Iran recently celebrated the 30th anniversary of Ayatollah Khomeini's Islamic Revolution
Hard-line Islamist Regime
Iran's commanding location on the trade routes of the northern Indian Ocean region, including the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf, its shared sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz that provides a vital passage for the export of the region's oil wealth, the gateway that it provides to land-locked Afghanistan, the Central Asian Republics and Russia (through Turkmenistan) and its shoreline on the Caspian Sea, imbue Iran with immense strategic significance. The Persian civilisation has historically provided a crucial link on the strategic crossroads between West Asia, South Asia and Central Asia. However, the ongoing wars in Iraq to Iran's west and in Afghanistan to its east have disrupted that link. Iran itself has also contributed in some measure to the regional instability that now prevails.
Under the Shah of Iran, who was deeply loyal to the United States, the country had made rapid progress as a modern state that was secular and progressive in outlook. After the 1979 Islamic revolution led by Ayatollah Khomeini and the imams, Iran had sunk back into the darkness of the Middle Ages, but not for long. President Hashemi Rafsanjani, a pragmatic conservative, attempted to revive Iran's failing economy on free-market principles, and gradually reopen the country to foreign investment. He made the first moves to re-establish relations with the West and promote Iran as a regional power.
Reformist President Mohammad Khatami's election in 1997, his call for a "dialogue of civilisations" and the sweeping victory of the reformers in the February 2000 Parliamentary elections augured the advent of a new era in Iran's political and social climate. However, President Ahmedinejad's radical views on Israel, Iran's seemingly unquenchable thirst to acquire nuclear weapons, its proximity to and vested interest in continuing instability in Iraq, the Iranian-supported Hamas and the Lebanese Hizbollah's prolonged assymetric war against Israel have angered world opinion. The complete domination of Iran's polity by a radical clergy and its retarded industrialisation despite large petro-dollar earnings have dampened the international community's desire to normalise relations with the country.
For India present-day Iranian policies present a complex challenge. Since its independence, India has traditionally enjoyed warm and friendly relations with Iran. However, these ties have begun to fray at the edges in recent years due to Iran's abrogation of its Non-proliferation Treaty obligations despite India's heavy dependence on Iran's oil and natural gas. In a September 2005 IAEA vote, India had voted to hold Iran in "non-compliance" of its safeguards obligations to the IAEA even though China, Russia and Pakistan abstained. Again in a February 2006 IAEA vote, India had voted in favour of referring Iran to the UN Security Council, due to India's apprehension that Iran's growing uranium enrichment capability may eventually lead to the development of nuclear weapons.
While the Iranian government has categorically ruled out any intentions of acquiring nuclear weapons, India is concerned that the acquisition of uranium enrichment capability may eventually create the propensity to develop nuclear warheads. As a hard-line nationalist regime has been ruling Iran for over two decades, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran will add to regional instability in an already unstable neighborhood, particularly when viewed in the light of the ongoing conflict in Iraq that faces the prospects of a civil war and Afghanistan that has seen the resurgence of the Taliban. Saudi Arabia may also opt to acquire its own nuclear weapons and other neighbours may seek nuclear guarantees from the US and even Israel. Also, an Iran-Pakistan nexus cannot be ruled out in future even though their present relations are lukewarm. On account of national security considerations alone India's opposition to Iran's uranium enrichment programme, which violates Iran's treaty and safeguards obligations, is entirely justified.
Unreliable Energy Partner
During the regime of the Shah of Iran, India's perception of Iran was that of an alliance partner of the US and Pakistan. Post-1979, the two countries crafted a warmer relationship that laid the foundation for renewed bilateral cooperation on the basis of mutuality of interests. In the past Iran has taken helpful positions on Kashmir in the Organisation of Islamic Conference meetings despite Pakistan's extensive sabre rattling. More recently, Iran helped India in providing assistance to the Northern Alliance against the Taliban before the US-led coalition finally overthrew the oppressive regime in Afghanistan. In 2004, Iran offered India a road link to Afghanistan through the Chabahar port, a North-South corridor for access to Central Asia and Russia and long-term cooperation in the field of hydrocarbon energy.
India has a rapidly growing appetite for hydrocarbons to sustain its eight percent per annum growth rate and Iran is one of India's leading suppliers. Currently India imports over 70 percent of its requirement of oil and natural gas. This is expected to double by 2020. India's energy relations with Iran extend far beyond the proposed Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) gas pipeline. In June 2005, the two countries signed a 25-year deal, potentially worth up to US$ 22 billion, under which India would import five million tons of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Iran every year. In connection with this deal, Iran granted development rights to India in two Iranian oil fields that are potentially capable of generating 60,000 barrels per day in production.
In another deal, Iran awarded India development rights to a block in the North Pars gas field. Both countries have also pledged to explore joint investment projects in petrochemicals. All of these deals are now beset by uncertainty. Iran has reneged several times on the previously contracted price for natual gas and is now demanding exhorbitant commercial rates even though the price of oil and gas has been declining. Though the US is no longer actively opposing the IPI pipeline, India's negotiations with Iran and Pakistan are stalled due to non-agreement on transit costs through Pakistan. India is also apprehensive about Pakistan's ability to ensure the security of the IPI pipeline.
It is often forgotten that Iran has been an unreliable energy partner for India in the past as well. In the 1960s, India had joined a consortium led by Amoco to produce oil from the Rostam and Raksh oil fields in Iran. When Islamist hard-liners came to power, they nationalised these and gave India a pittance as compensation. Also, the wisdom of depending on gas pipelines running through Pakistan has been questioned by many Indian analysts on account of the likelihood of their frequent disruption by Jihadi elements in the north and the Baloch tribesmen in the south. Despite their obvious drawbacks, pipelines from Iran and Turkmenistan are attratcive lifelines for India's energy security and India can ill afford to ignore these unless alternative sources can be tapped. Howver, Iran is unlikely to use oil as a weapon and withold supplies to India as that would be detrimental to Iran's own commercial interests.
