” as the flight computer commanded nose down while the pilot commanded nose up, attempting to abort the landing and go around. Sensing that he was being “ignored” by the airplane, the pilot ejected,
sustaining significant but non-life-threatening injuries.
Furthermore, the helmet-mounted display was misaligned and “distracted the pilot during a critical phase of flight,” the AIB determined. The aircraft’s breathing system also caused excessive fatigue—leading to “cognitive degradation,” while ineffective simulator instruction meant the pilot lacked sufficient knowledge of the aircraft’s flight control system.
The 58th Fighter Squadron aircraft rolled after the ejection and struck runway. was declared a total loss. The jet valued at almost $176 million as declared a total loss. The pilot had shards of the canopy and other foreign objects lodged in his eye and arm, and a spinal compression injury.
The report did not discuss corrective actions or flight safety restrictions as a result of the accident. The Air Force and Lockheed Martin referred all queries to the F-35 Joint Program Office, which did not offer immediate comment. Air Education and Training Command did not immediately respond to questions.
The crash occurred at the end of a night mission in which the pilot, an instructor, was coaching a student on air combat techniques. Upon returning to base, he set the excessive speed hold at 202 knots—which the investigation said is “not an authorized maneuver”—and a shallow angle of attack of 5.2 degrees, vice the desired 13 degrees. The pilot failed to disengage speed hold at the appropriate time, and there are no “audible warnings” for this dangerous configuration, the report said.
The jet touched down nearly simultaneously on all landing gear with such force that the nose gear pushed back up, causing the jet to become airborne again. As the pilot tried to recover, the jet and pilot got out of sync due to “multiple conflicting flight control inputs.”
The control software “became saturated and unresponsive, and ultimately biased the flight control surfaces toward nose down,” when the pilot was going to afterburner and trying to raise the nose and gain altitude. “Feeling confused, helpless and ignored,” the pilot ejected.
The investigation determined that three seconds of pilot input “was not enough time to overcome that saturation” and the flight control system failed to re-orient the aircraft for a go-around. The entire mishap occurred within five seconds of the initial touchdown.
The F-35 senses when its weight is on the wheels, and this biases the flight controls to keep the nose down. This aspect of flight control laws is not in the flight manual or syllabus, and “the flight control system is complex; there are too many sub-modes of the [control laws] to describe” in courseware. “Nevertheless, there exists a deficiency in the depths of the [control laws] logic and flight control systems knowledge in F-35A baseline manuals and academics,” the report states.
During the attempted landing, the pilot experienced a helmet-mounted display misalignment at night for the first time, with the HMD “misaligned low as opposed to high.” This caused the jet to come in too high for landing, conflicting with inertial landing system data and visual cues.
The pilot “fought his own instincts to push further into the darkness short of the runway to correct his trajectory,” the report stated. While crews train for HMD-out situations, they don’t train for misalignments, according to the Air Force.
Instead of easing workload, the helmet seems to have added to it in this instance.
“The focus required to mentally filter the degraded symbology, green glow of the HMD projector, visually acquire nighttime runway cues, correct and then set an aimpoint, fight the … darkness short of the runway, and monitor glide path trends, distracted the [pilot] from engaging the [approach power compensator] or slowing to final approach speed,” the AIB said. The “green glow” worsens due to feedback as the aircraft descends, and the pilot reported having to “squint through” it to pick environmental cues.”
The jet was from Low-Rate Initial Production Lot 6—the only one from that batch at Eglin. There were some corrective technical orders for the helmet system, but they were not deemed urgent and required depot assistance to make, the report said.
The pilot reported that flying the jet was more “draining” than his previous aircraft, the F-15E. The report said the F-35’s unique air
system, which requires a “work of breathing,” has that effect on many pilots. The pilot’s experience is “supported by emerging research” on the F-35A’s systems that “there appears to be a physiological toll taken on a pilot’s cognitive capacities as a result of breathing through the on-demand oxygen system,” the report said. The pilot reported that on a scale of one to ten, his cognitive degradation was “four out of ten on a routine basis.”
The report said flying the F-35A in instrument landing system mode is “not a mundane task,” which “could have been made more challenging” in the May mishap “by the reported level of cognitive degradation” from distractions, stress, lack of sleep, and the work it took the pilot to breathe. These factors could have contributed to the pilot’s “vulnerability to distractions” during the mishap landing, according to investigators.
On the issue of simulators, the report states that the systems “do not accurately represent the aircraft flight dynamics seen in this scenario.” In the simulator, the aircraft can be recovered after a hard bounce, and “two members of the AIB team were also able to land” in the simulator under the same conditions.
Lockheed Martin’s own report on the incident “verified the disjoint between actual [mishap aircraft] performance and the simulator model” adding that “the pitch rate sensitivity evident in flight was not observed in piloted simulation or initial attempts to match the maneuver with offline simulation.”
If the mishap pilot “did not have the negative learning from the simulator, he might have been able to recover the aircraft despite the high speed landing, which is why this is a contributing factor,” the report stated.

