Let's avoid OT posts like Indian nationalism etc. Here's a very well researched post by
RajaRajaC on the Bengal famine:
The famine was caused by war and natural disaster, the British did everything possible to help, and only local merchants are at fault for hoarding is the common defense of Colonial apologists. British primary sources themselves disagree with this finding.
Read on -
Close to 200,000 tonnes were exported from Jan - Apr 42 (appendix 4 Famine enquiry commission titled Report on Bengal pp 26-28) there were very limited local stockpiles.
Then in 1942 towards the end as no food relief was forthcoming, the Raj ordered people to board 3 months worth of food supplies (Nanavati papers pp 196-7), this further had a disastrous effect by taking even more food from the markets into private stashes.
Moving on, we have the effect of inflationary pressures and Churchill's direct role in this to consider.
To pay for wartime purchases and grain imports (India was a net grain importing nation by the 30's), Britain stopped payment in currency, it issued a sort of an IOU against Indian Sterling reserves held in London. But the Raj paid out the military and armament companies in India in currency. To cover this the RBI pumped in currency notes (amount of currency in circulation in India rose 5 fold in 4 years) fuelling runaway inflation. (M N Roy, poverty or plenty pp 25-30)
This is when Amery asked London to settle outstanding dues on the Sterling accounts (so that inflation may ease) Churchill flat out refused (Leo Amery diaries pp 833) he instead told Amery,
Amery wrote and I quote him in full,
He further writes
Then in Oct 42 came the first trigger, a massive cyclone that killed 10's of thousands and dispossessed millions. Appeals to the Civil supplies bureau to feed these millions went unheeded and the Indian official in charge R R Sen was asked to buy what rice he could and distribute it on his own accord (Nanavati papers Testimony of Sen. Pp 441)
Nov 1 1942 (a full 18 months before this telegram you so proudly cite) the American Welfare board issued a warning to the Raj about the fire food situation in Bengal and India in particular. It listed all the reasons that we argue to this day about,
- Fall of Burma
- Lack of effective price controls
- Speculation
- Exports
- Rail priority for military shipments
- Sharp inflation
So clearly this was not some secret but widely known including to the Americans and yet Churchill writes a letter pleading for help 18 months after?
Interestingly the Raj (famine enquiry commission, report of Bengal) through a food commission member of the Raj in an interview to the Statesman (Dec 18th, 1943) said that the food crisis is over and I pray that it may never occur again. So even by this yardstick, Churchill asks for help a full 4 months after the Raj declared this famine to be over.
Even in Nov 1943 when the famine was well and truly underway the Director of Civil supplies observed a shipment of grain being exported to Sri Lanka and Marutius (spelling?) So clearly export quotas were continuing to be met.
- Nanavati papers Testimony of Pinnel (said director) pp 552
December 9th, Linlithgow (head of the Raj food department), asked for 600,000 tonnes of grain. He even threw in a carrot of how the war work would get hampered without this aid
- vol 3, GoI food Dept to secy of state Dec 9, memo
This was denied. Reason? The cost would be prohibitive to the war effort
- vol 3, GoI food Dept to secy of state Dec 15th, memo
Multiple such telegrams were sent in the period Dec 9th to 20th, all turned down.
Even the CiC of South Asia Wavell got in the act and agreed with Linlithgow, but his petition was also rejected
In January 43, the War Cabinet authorised 130,000 tonnes but only by the end of April!
- Transfer of Power Vol 3, Amery to Linlithgow pp 520 (since you already quote extensively from TOP this should be easy for you to cross check)
Aug 4th 1943, the famine was well underway, Amery wrote and I quote,
He also demanded 500,000 tonnes of grains
- Transfer of Power Vol 4, document #67
This too went unheeded.
The war cabinet after a month said that it could divert a portion of 30,000 tonnes from Australia but only after stockpiles in Sri Lanka and Middle east were satisfied
- TOP vol 4, war cabinet minutes, 111th conclusion pp 155
By dec the famine was almost petering out but cholera and Malaria took hold. To combat cholera you need disinfectants, but disinfectants was being hoarded by the British army and it went unchecked.
- Nanavati papers, testimony of Lt Col Cotter pp 386
Wavell though continued his telegram onslaught, on the 24th of dec he wrote one to the cabinet demanding 1.5mn tonnes of grain imports to ward of further starvation related deaths
The cabinet replied
- TOP sexy of state to GoI, food department pp 585
The cabinet met on Feb 7, 1944 and Churchill ruled out any diverting of shipping to aid India. In this the minister for war transportation was in agreement with him.
They did though divert shipping to transport 10,000 tonnes of grain a month from India to Sri Lanka
- TOP vol 4, war cabinet 16th conclusion pp 701
The cabinet further noted that the shortage in Bengal was
I am going to repeat this,
After some 2mn had died, after their own govt in India had been warning about shortages of grains for 18 months by then, after even the Americans warned about dire shortages the Churchillian cabinet said
After denying shipping at that too.
The cabinet though magnanimously agreed to set up a committee to investigate, consisting of Minister for War transportation, food minister and Winston's closest advisor, Lord Cherwell.
Amery notes in his diaries (pp 933) that Cherwell hated India just like Winston.
When news of these denials reached Delhi, Wavell shot off another Telegram, saying
- TOP vol 4 Wavell to Amery pp 706
Churchill though remained stubborn and said while he would help, India should not ask the impossible
- TOP vol 4, Churchill to Wavell pp 718
The war cabinet then again met Feb 14th 1944 Churchill again said there was no shipping available and that IF there was acute shortage, then possibly 24,000 tonnes of Iraqi grain could be sent as aid
Yes that's right, 16 months after the famine began the cabinet of Churchill was considering this famine to be a ploy and not significant.
The request of the Viceroy was again...rejected
And now we get to the fun parts.
The Viceroy again shot off a Telegram
*demanding 500,000 tonnes of grain
- Aid request be placed to the Americans
- India apply to the UNRRA
Both the cinc of India Auchinlek and Mountbatten sent their own telgrams stressing the urgency of the situation.
The cabinet then met on Feb 21,
They denied it again. They also said that Aussie grain (promised before, see 3 Paras above) on the way to India was
redirected to the Balkans , the promised Iraqi grain was also rejected.
The request for aid to the Americans was denied (as it was assumed that the US had no shipping) as was the appeal to UNRA
- Top vol 4, Churchill to Wavell pp 729
Then Churchill had a brainwave and the cabinet cables Wavell that India could get 300,000 tonnes of Aussie wheat in exchange for 300,000 tonnes of Bengal rice (a cruel joke if there ever was one)
- TOP vol 4, Wavell to Amery pp 801.
The criminal culpability of Churchill and his cabinet is writ large to any reasonable person