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Paper no. 3601 13-Jan-2010
Asian Security Environment and India’s Options
By A. K. Verma
(This paper is being published by CENJOWS shortly)
Asian security environment is in a state of deep turmoil. The single event which has occasioned it is the rise of the giant - China during the past couple of decades, reaching higher and higher levels of economic and military strength. All neibhours of China including those further afield are engaged in working out strategies to cope with China should it turn into a rogue state sometime in future.
Even the US is looking for new equations of power as the centre of political and economic balance shifts towards Asia, led by China whose long term vision of itself remains unfathomable. Setting aside its suspicions of many decades and making an exception to its consistently held non-proliferation policies, the US offered to India a civilian nuclear agreement which will boost its economic and military strength. The rapprochement has been followed by another agreement for the joint defense framework that will be in place for ten years envisaging a closer military relationship and arms sale to India. China has not been very happy over these developments as it already sees itself as being the reason for them.
China has been singled out by US as its most likely bete noir of the future because of its galloping economic growth. Economists assess that the Chinese economy will outgrow US economy by the third decade of this century, giving it almost an equal status. But the Indian economy is also expected to grow almost uniformly during the same period, equaling the size of US economy and growing beyond by 2050s. Thus, while China becomes the largest economy in the world in the next 20 years and the most powerful nation in Asia, it will also have to share the high table with India, and Japan which before the spurt in Chinese growth, was the biggest economy in Asia. These three powers Japan, India and China, will have jointly or singly the greatest sway over Asian security in the coming years. History has already decided that they cannot love each other. And since rising to such eminence requires assurances of availability of markets and resources, the relationship among the three is likely to be marked by mutual rivalry, jealousies and recriminations. This accounts for the turmoil which is already visible in Asian security. If careful and visionary steps on future strategy are not taken now by all the nations of Asia, dark times will lie ahead. By opting for India, also a fellow democracy and hence sharing common values the US wants to preempt those dark times.
US has thus become an active participator in the power play in Asia with a new vantage held on Asian security. With its new alignments with India, it will try to balance off any attempt by China to dominate over Asia. Furthermore, its own impact on Asia and its security will stay unabated as it plays the role of mentor in the region.
The Japanese have also lately, been displaying a special interest in India, compelled by similar reservations on china. Since 2004, India has become the largest recipients of its overseas aid. In addition they are also mulling over how the constitutional embargoes, placed by the victorious US on a defeated Japan at the end of World War II, restricting their defense forces by size and role, can be amended. Japan is spending not more than 1% of its GDP on its defense whereas the figure for US is 4%. Some clever maneuvering is taking place in this respect and the size and lethality of the Japanese Coast Guard, not identified as a self defense force, is being furiously suspended. The Japanese, like China and India, is also entering space in a big way. All the three countries have set somewhat identical targets for space and research programs for lunar orbit and manned flights to moon, because the common belief is that space can become the platform for future wars if they cannot be avoided.
Another source of future aggression can be the economic tool of currency reserves. China is no longer a Marxist country even though it is a one party ruled authoritarian communist state. It turned capitalist a long while ago, of course with Chinese characteristics and opened itself to foreign investments, trade and globalization with its instant connectivity. The boom in economy which came in their wake has enabled it to accumulate reserves of which nearly 1.4 trillion is invested in US treasury bonds. Japan, the number one economy in Asia until overtaken by China, hold reserves of just less than $ 1 trillion. Such enormous wealth, in the context of cash imbalances in other Asian countries gives them opportunities for purchasing or heavily investing in state assets of the weaker Asian nations and thereby acquiring undue hold over such countries. In can effectively turn out to be a new form of colonialism. This calls for the establishment of appropriate review committees to exclude what can prove to be politically mandated sinister investments. Lesser nations have, thus, to remain on guard to preserve their economic integrity and safety.