The report, which the Air Force posted online Sept. 30, also listed multiple pilot mistakes or factors that investigators said significantly contributed to the crash on Eglin’s Runway 30. They found the pilot was fatigued and, as a result, “experienced cognitive degradation” was also distracted at a critical point in the flight due to a misaligned helmet-mounted display. The pilot tried to land with the speed hold engaged and used an alternate cross-check method, and lacked some key knowledge about the fighter’s flight control logic.

LRIP 6 & 7 Contract Agreements | F-35 Lightning II

The official website of the F-35 Lightning II. The Joint Strike Fighter is the next generation fighter to support the US Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, United Kingdom and defense partners in Australia, Canada, Denmark, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, and Turkey.

www.f35.com

LRIP 6 F135 Engines Contract | F-35 Lightning II

The official website of the F-35 Lightning II. The Joint Strike Fighter is the next generation fighter to support the US Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, United Kingdom and defense partners in Australia, Canada, Denmark, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, and Turkey.

www.f35.com

Sufficient training and enough rest is important.

Also Lot 6 the cost of the F-35A was around $103 million + Engine $29 million = $132 million. The $176 million is way over.

Lot-6 LRIP has the older Gen helmet as well. Helmet or any other kit can malfunction in flight, as long as the main display and instruments is functional he could have landed it. There can be additional warnings added off course to deal with dangerous landing conditions.

 

[Immanuel]

At least F35 succeed : it shoot down a KC 130 J !!!!

Rafale jet crash 'likely caused' by mid-air collision

Searchers have found pieces of the two French Rafale fighter jets that crashed into the Mediterranean during a test flight on Thursday. Naval officials believe the crash was probably caused by a mid-air…

www.france24.com

Rafale succeeded in fratricide. Chill nigga.

 

[Fonck83]

Unfortunately, the HMDS has not yet lived up to that potential. The daytime situational awareness and targeting capability that the HMDS offers is a game changer, but almost every pilot interviewed complained that the HMDS has significant issues that unnecessarily complicate otherwise administrative or mundane chores in a night environment.


Many of the tasks associated with employing fighters at night are considered routine—even pedestrian by the standards of the profession. Taking off and landing, flying formation, even air-to-air refueling at night are so well practiced that they are considered the equivalent of a walk in the park for the average fighter pilot. Hundreds of repetitions refine hand-eye coordination to a point where pilots are so comfortable with those tasks that they execute them while sharing their attention with other, often much more complex, issues. During combat ops, for example, many pilots will continue to listen to the active employment (radio) frequency in order to build or maintain their situational awareness on the battlefield while they are on the tanker boom, actively receiving fuel. That ability changes considerably when visual acuity drops in bad weather, or when a critical system fails or begins to perform below standard. Depending on the severity, those situations can test a pilot’s every faculty.


The F-35A’s HMDS was designed to simplify combat employment at night by blending the inputs from the night vision camera (NVC) and the DAS, along with the data normally projected on the HUD, such as airspeed, flight attitude, and weapons systems displays. Unfortunately, night system interface issues within the HMDS have made many mundane tasks so challenging that, in many cases, they become all consuming. A majority of the experienced pilots interviewed spoke of those problems, with some going so far as to say that they considered air-to-air refueling or “tanking” a near-emergency procedure. An F-16 Weapons Instructor Course (WIC) graduate with several hundred hours in the F-35A said: “Tanking at night gets my full attention and there are times where the visuals get really disorienting. Fixing the HMDS is an urgent operational need.” A former A-10 instructor with equal time in the F-35A went on to say: “On several occasions, the double vision the system projected on to my visor was so bad that I had to close one eye to get on the ground [land] safely.”


