severe up china- pakistan link by capturing POK and NA first and box up Punjab denying it sea link china will be out.
Balkanizing Pakistan: A Collective National Security Strategy
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Param
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I think we are going too far ahead in the realm of imagination.
We always provide moral and diplomatic support only don't we??=heheh
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No disrespect intended but Sindh is a cesspool.
1. Interior Sindh is more unsafe than Bihar, there is no rule of law there. Interior Sindh is a very tribal and backward society.
2. Power is held by Tribal leaders, Makhdooms and Wadheras, who have private armies, jails and own villages and its people. Tribal wars are common. Slavery and such are widespread.
4. Sindh is very poor and arid. Sindh's agro produce is going down y-o-y.
5. Sindh generally doesn't have any industrial base save for Karachi and maybe Hyderabad both dominated in part by non-Sindhis. and are tinderboxes. Large number of Baluchis are present in Sindh and Karachi as well.
PAKISTANI FLOODS: Strategic Invisibles
By B. Raman
"It wiped out villages. Destroyed crops. Over 3.6 million people were directly affected. Nearly 85% of the area was destroyed. Three months after the catastrophe some 75% of the population was receiving food from relief workers (more here).
"It happened in Pakistan. Yet few Pakistanis even know of it by name. Fewer still remember that it eventually contributed to Pakistan's break-up.
"The 1970 Bhola cyclone hit then East Pakistan on November 12, 1970. It brought with it winds of an unbelievable 185 km/hr. It left in its wake a half million Pakistanis dead.
"Meteorologists remember it as being one of the most deadly natural disasters in human history – sources suggest that it left between 300,000 to 1 million Pakistanis dead in its wake; most estimates suggest around 500,000 Pakistanis died.
"Historians tend to agree that although there were many other forces at work, the devastation caused by the cyclone and the widespread view that the government had mis-managed the relief efforts and West Pakistan had generally shown an attitude of neglect, contributed to high levels of anti-West Pakistan feeling, a sweeping victory for the Awami League, and eventually the breakup of Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh.
"Such, then, are the forces of nature. And such are the forces of history."
A post from a Pakistani website called "pakistaniat" at http://pakistaniat.com/2010/08/16/remembering-bhola-the-cyclone-that-broke-pakistans-back/
"The cost of rebuilding in the flood-hit areas could reach $15 billion and a Marshall Plan will be needed to meet the challenge, Pakistan's High Commissioner to Britain Wajid Shamsul Hasan said on Monday (August 16).
He said this was a rough estimate because an assessment of the extent of the damage caused by the floods – which have affected 20 million people – had yet to be carried out. But the number gave an indication of the scale of the reconstruction needed after the floods swept away roads, bridges, telecommunication infrastructure and destroyed crops. "It will take at least five years," Hasan told Reuters in an interview. Asked about the cost of rebuilding, he said, "I think more than $10 to $15 billion". Pakistan is appealing for international aid to help it cope with one of the worst natural disasters in its history. The United Nations says only a quarter of the estimated $459 million in international aid needed just for immediate relief has arrived so far. "If something happens to Pakistan, the whole region will be plunged into Balkanisation. You can't stop it there," Hasan warned, adding, that he was not suggesting Pakistan would collapse, but nonetheless drew a parallel with a cyclone, which hit East Pakistan in 1970, which fuelled resentment against the government, then, as now, it was accused of not doing enough. "In the longer term, when the water subsides, we need reconstruction ... we'll have to have a long-term plan, something like the Marshall Plan," Hasan said.
From the "Daily Times" of Lahore of August 18,2010
On November 12,1970, a cyclone of devastating magnitude struck the then East Pakistan. Over 300,000 people-----the overwhelming majority of them Bengalis----perished. East Pakistan's economy suffered extensive damages.
2. The indifference of the federal Government then ruled by Gen.Yahya Khan to the plight of the Bengalis and its failure to mobilise humanitarian relief for the victims created a permanent wedge between the Bengalis of East Pakistan and the non-Bengalis of the then West Pakistan and set in motion the train of events that ultimately led to the separation of East Pakistan and the birth of independent Bangladesh.