Infact the nations of South East Asia, neighbours of China and Japan, have already been vigilant for quite sometime. Five of these, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines and Singapore in 1967 created ASEAN, Association of South East Asian Nations, gradually enlarging it between 1984 and 1995 to include Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia. These nations primarily got together to expand intra regional trade and to move towards a single market and customs union. The secondary objective was to create a forum for joint assessments for any predatory assault from more powerful nations of the North and across the Pacific. While the ASEAN has not been able to accomplish much so far by way of integration and common policies, it has given its members a sense of being close knit group with some common concerns the most important of which remains not getting over shadowed by more powerful and not necessarily benign neighbours like China, Japan and the US.
In 1993 these nations took another step with national security as a special focus to set ARF, Asian Regional Forum, with a considerably expanded membership. ARF includes several distant countries like US, Canada, Australia, Russia and European Union, besides all major Asian countries like India, China, Japan and North Korea. The logic for creating such an omnibus forum was to have all likely adversaries on one platform so that all aggressive design towards the region could be controlled and stalled. ARF has not so far deliberated upon any major security issue but the hope is that in time to come, when regional rivalries are likely to be exacerbated. ARF could play the role of a mini General Assembly of the UN, India, by being a member of ARF, is now enabled to have its say on any troubling issue, arising in South East Asia.
Their rivalries were again on display when another forum called East Asia Summit was being set up. To the chagrin of China, India was invited to participate in it by Japan, Indonesia and Singapore, with tacit support from the US. By the time the East Asia Summit was inaugurated in 2005, Australia and New Zealand had also become its members. The Chinese ability to dominate over the institution was thus greatly diminished. The EAS is a futuristic organization, to play a role when in future security related issues in the region will become highly complex. Again, through its membership, India will be enabled to present its view forcefully on any or all issues including security.
The region’s cautious attitude towards China attitude towards China flows from the historical legacy when the Chinese communist party was blatantly supporting insurgencies and smaller communist parties in the neighbourhood. Chinese war with Vietnam in 1979 and propping up of the murderous government of Pol Pot in Cambodia had added to their misgivings. The Chinese attack on India in 1962 and subsequent withdrawal had already added another dimension to the mystery of Chinese decision making process. Since then and particularly after the Tiananmen Square uprising of 1989, China adopted a low profile and has been focused on economic development, avoiding distractions which could spoil its concentration. Chinese rapid economic development from the 1990s have revised those anxieties again since China has a number of territorial disputes with its neighbours which have remained unresolved.
China is squatting over 18,000 sq km of Indian land in Aksai Cheen in Ladakh and claims ownership of the entire of Arunachal Pradesh, an area of 84,000 sq kms. It is showing no signs of resolving these land disputes, leaving one wondering whether it wants the disputed status quo to remain just that way. The aim seems to be keep India destabilized in these regions. The Arunachal Pradesh issue was recently raked up by China with many shrill and hostile comments emanating from state controlled media in China. China’s long and consistent support to Pakistan, including aiding of the letter’s nuclear weapon development against India, violating all norms of non-proliferation, is an abiding indicator that China does not wish India well at all.
Certain projects undertaken by China in the neighbourhood strengthens the suspicion that it wants India hemmed in from all sides, so that it remains a regional power only in South Asia and does not reach the status of an Asian or global power.
Among these projects are part development at Gwadar in Pakistan which could also be a resting place for ships of Chinese Blue Water Navy, Karakoram highway connecting Pakistan with Western China, surveillance outposts on Myanmar Islands, a road from Yunan to Bay of Bengal through Myanmar, beefing up of ports of Myanmar and Srilanka etc. The emphasis on Port development suggests an intention to use them during forays of Chinese navy into the Indian Ocean. These projects when ready will also help China to expand its trade and investments further to the West. They are, thus a double purpose activity, which should alert India and require it to go by a worst case scenario for its security and prepare accordingly for the challenges they represent.
At this point it must be stated, the sense of threat is not unidirectional: as their economy strengthens China also is becoming conscious that India can prove to be a menace. Their biggest worry arises from the presence of Dalai Lama and over 100,000 Tibetans in India. Although India has long ago accepted Tibet to be an autonomous region of China, the undiminishing strength of Tibetan nationalism and the magnetism of Buddhist monasteries in Tibet for mobilization of Tibetan sentiments against Han settlers and authorities there lurks a deep suspicion in the Chinese mind that India will not hesitate to exploit any worsening of Chinese situation in Tibet. Selection of a new Dalai lama when the present one dies could create such a scenario if the Chinese seek to enforce their choice on the Tibetan people. The entire Tibetan diaspora including those in India could be expected explode against the Chinese with repercussions inside Tibet. In such an event Chin’s relationship with India will plummet and the borders would become active. It is probably because of such anticipation that the Chinese are delaying settlement of the border disputes with India.