Securing Indian Interests
In a suo motu statement in Parliament on February 17, 2006, Prime Minister Monmohan Singh had emphasised the civilisational nature of India's relations with Iran, the importance of cooperation on hydrocarbons for India's energy security and the security implications of Iran's clandestine uranium enrichment activities. The Prime Minister highlighted India's security concerns arising from proliferation activities in India's extended neighborhood and favoured a solution based on compromises acceptable to Iran and the international community through diplomatic efforts aimed at seeking a consensus in the IAEA.
The best way to ensure that Iran is never tempted to make nuclear weapons will be to address its security concerns and accommodate it as a major regional actor that is now showing increasing willingness to play a more responsible role in international affairs. There is no reason for India to abandon its traditional friendship with Iran and endanger its energy security. However, India has made it abundantly clear that it stands for Iran respecting its treaty obligations under the NPT and IAEA safeguards and giving up the pursuit of nuclear weapons. India must balance the concerns of the international community about Iran's nuclear ambitions with the advantages of close ties that are in India's interests. India cannot wish away the crippling impact that economic sanctions and, even worse, US-led military strikes on Iran will have on its energy security and its trade in the region.
Indian Muslims comprise almost 15 percent of the country's population, but they have never voted en bloc on issues concerning the community. However, some political parties seldom lose an opportunity to exploit their sentiments for narrow electoral gains. Former Indian External Affairs Minister Natwar Singh, pointing out the sensitivities of India's 150 million Muslims, had said that a significant number of them are Shias. This raises the question whether India's foreign policy is no more than an extension of domestic politics. The majority in India perceives Iran as a non-hostile Muslim country with which India can and must do business for mutual benefit. However, most thinking Indians are unfavourably disposed towards the present hard-line regime, are in favour of greater restraint on the part of Iran and are against the development of technological capabilities that will give Iran the ability to produce nuclear weapons in future. At the same time, most Indians are disinclined to allow the US and its allies to dictate terms to Iran.
Iran's political, socio-economic and military status and the threats and challenges that it is likely to face are of immense interest to India. India must carefully study the strategic trend lines and the emerging contours of Iran's inevitable rise as a regional power as it has significant implications for India. The gateway that Iran provides to the Central Asian Republics and to Afghanistan is crucial for India to achieve its foreign policy objectives in the region and to tap the region's energy resources, particularly its natural gas wealth.
Despite President Ahmadinejad's recent overtures and the prospects of direct talks with the US when the new US Administration takes office, it is still not clear whether the current Iranian regime would ultimately opt to be isolated from the international community but refuse to forego its option to develop nuclear weapons, or prefer to integrate Iran with the new world order on Western terms, that is, gain in economic and technological terms but lose the capacity to develop its own nuclear weapons. A civil nuclear energy programme that bestows enrichment capability on a state that is ruled by a hard-line nationalist regime and has been among the most active state sponsors of international terrorism, is a threat to peace and stability and must be curtailed or at least subjected to an intrusive safeguards regime. India is likely to go along with the international community in seeking such an arrangement.
However, India cannot wish away the crippling impact that economic sanctions and, even worse, US military strikes on Iran will have on its energy security and its trade in the region. Fortunately, the Obama Administration is likely to favour a peaceful resolution of Iran's nuclear crisis, rather than opt for military action that will create more problems than it might resolve. In the ultimate analysis, India's interests lie in the diplomatic resolution of the nuclear crisis. India should offer its good offices to the international community to rebuild bridges with Iran and help it to integrate itself with the new world order peacefully.
House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, March 31, 2009
Afghanistan provides the United States and Iran an important opportunity to engage each other positively, given how much both countries have at stake in its future and paving the way for a broader working relationship. That was the central thrust of testimony to the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform by Karim Sadjadpour on Tuesday, March 31.
U.S. policy recommendations:
Given important overlapping interests between Washington and Tehran, engagement with Iran as a “responsible stakeholder” in Afghanistan has little cost and potentially enormous benefits.
With over 1.5 million Afghan refugees, Iran does not stand to gain from continued instability in Afghanistan. And given its violent history with the inherently anti-Shia Taliban, Tehran has no interest in seeing their resurgence.
With one of the highest rates of drug addiction in the world, Iran has a strong interest in seeing narcotics production in Afghanistan eradicated. Iran’s agricultural expertise should be enlisted to help Afghan farmers plant alternatives to opium poppies.
The Obama administration should make clear that it is not merely interested in isolated engagement with Iran in Afghanistan, but in overcoming past animosity and establishing a broad working relationship.
Direct cooperation between U.S. and Iranian forces may be unrealistic in the short term, but Washington should encourage EU and NATO countries attempting to work with Iran on counternarcotics, infrastructure, and agricultural development.
U.S.–Iran tension over Hizbollah, Hamas, and uranium enrichment will not be resolved anytime soon but should not preclude U.S.–Iran cooperation in Afghanistan.
Designating the Islamic Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) as a terrorist entity will complicate any diplomatic initiatives, because Tehran’s policies in Afghanistan (as well as in Iraq and Lebanon) are executed by that organization. U.S. officials would effectively be prohibited from interacting with the Iranian actors who matter most.
Constructive discussion about Afghanistan could help set a new tone and context for the relationship, which could help allay Iranian insecurities vis-à-vis the United States and compel its leaders to reassess various aspects of their foreign policy, including their nuclear posture.
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee,
Thank you for inviting me to testify on such a critical issue. I applaud the Obama administration’s commitment to stability and human rights in Afghanistan, a country that has endured immeasurable suffering as a result of a longstanding pattern of great power machinations followed by great power neglect.