3. It is not without reason that an increasing number of Pakistanis with a sense of history are asking: Can history repeat itself?
4. Those who rule out a repeat of 1971 point out that the devastation caused by the current floods in Pakistan is not comparable to that caused by the cyclone of November,1970, in East Pakistan. Those, who are concerned over the prospects of a repeat of 1971, highlight that the present political class in Pakistan has been as indifferent to the plight of the victims as the political class of 1970 was. The disaster of 1970 took place when the army was in power. The current disaster has struck Pakistan when an elected civilian Government is in power. In the perception of many, the Government has shown itself to be not only incompetent, but uncaring. The international community has cared for the victims more than Pakistan's own political class.
5. The current disaster due to floods has had two dimensions-----the humanitarian and the strategic. The details of the humanitarian dimension have already been covered by me in an earlier article on the floods. While the humanitarian dimensions are important from the immediate and short-term points of view, the strategic dimensions could assume importance from the medium and long-term points of view.
6. The humanitarian dimensions are quantifiable and their consequences predictable. The likely strategic dimensions are as yet not fully visible, unquantifiable and their consequences unpredictable. The strategic dimensions of the disaster would arise from the following factors:
Firstly, nearly 90 per cent of the fatalities have taken place in the areas inhabited by non-Punjabi minorities---- in Khyber-Pakhtunkwa, the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Balochistan. Of the ethnic communities which constitute the Pakistani population, the Pashtuns have suffered the worst with nearly 1100 fatalities as against a total of 1400. Many Pashtun families in Khyber-Pakhtunkwa and the FATA have lost their near and dear ones. Among the other sufferers in terms of fatalities are the Balochs, the Punjabis, the Kashmiris and the Sindhis in that order.
Secondly, from the point of view of economic and infrastructural damages, Punjab and Sindh have suffered more than the Pashtun belt and Balochistan. The devastating quake of 2005 in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (POK) and some parts of Khyber-Pakhtunkwa did not have a major impact on the Pakistani economy. Agriculture, the main prop of the Pakistani economy, hardly suffered any damage.The current floods have hit hard the granaries of Pakistan in Punjab and Sindh and its gas-rich areas in Balochistan. The resulting impact on the agricultural and industrial economy will be considerable. Already, the Baloch freedom struggle has affected the flow of gas from Balochistan to the industries of Punjab. The damage caused by the floods will add to their difficulties.
Thirdly, the floods have hit hard the main recruiting grounds of the Pakistan Army---- the rural areas in Punjab, Khyber-Pakhtunkwa and the FATA. What impact will this have on the morale of the soldiers whose minds will be on the sufferings of their families back home due to the floods than on their fight against the various Talibans and Al Qaeda?
Fourthly, the increase in rural unemployment could help the recruitment drive of the army as well as the terrorists. An increase in the flow of suicide volunteers to the terrorist organisations is a possibility to be reckoned with.
Fifthly, the credibility of the political class, which has never been high, has suffered further due to its slow response to the tragedy. Perceptions that the political leadership and the bureaucracy have been more concerned with rapairing the economic and infrastructure damages in Punjab and Sindh than in attending to the human tragedies in the Pashtun belt and Balochistan could aggravate the feelings of alienation in these areas with unpredictable consequences.
Sixthly, from all accounts, the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) and the Jamaat-e-Islami (JEI) have been winning the hearts and minds of the affected people by the energetic way they have mobilised the relief and rehabilitation measures. While the image of the mainstream political class has suffered, that of the jihadis and fundamentalists has benefited. While the aid flows from the US and other Western Governments have been to the discredited governmental agencies, the aid flows from individuals and charity organisations of the Islamic world have been to the LET and the JEI. Any serious mismanagement of the relief and rehabilitation measures by the Government could not only further dent the image of the political class, but also damage the image of the Western Governments by association.
