Knowitall
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Still waiting for you to contradict this article and tell us what is wrong here or would you continue to dismiss everything without any facts.found this article some time back and had saved this for people like @asianobserve
The famine was caused by war and natural disaster, the British did everything possible to help, and only local merchants are at fault for hoarding is the common defense of Colonial apologists. British primary sources themselves disagree with this finding. Read on
close to 200,000 tonnes were exported from Jan - Apr 42 (appendix 4 Famine enquiry commission titled Report on Bengal pp 26-28) there were very limited local stockpiles.
Then in 1942 towards the end as no food relief was forthcoming, the Raj ordered people to board 3 months worth of food supplies (Nanavati papers pp 196-7), this further had a disastrous effect by taking even more food from the markets into private stashes.
Moving on, we have the effect of inflationary pressures and Churchill's direct role in this to consider.
To pay for wartime purchases and grain imports (India was a net grain importing nation by the 30's), Britain stopped payment in currency, it issued a sort of an IOU against Indian Sterling reserves held in London. But the Raj paid out the military and armament companies in India in currency. To cover this the RBI pumped in currency notes (amount of currency in circulation in India rose 5 fold in 4 years) fuelling runaway inflation. (M N Roy, poverty or plenty pp 25-30)
This is when Amery asked London to settle outstanding dues on the Sterling accounts (so that inflation may ease) Churchill flat out refused (Leo Amery diaries pp 833) he instead told Amery,
Amery wrote and I quote him in full,
He further writes
Then in Oct 42 came the first trigger, a massive cyclone that killed 10's of thousands and dispossessed millions. Appeals to the Civil supplies bureau to feed these millions went unheeded and the Indian official in charge R R Sen was asked to buy what rice he could and distribute it on his own accord (Nanavati papers Testimony of Sen. Pp 441)
- Amery diaries pp 836-7
Nov 1 1942 (a full 18 months before this telegram you so proudly cite) the American Welfare board issued a warning to the Raj about the fire food situation in Bengal and India in particular. It listed all the reasons that we argue to this day about,
So clearly this was not some secret but widely known including to the Americans and yet Churchill writes a letter pleading for help 18 months after?
- Fall of Burma
- Lack of effective price controls
- Speculation
- Exports
- Rail priority for military shipments
- Sharp inflation
Interestingly the Raj (famine enquiry commission, report of Bengal) through a food commission member of the Raj in an interview to the Statesman (Dec 18th, 1943) said that the food crisis is over and I pray that it may never occur again. So even by this yardstick, Churchill asks for help a full 4 months after the Raj declared this famine to be over.
Even in Nov 1943 when the famine was well and truly underway the Director of Civil supplies observed a shipment of grain being exported to Sri Lanka and Marutius (spelling?) So clearly export quotas were continuing to be met.
December 9th, Linlithgow (head of the Raj food department), asked for 600,000 tonnes of grain. He even threw in a carrot of how the war work would get hampered without this aid
- Nanavati papers Testimony of Pinnel (said director) pp 552
This was denied. Reason? The cost would be prohibitive to the war effort
- vol 3, GoI food Dept to secy of state Dec 9, memo
Multiple such telegrams were sent in the period Dec 9th to 20th, all turned down.
- vol 3, GoI food Dept to secy of state Dec 15th, memo
Even the CiC of South Asia Wavell got in the act and agreed with Linlithgow, but his petition was also rejected
In January 43, the War Cabinet authorised 130,000 tonnes but only by the end of April!
Aug 4th 1943, the famine was well underway, Amery wrote and I quote,
- Transfer of Power Vol 3, Amery to Linlithgow pp 520 (since you already quote extensively from TOP this should be easy for you to cross check)
He also demanded 500,000 tonnes of grains
This too went unheeded.
- Transfer of Power Vol 4, document #67
The war cabinet after a month said that it could divert a portion of 30,000 tonnes from Australia but only after stockpiles in Sri Lanka and Middle east were satisfied
By dec the famine was almost petering out but cholera and Malaria took hold. To combat cholera you need disinfectants, but disinfectants was being hoarded by the British army and it went unchecked.
- TOP vol 4, war cabinet minutes, 111th conclusion pp 155
Wavell though continued his telegram onslaught, on the 24th of dec he wrote one to the cabinet demanding 1.5mn tonnes of grain imports to ward of further starvation related deaths
- Nanavati papers, testimony of Lt Col Cotter pp 386
The cabinet replied
The cabinet met on Feb 7, 1944 and Churchill ruled out any diverting of shipping to aid India. In this the minister for war transportation was in agreement with him.
- TOP sexy of state to GoI, food department pp 585
They did though divert shipping to transport 10,000 tonnes of grain a month from India to Sri Lanka
The cabinet further noted that the shortage in Bengal was
- TOP vol 4, war cabinet 16th conclusion pp 701
I am going to repeat this,
After some 2mn had died, after their own govt in India had been warning about shortages of grains for 18 months by then, after even the Americans warned about dire shortages the Churchillian cabinet said
After denying shipping at that too.
The cabinet though magnanimously agreed to set up a committee to investigate, consisting of Minister for War transportation, food minister and Winston's closest advisor, Lord Cherwell.
Amery notes in his diaries (pp 933) that Cherwell hated India just like Winston.
When news of these denials reached Delhi, Wavell shot off another Telegram, saying
Churchill though remained stubborn and said while he would help, India should not ask the impossible
- TOP vol 4 Wavell to Amery pp 706
The war cabinet then again met Feb 14th 1944 Churchill again said there was no shipping available and that IF there was acute shortage, then possibly 24,000 tonnes of Iraqi grain could be sent as aid
- TOP vol 4, Churchill to Wavell pp 718
Yes that's right, 16 months after the famine began the cabinet of Churchill was considering this famine to be a ploy and not significant.
The request of the Viceroy was again...rejected
And now we get to the fun parts.
The Viceroy again shot off a Telegram
*demanding 500,000 tonnes of grain
Both the cinc of India Auchinlek and Mountbatten sent their own telgrams stressing the urgency of the situation.
- Aid request be placed to the Americans
- India apply to the UNRRA
The cabinet then met on Feb 21,
They denied it again. They also said that Aussie grain (promised before, see 3 Paras above) on the way to India was redirected to the Balkans , the promised Iraqi grain was also rejected.
The request for aid to the Americans was denied (as it was assumed that the US had no shipping) as was the appeal to UNRA
Then Churchill had a brainwave and the cabinet cables Wavell that India could get 300,000 tonnes of Aussie wheat in exchange for 300,000 tonnes of Bengal rice (a cruel joke if there ever was one)
- Top vol 4, Churchill to Wavell pp 729
But the criminal culpability of Churchill and his cabinet is writ large to any reasonable person.
- TOP vol 4, Wavell to Amery pp 801.