Pretending to be the voice of Asia again? Some people do suffer under grand illusions.
China and Japan dispute over Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands
- Thread starter LETHALFORCE
- Start date
Asia Times Online :: China pushes back against Japan
China pushes back against Japan
By Peter Lee 28/9-2012
Asia Times Online :: China pushes back against Japan
Another point of view:
[Peter Lee writes on East and South Asian affairs and their intersection with US foreign policy]
China's strategy on the Diaoyu Islands, or Senkakus as Japan calls them, appears to reflect careful calculation of risk and reward by the Beijing leadership, rather than the spasm of counterproductive nationalism sometimes described in the Western press. As a matter of equity, China has a pretty strong claim on the Senkakus. As a matter of geopolitics, the People's Republic of China (PRC) is not holding as weak a hand as one might think. This is something that the administration of US President Barack Obama, to its chagrin, knows well.
Careful readers of The Japan Times (presumably including strategists in Beijing) may remember this passage from August 17, 2010: The Obama administration has decided not to state explicitly that the Senkaku Islands, which are under Japan's control but claimed by China, are subject to the Japan-US security treaty, in a shift from the position of George W Bush, sources said Monday. The administration of Barack Obama has already notified Japan of the change in policy, but Tokyo may have to take countermeasures in light of China's increasing activities in the East China Sea, according to the sources. [1]
The Japanese "countermeasure" occurred less than three weeks later, on September 8, 2010, when Japan's ambitious minister of the interior, Seiji Maehara, instructed the coast guard to turn over the captain of a Chinese fishing boat to prosecutors for trial under Japanese law for ramming a pair of coast-guard vessels while trying to evade them near the Senkakus.
The rest is "contain China" history, as the spat escalated to a crisis in Sino-Japanese relations and lip service in favor of Japan's rights to the Senkakus became an important element of US East Asian policy and justification for the Obama administration's pivot into Asia.
Discreet silence also played a role, when the United States declined to contradict Maehara (by this time foreign minister) when he claimed, perhaps untruthfully, that he had obtained assurances that the Senkakus were covered by the US-Japan Security Treaty. [2] [3]
However, US enthusiasm for using the Senkaku dispute as a useful diplomatic lever appears to be reaching its limit.
Two major US dailies, The New York Times and the Los Angeles Times, recently weighed in with reviews of the history of the islands that may cause the Japanese government some heartburn. Nicholas Kristof turned his NYT column over to a Taiwanese scholar, Han Yishaw, to lay out China's historical claims to the islands. [4]
The LA Times' Barbara Demick also looked skeptically at the Japanese provenance of the Senkakus with a piece describing the research of scholar Unryu Suganuma, who found several references in Japanese government documents describing the Chinese character of the islands. [5]
A glance at a map confirms the impression that the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are in Taiwan's backyard, and Japanese efforts to claim them are almost as risible as China's infamous South China Sea-swallowing nine-dash line.
Japan's claim to incontestable sovereignty over the islands goes back no further than its seizure, together with Taiwan and the Ryukyu Islands, from the Qing empire in the 1895 Sino-Japanese War, and not being forced to give them back in the post-World War II muddle.
The "spoils of war" argument, aka we got 'em and by golly we're gonna keep 'em approach, is an awkward one for Japan. It would dearly like to get back four islands on the southern end of an archipelago stretching between the Kamchatka Peninsula and Hokkaido, which are now occupied by Russia as heir to the Soviet Union's spoils of war.
The short form of this imbroglio is the "Kurile Islands dispute", but the two southernmost islands are more Hokkaido-esque, and Russia has signaled a willingness to give them up. The two more northerly islands are bona fide members of the Kurile chain. Russia wants to keep them. Japan wants them. Awkwardly for Japan, in 1956 it promised to surrender its claims to these two islands if a formal peace treaty were concluded.
Given this unfavorable position, Japan must contest the "spoils of war" argument and rely on emotive, historical claims to the islands - the exact opposite of its position on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.
The "exercised sovereignty" argument also provides no comfort to Japan in its dispute with South Korea over the Dokdo Islands (Takeshima to the Japanese). After the conclusion of World War II, the United States supported the historical Japanese claims to the islands but declined to put their defense within the scope of the US-Japan Joint Security Treaty.
Since 1991, the main island has been home to a family of South Korean octopus fishermen and about three dozen Republic of Korea Coast Guard, fishery, and lighthouse personnel. President Lee Myung-bak has visited, as well as thousands of South Korean tourists who take a US$250 ferry trip to the island.
In July 2008, the administration of then-US president George W Bush acknowledged South Korean control over the islands by designating them as ROK territory.
Therefore, Japan's attempts to hold on to the Senkakus on the principle that their effective de facto control, by itself, constitutes de jure sovereignty undermines its arguments on Dokdo and the Kuriles. This inconsistency, one might assume, does not make an ironclad case to the United States to encourage a regional confrontation over Japanese dismay over Chinese pretensions to the rocks.
This year, the Japanese government is also facing a cannier and better-prepared PRC government than the flustered and panicky regime it confronted in 2010.
At that time, Beijing overreacted verbally and administratively and made the mistake of intervening as a government to disrupt trade with Japan to retaliate for the threat to put the skipper of the offending Chinese fishing vessel, Captain Zhan Qixiong, on trial in a Japanese court.
It tried to package its moves to pressure Japan as enforcement of trade regulations, particularly in the wild and wooly rare-earths business, but this was seen as a distinction without a difference, and the PRC was widely condemned by foreign governments and media. As a public relations bonus, China also stood accused of threatening the free world's full enjoyment of iPads and green energy and, indeed, attempting to bring America's high-tech defense industries to heel by exploiting its dominance over precious rare-earth oxides.
The ruckus over export and import restrictions - and the possibility of retaliation - also threatened China's access to the global free-trade regime, a critical matter given the its reliance on exports for growth and social stability. Beyond the threat of bilateral retaliation, there was the possibility that the issue would internationalize, with some sort of coordinated sanction against China.
This year, things are different.
When the Japanese right wing (which feels it got shortchanged by government appeasers who released Captain Zhan in 2010) served up its latest provocation - the campaign by Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara to purchase the Senkakus - the central government tried to defuse the situation by purchasing the islands itself.
Nevertheless, the Chinese government decided to make an issue of it, apparently to demonstrate to Japan's elite the high cost of pursuing an agenda of confrontation with the PRC over the pretext of the Senkakus.
As usual, Beijing is staying away from anything that might be construed as a direct military threat to the Japanese forces arrayed near the Senkakus.
Indeed, its first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning (originally Ukraine's Varyag, then repurposed as a floating casino and now destined to become an instantaneous and expensive artificial reef if it ever attempts naval operations against the United States or Japan), entered service on September 25. However, it is not going anywhere near the Senkakus and will need years and billions of yuan before it is a viable military air-operations platform.
Out of consideration for its key North Asia ally, the United States has declined to follow through on its previous intention to treat the Senkakus as it did the Dokdo and place them outside the scope of Article 5 of the US-Japan Security Treaty. Recently, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta affirmed that an attack on the Senkakus would evoke a US military response on behalf of Japan.
However, the fact that Beijing apparently has no intention of attacking the Senkakus has understandably given more weight to Panetta's statement that the United States has no position on the conflicting sovereignty claims and hopes that the Chinese and Japanese governments will work out the issue peaceably.
This time around, the Chinese government is not only avoiding inflammatory moves that would internationalize the dispute; in important ways, it is even de-bilateralizing it. In contrast to 2010, China is not directly interfering in foreign trade with Japan. Instead, Japanese interests inside China have been threatened directly by Chinese citizens, albeit egged on by their government.
This is a distinction that has been carefully drawn in Sino-Japanese confrontations over the past century and is probably well understood by current strategists.
Before World War II, "boycott" was an all-purpose descriptor for two different activities: what we would now call a popular boycott of people declining to buy certain goods, and also what is now called official government economic sanctions instituted by fiat.
It was a matter of some anxiety for the Chinese government to draw a line between the two, particularly during the "Great Boycott" in 1931 protesting the Japanese incursion into Manchuria (whose anniversary by coincidence occurred on September 19, at the height of this year's anti-Japanese rumpus), since the Japanese government at the time was inclined to engage in real warfare to retaliate for what it deemed economic warfare by China.
Today, with the anti-Japanese measures framed as a popular boycott, as long as the Chinese demonstrations stay away from red lines as defined in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations - which obligates the PRC to uphold the inviolability of the premises, personnel and property, both official and personal, of the Japanese diplomatic mission - then offenses against Japanese persons and property fall into the black hole of Chinese domestic civil and criminal law.
Ministry of Commerce spokesman Shen Danyang carefully made the distinction in a statement to reporters on September 19 (in a rather garbled translation):
Shen Danyang released three-point statement, the Ministry of Commerce strongly supports legitimate, rational, patriotic action, firmly opposed to all illegal thwarted grab [of the Diaoyutai Islands]; the legitimate rights and interests of foreign-invested enterprises in China are protected by law. China is a country ruled by law, the legitimate rights and interests of foreign-invested enterprises are protected by Chinese laws. Third, I believe that the vast majority of people can be calm, rational, legal and orderly express their demands. Foreign-invested enterprises, such as suffered violations should seek help in a timely manner to the relevant departments of the public security departments, including the business sector. [6]
For the historically minded, this allows the Chinese government to present the demonstrations as the spiritual heir to the series of protests against Japanese aggression that occurred between 1908 and 1931.
And if the Japanese government itself wants to reawaken memories of its detested extraterritorial privileges in China under the Qing and Kuomintang regimes, it is welcome to call on the PRC government to moderate the behavior of the demonstrators, and implore the Chinese courts to improve their efforts to protect the persons and property of Japanese citizens inside the PRC.