The HMDS has significant issues that unnecessarily complicate otherwise administrative tasks in a night environment, and fixing this system is an urgent operational need.

The F-35A Fighter Is the Most Dominant and Lethal Multi-Role Weapons System in the World: Now Is the Time to Ramp Up Production

In February 2018, the Defense Department’s F-35 Joint Program Office began to field the combat employment software for the F-35A. The software, referred to as Block 3F, or simply 3F, delivers the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program’s full operational capability to the Air Force. The changes and...

www.heritage.org

 

[BON PLAN]

Unfortunately, the HMDS has not yet lived up to that potential. The daytime situational awareness and targeting capability that the HMDS offers is a game changer, but almost every pilot interviewed complained that the HMDS has significant issues that unnecessarily complicate otherwise administrative or mundane chores in a night environment.


Many of the tasks associated with employing fighters at night are considered routine—even pedestrian by the standards of the profession. Taking off and landing, flying formation, even air-to-air refueling at night are so well practiced that they are considered the equivalent of a walk in the park for the average fighter pilot. Hundreds of repetitions refine hand-eye coordination to a point where pilots are so comfortable with those tasks that they execute them while sharing their attention with other, often much more complex, issues. During combat ops, for example, many pilots will continue to listen to the active employment (radio) frequency in order to build or maintain their situational awareness on the battlefield while they are on the tanker boom, actively receiving fuel. That ability changes considerably when visual acuity drops in bad weather, or when a critical system fails or begins to perform below standard. Depending on the severity, those situations can test a pilot’s every faculty.


The F-35A’s HMDS was designed to simplify combat employment at night by blending the inputs from the night vision camera (NVC) and the DAS, along with the data normally projected on the HUD, such as airspeed, flight attitude, and weapons systems displays. Unfortunately, night system interface issues within the HMDS have made many mundane tasks so challenging that, in many cases, they become all consuming. A majority of the experienced pilots interviewed spoke of those problems, with some going so far as to say that they considered air-to-air refueling or “tanking” a near-emergency procedure. An F-16 Weapons Instructor Course (WIC) graduate with several hundred hours in the F-35A said: “Tanking at night gets my full attention and there are times where the visuals get really disorienting. Fixing the HMDS is an urgent operational need.” A former A-10 instructor with equal time in the F-35A went on to say: “On several occasions, the double vision the system projected on to my visor was so bad that I had to close one eye to get on the ground [land] safely.”


The HMDS has significant issues that unnecessarily complicate otherwise administrative tasks in a night environment, and fixing this system is an urgent operational need.

The F-35A Fighter Is the Most Dominant and Lethal Multi-Role Weapons System in the World: Now Is the Time to Ramp Up Production

In February 2018, the Defense Department’s F-35 Joint Program Office began to field the combat employment software for the F-35A. The software, referred to as Block 3F, or simply 3F, delivers the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program’s full operational capability to the Air Force. The changes and...

www.heritage.org

unfortunately, the F35 is only a single pilot one... too many tasks for a sole pilot?

 

[BON PLAN]

Landing Speed Was The Main Cause Of F-35A Crash At Eglin AFB: Report - Fighter Jets World

An F-35A Lightning II Fighting flies past the Wasatch Mountains by Hill Air Force Base on Dec 7, 201

fighterjetsworld.com

"the aircraft, valued at $175,983,949, rolled, caught fire, and was completely destroyed. "

Where are the less than 100$ million F35 ???

 

[Flying Dagger]

Landing Speed Was The Main Cause Of F-35A Crash At Eglin AFB: Report - Fighter Jets World

An F-35A Lightning II Fighting flies past the Wasatch Mountains by Hill Air Force Base on Dec 7, 201

fighterjetsworld.com

"the aircraft, valued at $175,983,949, rolled, caught fire, and was completely destroyed. "

Where are the less than 100$ million F35 ???

The intitial batch was 132 mn dollar + the price dropped later in series production for F-35 A.

 

[Immanuel]

Landing Speed Was The Main Cause Of F-35A Crash At Eglin AFB: Report - Fighter Jets World

An F-35A Lightning II Fighting flies past the Wasatch Mountains by Hill Air Force Base on Dec 7, 201

fighterjetsworld.com

"the aircraft, valued at $175,983,949, rolled, caught fire, and was completely destroyed. "

Where are the less than 100$ million F35 ???

