China losing its grip on Pakistan
China losing its grip on Pakistan
By Hari Sud
Column: Abroad ViewPublished: July 03, 2009
Toronto, ON, Canada, — Since the early 1990s, China has taken advantage of opportunities to move strategically and militarily closer to Pakistan, always with an eye on rival India. China took advantage of U.S. pique over Pakistan from 1992 to 2001, and of political instability in Pakistan induced by the Pakistani army. China befriended former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and offered the country missile technology via North Korea.
China also helped Pakistan build its nuclear reactor and stockpile plutonium to offset India’s advantage. The military partnership included building a Pakistani version of a Chinese jet fighter, and a military port at Gwadar in Balochistan province at the apex of the Arabian Sea. China also supplied other military hardware, although inferior, that could not be procured in the West or Russia.
The United States from 1992 until 2001 lost interest in Pakistan after the Soviet Union broke up and interest in Afghanistan waned. But to maintain leverage with the Pakistani government, the United States continued supplying it with spare parts for military hardware given earlier and other low-key financial assistance.
The United States was not happy about the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan, but supported attempts to bring political stability to the war-torn nation. The Taliban seemed to provide just that – albeit under brutal Islamic law. Unhindered, they were also busy inviting like-minded individuals like Osama bin Laden into their midst.
India in 1997 tested its atom bomb, and so did Pakistan. An overconfident Pakistani military overthrew the civilian government and began a fresh military offensive with India in the Kargil Mountains of Indian-administered Kashmir. This was a bad move by Pakistan.
While the United States opposed the overthrow of Pakistan’s civilian government, it also disliked Pakistan detonating the atom bomb despite advice against it. Further, it hated the Kargil misadventure. From 1997 till 2001, Pakistan was in the U.S. bad books. Concurrently China accelerated its low-key approach to draw Pakistan into its orbit.
Then came the Sept. 11, 2001 terror attack on the World Trade Center in New York, and the days of the Taliban were numbered. They ran to Pakistan’s border region to seek protection. It was the Pakistanis who created the Taliban, so their protection from the big, ugly and ruthless Americans was essential.
Former U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell in September, 2001, gave Pakistan three days to decide whether it was “with us or against us.” Pakistan reluctantly joined the United States to punish the perpetrators of 9/11, but privately supported the Taliban and Osama bin Laden.
Playing a double game, Pakistan asked the United States for quick military and economic aid in 2001; at the same time it sought Chinese aid to build the Gwadar port to offset India’s naval advantages. Also, in 2007 new medium-quality fighters from China appeared in Pakistani skies.
China played a good game, but it miscalculated. It realized the Pakistanis could shift over to the U.S. orbit in a jiffy if a suitable offer was made. That offer came in early 2009, when U.S. President Barack Obama’s administration turned sympathetic toward Pakistan’s plight and offered long-term aid to the tune of US$1.5 billion. China could have matched the offer, but refusing the U.S. offer would have had grave consequences for Pakistan.
The new Obama administration has understood Pakistan’s double play between the Taliban and the United States, and has again asked them to choose. To ensure continued economic and military support, Pakistan chose to go with the United States, and began its war on the Pakistani Taliban. Now with Pakistan firmly in the U.S. orbit, China-Pakistan relations have come under strain.
Pakistan supported the Chinese 50 years ago only in pique against India. In return, China showered it with gifts and diplomatic and military support. With this China thought it had effectively neutralized India. But the United States changed the equation completely.
In the last 20 years, an overconfident China has been exerting pressure on India’s northern border. Until the late 1980s the subject was dormant, as late Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping willed it to be placed on the back burner. However, a new breed of Chinese leaders began sniping as soon as Deng died.
To make their point, they built an economically unimportant China-Tibet rail link. This rail link is miserably weak because of its construction on permafrost. It also upgraded its military infrastructure along the Indian border to intimidate India.
All these issues make the region’s geopolitics interesting if viewed collectively. Pakistan is back in the U.S. fold but internally it is stuck in a fight with Pushtun tribesmen, who form the Pakistani version of Afghanistan’s Taliban. The urban insurgency unleashed by angry tribesmen has turned more serious.
India, sensing a bit of a respite from constant insurgency in Kashmir, has begun reinforcing its northern border in Tibet to face China. The Chinese, unable to find a strategic equilibrium in South Asia, have upped the propaganda against India with India bashing as their new pastime.
U.S. State Department officials and National Security Advisor James L. Jones, on a recent spate of visits to the region, have stressed the need to resume the India-Pakistan dialogue that was halted after the Mumbai terror attack last November.
U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s proposed visit may set the political tone for the upcoming India-Pakistan talks. Progress will depend on how much pressure the United States can exert on Pakistan to relent on its terrorism agenda. If progress is significant, Obama may visit India and Pakistan and witness a firm handshake between the warring nations.
None of this could be to China’s liking. China wants Pakistan to keep its daggers drawn toward India.
Realizing that Pakistan is less of a threat now, India has begun countering the Chinese threat in Tibet, hoping to neutralize China’s build-up over the past 20 years. Assuming the Chinese can deploy an additional 10 divisions from their reserves to augment their current strength of 14 divisions in Tibet, it is still inadequate to mount an attack on India. Half of this force is needed to keep Tibet calm while the remaining force would face an Indian gauntlet in the Himalayas.
Not only that, India has eight divisions in the eastern sector facing China and will deploy an additional 40,000 heavily equipped mountain and snow warfare troops this year. In addition, two divisions keep an eye on China in the West, reinforced by an additional 20,000 troops who have been reassigned as the threat from Pakistan has diminished. Presently, India can match China’s power.
India has upgraded a major military and air force base close to the Chinese border in the east. It will field a squadron of the mightiest fighter jet in the world, the SU-30MK1. This fighter jet in friendly combat with U.S. F-15Cs and F-16s scored nine out of ten victories. This squadron alone can not only neutralize the Chinese air force in Tibet, but also bomb the China-Tibet rail link by melting the permafrost on which it stands. Without it, China will have difficulty resupplying 400,000 troops in Tibet.
In international politics, shifting sand the way the Pakistanis have done is not unusual. The Americans did the same to Egypt in 1978 when they took Anwar Sadat out of the Middle East equation. The loser in that case was the Arab world. In the case of Pakistan moving into the U.S. orbit, the loser will be China. India will be a net gainer.
--
(Hari Sud is a retired vice president of C-I-L Inc., a former investment strategies analyst and international relations manager. A graduate of Punjab University and the University of Missouri, he has lived in Canada for the past 34 years. ©Copyright Hari Sud.)
