Chinese Aspiration for Aircraft Carrier

[SHASH2K2]

China's rising-power exuberance is becoming a problem.

There's long been bipartisan policy support in the United States for emphasizing cooperation with China while minimizing competition. President Barack Obama, who has said that Sino-American relations would 'shape the 21st Century,' subscribes to this precept. But it was also generally assumed that a re-emerging China would be intelligent and self-interested. Instead, China's recent diplomatic and military assertiveness, apparently fuelled by overconfidence, is creating consternation—especially over freedom of the seas.

It's logical that Chinese leaders would want a protracted period of quiescence rather than to draw attention to a gradual military build-up. China's long history has focused on continental power and China's eager, 'let's-do-business' attitude has been successful around the globe.

But as China has become more influential, it has also become uncharacteristically assertive in the diplomatic arena. This assertiveness is nowhere more evident than with its naval power, and is prompting many to ask if it is now verging on the reckless, particularly over the South China Sea.

Consider four separate points that on the surface seem unrelated but which all point to China's insatiable expectations—if not an actual 'string of pearls' strategy—in the maritime sea lanes of the Pacific and Indian Oceans:

–Professor Wang Jisi, one of China's most gifted academics dealing with the United States, wrote this month that whether conflict erupts between the region's major powers may depend on the role of the two navies;

–Another leading academic, Shen Dingli of Fudan University, extended the logic of the recent official assertion that the South China Sea is a 'core interest' of China when he wrote that: 'When the US ponders the idea of deploying its nuclear aircraft carrier in the Yellow Sea, very close to China, shouldn't China have the same feeling as the US did when the Soviet Union deployed missiles in Cuba?'

–A Chinese exchange student engaging in an intensive Washington scholarship programme asked recently whether conflict was inevitable between a rising China and a declining United States;

–And one of the highest-ranking figures in the foreign policymaking of President Hu Jintao's administration recently waved his finger at a senior US official and said, 'I know what you're up to,' in an apparent reference to US diplomatic engagement with a neighbouring country.

Alone, any one of these incidents could be dismissed. But what's troubling is that such statements are part of a trend in Chinese statements that go beyond arrogance. How else can one explain China's willingness to countenance Pyongyang's deadly mini-submarine sinking of a South Korean naval vessel this spring? China also condemned a planned US-South Korea regional naval exercise designed to send North Korea a warning that its murderous aggression must have consequences.


It's increasingly clear that Beijing may have misinterpreted a relatively passive but definitely welcoming set of international reactions to China's rise. And the combination of China's aggressive naval actions and maritime territorial claims suggests an alarming indicator: Chinese assertiveness over its region is growing as fast as China's wealth and perceived power trajectory. Beijing's unwelcome intent appears to give notice that China is opting out of the Global Commons, and that the Western Pacific is not to be accessible to all, but instead increasingly part of China's exclusive sphere of influence.

Nowhere is this more apparent than in China's attitude over the South China Sea, which recently has been defined as a 'core interest'—the same phrase Chinese use to refer to Tibet, Taiwan and Xinjiang. In the process, China is in effect dismissing the international concept of the Global Commons, which refers to the maritime, air, space and cyberspace domains that comprise the circulatory system of our globalized world. Because the Global Commons hold together the international world order based on near-uncontested access, the rule of law and freedom of manoeuvre, China's challenging of these principles puts it at direct odds with the United States.

[ No, China's Not Arrogant--an Interview with Yiyi Lu ]

Indeed, China seems to regard the maritime global commons in a proprietary fashion. For a given area, the Chinese wish either to dominate it or for others to stay away; in effect, in the Chinese view, there's no 'commons.' China calling the South China Sea a 'core concern' is an attempt to place clear, Chinese-declared limits on the ability of the international community to assert its rights under international law.

China has two types of arbitrary claims: an assertion that China's territorial seas extend into much of the South China Sea and the more recent claim that they have the right to control navigation and research activities, not just fishing and seabed resources, within their Exclusive Economic Zones. If not challenged, China's assertive incrementalism has international legal risks, since international law is built on norms.

