CDS news, updates, discussions and reports

[neo29]

Most of the countries across the globe, big and small, have created the post of Chief of Defense Staff (CDS), who acts as single point military adviser to the government on military strategy, doctrines, and their requirements and in nuclear powered countries the CDS advises the head of state on nuclear doctrines and its use. The CDS also brings in synergy between the various branches of the armed forces which is crucial to win a war in the
changing geo-political scenario. But 60 years after Independence, India that has the second largest standing army, fourth largest air force and fifth largest navy strangely lacks it.

Particularly in India's context, as the country evolves as a strong economic and military power and as our nuclear arsenal and doctrine evolves, a CDS is must to take swift decisions on the use of the military or in the event of a retaliatory nuclear strike (we have committed to a no-first-strike).

In India the armed forces, the ones who fight on the field, are totally out of the loop in decision making and policy discussions due to perpetual fear of the Indian politicians that handing more power to the military would be counterproductive (so called fear of military becoming too powerful). Even during the Phokran tests in 1998, the military was informed just before the detonation that too just in case Pakistan resorts to any misadventures on the border and the military was taken by surprise when India disclosed that it has Chemical weapons.

The lack of a CDS has been felt during all the wars and even during peace times particularly during the 1962 with China where we faced a humiliating defeat. It was well known fact at that time that we had a better air force than the Chinese, but it was never called in due to the fear of expanding the conflict.

Well, had the air force been employed we would have read history in a different way. Fortunately, during the 1971 war for the liberation of Bangladesh, Field Marshal 'Sam Bahadur' Manekshaw donned that role and was steadfast in his assessment that we had to wait till December to strike and resisted the pressure from the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to move into East Pakistan which was to later become Bangladesh.

We all know the course of history in which 93,000 Pakistani soldiers surrendered and the largest such instance after World War II and is a case study on military strategy in military schools across the globe. But in the 1999 Kargil conflict the story is back to square one with lack of coordination within the services delaying a quick response. The Indian Army requested the Air Force for air strikes on the high altitude mountains where Pakistani forces have entrenched, but the Air Force asked the army to get the nod from the government. That took a fortnight and by then the causalities mounted on our side. That shows the sad
state of affairs and gives a glimpse at the level of coordination between the services.

In the India armed forces, each service feels that it alone can win battles and it alone has the primary role in national defense. There is an urgent need to address this. With Pakistan going nuclear, a long protracted conventional battle is ruled out as any major issue would attract international attention and the "International Community" would step in with diplomatic pressure on the government.

Hence, the room for action is very limited and for this, there is need for a greater synergy between the forces and mounting a swift and coordinating response is the order of the day to make tactical gains by launching punitive strikes across the border but not big enough to initiate a nuclear standoff. The CDS can bridge the services and give a fillip to this need. The need for a CDS has been long acknowledged but that remains there.

Both the Kargil Review Committee and the subsequent GOM (Group of Ministers) report in 2001 on reforming the national security system during the NDA government had stressed the need for a CDS to provide single-point military advice to the government and manage the country's nuclear arsenal. Though the political establishment agrees to the need, there has been no concerted effort by successive governments in this direction.

The lackadaisical approach is only complicating things with India rapidly modernizing its military spending tens of billions of dollars and the raising strategic profile of the country in the region and the world at large. What we need is better synergy between the services in terms of strategy and on the field, evolving doctrine and so on. Presently, there is a post called the Chief of Staff Committee (COSC) rotated among the three services but doesn't have any power over the others which is not of much help.

The Indian CDS should be a four or a five star general above the rank of the three service chiefs with power over them but at the same time does not interfere and undermine them. He should head the tri-service strategic Andaman Nicobar command and look after the strategic forces command and all issues related to Indian nuclear doctrine and also issues of procurement and evolving strategy in consultation with the service chiefs and with the
government. The three service chiefs meanwhile can concentrate on their individual service and to keep it battle ready.

It's high time for Indian political establishment to brush aside the unwanted fears and address the issue with utmost priority as the country assumes a prominent role and a powerful voice on the world stage.

idrw.org security magazine Dec issue

 

[rcscwc]

You have mentioned 1962, 71 and Kargil.

In 62, the humiliating defeat was due to political failure COMBINED with collapse of military leadership in the FIELD. A 62 veteran was our NCC instructor and he narrated how miserable the leadership was. He claimed that troops shot their officers trying to run away. How could a CDS have stopped this rot?