The Japanese newspaper Asahi Shinbum did its best to rekindle the spirit of 2010, if not 1931, mischaracterizing the Ministry of Commerce's statement of support for private boycotts as "economic sanctions", as in "China suggests economic sanctions over Senkakus". [7]
In the same article, Asahi also tried to get some geopolitical mileage by playing the rare-earths card with an anxious description of an announcement of restructuring in the Chinese rare-earths industry, while admitting the changes had long been expected, but then tried to have it both ways: China Central Television said September 19 that the Ministry of Land and Resources will slash the number of companies licensed to mine rare-earth elements by 40%, from 113 to 67.
That policy was published six days earlier and the companies to be affected were informed in August. In addition, cutting the number of mining companies is not expected to directly affect rare-earth exports to Japan.
However, the state-run broadcaster's report could be taken as a warning of stronger measures against the Japanese government for its purchase of three of the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea from a private owner on September 11.
Actually, the Chinese government has done a pretty good job of erecting a defense against the accusation of rare-earth economic warfare this time, as the lead from an article by David Stanway for Reuters in July demonstrates: China, the world's biggest producer of rare-earth metals, is likely to turn an importer of the vital industrial ingredients by as early as 2014 as it boosts consumption in domestic high-tech industries rather than just shipping raw material overseas. [8]
The "economic warfare" dog doesn't appear to be hunting internationally, since boycotts against Japanese companies inside China will be just as harmful to the Chinese economy as they are to Japan's.
Perhaps the most remarkable canine element of the current Senkaku/Diaoyu dustup, however, is the dog that didn't bark. Or, to be more accurate, the two dogs that didn't bark and the one that did ... but on China's behalf.
One would have thought that the PRC's tussle with Japan would have been the perfect opportunity for Beijing's two major South China Sea adversaries, the Philippines and Vietnam, to put the boot in, to draw attention to China's habitual high-handedness in island matters and strengthen the argument for the US-led pivot. That hasn't happened, perhaps because the United States has taken itself out of the game by limiting its involvement to exclusively military scenarios against the Senkakus.
The Philippine and Vietnamese governments have been relatively silent on the issue, perhaps because of some special Chinese attention.
To smooth over the disagreements with the Philippines, some high-profile emollient was personally applied by Vice-President Xi Jinping to the Philippine interior secretary in Beijing on September 21. In a practical and obliging vein - and in contrast to the huffing and puffing over the Scarborough Shoal - the Chinese government agreed to reschedule repayment of a US$500 million loan for a canceled rail project and discuss selling its stake in the Philippine national power grid, and promised to go easy on inspection of banana imports. [9]
Xi was also present at the China-ASEAN trade expo in Guangxi. Vietnamese Prime Nguyen Tan Minister Dung attended and for whatever economic or geopolitical reason, China-bashing apparently was not on the menu there either, as Voice of Vietnam reported:
Mr Dung's participation in CAEXPO and CABIS [China-ASEAN Business and Investment Summit] showed Vietnam's keen interest in promoting friendly neighborliness and comprehensive cooperation with China and encouraging its businesses to seek investment opportunities in China and expand economic, trade and investment cooperation with Chinese border provinces. [10]
As for Taiwan, it sowed confusion in the ranks of China-bashers and, one expects, a certain dismay in the hearts of Japan's diplomats by sending 40 fishing vessels and 12 patrol boats into Senkaku waters to engage in a water-cannon fight with the Japan Coast Guard, thus muddying the heretofore pristine narrative of Japanese maritime professionals vs mainland Chinese aggressors. The Telegraph posted video of the thrilling display. [11]
Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou, for whom the Senkakus has been a signature issue throughout his career, was clearly behind the provocation. In fact, it was alleged that the confrontation had been carefully scripted among Taiwan, the PRC and Japan to make sure things didn't get out of hand. [12]
One can speculate as to whether President Ma's main motivation was to provide aid and comfort to his political supporters in Beijing or he felt compelled to make a protest against Japan for nationalizing the Senkakus and, in the process, ignoring his political interests and sensibilities.
In any case, at the end of the day Japan found itself with a less-than-slam-dunk case for the Senkakus in the court of (non-Japanese) opinion, backed with limited and conditional US support, receiving little if any enthusiastic backing from its neighbors, and taking it on the chin financially from the anti-Japanese demonstrations inside China.
With this context, it looks as if the PRC regime decided after the 2010 debacle that, next time the Senkaku issue surfaced, it was going to be ready with an integrated strategy of mass mobilization, economic sanctions, avoidance of direct government-to-government economic and military confrontation, a regional charm offensive, and an expectation of US forbearance.
This appears to be a more plausible scenario for the current Senkaku dynamic than the dissident and China-bashing-fueled claim that the PRC ginned up the dispute to distract attention from domestic political unrest in the run-up to the 18th Communist Party Congress and leadership succession.
Allowing large crowds of disgruntled Chinese citizens to flood on to the streets - quite a few of them waving pictures of Mao Zedong in an implied expression of solidarity with purged "Red Mayor" Bo Xilai and a rebuke to his current persecutors in the power structure, and others willing to engage in criminal behavior and mix it up with security forces in order to make a spectacle of their atavistic nationalist fervor - is not a recipe for political calm.
It is more likely that the regime decided to roll the dice and enable widespread demonstrations in pursuit of its geostrategic strategy against Japan, and breathed a sigh of relief when things didn't get completely out of hand.
In other words, the viability of the Chinese-mass-opinion weapon - which such outlets as Global Times have been touting for the past few years - albeit applied in carefully controlled anti-Japanese doses, has been demonstrated to the Japanese government and business community.
Therefore, it isn't too surprising that Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister Chikai Kawai has gone to Beijing to try to ease the dispute. The Chinese Foreign Ministry position is that Japan has to "make strong efforts to improve Sino-Japanese relations", though one has to wonder what those efforts are supposed to involve.
Those "efforts" probably include a Japanese undertaking to coordinate and consult with China on regional affairs instead of maintaining a united front with Washington on matters related to the US pivot and trade blocs. Whether a geopolitical and economic reset can be negotiated, let alone survive the expected change of national administration in Japan - and the Senkakus can fade into deserved insignificance - remains to be seen.
Notes:
1. U.S. fudges Senkaku security pact status, Japan Times, Aug 17, 2010.
2. Clinton says disputed islands part of Japan-US pact: Maehara, Energy Daily, Sep 24, 2010.
3. Japan poured oil on troubled waters, Asia Times Online, Oct 2, 2010.
4. The Inconvenient Truth Behind the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, The New York Times, Sep 19, 2012.
5. The specks of land at the center of Japan-China islands dispute, Los Angeles Times, Sep 24, 2012.
6. Ministry of Commerce: "Share island" farce damage to Sino-Japanese economic and trade, Stock Market Today, Sep 24, 2012.
7. China suggests economic sanctions over Senkakus, Asahi Shimbun, Sep 20, 2012.
8. China reshapes role in rare earths, could be importer by 2014, Reuters, Jul 10, 2012.
9. Phl, China drop North Rail, PhilStar, Sep 26, 2012.
10. PM Dung attends China-ASEAN Expo, Voice of Vietnam, Sep 21, 2012.
11. Japanese and Taiwanese ships in water cannon battle over Senkaku Islands dispute, The Telegraph, Sep 25, 2012.
12. Ma lauds fishermen in islands protest, Taipei Times, Sep 27, 2012.
China pushes back against Japan
By Peter Lee 28/9-2012
Asia Times Online :: China pushes back against Japan
Another point of view:
[Peter Lee writes on East and South Asian affairs and their intersection with US foreign policy]
China's strategy on the Diaoyu Islands, or Senkakus as Japan calls them, appears to reflect careful calculation of risk and reward by the Beijing leadership, rather than the spasm of counterproductive nationalism sometimes described in the Western press. As a matter of equity, China has a pretty strong claim on the Senkakus. As a matter of geopolitics, the People's Republic of China (PRC) is not holding as weak a hand as one might think. This is something that the administration of US President Barack Obama, to its chagrin, knows well.
Careful readers of The Japan Times (presumably including strategists in Beijing) may remember this passage from August 17, 2010: The Obama administration has decided not to state explicitly that the Senkaku Islands, which are under Japan's control but claimed by China, are subject to the Japan-US security treaty, in a shift from the position of George W Bush, sources said Monday. The administration of Barack Obama has already notified Japan of the change in policy, but Tokyo may have to take countermeasures in light of China's increasing activities in the East China Sea, according to the sources. [1]
The Japanese "countermeasure" occurred less than three weeks later, on September 8, 2010, when Japan's ambitious minister of the interior, Seiji Maehara, instructed the coast guard to turn over the captain of a Chinese fishing boat to prosecutors for trial under Japanese law for ramming a pair of coast-guard vessels while trying to evade them near the Senkakus.
The rest is "contain China" history, as the spat escalated to a crisis in Sino-Japanese relations and lip service in favor of Japan's rights to the Senkakus became an important element of US East Asian policy and justification for the Obama administration's pivot into Asia.
Discreet silence also played a role, when the United States declined to contradict Maehara (by this time foreign minister) when he claimed, perhaps untruthfully, that he had obtained assurances that the Senkakus were covered by the US-Japan Security Treaty. [2] [3]
However, US enthusiasm for using the Senkaku dispute as a useful diplomatic lever appears to be reaching its limit.