In contrast, long-standing US diplomatic and military doctrine has been explicit that navies—including China's—have every right to operate on the high seas, even including in the territorial waters of other states. In support of this doctrine, Washington has attempted to establish a strong and open dialogue with the Chinese military. China, on the other hand, sees US operations inside the first island chain as impinging on its sovereignty, just as it has a very expansive interpretation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea as to its authority within its own (and contested) Exclusive Economic Zones. China's combination of its international legal strategies with naval force is telling: unlike the other claimants to the South China Sea, China backs up its words with military force.


The US Navy remains the strongest and only true blue-water naval force in the world and is the enabler and enforcer of much of the Global Commons, a system of free trade and unfettered economic and political access. As such, it appears to be the object of a different Chinese worldview, one of limited access for others and exclusive access for China. Meanwhile, the result of China's asymmetric anti-access and area-denial strategy is a growing Navy-killing array of ever more capable anti-ship missiles and other weapons. Beijing is trying to establish the precedent for limited access on its own terms and diminished freedom of navigation.

Time would be well spent in developing strategies, capacities and interoperability with allies and partners in the region. A parallel international emphasis on ensured access to the Global Commons would remind that the international community expects a rules-based system, and not one based on arbitrary uses of power and exertions of ownership. Freedom of the Global Commons provides a rationale for greater cooperation among like-minded countries, including support for partner navies and Air Forces in the region.

At the same time, the United States should step up naval and air cooperation with regional partners. Options include freedom of navigation missions; anti-submarine warfare practice; missile defence collaboration; and non-traditional missions such as humanitarian assistance and disaster response as well as counter-piracy.

While Beijing will want to stipulate that it is, after all, simply asserting its own Monroe Doctrine, a strong Navy and Air Force working in tandem with allies and partners is one of the most effective reminders that the analogy is specious, and that the maritime approaches to East Asia are Commons that must be preserved for access by all.

Some might protest that assertive actions will play into the hands of hardliners in the People's Liberation Army. China's recent penchant for aggressive action would argue otherwise. The United States and its allies should promote and support an international legal and security environment that induces China to choose cooperation over confrontation and recklessness. Beijing needs to be reminded that all parties are prepared for useful dialogue and welcome opportunities for meaningful cooperation with China, but that aggressive behavior will be met with strength, the necessary bulwark for effective discussions.

In short: talk to China, organize the region and preserve US and allied maritime and aerospace power. It's in everybody's interests.

Patrick M. Cronin is Senior Advisor and Asia Security Program Senior Director at the Center for a New American Security; Paul S. Giarra is President of Global Strategies and Transformation.
http://the-diplomat.com/2010/07/23/china%E2%80%99s-dangerous-arrogance/

 

[SHASH2K2]

China's pro-missile navy sinks carriers
By Peter J Brown

The United States-South Korea response to the recent sinking of the South Korean warship Cheonan - supposedly by North Korea - includes the arrival of US Navy (USN) aircraft carrier USS George Washington along with other US warships at the South Korean port of Busan, much to China's chagrin.

"Invincible Spirit", a joint US-South Korea exercise that is about to get underway, will be sending North Korea a strong message - "Don't try this again."

Beijing is very irritable and nervous as a result.

"The moment is truly delicate," said Zhu Feng, a professor of International Studies and deputy director of international strategy


center at Peking University in Beijing. "Beijing is also worried about the possibility of the situation to spill into a military collision with North Korea. That's why there is opposition from China. The joint exercise is rocking the boat." [1]

When the USS George Washington last visited Busan in late 2008, there were few Chinese maritime surveillance assets in space. In contrast, due to the launch of new Chinese satellites, the George Washington was closely watched as it sailed from its home base in Yokosuka in early July until its arrival in Busan almost two weeks later.