Absence of a CDS did not hamper India in 71.

In Kargil, the parameters of IAF depolyment were and had to restricted. Two aircraft which strayed a few miles were shot down. How could a CDS have accelerated the govt nod for IAF, beats me? A CDS HAS to work under the direction of political leadership. He is not as free an agent as you think.

 

[Yusuf]

pros and cons are there for CDS. I think rcscwc has pointed out why we dont need one. But as the US system shows, it is of help. India has discussed this many times but didnt come to a conclusion because of on most reasons at least the army thinks it should be in charge.

I think Ray Sir would be able to talk more on this.

 

[sesha_maruthi27]

Our babus and all the politicians think that if there is a CDS then they will loose control over the Defence services and one fine day the army may take over the government. This is the reason that they have not come to a conclusion. Either there must be a fearless Government at the centre and should be able to give correct fearcefull answer to whom so ever may attack INDIA or cause distress and harm to the people of INDIA or the politicians should leave the matter to the Defence services and should not interfear in the policies or decission taking of the Defence services.

 

[anoop_mig25]

my question which country in world has CDS system and how they are choosen. i have read it somewhere that piror to independence and after some time there post of cds or something like that or below that . it was abolished because he can dierctly advice to head of armed forces which in case was president by passing political administration . so our politican where worried and they abolished that post . is it true plz engligten us

 

[rcscwc]

Our babus and all the politicians think that if there is a CDS then they will loose control over the Defence services and one fine day the army may take over the government. This is the reason that they have not come to a conclusion. Either there must be a fearless Government at the centre and should be able to give correct fearcefull answer to whom so ever may attack INDIA or cause distress and harm to the people of INDIA or the politicians should leave the matter to the Defence services and should not interfear in the policies or decission taking of the Defence services.

It is quite fashionable to level insinusations about civil and political administration vis-a-vis armed forces. The atmosphere in this regard iseady quite vitiated. For 62 debacle if political leadership is to blame, then military leadership cannot escape it. A COAS first resigning, then taking it back and finally ignominously shunted out was not due to political or "babus". He brought it upon himself.

Fact is the post of CDS has been created. Fact is it has not been filled so far. Fact is that IAF has major reservations about CDS.

 

[rcscwc]

My earlier was limited in scope of 62, 71 and Kargil. This tackles OP in larger scope.

Particularly in India's context, as the country evolves as a strong economic and military power and as our nuclear arsenal and doctrine evolves, a CDS is must to take swift decisions on the use of the military or in the event of a retaliatory nuclear strike (we have committed to a no-first-strike).

CDS is not the final authority in taking a decision. Nowhere has this power delegated on CDS, and remains with political leadership. Period.

In India the armed forces, the ones who fight on the field, are totally out of the loop in decision making and policy discussions due to perpetual fear of the Indian politicians that handing more power to the military would be counterproductive (so called fear of military becoming too powerful). Even during the Phokran tests in 1998, the military was informed just before the detonation that too just in case Pakistan resorts to any misadventures on the border and the military was taken by surprise when India disclosed that it has Chemical weapons.

Let us seperate the apples and orages. Field formations take local decisions and field commanders in the thick of the battle have and must have power to take immidiate decisions. Chief of staff, far be a CDS, cannot charge of each each and every patrol. Period.

Well, had the air force been employed we would have read history in a different way. Fortunately, during the 1971 war for the liberation of Bangladesh, Field Marshal 'Sam Bahadur' Manekshaw donned that role and was steadfast in his assessment that we had to wait till December to strike and resisted the pressure from the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to move into East Pakistan which was to later become Bangladesh.

Sam Bahadur was not the only one to opt for December. That was the optimum time. During December the flows of rivers are at the minimum. Any "bloody" civilian water resources enginner knows that. Bahut door ki kauri nahin laya Sam. There was another reason too, rather many other reasons. ONE was that the Army was not ready [I wonder if it is ready any time. Post parliament it took months to deploy]. Another was that BSF assisted insurgency was undermining Pak defences. If called I can give more.

We all know the course of history in which 93,000 Pakistani soldiers surrendered and the largest such instance after World War II and is a case study on military strategy in military schools across the globe. But in the 1999 Kargil conflict the story is back to square one with lack of coordination within the services delaying a quick response. The Indian Army requested the Air Force for air strikes on the high altitude mountains where Pakistani forces have entrenched, but the Air Force asked the army to get the nod from the government. That took a fortnight and by then the causalities mounted on our side. That shows the sad
state of affairs and gives a glimpse at the level of coordination between the services.