The administration correctly understands that lasting security in Afghanistan is an enormous challenge that cannot be achieved without the collective efforts and cooperation of neighboring countries. Pakistan, as President Obama recently said, is “inextricably linked” to Afghanistan’s future. Likewise, given their deep historical links and cultural and linguistic affinities, neighboring Iran stands to play a decisive role in Afghanistan’s future. Effective U.S. diplomacy can help ensure that Iranian influence is decisively positive, rather than decisively negative.
Common interests, lingering enmities
Despite 30 years of hostilities, the United States has more overlapping interests with Iran in Afghanistan than it does with its allies Pakistan and Saudi Arabia (the Taliban’s chief patrons). Given their shared 580-mile border, and having accommodated over two million Afghan refugees over the last three decades, Iran does not stand to gain from continued instability and civil strife in Afghanistan. With one of the highest rates of drug addiction in the world, Iran has a strong interest in seeing narcotics production in Afghanistan eradicated. And given its violent history with the inherently anti-Shia Taliban (whom Iran has referred to in the past as “narco-terrorists”), Tehran has no interest in seeing their resurgence.
Indeed, Afghanistan is one of the very few positive examples of U.S.-Iran cooperation since the 1979 revolution. Tehran supported the opposition Northern Alliance long before September 11, 2001, and according to several senior U.S. officials played a critical role in helping to assemble the post-Taliban government. Like the United States, Iran has been a strong supporter of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, who has consistently praised Tehran for its support and cooperation.
Yet Iranian activities in Afghanistan (and elsewhere) are often a byproduct of its relationship with the United States. Tehran felt humiliated after being labeled by President Bush as part of an “axis of evil” in January 2002, believing its initial cooperation in Afghanistan had gone for naught. Relations further deteriorated after Iran’s nuclear program was revealed to the public, and as a result of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. Nefarious Iranian activities meant to counter U.S. influence became in part a self-fulfilling prophecy.
While Iran’s strategic objectives in Afghanistan have not changed, efforts to undermine the United States has led Tehran to occasionally employ tactics that are gratuitously unhelpful—such as abruptly and forcefully repatriating Afghan refugees—and even inimical to its own strategic interests—such as providing arms to the Taliban. According to former U.S. officials with access to classified intelligence, Iranian aid to the Taliban was too insignificant to make a difference, but significant enough to send a signal to the United States not to take Iranian restraint for granted.
The Bush administration’s decision to cast Iran as a source of the problem in Afghanistan, rather than a part of the solution, was met with chagrin by President Karzai and NATO allies. A senior European diplomat (and fluent Persian speaker) who spent several months in Afghanistan studying Iranian influence remarked to me upon his return that whereas Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan was about “20 percent positive, 80 percent negative”, Iran’s was more like “80 percent positive, 20 percent negative…and much of their negative activities are a reaction to punitive measures by us.” In this context, focusing on Iran’s support for the Taliban appears akin to focusing on Canadian illegal immigration to the United States.
Nonetheless, we should not exaggerate Iranian goodwill in Afghanistan. A government that is repressive and intolerant at home rarely seeks to export pluralism and Jeffersonian democracy abroad. Tehran will certainly seek to assert its influence in Afghanistan by supporting Afghan actors who are sympathetic to its worldview and interests. For the foreseeable future, however, Afghanistan’s immediate priorities will be far more rudimentary than the creation of a liberal democracy.
No nation has the luxury of choosing its neighbors, and a country as decimated, destitute, and desperate as Afghanistan certainly does not have the luxury of shunning their assistance. Given its previous efforts at promoting political reconciliation, and the fact that it is among the top ten country donors of economic aid to Afghanistan, Iran has shown that when it wants to it can play an important role in helping to develop and sustain a viable Afghan state.
Despite Afghanistan’s tremendous vulnerabilities, Iranian ambitions for hegemony in Afghanistan are tempered by historical experience and demographic realities. In contrast to Iraq, which is the cradle of Shiism—home to the faith’s most important shrines and seminaries in Najaf and Karbala—and also the country’s majority religion, the Shia in Afghanistan are a distinct minority, comprising less than 20 percent of the population. Moreover, Tehran saw in the early 1990s that a Tehran-centric, minority-led government in Kabul was simply not sustainable and led to more unrest. Experience has taught Tehran that its interests are better served with a stable, friendly, majority-led government, rather than a minority-led government subservient to Tehran but inherently unstable.
How to engage Iran on Afghanistan
Ultimately, U.S. engagement with Iran as a full partner and “responsible stakeholder” in Afghanistan has little cost and potentially enormous benefits. Though Tehran will express reluctance at working with Washington, and may couch its cooperation in critiques of U.S. policies, given its desire to be seen as the champions of the Muslim world’s downtrodden, it cannot give the appearance that its enmity toward the United States trumps its empathy for the Afghan people.
While direct cooperation between U.S. and Iranian forces in Afghanistan may not be immediately realistic, Washington should support and encourage EU and NATO countries that have attempted to work together with Iran on myriad issues ranging from counter-narcotics, infrastructure and agricultural development, and using Iranian ports and roads as a supply route for aid and NATO troops. Iranian agricultural expertise, in particular, should be enlisted to help Afghan farmers in planting alternative crops to the poppy.
Critics of engagement cite the fact that the Bush administration’s attempts to engage with Iran in Iraq did not bear any fruit. Despite several meetings between the U.S. and Iranian ambassadors in Baghdad, U.S. officials saw no improvement in Iranian policies in Iraq and in some cases even claimed that Tehran’s support for militant groups opposed to the United States increased despite this engagement.