Just prior to the start of "Invincible Spirit", US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates made it clear in Seoul that regardless of any eyes in the sky, China would not influence decisions made about the exercises.

"These exercises are off the coast of Korea, not off the coast of China," Gates said. "These are exercises like we have conducted for decades. We have conducted them in both the West and East seas, so there's nothing provocative about them at all. There should be no doubt in anybody's mind that we intend to exercise in both seas." [2]

China's People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) will soon deploy its own carriers, but among other things, China must decide what kind of carriers to build, and, if the US model for naval warfare with its dependence on huge super-carriers and carrier battle groups (CBGs) is the right one for China.

If nothing else, having a US carrier so close at hand will focus China's attention on very important carrier-related matters.

More than a decade has passed since a US aircraft carrier sailed into the Yellow Sea. Things are vastly different now. For example, China has had an opportunity to study the US "AirSea Battle" (ASB) concept in 2010 which merges air and naval forces into a single, more effective fighting unit. ASB might be adapted by China which cannot divorce the current movements of the George Washington from the efforts of the US to refine and implement ASB. [3]

"The acquisition of an aircraft carrier and carrier aviation was something that was clearly an ambition and an objective of the PLAN," said Admiral Gary Roughead, chief of naval operations, at a 2009 news conference in Beijing. "The advent of an aircraft carrier on the part of the PLAN really does not change the nature of our operations at all." [4]

James Bussert, co-author of "PLAN Combat Systems Technology 1949-2010", which will be published by the US Naval Institute Press next spring, is convinced that China does not want to duplicate the world policeman role that USN CBG's serve.

"China's goals do not require CBGs. They are achieving their goals via economic and political means in South America and Africa, and the power of the US Navy is not a factor," said Bussert.

While CBGs might give China certain advantages in Taiwan, in the South China Sea and along the routes used by ships transporting oil to China from the Middle East and Africa, the costs and the fact that CBGs are not required in order for China to achieve its national goals are distinct disadvantages.

"They do not have a superpower face-off agenda that the USSR had," said Bussert. "China believes the USN will retain its successful CBGs."

The first PLAN carrier is expected to have the keel laid by the end of 2010. A second hull should follow within a year. Both will rely on a ski-jump flight deck configuration, and not the steam catapult-based launch systems used on US carriers.

As for China's purchase in 1998 of the 67,000-ton Ukrainian-built Varyag, it is currently being fitted in the port of Dalian. It will likely serve as a carrier training platform for pilots flying J-15 aircraft until the indigenous PLAN carriers are commissioned around 2014.

As this work proceeds, retired Rear Admiral Eric McVadon, who serves as a senior advisor at the Virginia-based Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, also does not envision China acquiring enormous super-carriers.

"China is more likely to have smaller, less capable carriers suited to air support of surface action groups that are carrying out missions such as sea-lane security beyond the range of land-based air from Chinese bases," said McVadon. "The USN is not a model for the PLAN. Chinese leaders do not contemplate an ability to conduct massive air strikes against naval forces or targets ashore. Carrier aviation as done by the USN does not serve China's purposes. Having organic air available to PLAN units trying to deter attacks on tankers en route to China does make sense."

Because the PLA does not provide any official data on its future strategic naval modernization plans, US and Western experts must always rely on vast array of sources to determine what the PLAN has underway.

"A series of Hong Kong and Japanese newspaper articles from January 2009 citing Chinese shipbuilding and military sources indicated that the PLA was going to build two new Varyag style carriers, and then two larger nuclear-powered carriers," said Richard Fisher, senior fellow at the Washington, DC-based International Assessment and Strategy Center. "In the past, other PLA sources have indicated to US visitors their desire to build up to six carriers."

Over time, China will become more strategically savvy and will introduce conventional military power projection elements into arenas where it has long built significant elements of political and economic power.

"Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Africa are all areas where by the 2020s the PLA could be employing displays or usage of military power to sway political outcomes that benefit China's economic and political interests," said Fisher. "However, we should also expect that China will seek to make military deployments to South America a 'routine' element of its expanding political and economic power networks there."