Navy was not relevant there in Kargil. Air Force had to operate under severe limitations, as had the Army. Wisdom of PM in this regard is not open to question. Period. His wisdom can be questioned by historians, but not with respect to a CDS or any Chief of Staff.

In the India armed forces, each service feels that it alone can win battles and it alone has the primary role in national defense.

Our military leadership will do better to get rid of such notions. CDS too would be from those ranks which have such notions. In modern times, wars are impossible to fight without all out support from every quarter. You think Army can move divisions and tanks without railways who kasso their kamars? Can civilian transport be dispensed with? Can Army secure supply lines on its own? How will a CDS help their?

Reminds me. Railways are a PRIME target. But railways men are neither trained nor equipped for for self defence from areial attacks. They too get killed. Only nobody knows their names.

It's high time for Indian political establishment to brush aside the unwanted fears and address the issue with utmost priority as the country assumes a prominent role and a powerful voice on the world stage.

I don't think political leadership is apprehensive of a CDS, who has to operate under the orders of the that leadership, however number stars he has. After all, the President can sack him summarily if needed. It cannot be otherwise. A CNS was sacked like that. Please don't be starry eyed about a CDS.

There are reservations about the necessity of a CDS, and it is not high on the agenda of any political party.
***
Yusuf, please do not try to extrapolate USA or others to India. USA wants a global presence of its military. Not so for India. France, England etc have far flung possessions, not India.

***
An real case.

I was posted at Jammu during 1981-83. An old case of 71 against a Junior Engineer was there. He was posted a km from the border on Munnawar Tawi. It was only December ONE that he evacuated [literally at 11th hour hour] and released his staff. He packed the site records, valuable, and deposied with military authorities at Akhnoor, after labelling the forwarding address. To their credit, the Army delivered them to the deivisional office intact. He removed all the sophisticated equipment, but sold them for 5,000. That was the case.

I was hearing the case. I had called the Army people for evidence who deposed he had NOTHING except records, PLUS the site office was EMPTY before it fell into enemy hands. I exonerated him. Records were more valuable than some equipment, which would fetch 5 lakh today.

Was he valiant?


Psss I was convinced that he filched the equipment, crockery, cutelary etc.

 

[Indian Sniper.001]

Modi I-Day speech.

Modi officially announces CDS.

 

[Deathstar]

Modi I-Day speech.

Modi officially announces CDS.

Whats CDS??????????????........

 

[Anikastha]

Modi I-Day speech.

Modi officially announces CDS.

Cds kya hota hain....
0000000
0000000

 

[Holy Triad]

Modi I-Day speech.

Modi officially announces CDS.

BIG BREAKING: India to have a Chief Of Defence Staff, announces PM
@NarendraModi
. (This was a recommendation by the post Kargil War committee. Has taken 20 years to implement!)


Earlier this year,AFSOD was formed and now CDS!

hurray!

Truly a happy independence day indeed!

 

[Holy Triad]

Whats CDS??????????????........

Cds kya hota hain....
0000000
0000000

The Chief Of Defence Staff, apart from respective service chief,a single chief will head the tri services

An integrated command for tri services,like unkils joint chief of staff.

 

[Deathstar]

Chief Of Defence Staff, apart from respective service chief,a single chief will head the tri services

How is it different from chiefs of staff committee chairperson???????

 

[uoftotaku]

Chief Of Defence Staff, apart from respective service chief,a single chief will head the tri services

Would love to see the Librandu meltdown if Rawat sir is given the honour of being first to hold the post.

They will tear their hair off!

 

[Holy Triad]

How is it different from chiefs of staff committee chairperson???????

He has more powers to device strategies,control policies(like procurement,weapon standardization etc)unlike chairperson doesn't have those powers.

He will be above all the three chief of staff,

 

[Sanglamorre]

How is it different from chiefs of staff committee chairperson???????

Indian tri forces have had problems before due to not having a unified head. The go to excuse was "to stop a coup".

Now that we have one, it looks like war prep is really ongoing.

 

[tarunraju]

Indian tri forces have had problems before due to not having a unified head. The go to excuse was "to stop a coup".

Now that we have one, it looks like war prep is really ongoing.