The security scenario in East Asia remains troubled over the territorial disputes of China with its other neighbours. In East, China and Japan have laid rival claims over some islands and rights to explore gas and oil in the region. Neither side is giving in lest it is interpreted as weakness. The disputed Senkakus islands, presently in Japanese hands, lie in this patch of waters. Taiwan also claims Senkakus. In South China Sea, five countries, China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia and Philippines dispute ownership over Spratly and Paracel islands. A code of conduct signed by the five has taken away the sting but resolution of the problem of conflicting claims remains a distant dream. While India has no direct concerns over these disputes, a deterioration in the situation could result in the blocking of Malacco straits through which India’s bulk of trade with Eastern countries passes. Such disputes and the tension of catching up with the US has made China determine to upgrade its military capacity as fast as it can. The Chinese military budget hides much more than what it reveals and can be conservatively placed between dollar 50 billion to dollar 80 billion. Its military spending is rising in double digits every year. India’s military budget is less than half in comparison. Two consequences flow for India from this. One is that India stands out as a much weaker nation militarily before China. The other is that the people’s liberation army of China will always try to influence Chinese party leadership to remain jingoistic towards India. That is why Chinese official media often displays a tough and uncompromising attitude towards India.
While China thus remains a potent danger to India on its Eastern and northern flanks, many dangers abound in South Asia itself. In it an anarchic security environment prevails, driven by the flow of history and individual state systems which have developed. The nature of relationship among states of the region is influenced by internal ideologies and power equations. Foreign policy remains a hostage to internal environments and the urge for regional cooperation recedes to the background. Efforts at power balancing with India sends regional co-operation to the bottom of the list of priorities.
continued...
Asian Security Environment and India’s Options
By A. K. Verma
(This paper is being published by CENJOWS shortly)
Asian security environment is in a state of deep turmoil. The single event which has occasioned it is the rise of the giant - China during the past couple of decades, reaching higher and higher levels of economic and military strength. All neibhours of China including those further afield are engaged in working out strategies to cope with China should it turn into a rogue state sometime in future.
Even the US is looking for new equations of power as the centre of political and economic balance shifts towards Asia, led by China whose long term vision of itself remains unfathomable. Setting aside its suspicions of many decades and making an exception to its consistently held non-proliferation policies, the US offered to India a civilian nuclear agreement which will boost its economic and military strength. The rapprochement has been followed by another agreement for the joint defense framework that will be in place for ten years envisaging a closer military relationship and arms sale to India. China has not been very happy over these developments as it already sees itself as being the reason for them.
China has been singled out by US as its most likely bete noir of the future because of its galloping economic growth. Economists assess that the Chinese economy will outgrow US economy by the third decade of this century, giving it almost an equal status. But the Indian economy is also expected to grow almost uniformly during the same period, equaling the size of US economy and growing beyond by 2050s. Thus, while China becomes the largest economy in the world in the next 20 years and the most powerful nation in Asia, it will also have to share the high table with India, and Japan which before the spurt in Chinese growth, was the biggest economy in Asia. These three powers Japan, India and China, will have jointly or singly the greatest sway over Asian security in the coming years. History has already decided that they cannot love each other. And since rising to such eminence requires assurances of availability of markets and resources, the relationship among the three is likely to be marked by mutual rivalry, jealousies and recriminations. This accounts for the turmoil which is already visible in Asian security. If careful and visionary steps on future strategy are not taken now by all the nations of Asia, dark times will lie ahead. By opting for India, also a fellow democracy and hence sharing common values the US wants to preempt those dark times.
US has thus become an active participator in the power play in Asia with a new vantage held on Asian security. With its new alignments with India, it will try to balance off any attempt by China to dominate over Asia. Furthermore, its own impact on Asia and its security will stay unabated as it plays the role of mentor in the region.