This might explain what Brazilian Defense Minister Nelson Jobim had in mind when he issued a heads up in May 2009. Then, Brazilian President Luiz Inacio "Lula" da Silva flew to Beijing to formalize plans for a joint Brazil-China pilot training program to be staged aboard Brazil's new carrier. The current status of this program is unclear. [5]

According to Toshi Yoshihara, associate professor in the Strategy and Policy Department at the US Naval War College in Rhode Island, China will make prudent investments in a wide of variety naval capabilities as part of a very deliberate process of fleet experimentation for their surface forces.

"They are acquiring small batches of the same class of ships to work out their preferences and needs. They are not going to bankrupt themselves by overspending on carriers," said Yoshihara. "They have learned from the Soviet experience and have pledged never to repeat the fatal mistake of engaging in unwinnable arms races."

China is still grappling with its approach to the constraints imposed by the so-called "first island chain" which extends south from the Japanese archipelago down to Indonesia.

"Many Chinese analysts conceive of the island chain as a physical barrier and, more importantly, they see most countries that occupy the island chain, particularly Japan, as either friendly to the US and/or hostile to China," said Yoshihara. "Their main concern is how to break through the island chain in times of crisis or war. Naval penetrations by the PLAN through the waterways along the Ryukyu Islands since 2004 should be understood as exercises in breaking out of the maritime straitjacket."

For this and other reasons, building carriers is deemed far less of a priority than the PLAN's current and ongoing submarine buildup.

"Many Chinese strategists clearly understand that a naval force structure centered on the carrier would play to US strengths," said Yoshihara.

Back in May 2007, therefore, Admiral Timothy Keating, former commander of the US Pacific Command, caught the Chinese off guard perhaps when he implied that the US might be willing to provide assistance to China if it proceeded with the construction of its carriers.

Keating made the offer after he tried to convey the complexity of the carrier universe to Vice Admiral Wu Shengli, who is commander of the PLAN.

Major General Yang Chunchang of China's Academy of Military Sciences, for example, told the China-run Hong Kong daily, Wen Wei Po, that he "was concerned about [the implications of] Keating's remarks." [6]

Some Chinese were concerned that the US might foil the Chinese carrier program, while others wondered why the US would make such an offer at a time when the US was so intent upon halting the sale of advanced weaponry to China by the European Union.

US offers aside, an established two-step plan which involves China's initial acquisition of medium-sized aircraft carriers, first, may now be in motion. This will enable the PLAN to gain significant operational experience, and thus set the stage for the acquisition of very large carriers later on. [7]

China's development
of a new generation of land-based anti-ship missiles - many expected to see a test firing of China's new DF-21 medium-range, anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) during China's recent naval exercise in the East China Sea - suggests that while China slowly inches ahead with its carrier program, the PLAN is favoring a missile-centric strategy.

"Missiles will not replace warships. PLAN warships have relied on large, long-range cruise missiles ever since the early 1950's, continuing to today. The few air and submarine platforms can never provide the multi-purpose capabilities of surface warships," said Bussert.

Missile technologies may shift the offensive-defensive balance in favor of the defense, but this is not a new trend.

"From a historical perspective, changes in the offense-defense balance are cyclical," said Yoshihara. "World War II brought mobility back to sea power. Perhaps we are swinging back in the other direction."

Again, this bolsters the argument that many are making about the fact that undersea platforms will emerge as the most suitable alternatives for the future as a result.

"This brings up basic questions about sea control, a staple of US naval power. Would such a move require us to rethink or redefine what we mean by sea control?" asks Yoshihara.

The US which is already deploying its prototype "Prompt Global Strike" platform in space and placing lasers on its warships eventually will devise other means for countering advanced anti-ship missiles and even ASBMs, especially because this technology will soon be acquired by Iran and North Korea as well.