Seventhly, what impact will the floods and the resulting damage have on the capacity of Al Qaeda and its associates? It would be difficult to answer this question presently. One can only note that in the FATA the maximum damage seems to have been in North Waziristan, where Al Qaeda and its associates are based.
7. The post-flood situation in Pakistan needs careful monitoring by Indian strategic experts.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: [email protected])
Understanding the Pakistani floods
M.K. BHADRAKUMAR
SHARE · PRINT · T+
One day in mid-April, Dr. Bernard Rieux spotted a dead rat in the building he lived in the Mediterranean city of Oran, Algeria. Thousands of rats staggered out of their hideouts in the following days and died on the streets gripped by violent convulsions, spitting blood. A fortnight later Michel, concierge of Rieux's building, was down with a strange illness. While the rats suddenly disappeared, Michel died within two days.
That is how the terrible arrival of the bubonic plague in Albert Camus' masterpiece is chronicled. Major catastrophes tiptoe unnoticed. Pakistan's flood too appeared from nowhere. When the plague first arrived, the Oranites seemed to take life for granted and couldn't grasp its full import but soon they understood they must face up to an extraordinary situation and decide on their attitudes to it. They were forced to think, reflect and discard their "unauthentic" existence.
The flood is described in cold figures — 20 per cent of Pakistan devastated; one out of five Pakistanis' lives ruined; hundreds of thousands of electric pylons, cattle, culverts and bridges perished; farmlands inundated and crops rendered unworthy. The flood is destined to become a mathematical constant sooner or later and the residue that will endure is that the millions of human beings helplessly tossed around by it have become variables.
Pakistan, especially its elite — civilian but, more importantly, the military — faces an existential choice. They need to realise, as Greek philosopher Socrates once said, that the unexamined life is not worth living and they need to react in a unique way. A major catastrophe is also an opportunity to undergo transformations. However, regrettably, the discourse of the Pakistani officials and analysts has continued to turn in its old gyre. The well-known Pakistani journalist, Ahmed Rashid, typically summed it up last week as "an unparalleled national security challenge for the country, the region and the international community. It has become clear this week that, unless major aid is forthcoming immediately and international diplomatic effort is applied to improving Pakistan's relations with India, social and ethnic tensions will rise and there will be food riots."
Mr. Rashid added: "Large parts of the country that are now cut off will be taken over by the Pakistani Taliban and affiliated extremist groups, and governance will collapse. The risk is that Pakistan will become what many have long predicted — a failed state with nuclear weapons"¦ All of this will dramatically loosen the state's control over outlying areas, in particular those bordering Afghanistan, which could be captured quickly by local Taliban." Mr. Rashid, of course, concludes predictably, taking a swipe at India and seeking the West's mediatory "help" in India-Pakistan relations: "India has failed to respond to the crisis and there remains bitter animosity between the two countries, particularly because India blames the current uprising in Indian Kashmir on Pakistan — even though Indian commentators admit that it is more indigenous than Pakistan-instigated."
From the above we get a fair idea of the thought processes in Rawalpindi within the military establishment: Pakistan's coffers are empty and the international community should loosen its purse-strings; the military is overstretched with relief work and as Mr. Rashid put it, "the army is unlikely to be in a position even to hold the areas along the Afghan border;" Pakistan's stability which is linked to tensions with India ought to be the concern of the West whose mediation on Kashmir, therefore, is an imperative need so as "to sort out acute differences over their river systems." Fortunately, Mr. Rashid stops just short of accusing India of engineering the floods.
The shocking reality is that there has been no trace of any new thinking. The Pakistani military continues to be in a game of one-upmanship with the civilian leadership. Unsurprisingly, the military's work of rescuing flood victims is a visible act and politicians cannot match that. As a perceptive young Pakistani scholar Ahsan Butt put it: "This needs to be understood because to the extent that this is purely a logistical crisis, the military almost has an 'unfair' advantage in that it has the better toolbox for the immediate aftermath "¦ To use a cricketing analogy, batting is a lot easier at the non-striker's end." The fact remains that the military establishment has excellent spokesmen in the mainstream media, especially the top news channels, and the media invariably apply exacting standards to the civilian leaders while, for example, the military's institutionalised corruption is simply ignored or downplayed.