The Japanese have also lately, been displaying a special interest in India, compelled by similar reservations on china. Since 2004, India has become the largest recipients of its overseas aid. In addition they are also mulling over how the constitutional embargoes, placed by the victorious US on a defeated Japan at the end of World War II, restricting their defense forces by size and role, can be amended. Japan is spending not more than 1% of its GDP on its defense whereas the figure for US is 4%. Some clever maneuvering is taking place in this respect and the size and lethality of the Japanese Coast Guard, not identified as a self defense force, is being furiously suspended. The Japanese, like China and India, is also entering space in a big way. All the three countries have set somewhat identical targets for space and research programs for lunar orbit and manned flights to moon, because the common belief is that space can become the platform for future wars if they cannot be avoided.
Another source of future aggression can be the economic tool of currency reserves. China is no longer a Marxist country even though it is a one party ruled authoritarian communist state. It turned capitalist a long while ago, of course with Chinese characteristics and opened itself to foreign investments, trade and globalization with its instant connectivity. The boom in economy which came in their wake has enabled it to accumulate reserves of which nearly 1.4 trillion is invested in US treasury bonds. Japan, the number one economy in Asia until overtaken by China, hold reserves of just less than $ 1 trillion. Such enormous wealth, in the context of cash imbalances in other Asian countries gives them opportunities for purchasing or heavily investing in state assets of the weaker Asian nations and thereby acquiring undue hold over such countries. In can effectively turn out to be a new form of colonialism. This calls for the establishment of appropriate review committees to exclude what can prove to be politically mandated sinister investments. Lesser nations have, thus, to remain on guard to preserve their economic integrity and safety.
Infact the nations of South East Asia, neighbours of China and Japan, have already been vigilant for quite sometime. Five of these, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines and Singapore in 1967 created ASEAN, Association of South East Asian Nations, gradually enlarging it between 1984 and 1995 to include Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia. These nations primarily got together to expand intra regional trade and to move towards a single market and customs union. The secondary objective was to create a forum for joint assessments for any predatory assault from more powerful nations of the North and across the Pacific. While the ASEAN has not been able to accomplish much so far by way of integration and common policies, it has given its members a sense of being close knit group with some common concerns the most important of which remains not getting over shadowed by more powerful and not necessarily benign neighbours like China, Japan and the US.
In 1993 these nations took another step with national security as a special focus to set ARF, Asian Regional Forum, with a considerably expanded membership. ARF includes several distant countries like US, Canada, Australia, Russia and European Union, besides all major Asian countries like India, China, Japan and North Korea. The logic for creating such an omnibus forum was to have all likely adversaries on one platform so that all aggressive design towards the region could be controlled and stalled. ARF has not so far deliberated upon any major security issue but the hope is that in time to come, when regional rivalries are likely to be exacerbated. ARF could play the role of a mini General Assembly of the UN, India, by being a member of ARF, is now enabled to have its say on any troubling issue, arising in South East Asia.
Their rivalries were again on display when another forum called East Asia Summit was being set up. To the chagrin of China, India was invited to participate in it by Japan, Indonesia and Singapore, with tacit support from the US. By the time the East Asia Summit was inaugurated in 2005, Australia and New Zealand had also become its members. The Chinese ability to dominate over the institution was thus greatly diminished. The EAS is a futuristic organization, to play a role when in future security related issues in the region will become highly complex. Again, through its membership, India will be enabled to present its view forcefully on any or all issues including security.
The region’s cautious attitude towards China attitude towards China flows from the historical legacy when the Chinese communist party was blatantly supporting insurgencies and smaller communist parties in the neighbourhood. Chinese war with Vietnam in 1979 and propping up of the murderous government of Pol Pot in Cambodia had added to their misgivings. The Chinese attack on India in 1962 and subsequent withdrawal had already added another dimension to the mystery of Chinese decision making process. Since then and particularly after the Tiananmen Square uprising of 1989, China adopted a low profile and has been focused on economic development, avoiding distractions which could spoil its concentration. Chinese rapid economic development from the 1990s have revised those anxieties again since China has a number of territorial disputes with its neighbours which have remained unresolved.