"It is also necessary for the US to develop new multi-role medium range missiles that can provide missile defense and surface strike, even anti-ship capabilities. Such missiles should be sold to US allies, to facilitate a near-term maritime missile balance, so that any PLA use of ASBMs would guarantee the immediate loss of its surface fleet," said Fisher.

McVadon remains optimistic that everyone will focus on the bigger picture, and that the USN and PLAN will emerge as partners on the high seas.

"It is more likely that USN forces 10 years from now will be operating with a PLAN moderate-sized carrier chasing pirates or providing disaster relief somewhere west of Malacca than it is for USN forces attacking a PLAN carrier in a Taiwan conflict," said McVadon. If this peaceful partnership is not soon viewed by both countries as a more acceptable outcome, "then we need to devote enormous effort to change things."

Speaking to a few hundred US troops in South Korea prior to the beginning of "Invincible Spirit", Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the US Joints Chiefs of Staff, said that he was downright concerned about what China is doing. Mullen highlighted China's "fairly significant investment" in high-end equipment including carriers, satellites, and anti-ship missiles. However, it was the absence of transparency, not the equipment itself that troubled Mullen most of all.

"It is difficult to figure out where they're headed," he said.

Chances are, they will soon be heading to sea aboard their new carrier.
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/LG23Ad01.html

 

[SHASH2K2]

An optimal aircraft carrier strategy


The recent war of words surrounding the deployment of the US aircraft carrier George Washington close to China's waters has once again sparked debate on the symbolic and practical significance of the large naval vessel.
http://opinion.globaltimes.cn/editorial/2010-07/557645.html
How would an aircraft carrier change the dynamics of China's rise and how would it affect the regional geopolitical landscape? The outcome depends on China's overall aircraft carrier strategy.

An aircraft carrier is a crucial element of a modern naval force. Currently there are 22 aircraft carriers in active service in nine countries. China is the only UN Security Council permanent member that does not have an aircraft carrier.

The public strongly desires an aircraft carrier because of the prestige associated with one, the power it projects to the rest of the world and the sense of defensive security it provides.

There is a lot of speculation about China's aircraft carrier plan.

Given a carrier's incredible size, it could be wrongly perceived as Chinese military assertiveness, and may create unnecessary tension.

In the South China Sea, for example, where tensions occasionally spill over, an aircraft carrier might help China achieve victory in small-scale clashes in disputed waters. However, the win might turn a relatively small dispute into long running hostility that destabilizes bilateral relationships.

But on the high seas, an aircraft carrier could be an effective tool to maintain order, and it could win China respect from neighboring countries.

The number of the aircraft carriers China hopes to posses should also be well pondered. Too small a fleet and it may be ineffective, but an oversized fleet will eat up too much of the defense budget.

The best deployment of an aircraft carrier would be for effective deterrence and to strengthen China's military power. A carrier could also provide a platform to launch industrial and technological upgrades.

Domestically there is also opposition against building or acquiring aircraft carriers given the enormous cost and maintenance difficulties.

There has been some support internationally for China's ambition of aircraft carriers, as the Chinese navy would assume a bigger role on the world stage.

The Chinese government has kept tacit over its aircraft carrier strategy, though many signs suggest that they are elements that would make the Chinese navy complete.


A sound aircraft carrier strategy should be put in place to optimize its future functions.

 

[SHASH2K2]

China's pro-missile navy sinks carriers
By Peter J Brown

The United States-South Korea response to the recent sinking of the South Korean warship Cheonan - supposedly by North Korea - includes the arrival of US Navy (USN) aircraft carrier USS George Washington along with other US warships at the South Korean port of Busan, much to China's chagrin.

"Invincible Spirit", a joint US-South Korea exercise that is about to get underway, will be sending North Korea a strong message - "Don't try this again."

Beijing is very irritable and nervous as a result.