Yup, that's what my dad said: this is a wartime appointment. It remains to be seen if CDS is a 4-star officer or 5-star. 5-star confirms we're going to war.

A 5-star officer in regular service (not in an honourary post) never superannuates and has a bunch of constitutional powers that come into play during war.

 

[Holy Triad]

This was an old article,which explains the role of cds


Where is India's Chief of Defence Staff ?
While the army and the navy support the idea of a CDS, senior officers of the IAF oppose the move.


When he was India’s Defence Minister, Manohar Parrikar had said two years ago that he would ‘soon’ recommend the creation of the post of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), which he considered “a must”, to the Cabinet Committee on Security(CCS). He had also said that the Ministry of Defence (MoD) was engaged in working out a mechanism for the post. So far there has been no progress on appointing a CDS and constituting integrated theatre commands.

Consequent to the submission of the Kargil Review Committee report, a group of ministers (GoM) headed by then Deputy Prime Minister L. K. Advani had analysed the functioning of the higher defence organisation in India. Among the major recommendations of this GoM was the establishment of the post of CDS with a tri-Service joint planning staff HQ. The CCS accepted this recommendation but held its implementation in abeyance. The two reasons cited for the deferment were the lack of political consensus on the need for a CDS and opposition within certain sections of the armed forces and the bureaucracy. More recently, the Naresh Chandra committee is reported to have recommended the appointment of a ‘permanent’ chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (CoSC) as the first among equals.


While the army and the navy are known to support the idea of a CDS and theatre commands, many senior officers of the Indian Air Force (IAF) oppose the move. General Bikram Singh, former army chief, wrote recently that an “empowered CDS” is needed to draw up a “pragmatic architecture for integrated tri-Service theatre commands”. (”A Fresh Security Strategy is Needed”, Hindustan Times, August 28, 2018.) Admiral Arun Prakash, former naval chief, has written often about the need for reform in higher defence organisations at the apex level. Air Chief Marshal S Krishnaswamy, former air chief, opposes the concept of CDS has written that theatre commands are unnecessary (“Why Theatre Commands is an Unnecessary Idea”, Indian Express, August 16, 2018). About a year ago, Air Marshal Vinod Patney had written in a similar vein (“Unity of the Services”, Indian Express, May 10, 2017).

It is well known that the operational plans of the armed forces lack synergy. In 1962, the IAF was not given any role to play during the war with China when it could have wreaked havoc on the Chinese hordes that had concentrated on the Tibetan Plateau without air cover. In 1965, the Indian Navy (IN) was not even informed about the plans to launch a three-pronged attack across the international boundary (IB) into Pakistan.


It is repeated ad nauseum that the 1971 war was a well-coordinated tri-Service effort that led to a grand victory. The rather limited coordination that was actually achieved during the wars with Pakistan in 1965 and 1971 was mainly due to the personalities of the Chiefs in position of authority and not due to any institutionalised arrangements. During the 1971 war, Field Marshal Sam Maneckshaw was able to carry his naval and air force colleagues with him due to the personal rapport that he had established with them. Yet, there were several glitches in the planning and conduct of the land and air campaigns and it cannot be stated that India fought a coordinated "air-land" war.

The Indian intervention in Sri Lanka was undoubtedly a disaster from the joint planning point of view. The Kargil conflict of 1999 is the only real example of a coordinated effort. Even here there were initial hiccups and it took the IAF several weeks to begin bombing the Pakistani intruders’ sangars (ad hoc bunkers) on the Indian side of the LoC after the army had made such a request.


India's prevailing security environment is marked by regional instability with a nuclear overhang, unresolved territorial disputes with China and Pakistan, an active Line of Control (LoC) with Pakistan, tensions along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China, Pakistan’s proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir, repeated air space violations, burgeoning maritime security challenges and increasing demands for Indian contribution to multinational coalition forces. More than ever before, it is now necessary for the national security decision makers to be given "single-point military advice" that takes into account the operational strengths and weaknesses and the inter-dependence of each of the armed forces on the other to meet complex emerging challenges. Such advice can come only from an empowered CDS.

Ideally, the CDS should be an overall commander-in-chief and not merely the first among equals with no forces under his command. From the CDS command should flow to individual theatre commanders who are in command of troops and equipment from all three Services. Given India’s long land borders with a varied terrain configuration and two major seaboards, a "theatre" system of tri-Service command is best suited for the optimum management of both external and internal security challenges. At present, HQ Eastern Command of the army is located at Kolkata while the corresponding HQ of the navy and the air force are at Visakhapatnam and Shillong, respectively.


