by Malcolm Davis
If Putin Dies | The War RoomMarch 13, 2015 @ 6:57 PM
I agree, the Putin in 'Wolf's Lair' scenario is perhaps one of the most interesting ones. Let's speculate on that for a moment. What if Russia were going to unleash a full scale invasion of Ukraine? Stratfor did a rather entertaining analysis on this a few days ago – see https://www.stratfor.com/video/wargaming-russias-military-options-ukraine though they followed it up with a very tactical level analysis on US-NATO response options which was a bit dissapointing due to the absence of strategic thought and the total absence of considering Russian escalation (see https://www.stratfor.com/sample/analysis/what-west-could-do ). Personally, I doubt that the US or NATO would respond to a Russian military campaign to grab all of eastern and southern Ukraine up to the Dneiper (which is what the first Stratfor link seems to suggest is possible) by intervening militarily in Ukraine as the second Stratfor analysis suggests, but the Russians could not assume there would be no response. So, maybe they are preparing for a 'big show' in Ukraine that could potentially touch off a direct Russia-NATO clash. If that were the case I doubt Putin would be carrying on with the daily business as usual in the Kremlin – all his attention would be focused on the possibility of a major war looming.
Let's just speculate that a new Russian offensive in Ukraine did see some sort of NATO response. Once again, I need to emphasize that I doubt this would happen. I don't think Obama would have the balls to confront the Russians eyeball to eyeball, and I don't think Europe is unified or has the resolve to do so without the Americans. But let's just say for argument's sake there was a response. A conventional military conflict in Ukraine between Russia and NATO could escalate very quickly indeed and whilst the Russians might have an immediate and regional military advantage, over time the correlation of forces would inevitably change in NATO's favour if Russia refrained from attacking NATO air bases and ports to prevent reinforcement. The Russians in this scenario would face three options – eventual defeat in Ukraine; conventional escalation by attacking NATO directly to prevent rapid reinforcement; or a rapid move to 'nuclear de-escalation'. Ukraine is a core interest to Moscow and I don't see how Putin could accept defeat and rollback at the hands of NATO forces and stay in power. That could bring on the very coup that is one of the other (more likely) explanations for his absence. So Russia either escalates conventionally by attacking NATO's rear to raise the cost of the conflict to unacceptable levels and prevent a NATO operational success in Ukraine, or he looks at the 'nuclear de-escalation' option.
The Russians talk openly about this option – the use of a single or small number of nuclear weapons to bring a conventional conflict to a close on terms favourable to Russia. Would a Russian nuclear attack – say with one weapon detonated in a manner to cause minimal casualties and destruction have the desired strategic effect of forcing NATO to pause and reconsider continuing a conventional battle? Or would NATO be forced to respond in kind? It's impossible to know how they would respond if the nuclear precipice were actually crossed for the first time since 1945. The Russians would know this too, and would have to be prepared for NATO counter-responses. If NATO did back off quickly, it would be a huge strategic victory for Russia because NATO credibility would be utterly gone. But is that worse than an escalating series of nuclear exchanges? The Russians could not guarantee that NATO would blink. NATO might call Moscow's bluff and fire a nuclear warning shot back in response, and then the ball is in Moscow's court.
Now, here's the interesting thing. At the moment the Russians have NO functioning missile early warning satellites. The last one failed a few weeks back. So they are entirely dependent on ground-based radar (their equivalent of BMEWS) to detect a nuclear attack from the West. That means they are not well placed to fight a nuclear war in a traditional sense. But if they had to do it now or in the next few weeks, would it not make sense for them to carry out a decapitation strike against key US and NATO political and military leadership, as well as nuclear command and control, in order to throw any nuclear response from the US into utter dissarray and maybe make it completely ineffective? If I were a Russian nuclear planner that's what I'd be thinking – fight asymmetrically to turn inferiority into advantage, even at the nuclear level.
So, if we are talking about the 'less likely' scenario of Putin preparing for some major escalation in Ukraine (or elsewhere – the Baltics?) that would have to entail preparation for potential nuclear war. All those Russian training missions with their bombers, and the nuclear command and control exercises in recent months would fit in with that.
Would this actually happen? I doubt it, and I think Tom's assessment that Putin is ill is probably the most likely explanation, or the possibility of a palace coup. But if we don't think about the unthinkable, then the unthinkable has a bad habit of biting us on the ass when we least expect it. If I were in STRATCOM, I'd be watching Russia's nuclear forces and their message traffic very carefully.