"The moment is truly delicate," said Zhu Feng, a professor of International Studies and deputy director of international strategy


center at Peking University in Beijing. "Beijing is also worried about the possibility of the situation to spill into a military collision with North Korea. That's why there is opposition from China. The joint exercise is rocking the boat." [1]

When the USS George Washington last visited Busan in late 2008, there were few Chinese maritime surveillance assets in space. In contrast, due to the launch of new Chinese satellites, the George Washington was closely watched as it sailed from its home base in Yokosuka in early July until its arrival in Busan almost two weeks later.

Just prior to the start of "Invincible Spirit", US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates made it clear in Seoul that regardless of any eyes in the sky, China would not influence decisions made about the exercises.

"These exercises are off the coast of Korea, not off the coast of China," Gates said. "These are exercises like we have conducted for decades. We have conducted them in both the West and East seas, so there's nothing provocative about them at all. There should be no doubt in anybody's mind that we intend to exercise in both seas." [2]

China's People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) will soon deploy its own carriers, but among other things, China must decide what kind of carriers to build, and, if the US model for naval warfare with its dependence on huge super-carriers and carrier battle groups (CBGs) is the right one for China.

If nothing else, having a US carrier so close at hand will focus China's attention on very important carrier-related matters.

More than a decade has passed since a US aircraft carrier sailed into the Yellow Sea. Things are vastly different now. For example, China has had an opportunity to study the US "AirSea Battle" (ASB) concept in 2010 which merges air and naval forces into a single, more effective fighting unit. ASB might be adapted by China which cannot divorce the current movements of the George Washington from the efforts of the US to refine and implement ASB. [3]

"The acquisition of an aircraft carrier and carrier aviation was something that was clearly an ambition and an objective of the PLAN," said Admiral Gary Roughead, chief of naval operations, at a 2009 news conference in Beijing. "The advent of an aircraft carrier on the part of the PLAN really does not change the nature of our operations at all." [4]

James Bussert, co-author of "PLAN Combat Systems Technology 1949-2010", which will be published by the US Naval Institute Press next spring, is convinced that China does not want to duplicate the world policeman role that USN CBG's serve.

"China's goals do not require CBGs. They are achieving their goals via economic and political means in South America and Africa, and the power of the US Navy is not a factor," said Bussert.

While CBGs might give China certain advantages in Taiwan, in the South China Sea and along the routes used by ships transporting oil to China from the Middle East and Africa, the costs and the fact that CBGs are not required in order for China to achieve its national goals are distinct disadvantages.

"They do not have a superpower face-off agenda that the USSR had," said Bussert. "China believes the USN will retain its successful CBGs."

The first PLAN carrier is expected to have the keel laid by the end of 2010. A second hull should follow within a year. Both will rely on a ski-jump flight deck configuration, and not the steam catapult-based launch systems used on US carriers.

As for China's purchase in 1998 of the 67,000-ton Ukrainian-built Varyag, it is currently being fitted in the port of Dalian. It will likely serve as a carrier training platform for pilots flying J-15 aircraft until the indigenous PLAN carriers are commissioned around 2014.

As this work proceeds, retired Rear Admiral Eric McVadon, who serves as a senior advisor at the Virginia-based Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, also does not envision China acquiring enormous super-carriers.

"China is more likely to have smaller, less capable carriers suited to air support of surface action groups that are carrying out missions such as sea-lane security beyond the range of land-based air from Chinese bases," said McVadon. "The USN is not a model for the PLAN. Chinese leaders do not contemplate an ability to conduct massive air strikes against naval forces or targets ashore. Carrier aviation as done by the USN does not serve China's purposes. Having organic air available to PLAN units trying to deter attacks on tankers en route to China does make sense."

Because the PLA does not provide any official data on its future strategic naval modernization plans, US and Western experts must always rely on vast array of sources to determine what the PLAN has underway.

"A series of Hong Kong and Japanese newspaper articles from January 2009 citing Chinese shipbuilding and military sources indicated that the PLA was going to build two new Varyag style carriers, and then two larger nuclear-powered carriers," said Richard Fisher, senior fellow at the Washington, DC-based International Assessment and Strategy Center. "In the past, other PLA sources have indicated to US visitors their desire to build up to six carriers."