Two major US dailies, The New York Times and the Los Angeles Times, recently weighed in with reviews of the history of the islands that may cause the Japanese government some heartburn. Nicholas Kristof turned his NYT column over to a Taiwanese scholar, Han Yishaw, to lay out China's historical claims to the islands. [4]
The LA Times' Barbara Demick also looked skeptically at the Japanese provenance of the Senkakus with a piece describing the research of scholar Unryu Suganuma, who found several references in Japanese government documents describing the Chinese character of the islands. [5]
A glance at a map confirms the impression that the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are in Taiwan's backyard, and Japanese efforts to claim them are almost as risible as China's infamous South China Sea-swallowing nine-dash line.
Japan's claim to incontestable sovereignty over the islands goes back no further than its seizure, together with Taiwan and the Ryukyu Islands, from the Qing empire in the 1895 Sino-Japanese War, and not being forced to give them back in the post-World War II muddle.
The "spoils of war" argument, aka we got 'em and by golly we're gonna keep 'em approach, is an awkward one for Japan. It would dearly like to get back four islands on the southern end of an archipelago stretching between the Kamchatka Peninsula and Hokkaido, which are now occupied by Russia as heir to the Soviet Union's spoils of war.
The short form of this imbroglio is the "Kurile Islands dispute", but the two southernmost islands are more Hokkaido-esque, and Russia has signaled a willingness to give them up. The two more northerly islands are bona fide members of the Kurile chain. Russia wants to keep them. Japan wants them. Awkwardly for Japan, in 1956 it promised to surrender its claims to these two islands if a formal peace treaty were concluded.
Given this unfavorable position, Japan must contest the "spoils of war" argument and rely on emotive, historical claims to the islands - the exact opposite of its position on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.
The "exercised sovereignty" argument also provides no comfort to Japan in its dispute with South Korea over the Dokdo Islands (Takeshima to the Japanese). After the conclusion of World War II, the United States supported the historical Japanese claims to the islands but declined to put their defense within the scope of the US-Japan Joint Security Treaty.
Since 1991, the main island has been home to a family of South Korean octopus fishermen and about three dozen Republic of Korea Coast Guard, fishery, and lighthouse personnel. President Lee Myung-bak has visited, as well as thousands of South Korean tourists who take a US$250 ferry trip to the island.
In July 2008, the administration of then-US president George W Bush acknowledged South Korean control over the islands by designating them as ROK territory.
Therefore, Japan's attempts to hold on to the Senkakus on the principle that their effective de facto control, by itself, constitutes de jure sovereignty undermines its arguments on Dokdo and the Kuriles. This inconsistency, one might assume, does not make an ironclad case to the United States to encourage a regional confrontation over Japanese dismay over Chinese pretensions to the rocks.
This year, the Japanese government is also facing a cannier and better-prepared PRC government than the flustered and panicky regime it confronted in 2010.
At that time, Beijing overreacted verbally and administratively and made the mistake of intervening as a government to disrupt trade with Japan to retaliate for the threat to put the skipper of the offending Chinese fishing vessel, Captain Zhan Qixiong, on trial in a Japanese court.
It tried to package its moves to pressure Japan as enforcement of trade regulations, particularly in the wild and wooly rare-earths business, but this was seen as a distinction without a difference, and the PRC was widely condemned by foreign governments and media. As a public relations bonus, China also stood accused of threatening the free world's full enjoyment of iPads and green energy and, indeed, attempting to bring America's high-tech defense industries to heel by exploiting its dominance over precious rare-earth oxides.
The ruckus over export and import restrictions - and the possibility of retaliation - also threatened China's access to the global free-trade regime, a critical matter given the its reliance on exports for growth and social stability. Beyond the threat of bilateral retaliation, there was the possibility that the issue would internationalize, with some sort of coordinated sanction against China.
This year, things are different.
When the Japanese right wing (which feels it got shortchanged by government appeasers who released Captain Zhan in 2010) served up its latest provocation - the campaign by Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara to purchase the Senkakus - the central government tried to defuse the situation by purchasing the islands itself.
Nevertheless, the Chinese government decided to make an issue of it, apparently to demonstrate to Japan's elite the high cost of pursuing an agenda of confrontation with the PRC over the pretext of the Senkakus.
As usual, Beijing is staying away from anything that might be construed as a direct military threat to the Japanese forces arrayed near the Senkakus.
Indeed, its first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning (originally Ukraine's Varyag, then repurposed as a floating casino and now destined to become an instantaneous and expensive artificial reef if it ever attempts naval operations against the United States or Japan), entered service on September 25. However, it is not going anywhere near the Senkakus and will need years and billions of yuan before it is a viable military air-operations platform.
Out of consideration for its key North Asia ally, the United States has declined to follow through on its previous intention to treat the Senkakus as it did the Dokdo and place them outside the scope of Article 5 of the US-Japan Security Treaty. Recently, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta affirmed that an attack on the Senkakus would evoke a US military response on behalf of Japan.
However, the fact that Beijing apparently has no intention of attacking the Senkakus has understandably given more weight to Panetta's statement that the United States has no position on the conflicting sovereignty claims and hopes that the Chinese and Japanese governments will work out the issue peaceably.
This time around, the Chinese government is not only avoiding inflammatory moves that would internationalize the dispute; in important ways, it is even de-bilateralizing it. In contrast to 2010, China is not directly interfering in foreign trade with Japan. Instead, Japanese interests inside China have been threatened directly by Chinese citizens, albeit egged on by their government.
This is a distinction that has been carefully drawn in Sino-Japanese confrontations over the past century and is probably well understood by current strategists.
Before World War II, "boycott" was an all-purpose descriptor for two different activities: what we would now call a popular boycott of people declining to buy certain goods, and also what is now called official government economic sanctions instituted by fiat.
It was a matter of some anxiety for the Chinese government to draw a line between the two, particularly during the "Great Boycott" in 1931 protesting the Japanese incursion into Manchuria (whose anniversary by coincidence occurred on September 19, at the height of this year's anti-Japanese rumpus), since the Japanese government at the time was inclined to engage in real warfare to retaliate for what it deemed economic warfare by China.
Today, with the anti-Japanese measures framed as a popular boycott, as long as the Chinese demonstrations stay away from red lines as defined in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations - which obligates the PRC to uphold the inviolability of the premises, personnel and property, both official and personal, of the Japanese diplomatic mission - then offenses against Japanese persons and property fall into the black hole of Chinese domestic civil and criminal law.
Ministry of Commerce spokesman Shen Danyang carefully made the distinction in a statement to reporters on September 19 (in a rather garbled translation):
Shen Danyang released three-point statement, the Ministry of Commerce strongly supports legitimate, rational, patriotic action, firmly opposed to all illegal thwarted grab [of the Diaoyutai Islands]; the legitimate rights and interests of foreign-invested enterprises in China are protected by law. China is a country ruled by law, the legitimate rights and interests of foreign-invested enterprises are protected by Chinese laws. Third, I believe that the vast majority of people can be calm, rational, legal and orderly express their demands. Foreign-invested enterprises, such as suffered violations should seek help in a timely manner to the relevant departments of the public security departments, including the business sector. [6]
For the historically minded, this allows the Chinese government to present the demonstrations as the spiritual heir to the series of protests against Japanese aggression that occurred between 1908 and 1931.
And if the Japanese government itself wants to reawaken memories of its detested extraterritorial privileges in China under the Qing and Kuomintang regimes, it is welcome to call on the PRC government to moderate the behavior of the demonstrators, and implore the Chinese courts to improve their efforts to protect the persons and property of Japanese citizens inside the PRC.
The Japanese newspaper Asahi Shinbum did its best to rekindle the spirit of 2010, if not 1931, mischaracterizing the Ministry of Commerce's statement of support for private boycotts as "economic sanctions", as in "China suggests economic sanctions over Senkakus". [7]
In the same article, Asahi also tried to get some geopolitical mileage by playing the rare-earths card with an anxious description of an announcement of restructuring in the Chinese rare-earths industry, while admitting the changes had long been expected, but then tried to have it both ways: China Central Television said September 19 that the Ministry of Land and Resources will slash the number of companies licensed to mine rare-earth elements by 40%, from 113 to 67.
That policy was published six days earlier and the companies to be affected were informed in August. In addition, cutting the number of mining companies is not expected to directly affect rare-earth exports to Japan.
However, the state-run broadcaster's report could be taken as a warning of stronger measures against the Japanese government for its purchase of three of the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea from a private owner on September 11.
Actually, the Chinese government has done a pretty good job of erecting a defense against the accusation of rare-earth economic warfare this time, as the lead from an article by David Stanway for Reuters in July demonstrates: China, the world's biggest producer of rare-earth metals, is likely to turn an importer of the vital industrial ingredients by as early as 2014 as it boosts consumption in domestic high-tech industries rather than just shipping raw material overseas. [8]
The "economic warfare" dog doesn't appear to be hunting internationally, since boycotts against Japanese companies inside China will be just as harmful to the Chinese economy as they are to Japan's.
Perhaps the most remarkable canine element of the current Senkaku/Diaoyu dustup, however, is the dog that didn't bark. Or, to be more accurate, the two dogs that didn't bark and the one that did ... but on China's behalf.
One would have thought that the PRC's tussle with Japan would have been the perfect opportunity for Beijing's two major South China Sea adversaries, the Philippines and Vietnam, to put the boot in, to draw attention to China's habitual high-handedness in island matters and strengthen the argument for the US-led pivot. That hasn't happened, perhaps because the United States has taken itself out of the game by limiting its involvement to exclusively military scenarios against the Senkakus.
The Philippine and Vietnamese governments have been relatively silent on the issue, perhaps because of some special Chinese attention.