A misperception has been created that only the United States needs a theatre system because of its wider geo-political interests and involvement in security issues all over the globe. With its sprawling land borders, long coastlines and complex national security threats and challenges, India too needs a theatre system for integrated functioning to achieve synergy in operations by optimally exploiting limited resources. The Chinese, with similar needs, have a well-established theatre command system. While a single Chinese commander is responsible for operations against India, three Indian armycommanders will be involved in the planning and conduct of operations against China.

Each theatre commander should have under his command forces from all the three Services based on the operational requirement. The initial allocation of forces will seldom remain constant. At the inception stage it would be more appropriate to appoint a CDS without simultaneously constituting theatre commands. The second step can follow a few years later. Once the new system matures and theatre commanders are appointed, the Chiefs of Staff of the three Services should have responsibility primarily for force structure and drawing up perspective plans. They should oversee the development and acquisition of weapons and equipment, plan recruitment, guide and coordinate training at specialised training establishments and control administrative matters such as the annual budget, pay and allowances, maintenance support and medical services etc.

Several other areas of functioning necessitate overarching military command and control at the national level. While India’s nuclear doctrine and policy are guided by the National Security Council and the Cabinet Committee on Security, their execution is entrusted to the Services and here a joint approach is mandatory. The Strategic Forces Command (SFC), constituted for the planning, coordination and control of India's nuclear weapons, must function directly under the CDS even while functional control over the nuclear warheads and the delivery systems comprising the "triad" remains with the civilian political leadership.

Aerospace, information warfare, cyber-security and issues like the management of the electro-magnetic spectrum, including frequency management, electro-magnetic compatibility (EMC), electro-magnetic interference (EMI), electronic emission policy (EEP) and the offensive employment of non-communications devices such as radars for electronic warfare, should all be the legitimate domain of the CDS and HQ IDS. It is time to set up a tri-Service Aerospace and Cyber Command as well as a Special Forces Command to meet emerging challenges in these fields and to better manage all available resources. A tri-Service Logistics and Maintenance command has also been long overdue.

Similarly, on the non-operational side, training institutions such as the National Defence College, the College of Defence Management and the National Defence Academy and organisations like the Armed Forces Medical Services, Canteen Stores Department and a host of others must be placed under the direct command of the CDS for better synergy in their functioning and optimum exploitation of their potential. International experience shows that such reform has to be imposed from the top down and can never work if the government keeps waiting for it to come about from the bottom up.

The Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) is an experiment that can only be described as partially successful. It is driven by single-Service requirements and perceptions. The Chairman, COSC, normally the senior most serving chief, has no executive authority over the other two Services. The COSC works primarily by consensus and cannot make hard decisions that would be binding on all the services. During peace time, turf battles and inter-Service rivalries rule the roost and minor, inconsequential issues take up most of the time available for discussion.

War-time decisions require professional understanding, a bi-partisan approach and, often, hard compromises. As Winston Churchill famously said, “Committees cannot fight wars.” It is time to implement the GoM recommendation to appoint a CDS. Theatre commands are but one step further in the quest for synergy in operations. It should be a short step, but the way the Indian system works, it is likely to be a very long one indeed.

Often during war, the fate of an entire campaign can hinge on a single decision. Such a decision can only be made by a specially selected defence chief and not by a committee like the COSC that operates on the principle of the least common denominator. Military history is replete with examples of how such decisions changed the course of a war. Eisenhower’s decision to launch the Normandy landings in the face of continuing rough weather and MacArthur’s decision to land at Inchon against stiff opposition from virtually his entire staff, could not have been made by committees. All other major democracies have opted for the CDS system. India cannot ignore it any further except at great peril. It is an idea whose time has come.


https://m.economictimes.com/news/de...f-defence-staff-/amp_articleshow/65975999.cms

 

[lcafanboy]

PM Narendra Modi's mega announcement: India will now have Chief of Defence Staff

PM Narendra Modi Independence Day speech: The three armed forces of India will now have a post of Chief of Defence Staff that will integrate the operations of the three forces-the Army, Navy and Air Force.

https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.in...ff-independence-day-speech-1581006-2019-08-15

 

[lcafanboy]

Guys this is huge. Use this thread for Guess, suggestions for new CDS.


My first choice and guess is Bipin Rawat.