A fundamental shortcoming of the Bush administration’s approach, however, was that it gave Tehran no indication it was interested in a broader strategic cooperation. It simply implored Iran to facilitate America’s mission in Iraq because Iraqi stability was in Tehran’s own interests. As one Iranian diplomat told me at the time, “The U.S. consistently threatens us militarily, encourages our population to rise up, and does its utmost to punish us economically and isolate us politically. And then we’re expected to help them out in Iraq? We’re not going to be good Samaritans for the sake of being good Samaritans.”
The Obama administration should continue to make it clear to Tehran that it is not merely interested in tactical or isolated engagement with Iran in Afghanistan, but is genuinely interested in overcoming the animosity of the last three decades and establishing a broad working relationship.
While it’s important to understand Iran’s sizable influence on other issues of critical importance to the U.S.—Iraq, the Arab-Israeli conflict, nuclear proliferation, terrorism, and energy—and the linkages between then, it’s also important to disaggregate Iran policies. In other words, while U.S.–Iran tension over Hezbollah or Hamas will not be resolved anytime soon, this should not preclude U.S.–Iran cooperation in Afghanistan.
Given Tehran’s policies in Afghanistan (as well as in Iraq and Lebanon) are executed not by the Iranian foreign ministry but rather the elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), attempts by Congress to designate the IRGC a terrorist entity, if successful, would severely complicate any diplomatic initiatives with Iran. U.S. officials would effectively be prohibited from talking to the Iranian actors who matter most. To paraphrase Donald Rumsfeld, we have to deal with the Iranian leaders we’ve got, not the ones we wish we had.
Ultimately, the underlying source of tension in the U.S.-Iran relationship is mistrust. Washington does not trust that Iran’s nuclear intentions are peaceful, and does not believe that Iran can play a cooperative role in bringing peace and stability to the Middle East. Iran’s leadership, on the other hand, believes that Washington’s ultimate goal is not to change Iranian behavior, but the regime itself.
For this reason, President Obama, Secretary of State Clinton, and Ambassador Holbrooke are wise to temper expectations of a diplomatic breakthrough with Tehran. Given three decades of compounded mistrust and ill will, the results of any engagement process will not be quick, and antagonism will not melt away after one, two, or perhaps even many meetings.
That said, we should be aware of the possibilities. Constructive discussions about Afghanistan could have a positive spillover on the nuclear dispute, which is a symptom of U.S.-Iranian mistrust, not the underlying cause of tension. If indeed Iran’s nuclear ambitions reflect a sense of insecurity vis-à-vis the United States, building cooperation and goodwill in Afghanistan could set a new tone and context for the relationship, which could allay Tehran’s threat perception and compel its leaders to reassess various aspects of their foreign policy, including their nuclear disposition.
A win-win-win is not often in international relations. U.S.-Iran cooperation in Afghanistan would be to the benefit of all three countries, just as U.S.-Iran antagonism the last several years has been to the detriment of all three.
A 14-nation “Africa Summit” in New Delhi in April might have sounded like a throwback to the strongest days of the Nonaligned Movement. But India’s policy today in Africa is different, driven chiefly by energy. India hopes to secure energy assets through a vigorous commercial presence, the beginnings of an aid program, and political engagement. This is also part of India’s “rebranding” of its international role. For the United States, this expansion of India’s international leadership role should be welcome, though some of its manifestations may be inconvenient.
India’s oil interests: Energy is at the forefront of India’s strategy in Africa. India’s economy has grown at an incredible 8 percent per year in the last decade. Presently 30 percent of India‘s energy needs are met by oil and the remaining 70 percent is met by domestic coal reserves. Approximately 70 percent of oil supply is imported. The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that in order to stay on its current growth trajectory, India will have to increase its energy consumption by at least 3.6 percent annually. This will lead India’s energy demand to double by 2025, compelling it to import 90 percent of its petroleum supply.
As part of its international strategy to diversify suppliers, the government’s oil exploration and production enterprise, the Oil and National Gas Corporation (ONGC), has ventured into Africa. Nigeria is already India’s second largest supplier, with 15 percent of the market. ONGC Videsh, the international arm of the agency, has acquired shares in oil exploration ventures in Libya and Nigeria. It has also made substantial investments in Sudan’s hydrocarbon sector and plans to invest in offshore drilling in the Ivory Coast. Reliance Industries, one of India’s largest privately held energy companies, is also negotiating energy collaborations for refining with several African countries including Angola and Nigeria.
An economic bargain: In exchange for access to energy, India is prepared to offer economic aid, assistance in finding low-cost solutions to poverty, and improved business relations. The private sector plays a significant role in strengthening Indian goodwill in the continent. Indian pharmaceutical companies supply low-cost generic drugs and provide support to humanitarian programs across the African continent. Ranbaxy, a leading Indian pharmaceutical company, has provided reasonably priced medicines, particularly Anti-retroviral (ARV) drugs, to several African countries including Nigeria, Kenya and Zambia. Another pharmaceutical company, Cipla, provides HIV/AIDS drugs to 1 in 3 patients in Africa. Some pharmaceutical companies, notably Ranbaxy, also have production facilities in Africa. These pharmaceutical companies are not only adding to their bottom line, they are providing urgently needed healthcare at affordable prices.
India’s leading telecommunications companies have also expressed an interest in investing in Africa. Bharti Airtel is currently in negotiations to acquire 51 percent of the controlling share in South Africa’s Mobile Telephone Networks, the largest mobile phone-operator in Africa.
India-Africa trade has grown rapidly in the last 5 years $3.39 billion per year in 2000 to $30 billion per year in 2007. Although energy trade currently accounts for the lion’s share sectors such as construction, automotive manufacturing, hotels, steel and information technology are increasing as well. India recently announced import duty concessions, which is expected to further bolster imports from Africa. Overall India runs a trade surplus with Africa.