China is squatting over 18,000 sq km of Indian land in Aksai Cheen in Ladakh and claims ownership of the entire of Arunachal Pradesh, an area of 84,000 sq kms. It is showing no signs of resolving these land disputes, leaving one wondering whether it wants the disputed status quo to remain just that way. The aim seems to be keep India destabilized in these regions. The Arunachal Pradesh issue was recently raked up by China with many shrill and hostile comments emanating from state controlled media in China. China’s long and consistent support to Pakistan, including aiding of the letter’s nuclear weapon development against India, violating all norms of non-proliferation, is an abiding indicator that China does not wish India well at all.
Certain projects undertaken by China in the neighbourhood strengthens the suspicion that it wants India hemmed in from all sides, so that it remains a regional power only in South Asia and does not reach the status of an Asian or global power.
Among these projects are part development at Gwadar in Pakistan which could also be a resting place for ships of Chinese Blue Water Navy, Karakoram highway connecting Pakistan with Western China, surveillance outposts on Myanmar Islands, a road from Yunan to Bay of Bengal through Myanmar, beefing up of ports of Myanmar and Srilanka etc. The emphasis on Port development suggests an intention to use them during forays of Chinese navy into the Indian Ocean. These projects when ready will also help China to expand its trade and investments further to the West. They are, thus a double purpose activity, which should alert India and require it to go by a worst case scenario for its security and prepare accordingly for the challenges they represent.
At this point it must be stated, the sense of threat is not unidirectional: as their economy strengthens China also is becoming conscious that India can prove to be a menace. Their biggest worry arises from the presence of Dalai Lama and over 100,000 Tibetans in India. Although India has long ago accepted Tibet to be an autonomous region of China, the undiminishing strength of Tibetan nationalism and the magnetism of Buddhist monasteries in Tibet for mobilization of Tibetan sentiments against Han settlers and authorities there lurks a deep suspicion in the Chinese mind that India will not hesitate to exploit any worsening of Chinese situation in Tibet. Selection of a new Dalai lama when the present one dies could create such a scenario if the Chinese seek to enforce their choice on the Tibetan people. The entire Tibetan diaspora including those in India could be expected explode against the Chinese with repercussions inside Tibet. In such an event Chin’s relationship with India will plummet and the borders would become active. It is probably because of such anticipation that the Chinese are delaying settlement of the border disputes with India.
The security scenario in East Asia remains troubled over the territorial disputes of China with its other neighbours. In East, China and Japan have laid rival claims over some islands and rights to explore gas and oil in the region. Neither side is giving in lest it is interpreted as weakness. The disputed Senkakus islands, presently in Japanese hands, lie in this patch of waters. Taiwan also claims Senkakus. In South China Sea, five countries, China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia and Philippines dispute ownership over Spratly and Paracel islands. A code of conduct signed by the five has taken away the sting but resolution of the problem of conflicting claims remains a distant dream. While India has no direct concerns over these disputes, a deterioration in the situation could result in the blocking of Malacco straits through which India’s bulk of trade with Eastern countries passes. Such disputes and the tension of catching up with the US has made China determine to upgrade its military capacity as fast as it can. The Chinese military budget hides much more than what it reveals and can be conservatively placed between dollar 50 billion to dollar 80 billion. Its military spending is rising in double digits every year. India’s military budget is less than half in comparison. Two consequences flow for India from this. One is that India stands out as a much weaker nation militarily before China. The other is that the people’s liberation army of China will always try to influence Chinese party leadership to remain jingoistic towards India. That is why Chinese official media often displays a tough and uncompromising attitude towards India.
While China thus remains a potent danger to India on its Eastern and northern flanks, many dangers abound in South Asia itself. In it an anarchic security environment prevails, driven by the flow of history and individual state systems which have developed. The nature of relationship among states of the region is influenced by internal ideologies and power equations. Foreign policy remains a hostage to internal environments and the urge for regional cooperation recedes to the background. Efforts at power balancing with India sends regional co-operation to the bottom of the list of priorities.
continued...