Lockheed, Pentagon reach handshake agreement on next F-35 lot, paving the way for an $80M jet next year

The agreement covers lots 12, 13 and 14.

www.defensenews.com

Lot 10 onwards F-35As have had a price under 100 million (Lot 11 is at $89 million). F-35B is still over 100 but will drop under 100 million in Lot-15. By Lot 14 F-35C is under $95 million.

The F-35B short-takeoff-and-vertical-landing model will fall to $108 million in Lot 12, $104.8 million in Lot 13 and $101.3 million in Lot 14. The F-35C variant, which can take off and land on aircraft carriers, also decreased in price, dropping to $103.1 million in Lot 12, $98.1 million in Lot 13 and $94.4 million in Lot 14.
Lockheed will deliver 149 F-35s in Lot 12, 160 aircraft in Lot 13 and 169 for Lot 14.

 

[Wisemarko]

Finland gets the green light to buy F-35, F-18 and billions of dollars in weapons

Valerie Insinna
WASHINGTON — The U.S. State Department on Oct. 9 approved the sale of the F/A-18EF Super Hornet and F-35 Joint Strike Fighter to Finland, paving the way for the nation to purchase American jets should either Boeing or Lockheed Martin win its ongoing fighter competition.
The two U.S. offerings are facing off in a multinational contest that also includes France’s Dassault Rafale, the British-made Eurofighter Typhoon and the Swedish Saab Gripen E/F.
The F-35 package, worth $12.5 billion, includes 64 F-35A conventional-takeoff-and-landing jets, 66 Pratt & Whitney F135 engines, and the aircraft’s associated communications and electronic warfare systems. Notably, it contains not only the aircraft’s current logistics system — the troubled Autonomic Logistics Information System — but also its replacement — the Operational Data Integrated Network — which is under development.
Meanwhile, the Super Hornet package — worth an estimated $14.7 billion — includes 50 single-seat F/A-18E jets, eight double-seated F/A-18Fs and 14 EA-18G Growlers, which is the electronic attack variant. The package also includes 166 F414-GE-400 engines for the dual-engine fighter, Sniper targeting pods, AN/APG-79 radars, AN/ALR-67(V)3 electric warfare countermeasures receiving sets, and Next Generation Jammer Midband and advanced electronic attack kits for the EA-18G.
Both offers include a suite of munitions for the aircraft, including 500 Small Diameter Bomb II weapons, 150 AIM-9X missiles, 200 Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile-Extended Range weapons, Joint Standoff Weapons, Joint Direct Attack Munition kits that turn dumb bombs into precision-guided weapons, and assorted test and support gear for training and maintenance.
After the U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency posted the notification of the potential sale, Finland’s Ministry of Defence released a statement clarifying that the announcement represents an important procedural step forward for the HX Fighter Program, but that negotiations with all competitors are ongoing.
“The announcement of the notification procedure does not constitute a procurement decision by Finland, as the decision to procure multi-role fighters will be made by the Government in 2021,” the statement said. “Furthermore, the types and quantities of multi-role fighters and weapons specified in the notification do not represent the final content of the Finnish procurement package; instead, the list published by the DSCA indicates those items and quantities that the US administration is prepared to sell at this stage of the procurement process.”
Finland also addressed the price of the packages, which exceed the $12 billion budget set by the country for the total cost of the program.
“In the FMS procedure, the quantities and prices proposed for approval are generally set higher than what the purchasing country has indicated in its own request. The purpose of this formality is to avoid the need to submit a new and time-consuming Congressional Notification in the event that the purchasing country makes changes to the procurement package,” it said.

The winner of the HX competition will produce up to 64 fighters to replace Finland’s Boeing F/A-18C/D Hornets, which are expected to be retired by 2030. Instead of issuing a requirement for a particular number of aircraft with set capabilities, Finland is allowing the vendors to create packages of aircraft and weapons that best meet the Air Force’s operational needs — and the nation’s budget.
Despite financial setbacks to the country caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, Finland’s Defence Ministry in August proposed a massive 54 percent spending boost to the defense budget to $5.8 billion in 2021 (4.87 billion Euros), with much of the increase caused by the HX competition.