India is unique amongst developing countries in that its foreign direct investment (FDI) outflows exceed its FDI inflows. In 2007, it is estimated that India invested $13.6 billion abroad. If even a fraction of this investment goes into Africa, it could significantly facilitate Africa’s integration into the global economy.
Engaging Africa politically: The first India-Africa summit in New Delhi in April 2008 witnessed a serious strategic push from the Indian government to strengthen its ties with leading African nations. 14 African countries were represented at the summit, including Algeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Libya, Nigeria, South Africa and Uganda.
At the policy level, trade policy is an important element. India has coordinated closely with African countries on the Doha Round of negotiations, especially on agriculture. India has looked especially toward South Africa, creating a forum of large developing countries with Brazil, the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) bloc. However, although IBSA has negotiated successfully at Doha and other trade talks, they not yet established trilateral trade agreements among themselves, nor have they established any institutions for the group.
Climate change is also an issue of common interest. In the Delhi Declaration concluding the summit, the participants stressed the importance of a fair and equitable division between developing and developed countries in sharing the burden of climate change, by taking into account historical emissions in addition to current emissions. They also expressed a desire to ensure that the adoption of new policies is funded through dedicated resources and not through funds meant for development purposes.
India is also trying to develop African support for its candidacy for a permanent Security Council seat. In principle, this is to work both ways, with India supporting a suitable African candidate, presumably South Africa.
The China factor: The Indian government has repeatedly stated that India is not in competition with China in Africa, but China is undoubtedly India’s foremost rival in strengthening ties with African countries. China has a much larger presence in Africa, in terms of acquiring energy deals and in terms of government engagement. China’s trade with Africa is currently approximately $60 billion per year and although India has substantially increased its trade with Africa, it still remains only half of Sino-African trade.
The main driver for both Asian giants is energy. Interestingly, it is against the backdrop of Africa’s energy landscape that India and China have are learning to fine-tune their bilateral balancing act; they have co-operated when it has suited their interests and have competed when necessary. However, India has lost several lucrative oil deals to China and so far New Delhi seemingly lacks the unyielding strategic drive that Beijing has deftly displayed in the African continent.
India is also reportedly uncomfortable with the growing Chinese presence on the African rim of the Indian Ocean. The security of Indian Ocean sea lanes is an area of major concern for India, which has traditionally seen the Indian Ocean as its strategic backyard. According to a recent report released by Chatham House, this is another issue that drives India’s desire to strengthen its presence in Africa.
A new kind of globalization: In the days of maximum influence for the non-aligned movement, this kind of political contact between Indian and African officials and leaders was commonplace. There are three differences today. India has very concrete interests in play in Africa. Its private economic companies are significant players. But most importantly, this engagement with Africa comes at a time when India is also cultivating a global relationship with the United States, and it is interacting in Africa with other global powers such as China. Africa is still a relatively small part of India’s foreign policy, far less significant in commercial or political terms than the Middle East or Southeast Asia. But as India cultivates its global role, this is an area where it can position itself as a leader, a supplier of investment, and an aid donor.
For the United States, much of what India does in Africa is below the radar screen. India’s commercial presence is a plus from Washington’s perspective, reinforcing the dynamic growth that has been so important to the new U.S.-India relationship. On issues like trade policy and climate change, Indian-African coordination will be a thorn in Washington’s side. It is a reminder that as India expands its global role, a serious partnership with the United States will require Washington and Delhi to understand better each other’s goals and hopes in different parts of the world, including this one.
Vibhuti Haté is a Research Associate with the South Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Haté conducts research, analysis, and writing for projects that focus on international trade, economic policy, and political trends that pertain to South Asia.
Indian Ocean - A strategic appraisal: by Flt Lt N.K Pant.
The strategic importance of Indian Ocean has gone up after the British withdrew from the bases in the region. This is evident from the increased maritime activity by the Americans, Soviet, British and French naval flotillas in this area. It seems the contending fleets will sail more and more to fill up the power vacuum created by British withdrawal.
As a result of the recent ceasefire in Vietnam, the U.S Seventh Fleet with no more commitments in that theatre, may extend its vigilance from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean. During the last few years Americans have aquired bases in Baherein and Western Australia. A joint Anglo-American installation is under construction in Diego Garcia island near Mauritius.
Britain still controls the Seychelle islands and has formed the British Indian Ocean Territory by purchasing the islands of Aldabra, Farquhar, Des Roches and the Chagos Archipelago. They also have facilities for refuelling and staging in Maldives islands south west of Ceylon. Thus the British seemed to have changed their strategy by again evincing keen interest in this region which was solely dominated by their naval power till the beginning of the second world war.
Sorrounded by Indian Sub-Continent in the north, East Africa in the west, Malaysia, Indonesia and Australia in the east and the frozen continent of Antarctica in the far south, the Indian Ocean covers an area of 2,85,00,000 square miles with an average depth of 12,900 feet. Red Sea approach to the Suez Canal, oil rich Persian Gulf, the Strait of Malacca, and the Cape of Good Hope on the southern most tip of African continent are the strategically located points in the region.
The trade routes passing through this ocean are gaining importance with greater Japanese and Western dependence on Persian Gulf oil and the substantial economic progress in India with upward parallel trends in shipping and overseas trade. Foreign trade is an industry considered of such national importance as to be closely guided along the lines of national policies.
In order to protect her expanding trade interests and rapidly increasing tonnage over the sea lanes of the Indian Ocean, India will have to evolve a new national policy, keeping in view the chief threat to shipping which may come from a conventional sea power comprising mainly of submarines, mines and aircraft of a belligerant nation in case of hostilities.
Nations located in the periphery of the Indian Ocean are becoming aware of the potential danger as the fleets of the major powers continue policing the area due to their strategic, economic and trade interests. This is evident from the resolutions moved in the United Nations General Assembly and other international forums for making the Indian Ocean a neutral zone.