Given the gigantic scale of reconstruction that lies ahead and the tardy performance standards of the civilian governments of the South Asian region, the Pakistani political elite will inevitably appear chaotic and inept in its response to the floods, while any further drain of support for the already-weak civilian government can only tighten the powerful military's grip on the power structure. This means that for the foreseeable future, the military will continue to operate with full autonomy on foreign and security policies of core concern, although the scope for conflictual relationship with the civilian leadership or the launch of a coup will not necessarily increase — and may diminish — in the given situation of a fundamental imbalance in the calculus of power.
To be sure, the floods have further exposed the regional, political and ethnic divisions. Most certainly, there will be nasty disputes in the coming period over the allocation of aid, especially on the part of the smaller provinces, as regards the Punjabi-dominated establishment's perceived self-aggrandisement. On the other hand, in Punjab, the main Opposition, Pakistan Muslim League (N), is in charge and it would get into a blame game with the federal government over the inevitable acts of commission and omission in relief and reconstruction. In fact, the signs are already there.
A core issue concerns the strategic impact of the floods on regional security issues devolving upon the United-States led war in Afghanistan. A mixed picture emerges. To quote an expert in the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, "The U.S. has an opportunity in this disaster to do even more to demonstrate to the people and leaders of Pakistan just how helpful the U.S. and the American people can be to move Pakistan forward. But, at the same time, the problems that Pakistan faces, in the immediate near-term as well as the longer term, have simply been compounded. Everything that the U.S. already thought was going to be very difficult."
In financial terms, it means a need arises to reassess the disbursal of the $7.5-billion aid package under the Kerry-Lugar-Berman legislation — shifting attention from long-term projects to the immediate priorities. In political terms, the impact will be felt on several templates. One, there are no means of divining whether with all the King's men and all the King's horses deployed in Pakistan, Uncle Sam's image would still get burnished in the Pakistani eye. Probably, it is a long haul for the U.S.' public diplomacy — even with George Sores brought into the act. A July 29 Pew Global Attitudes Project estimated that 59 per cent of Pakistanis regarded America as an enemy country. In short, the fragility of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship remains a fact of life.
On the contrary, USS Peleliu arrived off the coast near Karachi on August 12 along with helicopters and a thousand Marines who have since been deployed and Pakistan hasn't erupted in flames or protest marches. Not only will this "collaboration," to borrow the words of noted author Shuja Nawaz, "go a long way toward building up relationships among rank-and-file service members." It is also an extraordinary sight to see the Marines involved in relief work alongside some controversial Islamic charity organisations such as the Falah-e-Insaniat Foundation linked to the banned Lashkar-e-Taiba and the social welfare wings of the rabidly "anti-American" Jamaat-e-Islami.
The million-dollar question indeed is what will happen to the Pakistani military's operations in the Afghan-Pakistan border region, especially the North Waziristan area. Even the U.S. special representative for AfPak, Richard Holbrooke, wryly said, "It is an equal-opportunity disaster, and military operations have effectively faded away." The bitter truth is that the U.S. is fated to learn — even if Mr. Holbrooke is loath to admit it — that aid will not address the real security threats in Pakistan. The high probability is that the U.S.-led coalition will soon find itself out on a limb in Afghanistan with the Pakistani military nowhere seen cracking down on the Haqqani insurgents and their allies ensconced in FATA. The implications are, simply put, too stunning to want to think about — although the flood waters may help wash away the WikiLeaks documents detailing not only how the ISI sympathises with the Taliban but they also meet to plan joint actions.
(The writer is a former diplomat.)
The floods have further exposed the regional, political and ethnic divisions in Pakistan.
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