Over time, China will become more strategically savvy and will introduce conventional military power projection elements into arenas where it has long built significant elements of political and economic power.

"Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Africa are all areas where by the 2020s the PLA could be employing displays or usage of military power to sway political outcomes that benefit China's economic and political interests," said Fisher. "However, we should also expect that China will seek to make military deployments to South America a 'routine' element of its expanding political and economic power networks there."

This might explain what Brazilian Defense Minister Nelson Jobim had in mind when he issued a heads up in May 2009. Then, Brazilian President Luiz Inacio "Lula" da Silva flew to Beijing to formalize plans for a joint Brazil-China pilot training program to be staged aboard Brazil's new carrier. The current status of this program is unclear. [5]

According to Toshi Yoshihara, associate professor in the Strategy and Policy Department at the US Naval War College in Rhode Island, China will make prudent investments in a wide of variety naval capabilities as part of a very deliberate process of fleet experimentation for their surface forces.

"They are acquiring small batches of the same class of ships to work out their preferences and needs. They are not going to bankrupt themselves by overspending on carriers," said Yoshihara. "They have learned from the Soviet experience and have pledged never to repeat the fatal mistake of engaging in unwinnable arms races."

China is still grappling with its approach to the constraints imposed by the so-called "first island chain" which extends south from the Japanese archipelago down to Indonesia.

"Many Chinese analysts conceive of the island chain as a physical barrier and, more importantly, they see most countries that occupy the island chain, particularly Japan, as either friendly to the US and/or hostile to China," said Yoshihara. "Their main concern is how to break through the island chain in times of crisis or war. Naval penetrations by the PLAN through the waterways along the Ryukyu Islands since 2004 should be understood as exercises in breaking out of the maritime straitjacket."

For this and other reasons, building carriers is deemed far less of a priority than the PLAN's current and ongoing submarine buildup.

"Many Chinese strategists clearly understand that a naval force structure centered on the carrier would play to US strengths," said Yoshihara.

Back in May 2007, therefore, Admiral Timothy Keating, former commander of the US Pacific Command, caught the Chinese off guard perhaps when he implied that the US might be willing to provide assistance to China if it proceeded with the construction of its carriers.

Keating made the offer after he tried to convey the complexity of the carrier universe to Vice Admiral Wu Shengli, who is commander of the PLAN.

Major General Yang Chunchang of China's Academy of Military Sciences, for example, told the China-run Hong Kong daily, Wen Wei Po, that he "was concerned about [the implications of] Keating's remarks." [6]

Some Chinese were concerned that the US might foil the Chinese carrier program, while others wondered why the US would make such an offer at a time when the US was so intent upon halting the sale of advanced weaponry to China by the European Union.

US offers aside, an established two-step plan which involves China's initial acquisition of medium-sized aircraft carriers, first, may now be in motion. This will enable the PLAN to gain significant operational experience, and thus set the stage for the acquisition of very large carriers later on. [7]

China's development of a new generation of land-based anti-ship missiles - many expected to see a test firing of China's new DF-21 medium-range, anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) during China's recent naval exercise in the East China Sea - suggests that while China slowly inches ahead with its carrier program, the PLAN is favoring a missile-centric strategy.

"Missiles will not replace warships. PLAN warships have relied on large, long-range cruise missiles ever since the early 1950's, continuing to today. The few air and submarine platforms can never provide the multi-purpose capabilities of surface warships," said Bussert.

Missile technologies may shift the offensive-defensive balance in favor of the defense, but this is not a new trend.

"From a historical perspective, changes in the offense-defense balance are cyclical," said Yoshihara. "World War II brought mobility back to sea power. Perhaps we are swinging back in the other direction."

Again, this bolsters the argument that many are making about the fact that undersea platforms will emerge as the most suitable alternatives for the future as a result.