To smooth over the disagreements with the Philippines, some high-profile emollient was personally applied by Vice-President Xi Jinping to the Philippine interior secretary in Beijing on September 21. In a practical and obliging vein - and in contrast to the huffing and puffing over the Scarborough Shoal - the Chinese government agreed to reschedule repayment of a US$500 million loan for a canceled rail project and discuss selling its stake in the Philippine national power grid, and promised to go easy on inspection of banana imports. [9]
Xi was also present at the China-ASEAN trade expo in Guangxi. Vietnamese Prime Nguyen Tan Minister Dung attended and for whatever economic or geopolitical reason, China-bashing apparently was not on the menu there either, as Voice of Vietnam reported:
Mr Dung's participation in CAEXPO and CABIS [China-ASEAN Business and Investment Summit] showed Vietnam's keen interest in promoting friendly neighborliness and comprehensive cooperation with China and encouraging its businesses to seek investment opportunities in China and expand economic, trade and investment cooperation with Chinese border provinces. [10]
As for Taiwan, it sowed confusion in the ranks of China-bashers and, one expects, a certain dismay in the hearts of Japan's diplomats by sending 40 fishing vessels and 12 patrol boats into Senkaku waters to engage in a water-cannon fight with the Japan Coast Guard, thus muddying the heretofore pristine narrative of Japanese maritime professionals vs mainland Chinese aggressors. The Telegraph posted video of the thrilling display. [11]
Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou, for whom the Senkakus has been a signature issue throughout his career, was clearly behind the provocation. In fact, it was alleged that the confrontation had been carefully scripted among Taiwan, the PRC and Japan to make sure things didn't get out of hand. [12]
One can speculate as to whether President Ma's main motivation was to provide aid and comfort to his political supporters in Beijing or he felt compelled to make a protest against Japan for nationalizing the Senkakus and, in the process, ignoring his political interests and sensibilities.
In any case, at the end of the day Japan found itself with a less-than-slam-dunk case for the Senkakus in the court of (non-Japanese) opinion, backed with limited and conditional US support, receiving little if any enthusiastic backing from its neighbors, and taking it on the chin financially from the anti-Japanese demonstrations inside China.
With this context, it looks as if the PRC regime decided after the 2010 debacle that, next time the Senkaku issue surfaced, it was going to be ready with an integrated strategy of mass mobilization, economic sanctions, avoidance of direct government-to-government economic and military confrontation, a regional charm offensive, and an expectation of US forbearance.
This appears to be a more plausible scenario for the current Senkaku dynamic than the dissident and China-bashing-fueled claim that the PRC ginned up the dispute to distract attention from domestic political unrest in the run-up to the 18th Communist Party Congress and leadership succession.
Allowing large crowds of disgruntled Chinese citizens to flood on to the streets - quite a few of them waving pictures of Mao Zedong in an implied expression of solidarity with purged "Red Mayor" Bo Xilai and a rebuke to his current persecutors in the power structure, and others willing to engage in criminal behavior and mix it up with security forces in order to make a spectacle of their atavistic nationalist fervor - is not a recipe for political calm.
It is more likely that the regime decided to roll the dice and enable widespread demonstrations in pursuit of its geostrategic strategy against Japan, and breathed a sigh of relief when things didn't get completely out of hand.
In other words, the viability of the Chinese-mass-opinion weapon - which such outlets as Global Times have been touting for the past few years - albeit applied in carefully controlled anti-Japanese doses, has been demonstrated to the Japanese government and business community.
Therefore, it isn't too surprising that Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister Chikai Kawai has gone to Beijing to try to ease the dispute. The Chinese Foreign Ministry position is that Japan has to "make strong efforts to improve Sino-Japanese relations", though one has to wonder what those efforts are supposed to involve.
Those "efforts" probably include a Japanese undertaking to coordinate and consult with China on regional affairs instead of maintaining a united front with Washington on matters related to the US pivot and trade blocs. Whether a geopolitical and economic reset can be negotiated, let alone survive the expected change of national administration in Japan - and the Senkakus can fade into deserved insignificance - remains to be seen.
Notes:
1. U.S. fudges Senkaku security pact status, Japan Times, Aug 17, 2010.
2. Clinton says disputed islands part of Japan-US pact: Maehara, Energy Daily, Sep 24, 2010.
3. Japan poured oil on troubled waters, Asia Times Online, Oct 2, 2010.
4. The Inconvenient Truth Behind the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, The New York Times, Sep 19, 2012.
5. The specks of land at the center of Japan-China islands dispute, Los Angeles Times, Sep 24, 2012.
6. Ministry of Commerce: "Share island" farce damage to Sino-Japanese economic and trade, Stock Market Today, Sep 24, 2012.
7. China suggests economic sanctions over Senkakus, Asahi Shimbun, Sep 20, 2012.
8. China reshapes role in rare earths, could be importer by 2014, Reuters, Jul 10, 2012.
9. Phl, China drop North Rail, PhilStar, Sep 26, 2012.
10. PM Dung attends China-ASEAN Expo, Voice of Vietnam, Sep 21, 2012.
11. Japanese and Taiwanese ships in water cannon battle over Senkaku Islands dispute, The Telegraph, Sep 25, 2012.
12. Ma lauds fishermen in islands protest, Taipei Times, Sep 27, 2012.
Whether rest of the Asia is voicing in support of Japan can be an opinion. Whether China is a bully is not, there is no question or uncertainity.
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mikhail
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again ranting sh*t my little chini friend
!why don't you take a break and stop posting all these b.s.
!while you chini guys are babbling b.s. everywhere in the internet,the japanese navy have already strengthened their defence around these islands.so my advice to china would be not to try any misadventure at present or else Japan would do the same thing they did 70 years ago by capturing the entire eastern part of china!:cool2:
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You're the one who is all soak up in your dreamt up Asia were everybody symphatizes with you. Nobody does. You are seen as the destabilizer in the region with your excessive hunger for resources, money and recognition leading you to grab other country's backyards or act like badly behaving nuveau riche. If you don't hear other countries openly declare it (at least those that are not directly affected by the territorial grabs of China) its because they don't want to jeoperdize their trade relations with China or their bribes (for those countries receiving bribes and disproportionately plundered or natural resources in return) countries.
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There is no doubt about that.
Chinese aggressive postures is not appreciated by most of the Asian nations.
Even a trusted friend like Myanmar, told China to take a hike over the Myitsone Dam by China Power Investment Corporation (CPI). It is estimated that it will provide between 3,600 to 6,000 megawatts of electricity primarily for Yunnan, China.
The dam project has been controversial in Burma due to its enormous flooding area, environmental impact and its location on the Sagaing fault line. The electricity generated will be distributed mainly to China for fifty years despite limited power supply in Burma. The Burmese public also resent the growing Chinese influence in Burma, whose companies have invested billions of dollar in the country, mainly in the energy sector. Even the government itself appears divided on the project.
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China is a great bully but the majority of chinese don't see it that way. To them it is normal. Have a look at the youtube clip showing a woman who was beaten in front of her son and many people by an official because she dared to complain.
实æ‹å¥³å镇政府大院内é副书记殴打 转载：新浪视频 - YouTube!
实æ‹å¥³å镇政府大院内é副书记殴打 转载：新浪视频 - YouTube!
marshal panda
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Tokyo should have read the writings on the wall long back and transferred its investments to India.
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It may be normal to them but not to their neighbors. If they can't exercise sensitivity then the more that they have no business lording it over in Asia.
Hi all,
It's interesting to read how the strategies from the China to invade the island and from the Japan to protect it (from a japanese point of view).
Sekai no Kansen: Japan's Strategy Against Senkaku Islands Dispute
by Kyle Mizokami on Sep 14, 2012 (http://jsw.newpacificinstitute.org/?p=10495)
– Rampancy of Chinese military vessels
JMSDF Sasebo base is located in Sasebo City, Nagasaki Prefecture — merely 800 km from Tsingtao (Qingdao) where the Chinese North Sea Fleet's (NSF) concentrates its activities, and only 720 km from the East Sea Fleet's (ESF) activity zone. This area is in the center of natural energy resources, and the frontline of the People's Liberation Army Navy's (PLAN) activities surrounding Japanese territorial waters.
JMSDF currently homeports three AEGIS destroyers, 16 escort destroyers, two refuel (oiler) ships, three minesweepers, and two missile craft in Sasebo. A total of 23 vessels are stationed there — a total of 97,700 tons. A third of the escort ships, and half of the AEGIS ships, owned by JMSDF, are located in Sasebo.
However, JMSDF is now facing the biggest change in history.
On May 1, a JMSDF P-3C assigned to Atsugi base identified three PLAN vessels navigating from the west of Kagoshima/Yakushima, and transiting eastward towards Oosumi strait, the southern tip of Kyushu, and into the western Pacific Ocean. JMSDF dispatched three escort ships from Sasebo to track two Jiangkai II-class Frigates and a Dongdiao-class surveillance ship with three larger radars onboard.
However, six days later, another JMSDF P-3C based out of Okinawa spotted five PLAN vessels, to include two Luyang I-class guided missile destroyers, located 650 km southwest of Okinawa, and heading eastward. The ships were from the South Sea Fleet, and with the imminent possibility of the ships approaching southwest islands of Okinawa, JMSDF decided to track them with the escort ships.
Two PLAN Fleets advancing into the Western Pacific (WESTPAC) from the East China Sea (ECS) — this was the first time that the PLAN Navy advanced out from northern and southern territorial waters, almost simultaneously. The three vessels that navigated through Oosumi strait also passed through and area south of Shikoku Island, then the southern part of Hachijo-Jima, Tokyo, and circled the second-island-chain in a clockwise motion — followed by UAV flight training in the vicinity of Okinotori Shima. Meanwhile, the five guided missile destroyers, with an LSD in the center portraying as an aircraft carrier, navigated in formation through southern islands of Okinawa to Okinotori Shima.