On the other hand a new strategic thinking is taking place in countries like Iran and Pakistan putting forward their claims as the dominant powers of the Arabian Sea and suggesting that Indonesia should dominate the Bay of Bengal, being a dominant power in that area. This is an utterly Utopian idea which completely ignores the vital Indian role.
India is the largest country in this part of the globe in terms of its area and population, comparatively far advanced in the economic and industrial fields with sufficient natural resources and a technological capability for tapping them. India's strategic location commands the Indian Ocean especially the region in the north of the equator. Geographical distances are such that with sufficient naval and air cover, India can easily dominate the Red Sea approach to the Suez Canal, oil rich Persian Gulf and the strategic Strait of Malacca.
Other potential regional powers in the region are Indonesia, Australia and South Africa. When fully developed Indonesia may have an important role in the South East Asian affairs. South Africa, if she continues the racial policy, may become a brewing pot for regional conflict which may have a devastating effect on east-west trade since the vital arteries of international shipping pass through the Cape of Good Hope. Another hotbed where trouble may sprout is the Persian Gulf which may become a bone of contention between Iran and the Arabs led by the Iraqies.
Much has been written and discussed in the recent past about the role of India in the region. Latest suggestion came from Admiral Nanda who, during his farewell address to the Navy mentioned the need for an Indian Ocean fleet for filling up the "vacuum" in the region. India's location in the Bay of Bengal is strategically advantageous and does not warrant search for foreign bases. The islands of Andamans and Nicobars are closely situated to Burma, Indonesia and Malaysia. These islands when properly garrisoned with naval bases supported by an effective maritime air cover, will enable us to attain complete naval superiority in this zone.
From these points a constant vigil can be kept on any belligerant activity over an area extending upto the Strait of Malacca, 24 miles wide eastern gateway to the Indian Ocean. Here India should adopt a policy of forward strategy to meet the initial shock of any threat originating from the east. The declaration of sovereignty over the Malaccan Straits by Indonesia and Malaysia if properly implemented will go in India's favour as it may restrict free passage of naval vessels into the Indian Ocean from the far east and will be a contribution towards making the region as a neutral zone.
Now let us divert our atention to the Arabian sea, lying between the Indian Sub-Continent and the Eastern Africa. Bulk of our trade passes through the shipping lanes of this sea. Prospects of rich oil reserves in our western coast enhance the economic and strategic importance of the region. Also located in the area is the Red Sea approach to the Suez Canal and the oil rich Sheikdoms of the Persian Gulf where a feeling of insecurity prevails after the British withdrawal from the area which is bound to increase with the massive armament programme started by Iran.
The strategic points and the shipping lanes of the region can be safeguarded by strengthening our naval bases on the western shores. Submarines assisted by long range aircraft will provide an excellent cover to our trade and shipping. While formulating a naval policy in this theatre, strategic utility of the Laccadive and Minicoy islands should be taken in full consideration. A strong western fleet of friendly and neutral India dominating the region as far as Aden and Mauritius will generate a sense of security among the smaller countries besides acting as a deterrent to Iranian and Pakistani motives.
There is an urgent need of reassessing India's strategic requirements for the sake of national security and in the broader perspective of maintaining peace and stability in the Indian Ocean where a large number of countries are taking exceptional interest by building new bases, arming nations like Iran and South Africa and continuing the naval presence with a view to interfere in the internal matters of countries of the region. An example of this interference was the movement of Seventh Fleet into the Bay of Bengal during the Indo-Pak war of December, 1971.
India will have to assert her position by attaining the status of powerhood within a decade or so. India's area, population, industrial growth, technology and political stability assure her such a position in the coming years. Our need will be met by a strong two fleet navy centered around submarines, missile ships, frigates and other allied craft supported by offshore and island based maritime air cover. Early aquisition of military and naval power is in the utmost interest of national security as the chances of the Indian Ocean being treated as an area of peace and neutrality despite the resolutions of the U.N., are limited.
A recent study by the Economic and Scientific Foundation has forecast a major power role for India in the next 20 to 30 years and has warned that if she fails to achieve this, external pressure will break her up. The study has recommended quadrupling the navy budget and doubling the air force budget and has brought out the fact that if India desires to be respected as an independent decision making centre, she must possess adequate military power.
To achieve these results, strides will have to be made for rapid industrialisation and an integrated all round economic growth which indirectly will boost the military potential of the country. After all a strong military power is always based on a healthy and prosperous economy. Once this goal is achieved, the long existing power vacuum in the Indian Ocean will be automatically filled up and will be instrumental in maintaining peace and stability in the region apart from enhancing the country's international prestige.
The following is the text of the Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of India concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy (123 Agreement):
AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
CONCERNING PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY (123 AGREEMENT)
The Government of India and the Government of the United States of America, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,
RECOGNIZING the significance of civilian nuclear energy for meeting growing global energy demands in a cleaner and more efficient manner;
DESIRING to cooperate extensively in the full development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes as a means of achieving energy security, on a stable, reliable and predictable basis;
WISHING to develop such cooperation on the basis of mutual respect for sovereignty, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality, mutual benefit, reciprocity and with due respect for each other’s nuclear programmes;
DESIRING to establish the necessary legal framework and basis for cooperation concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy;
AFFIRMING that cooperation under this Agreement is between two States possessing advanced nuclear technology, both Parties having the same benefits and advantages, both committed to preventing WMD proliferation;
NOTING the understandings expressed in the India – U.S. Joint Statement of July 18, 2005 to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India covering aspects of the associated nuclear fuel cycle;
AFFIRMING their support for the objectives of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its safeguards system, as applicable to India and the United States of America, and its importance in ensuring that international cooperation in development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is carried out under arrangements that will not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
NOTING their respective commitments to safety and security of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, to adequate physical protection of nuclear material and effective national export controls;
MINDFUL that peaceful nuclear activities must be undertaken with a view to protecting the environment;
MINDFUL of their shared commitment to preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and
DESIROUS of strengthening the strategic partnership between them;
Have agreed on the following:
ARTICLE 1 – DEFINITIONS
For the purposes of this Agreement:
(A) “By-product material” means any radioactive material (except special fissionable material) yielded in or made radioactive by exposure to the radiation incident to the process of producing or utilizing special fissionable material. By-product material shall not be subject to safeguards or any other form of verification under this Agreement, unless it has been decided otherwise by prior mutual agreement in writing between the two Parties.