"This brings up basic questions about sea control, a staple of US naval power. Would such a move require us to rethink or redefine what we mean by sea control?" asks Yoshihara.

The US which is already deploying its prototype "Prompt Global Strike" platform in space and placing lasers on its warships eventually will devise other means for countering advanced anti-ship missiles and even ASBMs, especially because this technology will soon be acquired by Iran and North Korea as well.

"It is also necessary for the US to develop new multi-role medium range missiles that can provide missile defense and surface strike, even anti-ship capabilities. Such missiles should be sold to US allies, to facilitate a near-term maritime missile balance, so that any PLA use of ASBMs would guarantee the immediate loss of its surface fleet," said Fisher.

McVadon remains optimistic that everyone will focus on the bigger picture, and that the USN and PLAN will emerge as partners on the high seas.

"It is more likely that USN forces 10 years from now will be operating with a PLAN moderate-sized carrier chasing pirates or providing disaster relief somewhere west of Malacca than it is for USN forces attacking a PLAN carrier in a Taiwan conflict," said McVadon. If this peaceful partnership is not soon viewed by both countries as a more acceptable outcome, "then we need to devote enormous effort to change things."

Speaking to a few hundred US troops in South Korea prior to the beginning of "Invincible Spirit", Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the US Joints Chiefs of Staff, said that he was downright concerned about what China is doing. Mullen highlighted China's "fairly significant investment" in high-end equipment including carriers, satellites, and anti-ship missiles. However, it was the absence of transparency, not the equipment itself that troubled Mullen most of all.

"It is difficult to figure out where they're headed," he said.

Chances are, they will soon be heading to sea aboard their new carrier .
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/LG23Ad01.html

 

[SHASH2K2]

China for the first time reveals aircraft carrier plan​

The Chinese government has for the first time officially revealed that it has launched a programme to build an aircraft carrier, an already widely-known project that has recently stirred debate over China's naval intentions and capabilities.

A report released this year by the State Oceanic Administration said China's progress had even been quicker than expected, with the first Chinese-made carrier set to be ready in 2014, a year ahead of the schedule.

The report, a copy of which was obtained by the Japanese newspaper The Asahi Shimbun, says China's leaders decided at a meeting of the Communist Party's powerful Politburo in April 2009 to back the

programme, which has been largely kept quiet, as part of a larger strategy for China to "build itself up as a maritime power."

Some Chinese leaders were reluctant to announce the plans, the report said, because it would "fan concerns in neighbouring countries".

The military, however, had been pushing for a public announcement. In March, China's Defence Minister Liang Guanglie said China's navy was weak and hinted that China needed an aircraft carrier "soon", without revealing further details.

The Ocean Development Report said projecting power at sea was "indispensible to accomplishing the great resurgence of the Chinese people," according to the newspaper. The report also calls for a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier to be made ready by 2020.

Construction had begun at "six military-affiliated companies and research institutes in Shanghai and other locations." A full-scale model of an aircraft carrier had been constructed in Wuhan, in central Hubei province, to test radar systems, while preparations to train pilots for landing and taking off aircraft at sea would be carried out in northeastern Liaoning and Xian in Shaanxi province.

The report said having an aircraft carrier was not only required to close China's yawning gap with American naval might, but also to "heighten patriotic sentiment" at home.

The announcement comes against the backdrop of rising naval tensions between China and several of its neighbours in recent months. Territorial tensions over claims in the South China Sea have resurfaced, as have maritime disputes between China and Japan over the disputed Diaoyu or Senkaku islands.

On Friday, Japan announced a new defence policy, its first since 2004, which warned of a growing military threat to the international community from China, and indicated that Japan would strengthen security arrangements around disputed islands.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry on Friday strongly hit out at the defence policy. "A certain country has no right to act as a representative of the international community and make irresponsible remarks on China's

development," Foreign Ministry spokesperson Jiang Yu said. "China unswervingly follows the path of peaceful development, and its defense policy is defensive in nature."