Both fleets completed their training around the 20th of May, and returned to their respective bases.
JMSDF resumed routine training after completing the tracking missions, however, on 13 June, China's Luzhou-class guided missile destroyer appeared, along with a refueling ship, from around Yakushima and headed towards Oosumi strait. As soon as the vessels crossed the strait, they headed south and conducted helo training north of Okinotori Shima for ten days. They later relocated to the south of Okinotori Shima to conduct replenishment-at-sea training. JMSDF dispatched an escort ship (AMAGIRI) and P-3C's to monitor and track PLAN's activities, but basically, the ships based out of Sasebo were tossed about by the activities of China's three Fleets.
A senior leader of JMSDF complained, "China appears every time we mobilize for training, as if they were waiting for that moment. We have no choice but to track them and monitor their moves every time we identify them, so we end up having to cut our training short."
Another senior leader also shared, "We didn't realize so much of our time would be taken by tracking PLAN activities "¦ they may be strategically doing this to prevent us from training"¦"
Securing training time is critical to JMSDF in order to maintain a level of proficiency — so in July, JMSDF launched a specialized plan to place three "special mission" ships based out of Sasebo on "monitor and track" duties for two weeks out of the month to keep an eye on the PLAN activities. All the escort ships rotate to take on the two week mission along with P-3C support. However, senior JMSDF officials are aware that three ships may not be enough, depending on China's scope of activities or scale of the PLAN Fleets in motion.
So, while JMSDF had its hands full in monitoring PLAN's activities, the situation surrounding the Senkaku islands had also become tense, rapidly.
– China's scenario to invade the Senkaku islands
Three fishing surveillance vessels, belonging to the Fishery Bureau of China's State Council, violated Japan's water territory and came in to the vicinity of the Senkaku islands on the 11th and 12th of July. A Japan Coast Guard patrol ship demanded the Chinese ship to leave Japan territorial waters when the Chinese vessel responded, "Do not interfere! Get out of Chinese territorial waters!" Furthermore, the People's Daily, newspaper of the Communist Party of China warned that the issue could escalate out of control depending on Japan's response.
It is believed that the act of violation was in response to PM Noda's policy to nationalize the Senkaku islands, but the National Oceanographic Office under China's State Council announced in March of this year that it will conduct surveillance missions in the vicinity of the Senkaku Islands — and true to its words, China's Oceanographic Survey ships have violated Japan territorial waters numerous times since then.
There is no evidence that the Chinese activities in ECS and WESTPAC have any direct relation to the activities surrounding the Senkaku Islands, however, JMSDF senior officials are stating they are considering all possible scenarios.
One of JMSDF's scenarios is one that China conducts a large scale exercise in ECS and the WESTPAC, which will draw JMSDF's attention away from the Senkakus, while China sends multiple fishing vessels, with militias on board, to land on the Senkaku islands. JMSDF is taking such a guerrilla-like scenario into consideration while planning countermeasures. The scenario goes like this: 500-800 Chinese fishing vessels mass together ff the coast of Zhejiang, along with attack helos and other ammunition providing backup support, and this "fleet" launches a large scale invasion of the Senkaku islands, ignoring the warnings of JCG patrol ships, and lands on the islands. After landing, the scenario moves to the Chinese building bridgeheads with the help of their Navy and Army.
This scenario is actually an expanded version of what occurred in April of 1978, when over 140 Chinese fishing vessels came into the vicinity of the Senkaku islands. In fact, a similar situation already occurred just two years ago. 270 Chinese vessels were operating in the area close to Japan waters, and up to 70 vessels a day were confirmed to have violated Japan territory. In the midst of these related operations, China's fishing trawler collided with JCG's patrol ship and fled the scene. It is safe to say that China is well on their way to invading the Senkaku islands.
Furthermore, China has been taking every opportunity to state their position on the Senkaku issues. For example, at a regular conference held between retired JSDF generals/admirals and executives of the PLA this June, China clearly stated, "Territorial issues are our core interest. The Senkaku islands are Chinese territory, and our core interest. We will not condone illegal occupancy on our territory. However, there is no reason to resort to armed forces to find resolution in territorial and sovereignty issues."
Identifying the Senkaku islands as China's "core interest" is one of the key takeaways — but so is the following statement: ""¦there is no reason to resort to armed forces to find resolution in territorial and sovereignty issues." Therefore, China could utilize militias on fishing vessels to invade the Senkaku islands — i.e., to give them the excuse that the actions taken are not "military forces", because the PLAN is not involved.
Recently, China has been threatening the Indonesian and Vietnam navies with small firearms in South China Sea (SCS) over territorial issues. It is hard to believe that China's demands will be embraced by the international community. However, if the scenario JMSDF has been thinking of is executed by China, JMSDF will have to respond with force. In such case, China will claim that Japan escalated the situation to a military issue first, and will accuse Japan for forgetting their history of invasions, which will be their cry to the international community. In a world where information travels via internet in matter of minutes, Japan cannot take the risk of turning the global community against them.
– Demonstrating the will to defend the Senkaku islands
In order prevent such an escalation, Japan must consider utilizing law enforcement agencies such as the JCG, prefectural police forces, the riot police forces, Police Special Assault Teams (SATs), and other special forces, to respond to such a situation and keep JMSDF away from the scene as much as possible — and train for such scenario.
Disappointingly, although Senkaku Islands fall under the jurisdiction of Okinawa Prefectural Police (OPP), training with OPP and Japan riot police in the Kyushu district is not occurring, and there is no effort to patrol the islands in a joint effort.
Specifically, the riot police and Special Forces should land on Senkaku islands via helo and boats, while JCG dispatches patrol ships and aircraft as soon as the first sign of a Chinese invasion is detected. The GOJ must officially order JSDF to conduct maritime patrols in support of the police and the JCG, and as soon as there are signs of forceful violation of security lines by the Chinese, JMSDF must shift into defense (kinetic) mode to protect the Senkaku islands. In order to train for this scenario, it is critical to gain the understanding and support from Ambassadors of various nations and Defense Attachés of the sensitivities and defense strategies surrounding the Senkaku islands.
Of course, in order to prevent possible invasion of China, Japan must strengthen its line of control of the Senkaku Islands. Currently, the only "defense" demonstrated by Japan is for four JCG patrol ships to routinely patrol in the vicinity of the islands, and for JMSDF P-3C's to conduct surveillance missions once a day.
In July, three Chinese fishing vessels repeatedly violated Japan territorial waters, and it was clear to JCG that maintaining security with merely four patrol boats is challenging and impossible to demonstrate line of control. In order to demonstrate sovereignty over the Senkaku islands, JCG must store fuel, food supplies, and other equipment necessary to conduct operations on a 24-hour basis on the largest island of the Senkaku islands — Uotsuri-Jima. Over the years, GOJ left the islands uninhabited to prevent provoking China, but it is time to change the current situation as soon as possible.
Furthermore, the government must expedite the process of strengthening the two critical organizations in this situation — JMSDF and JCG. JMSDF and JCG worked closely together shortly after the 3-11 disaster to conduct Search-and-Rescue (SAR) missions. While all JMSDF ships replenished fuel from refueling ships during these missions, JCG ships were forced to return back to the port to replenish fuel. The fundamental reason for that is the difference in fuel used — while JMSDF uses light diesel, JCG requires heavy oil. Also, there's a difference in the fuel filler tube opening, making it impossible for JMSDF to provide fuel to JCG ships. These fundamental differences could be detrimental to the productivity of SAR missions. The ability to demonstrate line of control would significantly increase if the issue in conducting replenishment-at-sea is resolved.
For example, if JMSDF provides a refueling ship and an escort ship to support the four JCG patrol ships once a week in the vicinity of the Senkaku islands, Japan's "presence" will be significantly more visible. It is easy for JCG to change the fuel to diesel, as well as changing the fuel filler tube opening to meet the JMSDF specifications. Of course, the new JCG ships should be compatible with JMSDF ships for that reason. It is critical for Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT) to remove any communication barriers so they are in sync with each other.
Demonstrating Japanese sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands, such as building structures on the islands and establishing surveillance and patrols, must be expedited — but at the same time, GOJ must justify its argument to the international community and gain their support and recognition that the Senkaku islands belong to Japan.
GOJ passed a resolution to place the Senkaku islands under the administration of Okinawa during the January 1895 Cabinet Council — and immediately thereafter launched development projects to install a concrete territorial claim and other various development projects. Immigrants were sent to the Senkaku islands every year, thereafter, to collect albatross feathers and to manufacture dried bonito flakes.
China and Taiwan began claiming sovereignty of the Senkaku islands in the 1970"²s after experts discovered oil reserves might be found under the sea near the islands. China claimed that Japan invaded the Senkaku islands during the Russo-Japanese War (1894-1895) — however, GOJ began researching if the Senkaku islands were "terra nullius" in 1885, by ordering a steamboat from Okinawa to conduct site surveys.
Back then, the Qing Dynasty had supreme military power with powerful ships. In 1886, four Qing Fleet ships appeared in the coast of Nagasaki and landed on Japan soil. Sailors of the Qing Fleet assaulted and stole from the Japanese people, resulting to injuries and deaths. This incident — known as the "Nagasaki Incident" — proves how powerful China was; so, how could Japan "invade" the Senkaku islands? Japan must use historical documents to prove how China and Taiwan's claims are unsubstantiated, while gaining the international support that Japan has territorial rights. Japan must not forget that China is attempting to disprove Japan's claims to territorial rights.