(B) “Component” means a component part of equipment, or other item so designated by agreement of the Parties.
(C) “Conversion” means any of the normal operations in the nuclear fuel cycle, preceding fuel fabrication and excluding enrichment, by which uranium is transformed from one chemical form to another – for example, from uranium hexafluoride (UF6) to uranium dioxide (UO2) or from uranium oxide to metal.
(D) “Decommissioning” means the actions taken at the end of a facility’s useful life to retire the facility from service in the manner that provides adequate protection for the health and safety of the decommissioning workers and the general public, and for the environment. These actions can range from closing down the facility and a minimal removal of nuclear material coupled with continuing maintenance and surveillance, to a complete removal of residual radioactivity in excess of levels acceptable for unrestricted use of the facility and its site.
(E) “Dual-Use Item” means a nuclear related item which has a technical use in both nuclear and non-nuclear applications.
(F) “Equipment” means any equipment in nuclear operation including reactor, reactor pressure vessel, reactor fuel charging and discharging equipment, reactor control rods, reactor pressure tubes, reactor primary coolant pumps, zirconium tubing, equipment for fuel fabrication and any other item so designated by the Parties.
(G) “High enriched uranium” means uranium enriched to twenty percent or greater in the isotope 235.
(H) “Information” means any information that is not in the public domain and is transferred in any form pursuant to this Agreement and so designated and documented in hard copy or digital form by mutual agreement by the Parties that it shall be subject to this Agreement, but will cease to be information whenever the Party transferring the information or any third party legitimately releases it into the public domain.
(I) “Low enriched uranium” means uranium enriched to less than twenty percent in the isotope 235.
(J) “Major critical component” means any part or group of parts essential to the operation of a sensitive nuclear facility or heavy water production facility.
(K) “Non-nuclear material” means heavy water, or any other material suitable for use in a reactor to slow down high velocity neutrons and increase the likelihood of further fission, as may be jointly designated by the appropriate authorities of the Parties.
(L) “Nuclear material” means (1) source material and (2) special fissionable material. “Source material” means uranium containing the mixture of isotopes occurring in nature; uranium depleted in the isotope 235; thorium; any of the foregoing in the form of metal, alloy, chemical compound, or concentrate; any other material containing one or more of the foregoing in such concentration as the Board of Governors of the IAEA shall from time to time determine; and such other materials as the Board of Governors of the IAEA may determine or as may be agreed by the appropriate authorities of both Parties. “Special fissionable material” means plutonium, uranium-233, uranium enriched in the isotope 233 or 235, any substance containing one or more of the foregoing, and such other substances as the Board of Governors of the IAEA may determine or as may be agreed by the appropriate authorities of both Parties. “Special fissionable material” does not include “source material”. Any determination by the Board of Governors of the IAEA under Article XX of that Agency’s Statute or otherwise that amends the list of materials considered to be “source material” or “special fissionable material” shall only have effect under this Agreement when both Parties to this Agreement have informed each other in writing that they accept such amendment.
(M) “Peaceful purposes” include the use of information, nuclear material, equipment or components in such fields as research, power generation, medicine, agriculture and industry, but do not include use in, research on, or development of any nuclear explosive device or any other military purpose. Provision of power for a military base drawn from any power network, production of radioisotopes to be used for medical purposes in military environment for diagnostics, therapy and sterility assurance, and other similar purposes as may be mutually agreed by the Parties shall not be regarded as military purpose.
(N) “Person” means any individual or any entity subject to the territorial jurisdiction of either Party but does not include the Parties.
(O) “Reactor” means any apparatus, other than a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device, in which a self-sustaining fission chain reaction is maintained by utilizing uranium, plutonium, or thorium or any combination thereof.
(P) “Sensitive nuclear facility” means any facility designed or used primarily for uranium enrichment, reprocessing of nuclear fuel, or fabrication of nuclear fuel containing plutonium.
(Q) “Sensitive nuclear technology” means any information that is not in the public domain and that is important to the design, construction, fabrication, operation, or maintenance of any sensitive nuclear facility, or other such information that may be so designated by agreement of the Parties.
ARTICLE 2 – SCOPE OF COOPERATION
1. The Parties shall cooperate in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement. Each Party shall implement this Agreement in accordance with its respective applicable treaties, national laws, regulations, and license requirements concerning the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
2. The purpose of the Agreement being to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation between the Parties, the Parties may pursue cooperation in all relevant areas to include, but not limited to, the following:
a. Advanced nuclear energy research and development in such areas as may be agreed between the Parties; b. Nuclear safety matters of mutual interest and competence, as set out in Article 3; c. Facilitation of exchange of scientists for visits, meetings, symposia and collaborative research; d. Full civil nuclear cooperation activities covering nuclear reactors and aspects of the associated nuclear fuel cycleincluding technology transfer on an industrial or commercial scale between the Parties or authorized persons; e. Development of a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply over the lifetime of India’s reactors; f. Advanced research and development in nuclear sciences including but not limited to biological research, medicine, agriculture and industry, environment and climate change; g. Supply between the Parties, whether for use by or for the benefit of the Parties or third countries, of nuclear material; h. Alteration in form or content of nuclear material as provided for in Article 6; i. Supply between the Parties of equipment, whether for use by or for the benefit of the Parties or third countries; j. Controlled thermonuclear fusion including in multilateral projects; and k. Other areas of mutual interest as may be agreed by the Parties.
