Mob Control Manager
- Feb 12, 2009
Guys I am starting this topic so that we can have a discussion on the essential elements to deter our enemy from using nuclear weapons on us.
India should have the capability to destroy 20 long range, 30 medium and 50 regional targets. These are based on ensuring enough destruction capability to deter any aggressive behavior from any quarters. If only modest numbers are available, it would mean a reverse kamikaze situation- a negligible, minuscule retaliatory strike on a challenger who has delivered excessive destruction to the Indian State in a first strike. As the Indian deterrent program is based on minimal testing and low yield devices (< 45kt) , it would require three times this numbers to assure destruction. These numbers could come down with further delivery vehicle tests to prove reliability and accuracy; again if credible stewardship program is established, new payload details are revealed and accepted by the challengers, the numbers could go down.
Then how many do we have? Any article on how many our enemies would need?Articles #1955 , How many Nuclear Warheads does India Need?
A retaliatory strike capability to destroy eight to 10 major population and industrial centres would be adequate to meet the requirements of deterrence. For 10 counter value targets to be destroyed in the adversary country, a total of 40 nuclear warheads, at the scale of four 20 to 40 Kiloton warheads per target, would be adequate to cause unacceptable damage in a retaliatory nuclear strike if the probable error (CEP) of the Agni IRBM delivery systems is taken to be 1,000 metres and a destruction assurance level of 0.7 (about 70 percent) is considered acceptable.
If the efficiency or overall reliability of India's nuclear delivery system is taken to be between 0.5 and 0.6 (50 to 60 per cent), a reasonable assumption for a modern nuclear force, then 75 warheads must actually be launched for about 40 to 45 warheads to explode successfully over their targets as some missiles may fail to take off, some may veer off course, some may be intercepted and some warheads may either fail to explode or may explode in a sub-optimal manner. Hence, a minimum of 75 warheads and, of course, their delivery systems must survive the enemy's first strike on Indian targets and be available for retaliation.
Despite the best possible concealment and dispersion measures approximately 50 per cent of the nuclear warheads and delivery systems may be destroyed in a first strike by the adversary. It would, therefore, be reasonable to plan a warhead stocking level of at least twice the number of warheads that are actually required to be launched, that is, 150 warheads. The last aspect to be catered for is a prudent level of reserves for larger than anticipated damage to own nuclear forces in a first strike and for unforeseen eventualities. Escalation control and war termination strategies would also be dependent on the ability to launch counter-recovery strikes and some fresh strikes. One-third the required number of warheads should be adequate as reserves. Hence, the total requirement works out to 200 nuclear warheads for a minimum deterrence doctrine with a no first use strategy if 10 major population and industrial centres are to be attacked in a retaliatory strike to achieve a 70 to 80 per cent assurance level of destruction.
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