Historically speaking, when a "status quo" nation is more powerful than a "change seeking" nation, the situation usually does not escalate to brute force. However, if the level of power is reversed, the situation can quickly turn to forceful resolution. The current military power between Japan and China is equal, but it is also apparent that China is rapidly expanding its power. With China's clear position on the Senkaku islands being their "core interest", it is unlikely that an amicable resolution is attainable.
The Chinese Communist Party cannot risk to be viewed as weak-kneed by its 1.3 billion population. However, China must also keep in mind that an armed conflict with Japan will lead to the involvement of the U.S. military, which will guarantee China's defeat. Therefore, China must be smart in its strategy — i.e., to maintain the conflict with Japan within the realm where it does not involve the U.S.
If Japan should face conflict with China, will the U.S. really support Japan? Although Secretary Clinton clearly stated that the U.S. views the Senkaku islands to fall under article 5 of the U.S.- Japan Security Treaty, there has not been any clarification as to whether or not the U.S. endorses Japan's claims to territorial rights. In May this year, RADM (ret) Michael McDevitt, Director of the Center for Strategic Studies for the CNA Corporations stated at a symposium hosted by the Embassy in Tokyo, "Currently, Japan has administrative control of the Senkaku islands. Secretary Clinton's statement indicates that the Security Treaty will cover the Senkaku islands, as long as Japan has administrative control. However, if Japan loses administrative control, the treaty would not cover the Senkaku islands."
Japan must come to realization that it must demonstrate its willingness and intention to prevent forceful landing at all costs, or the U.S. will not execute collaborative defense in accordance to the treaty. JCG and remote island police must strengthen their security postures, with the support of JSDF, to validate the line of (territorial) control, while GOJ convinces the international community that Japan has territorial rights to the Senkaku islands.
Furthermore, Japan must align its military power with the U.S. to fully defend its territorial waters. Should Japan fail to take such actions, control over the Senkaku islands will definitely be lost.
It's interesting to read how the strategies from the China to invade the island and from the Japan to protect it (from a japanese point of view).
Sekai no Kansen: Japan's Strategy Against Senkaku Islands Dispute
by Kyle Mizokami on Sep 14, 2012 (http://jsw.newpacificinstitute.org/?p=10495)
– Rampancy of Chinese military vessels
JMSDF Sasebo base is located in Sasebo City, Nagasaki Prefecture — merely 800 km from Tsingtao (Qingdao) where the Chinese North Sea Fleet's (NSF) concentrates its activities, and only 720 km from the East Sea Fleet's (ESF) activity zone. This area is in the center of natural energy resources, and the frontline of the People's Liberation Army Navy's (PLAN) activities surrounding Japanese territorial waters.
JMSDF currently homeports three AEGIS destroyers, 16 escort destroyers, two refuel (oiler) ships, three minesweepers, and two missile craft in Sasebo. A total of 23 vessels are stationed there — a total of 97,700 tons. A third of the escort ships, and half of the AEGIS ships, owned by JMSDF, are located in Sasebo.
However, JMSDF is now facing the biggest change in history.
On May 1, a JMSDF P-3C assigned to Atsugi base identified three PLAN vessels navigating from the west of Kagoshima/Yakushima, and transiting eastward towards Oosumi strait, the southern tip of Kyushu, and into the western Pacific Ocean. JMSDF dispatched three escort ships from Sasebo to track two Jiangkai II-class Frigates and a Dongdiao-class surveillance ship with three larger radars onboard.
However, six days later, another JMSDF P-3C based out of Okinawa spotted five PLAN vessels, to include two Luyang I-class guided missile destroyers, located 650 km southwest of Okinawa, and heading eastward. The ships were from the South Sea Fleet, and with the imminent possibility of the ships approaching southwest islands of Okinawa, JMSDF decided to track them with the escort ships.
Two PLAN Fleets advancing into the Western Pacific (WESTPAC) from the East China Sea (ECS) — this was the first time that the PLAN Navy advanced out from northern and southern territorial waters, almost simultaneously. The three vessels that navigated through Oosumi strait also passed through and area south of Shikoku Island, then the southern part of Hachijo-Jima, Tokyo, and circled the second-island-chain in a clockwise motion — followed by UAV flight training in the vicinity of Okinotori Shima. Meanwhile, the five guided missile destroyers, with an LSD in the center portraying as an aircraft carrier, navigated in formation through southern islands of Okinawa to Okinotori Shima.
Both fleets completed their training around the 20th of May, and returned to their respective bases.
JMSDF resumed routine training after completing the tracking missions, however, on 13 June, China's Luzhou-class guided missile destroyer appeared, along with a refueling ship, from around Yakushima and headed towards Oosumi strait. As soon as the vessels crossed the strait, they headed south and conducted helo training north of Okinotori Shima for ten days. They later relocated to the south of Okinotori Shima to conduct replenishment-at-sea training. JMSDF dispatched an escort ship (AMAGIRI) and P-3C's to monitor and track PLAN's activities, but basically, the ships based out of Sasebo were tossed about by the activities of China's three Fleets.
A senior leader of JMSDF complained, "China appears every time we mobilize for training, as if they were waiting for that moment. We have no choice but to track them and monitor their moves every time we identify them, so we end up having to cut our training short."
Another senior leader also shared, "We didn't realize so much of our time would be taken by tracking PLAN activities "¦ they may be strategically doing this to prevent us from training"¦"
Securing training time is critical to JMSDF in order to maintain a level of proficiency — so in July, JMSDF launched a specialized plan to place three "special mission" ships based out of Sasebo on "monitor and track" duties for two weeks out of the month to keep an eye on the PLAN activities. All the escort ships rotate to take on the two week mission along with P-3C support. However, senior JMSDF officials are aware that three ships may not be enough, depending on China's scope of activities or scale of the PLAN Fleets in motion.
So, while JMSDF had its hands full in monitoring PLAN's activities, the situation surrounding the Senkaku islands had also become tense, rapidly.
– China's scenario to invade the Senkaku islands
Three fishing surveillance vessels, belonging to the Fishery Bureau of China's State Council, violated Japan's water territory and came in to the vicinity of the Senkaku islands on the 11th and 12th of July. A Japan Coast Guard patrol ship demanded the Chinese ship to leave Japan territorial waters when the Chinese vessel responded, "Do not interfere! Get out of Chinese territorial waters!" Furthermore, the People's Daily, newspaper of the Communist Party of China warned that the issue could escalate out of control depending on Japan's response.
It is believed that the act of violation was in response to PM Noda's policy to nationalize the Senkaku islands, but the National Oceanographic Office under China's State Council announced in March of this year that it will conduct surveillance missions in the vicinity of the Senkaku Islands — and true to its words, China's Oceanographic Survey ships have violated Japan territorial waters numerous times since then.
There is no evidence that the Chinese activities in ECS and WESTPAC have any direct relation to the activities surrounding the Senkaku Islands, however, JMSDF senior officials are stating they are considering all possible scenarios.
One of JMSDF's scenarios is one that China conducts a large scale exercise in ECS and the WESTPAC, which will draw JMSDF's attention away from the Senkakus, while China sends multiple fishing vessels, with militias on board, to land on the Senkaku islands. JMSDF is taking such a guerrilla-like scenario into consideration while planning countermeasures. The scenario goes like this: 500-800 Chinese fishing vessels mass together ff the coast of Zhejiang, along with attack helos and other ammunition providing backup support, and this "fleet" launches a large scale invasion of the Senkaku islands, ignoring the warnings of JCG patrol ships, and lands on the islands. After landing, the scenario moves to the Chinese building bridgeheads with the help of their Navy and Army.
This scenario is actually an expanded version of what occurred in April of 1978, when over 140 Chinese fishing vessels came into the vicinity of the Senkaku islands. In fact, a similar situation already occurred just two years ago. 270 Chinese vessels were operating in the area close to Japan waters, and up to 70 vessels a day were confirmed to have violated Japan territory. In the midst of these related operations, China's fishing trawler collided with JCG's patrol ship and fled the scene. It is safe to say that China is well on their way to invading the Senkaku islands.
Furthermore, China has been taking every opportunity to state their position on the Senkaku issues. For example, at a regular conference held between retired JSDF generals/admirals and executives of the PLA this June, China clearly stated, "Territorial issues are our core interest. The Senkaku islands are Chinese territory, and our core interest. We will not condone illegal occupancy on our territory. However, there is no reason to resort to armed forces to find resolution in territorial and sovereignty issues."
Identifying the Senkaku islands as China's "core interest" is one of the key takeaways — but so is the following statement: ""¦there is no reason to resort to armed forces to find resolution in territorial and sovereignty issues." Therefore, China could utilize militias on fishing vessels to invade the Senkaku islands — i.e., to give them the excuse that the actions taken are not "military forces", because the PLAN is not involved.
Recently, China has been threatening the Indonesian and Vietnam navies with small firearms in South China Sea (SCS) over territorial issues. It is hard to believe that China's demands will be embraced by the international community. However, if the scenario JMSDF has been thinking of is executed by China, JMSDF will have to respond with force. In such case, China will claim that Japan escalated the situation to a military issue first, and will accuse Japan for forgetting their history of invasions, which will be their cry to the international community. In a world where information travels via internet in matter of minutes, Japan cannot take the risk of turning the global community against them.
– Demonstrating the will to defend the Senkaku islands
In order prevent such an escalation, Japan must consider utilizing law enforcement agencies such as the JCG, prefectural police forces, the riot police forces, Police Special Assault Teams (SATs), and other special forces, to respond to such a situation and keep JMSDF away from the scene as much as possible — and train for such scenario.
Disappointingly, although Senkaku Islands fall under the jurisdiction of Okinawa Prefectural Police (OPP), training with OPP and Japan riot police in the Kyushu district is not occurring, and there is no effort to patrol the islands in a joint effort.
Specifically, the riot police and Special Forces should land on Senkaku islands via helo and boats, while JCG dispatches patrol ships and aircraft as soon as the first sign of a Chinese invasion is detected. The GOJ must officially order JSDF to conduct maritime patrols in support of the police and the JCG, and as soon as there are signs of forceful violation of security lines by the Chinese, JMSDF must shift into defense (kinetic) mode to protect the Senkaku islands. In order to train for this scenario, it is critical to gain the understanding and support from Ambassadors of various nations and Defense Attachés of the sensitivities and defense strategies surrounding the Senkaku islands.
Of course, in order to prevent possible invasion of China, Japan must strengthen its line of control of the Senkaku Islands. Currently, the only "defense" demonstrated by Japan is for four JCG patrol ships to routinely patrol in the vicinity of the islands, and for JMSDF P-3C's to conduct surveillance missions once a day.
In July, three Chinese fishing vessels repeatedly violated Japan territorial waters, and it was clear to JCG that maintaining security with merely four patrol boats is challenging and impossible to demonstrate line of control. In order to demonstrate sovereignty over the Senkaku islands, JCG must store fuel, food supplies, and other equipment necessary to conduct operations on a 24-hour basis on the largest island of the Senkaku islands — Uotsuri-Jima. Over the years, GOJ left the islands uninhabited to prevent provoking China, but it is time to change the current situation as soon as possible.
Furthermore, the government must expedite the process of strengthening the two critical organizations in this situation — JMSDF and JCG. JMSDF and JCG worked closely together shortly after the 3-11 disaster to conduct Search-and-Rescue (SAR) missions. While all JMSDF ships replenished fuel from refueling ships during these missions, JCG ships were forced to return back to the port to replenish fuel. The fundamental reason for that is the difference in fuel used — while JMSDF uses light diesel, JCG requires heavy oil. Also, there's a difference in the fuel filler tube opening, making it impossible for JMSDF to provide fuel to JCG ships. These fundamental differences could be detrimental to the productivity of SAR missions. The ability to demonstrate line of control would significantly increase if the issue in conducting replenishment-at-sea is resolved.
For example, if JMSDF provides a refueling ship and an escort ship to support the four JCG patrol ships once a week in the vicinity of the Senkaku islands, Japan's "presence" will be significantly more visible. It is easy for JCG to change the fuel to diesel, as well as changing the fuel filler tube opening to meet the JMSDF specifications. Of course, the new JCG ships should be compatible with JMSDF ships for that reason. It is critical for Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT) to remove any communication barriers so they are in sync with each other.
Demonstrating Japanese sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands, such as building structures on the islands and establishing surveillance and patrols, must be expedited — but at the same time, GOJ must justify its argument to the international community and gain their support and recognition that the Senkaku islands belong to Japan.
GOJ passed a resolution to place the Senkaku islands under the administration of Okinawa during the January 1895 Cabinet Council — and immediately thereafter launched development projects to install a concrete territorial claim and other various development projects. Immigrants were sent to the Senkaku islands every year, thereafter, to collect albatross feathers and to manufacture dried bonito flakes.
China and Taiwan began claiming sovereignty of the Senkaku islands in the 1970"²s after experts discovered oil reserves might be found under the sea near the islands. China claimed that Japan invaded the Senkaku islands during the Russo-Japanese War (1894-1895) — however, GOJ began researching if the Senkaku islands were "terra nullius" in 1885, by ordering a steamboat from Okinawa to conduct site surveys.
Back then, the Qing Dynasty had supreme military power with powerful ships. In 1886, four Qing Fleet ships appeared in the coast of Nagasaki and landed on Japan soil. Sailors of the Qing Fleet assaulted and stole from the Japanese people, resulting to injuries and deaths. This incident — known as the "Nagasaki Incident" — proves how powerful China was; so, how could Japan "invade" the Senkaku islands? Japan must use historical documents to prove how China and Taiwan's claims are unsubstantiated, while gaining the international support that Japan has territorial rights. Japan must not forget that China is attempting to disprove Japan's claims to territorial rights.
Historically speaking, when a "status quo" nation is more powerful than a "change seeking" nation, the situation usually does not escalate to brute force. However, if the level of power is reversed, the situation can quickly turn to forceful resolution. The current military power between Japan and China is equal, but it is also apparent that China is rapidly expanding its power. With China's clear position on the Senkaku islands being their "core interest", it is unlikely that an amicable resolution is attainable.
The Chinese Communist Party cannot risk to be viewed as weak-kneed by its 1.3 billion population. However, China must also keep in mind that an armed conflict with Japan will lead to the involvement of the U.S. military, which will guarantee China's defeat. Therefore, China must be smart in its strategy — i.e., to maintain the conflict with Japan within the realm where it does not involve the U.S.
If Japan should face conflict with China, will the U.S. really support Japan? Although Secretary Clinton clearly stated that the U.S. views the Senkaku islands to fall under article 5 of the U.S.- Japan Security Treaty, there has not been any clarification as to whether or not the U.S. endorses Japan's claims to territorial rights. In May this year, RADM (ret) Michael McDevitt, Director of the Center for Strategic Studies for the CNA Corporations stated at a symposium hosted by the Embassy in Tokyo, "Currently, Japan has administrative control of the Senkaku islands. Secretary Clinton's statement indicates that the Security Treaty will cover the Senkaku islands, as long as Japan has administrative control. However, if Japan loses administrative control, the treaty would not cover the Senkaku islands."
Japan must come to realization that it must demonstrate its willingness and intention to prevent forceful landing at all costs, or the U.S. will not execute collaborative defense in accordance to the treaty. JCG and remote island police must strengthen their security postures, with the support of JSDF, to validate the line of (territorial) control, while GOJ convinces the international community that Japan has territorial rights to the Senkaku islands.
Furthermore, Japan must align its military power with the U.S. to fully defend its territorial waters. Should Japan fail to take such actions, control over the Senkaku islands will definitely be lost.
Zebra
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China ready for protracted war with Japan
16:24, October 08, 2012
China ready for protracted war with Japan - People's Daily Online
16:24, October 08, 2012
China ready for protracted war with Japan - People's Daily Online
China is trying to draw Japan into a confrontation and then crying loud that Japan attacks its ships in China indisputatble territory. I believe China is playing the nationlist card to its own people to hide internal problems including slowdown in the economy and other social unrests. People get restless and and their anger needs to be directed to japanese hatre or else they might turn against the government.
China also try to same trick with South China Sea (Vietnam and Philipine) but it lost as asean countries are regrouping into one united block which is to difficult to digest.
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14:59 9 October
Chinese ships sail near Senkakus for 9th straight day
NAHA, Japan, Oct. 9, Kyodo
Chinese vessels continued to enter waters Tuesday near the Japanese-controlled islets in the East China Sea, sailing in the contiguous zone for the ninth consecutive day.
Four maritime surveillance vessels, all of which entered the area the previous day, reentered the band of water just outside Japan's territorial sea near Kuba Island in the Senkaku group, the 11th Regional Coast Guard Headquarters in Naha, Okinawa Prefecture, said.
The coast guard aircraft also spotted a fisheries patrol boat sailing in the contiguous zone near Uotsuri Island, the largest of the islets, before it exited the area in little over an hour. The same Chinese patrol boat was seen in Uotsuri's contiguous zone on Sunday.
==Kyodo
------------------------------------------------------------
China also try to same trick with South China Sea (Vietnam and Philipine) but it lost as asean countries are regrouping into one united block which is to difficult to digest.
-----------------------------------------------------------
14:59 9 October
Chinese ships sail near Senkakus for 9th straight day
NAHA, Japan, Oct. 9, Kyodo
Chinese vessels continued to enter waters Tuesday near the Japanese-controlled islets in the East China Sea, sailing in the contiguous zone for the ninth consecutive day.
Four maritime surveillance vessels, all of which entered the area the previous day, reentered the band of water just outside Japan's territorial sea near Kuba Island in the Senkaku group, the 11th Regional Coast Guard Headquarters in Naha, Okinawa Prefecture, said.
The coast guard aircraft also spotted a fisheries patrol boat sailing in the contiguous zone near Uotsuri Island, the largest of the islets, before it exited the area in little over an hour. The same Chinese patrol boat was seen in Uotsuri's contiguous zone on Sunday.
==Kyodo
------------------------------------------------------------
when war breaks out over the island, it is going to be very bloody, just like in the youtube clip.
实æ‹ï¼šå¹¿å·žåœ°é“两男撕咬抢座血溅当场 Man Bites Man in Subway - YouTube
实æ‹ï¼šå¹¿å·žåœ°é“两男撕咬抢座血溅当场 Man Bites Man in Subway - YouTube
It's unofficially official: Okinawa belongs to China. Indisputable!
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BEIJING —
In a glass case at Beijing's Imperial College, an 18th century book with a yellowed title page in bold, black characters is evidence—some Chinese say—that a swathe of modern-day Japan belongs to China.
The two Asian powers are already at loggerheads over a set of tiny uninhabited islets in the East China Sea, even stoking fears of armed conflict.
But the most aggressive Chinese nationalists—tacitly encouraged by authorities—say far more is open to claim, including the island of Okinawa, home to 1.3 million people and major U.S. military bases.
The biggest of the Ryukyu Islands, which stretch for about 1,000 kilometers from Japan's mainland almost to Taiwan, Okinawa was the center of the Ryukyuan kingdom, which pledged fealty to both Chinese emperors and Japanese feudal lords.
For hundreds of years it paid tribute to China's Ming and Qing dynasties, until it was absorbed by Japan in 1879.
The people of the Ryukyus are considered more closely related to Japan in ethnic and linguistic terms, than to China.
Some Chinese, however, see historical and cultural ties as a basis for sovereignty and dismiss Japan's possession of the islands as a legacy of its aggressive expansionism that ended in World War II defeat.
"This kind of thing proves Ryukyu is China's," said electrical engineer Zhu Shaobo, looking at a Qing dynasty volume from the 1760s about Ryukyuan students on display at the Imperial College, now a tourist site.
"Ryukyuan students studied hard and the cultural level of some was not inferior to Chinese students," explains an exhibit panel at the institution, which trained Imperial officials and some foreign students.
The belief that China has a legitimate claim to the Ryukyu Islands has existed among flag-wavers in China—and Taiwan—for years.
But it has been given new attention by the row over the uninhabited islets, known as the Diaoyu islands in China, which claims them, and as the Senkaku chain in Japan, which controls them.
In recent anti-Japan protests in China, some demonstrators carried signs reading: "Retake Ryukyu" and "Take back Okinawa".
China's government does not make such claims, but state media have carried articles and commentaries questioning Japan's authority.
In an article carried by state media in July, People's Liberation Army Major General Luo Yuan wrote: "The Ryukyu Kingdom had always been an independent kingdom directly under the Chinese imperial government before it was seized by Japan in 1879."
The kingdom, which lasted from 1429 until 1879, had a complex history wedged between powerful neighbors.
In return for tribute to Chinese emperors, trade and cultural ties flourished. But from the early 17th century, it came under pressure from Japan, suffering a punitive invasion and demands for loyalty and tribute.
Nominal independence, however, was maintained, and the "dual subordination" continued until the late 19th century when a modernizing Japan could no longer tolerate Ryukyu's vague status.
Western and Japanese scholars say Okinawa's links to China are no basis for sovereignty claims today. Many states were part of a China-centered structure of international relations in Asia.
"It was a system of cultural subordination and also a way of the Chinese empire attempting to control trade," said Gregory Smits, an expert on Ryukyu history at Pennsylvania State University.
Experts see little chance of Beijing pushing a demand for Okinawa.
Gavan McCormack, emeritus professor at Australian National University, called any claim "quite unrealistic," adding it was probably "an extreme position to try and attract Japan back to the negotiating table."
Jia Qingguo, an international relations expert at Peking University, added: "I don't think the Chinese government wants to further complicate the already complicated issue."
Still, questions being raised over Japan's sovereignty worry Akihiro Kinjo, a 25-year-old Okinawa native and restaurant manager in Beijing.
Okinawa was the site of a deadly 1945 battle between Japan and the United States.
"Our grandmothers experienced war and based on their stories they had a horrible time," he said.
Under a security treaty with Japan the US maintains major military facilities on the island, and Washington is also making a strategic "pivot" to Asia, raising fears in Beijing of containment.
In August, the World Journal, a military affairs tabloid, carried a cover showing a projectile soaring toward Okinawa under the headline: "People's Liberation Army guided missile targets Okinawa bases."
Japan Today (by Kelly Olsen)
-------------------------
----------
BEIJING —
In a glass case at Beijing's Imperial College, an 18th century book with a yellowed title page in bold, black characters is evidence—some Chinese say—that a swathe of modern-day Japan belongs to China.
The two Asian powers are already at loggerheads over a set of tiny uninhabited islets in the East China Sea, even stoking fears of armed conflict.
But the most aggressive Chinese nationalists—tacitly encouraged by authorities—say far more is open to claim, including the island of Okinawa, home to 1.3 million people and major U.S. military bases.
The biggest of the Ryukyu Islands, which stretch for about 1,000 kilometers from Japan's mainland almost to Taiwan, Okinawa was the center of the Ryukyuan kingdom, which pledged fealty to both Chinese emperors and Japanese feudal lords.
For hundreds of years it paid tribute to China's Ming and Qing dynasties, until it was absorbed by Japan in 1879.
The people of the Ryukyus are considered more closely related to Japan in ethnic and linguistic terms, than to China.
Some Chinese, however, see historical and cultural ties as a basis for sovereignty and dismiss Japan's possession of the islands as a legacy of its aggressive expansionism that ended in World War II defeat.
"This kind of thing proves Ryukyu is China's," said electrical engineer Zhu Shaobo, looking at a Qing dynasty volume from the 1760s about Ryukyuan students on display at the Imperial College, now a tourist site.
"Ryukyuan students studied hard and the cultural level of some was not inferior to Chinese students," explains an exhibit panel at the institution, which trained Imperial officials and some foreign students.
The belief that China has a legitimate claim to the Ryukyu Islands has existed among flag-wavers in China—and Taiwan—for years.
But it has been given new attention by the row over the uninhabited islets, known as the Diaoyu islands in China, which claims them, and as the Senkaku chain in Japan, which controls them.
In recent anti-Japan protests in China, some demonstrators carried signs reading: "Retake Ryukyu" and "Take back Okinawa".
China's government does not make such claims, but state media have carried articles and commentaries questioning Japan's authority.
In an article carried by state media in July, People's Liberation Army Major General Luo Yuan wrote: "The Ryukyu Kingdom had always been an independent kingdom directly under the Chinese imperial government before it was seized by Japan in 1879."
The kingdom, which lasted from 1429 until 1879, had a complex history wedged between powerful neighbors.
In return for tribute to Chinese emperors, trade and cultural ties flourished. But from the early 17th century, it came under pressure from Japan, suffering a punitive invasion and demands for loyalty and tribute.
Nominal independence, however, was maintained, and the "dual subordination" continued until the late 19th century when a modernizing Japan could no longer tolerate Ryukyu's vague status.
Western and Japanese scholars say Okinawa's links to China are no basis for sovereignty claims today. Many states were part of a China-centered structure of international relations in Asia.
"It was a system of cultural subordination and also a way of the Chinese empire attempting to control trade," said Gregory Smits, an expert on Ryukyu history at Pennsylvania State University.
Experts see little chance of Beijing pushing a demand for Okinawa.
Gavan McCormack, emeritus professor at Australian National University, called any claim "quite unrealistic," adding it was probably "an extreme position to try and attract Japan back to the negotiating table."
Jia Qingguo, an international relations expert at Peking University, added: "I don't think the Chinese government wants to further complicate the already complicated issue."
Still, questions being raised over Japan's sovereignty worry Akihiro Kinjo, a 25-year-old Okinawa native and restaurant manager in Beijing.
Okinawa was the site of a deadly 1945 battle between Japan and the United States.
"Our grandmothers experienced war and based on their stories they had a horrible time," he said.
Under a security treaty with Japan the US maintains major military facilities on the island, and Washington is also making a strategic "pivot" to Asia, raising fears in Beijing of containment.
In August, the World Journal, a military affairs tabloid, carried a cover showing a projectile soaring toward Okinawa under the headline: "People's Liberation Army guided missile targets Okinawa bases."
Japan Today (by Kelly Olsen)
-------------------------
LETHALFORCE
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Kissinger: US should not take sides on Diaoyu Islands
Kissinger: US should not take sides on Diaoyu Islands|Politics|chinadaily.com.cn
Former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger said in Washington that the Diaoyu Islands dispute should remain a bilateral issue between China and Japan and the US should not take sides on the issue, according to Radio Australia and the Seoul-based Chosun Ilbo newspaper.
Kissinger, who took part in the handover of Okinawa to Japan and the normalization of US-China ties, said the governments of China and Japan reached an agreement of shelving the islet dispute in 1978.
And he also said that there was "no active American involvement" in formulating a conclusion between the two countries on the Diaoyu Islands.
Kissinger urged that the US should not take a position on the sovereignty of the Diaoyu Islands.
A US Congressional report said Washington has never recognized Japan's sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands and takes no position over the territorial row between Japan and China.
The report, published on Sept 25 by the Congressional Research Service, the public-policy research arm of the US Congress, said the US recognizes only Japan's administrative power over the Diaoyu Islands after the Okinawa Reversion Treaty was signed in 1971.
"US State Department officials asserted that reversion of administrative rights to Japan did not prejudice any claims to the islands," said the report from the Congress think tank.
Kissinger: US should not take sides on Diaoyu Islands|Politics|chinadaily.com.cn
Former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger said in Washington that the Diaoyu Islands dispute should remain a bilateral issue between China and Japan and the US should not take sides on the issue, according to Radio Australia and the Seoul-based Chosun Ilbo newspaper.
Kissinger, who took part in the handover of Okinawa to Japan and the normalization of US-China ties, said the governments of China and Japan reached an agreement of shelving the islet dispute in 1978.
And he also said that there was "no active American involvement" in formulating a conclusion between the two countries on the Diaoyu Islands.
Kissinger urged that the US should not take a position on the sovereignty of the Diaoyu Islands.
A US Congressional report said Washington has never recognized Japan's sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands and takes no position over the territorial row between Japan and China.
The report, published on Sept 25 by the Congressional Research Service, the public-policy research arm of the US Congress, said the US recognizes only Japan's administrative power over the Diaoyu Islands after the Okinawa Reversion Treaty was signed in 1971.
"US State Department officials asserted that reversion of administrative rights to Japan did not prejudice any claims to the islands," said the report from the Congress think tank.
Last edited:
trackwhack
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Re: Kissinger: US should not take sides on Diaoyu Islands
I can see Japan starting to put together the building blocks of you know what.
I can see Japan starting to put together the building blocks of you know what.