3. Transfer of nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components and information under this Agreement may be undertaken directly between the Parties or through authorized persons. Such transfers shall be subject to this Agreement and to such additional terms and conditions as may be agreed by the Parties. Nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components and information transferred from the territory of one Party to the territory of the other Party, whether directly or through a third country, will be regarded as having been transferred pursuant to this Agreement only upon confirmation, by the appropriate authority of the recipient Party to the appropriate authority of the supplier Party that such items both will be subject to the Agreement and have been received by the recipient Party.
4. The Parties affirm that the purpose of this Agreement is to provide for peaceful nuclear cooperation and not to affect the unsafeguarded nuclear activities of either Party. Accordingly, nothing in this Agreement shall be interpreted as affecting the rights of the Parties to use for their own purposes nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components, information or technology produced, acquired or developed by them independent of any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components, information or technology transferred to them pursuant to this Agreement. This Agreement shall be implemented in a manner so as not to hinder or otherwise interfere with any other activities involving the use of nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components, information or technology and military nuclear facilities produced, acquired or developed by them independent of this Agreement for their own purposes.
ARTICLE 3 – TRANSFER OF INFORMATION
1. Information concerning the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes may be transferred between the Parties. Transfers of information may be accomplished through reports, data banks and computer programs and any other means mutually agreed to by the Parties. Fields that may be covered include, but shall not be limited to, the following:
a. Research, development, design, construction, operation, maintenance and use of reactors, reactor experiments, and decommissioning; b. The use of nuclear material in physical, chemical, radiological and biological research, medicine, agriculture and industry; c. Fuel cycle activities to meet future world-wide civil nuclear energy needs, including multilateral approaches to which they are parties for ensuring nuclear fuel supply and appropriate techniques for management of nuclear wastes; d. Advanced research and development in nuclear science and technology; e. Health, safety, and environmental considerations related to the foregoing; f. Assessments of the role nuclear power may play in national energy plans; g. Codes, regulations and standards for the nuclear industry; h. Research on controlled thermonuclear fusion including bilateral activities and contributions toward multilateral projects such as the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER); and i. Any other field mutually agreed to by the Parties.
2. Cooperation pursuant to this Article may include, but is not limited to, training, exchange of personnel, meetings, exchange of samples, materials and instruments for experimental purposes and a balanced participation in joint studies and projects.
3. This Agreement does not require the transfer of any information regarding matters outside the scope of this Agreement, or information that the Parties are not permitted under their respective treaties, national laws, or regulations to transfer.
4. Restricted Data, as defined by each Party, shall not be transferred under this Agreement.
ARTICLE 4 – NUCLEAR TRADE
1. The Parties shall facilitate nuclear trade between themselves in the mutual interests of their respective industry, utilities and consumers and also, where appropriate, trade between third countries and either Party of items obligated to the other Party. The Parties recognize that reliability of supplies is essential to ensure smooth and uninterrupted operation of nuclear facilities and that industry in both the Parties needs continuing reassurance that deliveries can be made on time in order to plan for the efficient operation of nuclear installations.
2. Authorizations, including export and import licenses as well as authorizations or consents to third parties, relating to trade, industrial operations or nuclear material movement should be consistent with the sound and efficient administration of this Agreement and should not be used to restrict trade. It is further agreed that if the relevant authority of the concerned Party considers that an application cannot be processed within a twomonth period it shall immediately, upon request, provide reasoned information to the submitting Party. In the event of a refusal to authorize an application or a delay exceeding four months from the date of the first application the Party of the submitting persons or undertakings may call for urgent consultations under Article 13 of this Agreement, which shall take place at the earliest opportunity and in any case not later than 30 days after such a request.
ARTICLE 5 – TRANSFER OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL, NON-NUCLEAR MATERIAL, EQUIPMENT, COMPONENTS AND RELATED TECHNOLOGY
1. Nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment and components may be transferred for applications consistent with this Agreement. Any special fissionable material transferred under this Agreement shall be low enriched uranium, except as provided in paragraph 5.
2. Sensitive nuclear technology, heavy water production technology, sensitive nuclear facilities, heavy water production facilities and major critical components of such facilities may be transferred under this Agreement pursuant to an amendment to this Agreement. Transfers of dual-use items that could be used in enrichment, reprocessing or heavy water production facilities will be subject to the Parties’ respective applicable laws, regulations and license policies.
3. Natural or low enriched uranium may be transferred for use as fuel in reactor experiments and in reactors, for conversion or fabrication, or for such other purposes as may be agreed to by the Parties.
4. The quantity of nuclear material transferred under this Agreement shall be consistent with any of the following purposes: use in reactor experiments or the loading of reactors, the efficient and continuous conduct of such reactor experiments or operation of reactors for their lifetime, use as samples, standards, detectors, and targets, and the accomplishment of other purposes as may be agreed by the Parties.
5. Small quantities of special fissionable material may be transferred for use as samples, standards, detectors, and targets, and for such other purposes as the Parties may agree.
(a) The United States has conveyed its commitment to the reliable supply of fuel to India. Consistent with the July 18, 2005, Joint Statement, the United States has also reaffirmed its assurance to create the necessary conditions for India to have assured and full access to fuel for its reactors. As part of its implementation of the July 18, 2005, Joint Statement the United States is committed to seeking agreement from the U.S. Congress to amend its domestic laws and to work with friends and allies to adjust the practices of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to create the necessary conditions for India to obtain full access to the international fuel market, including reliable, uninterrupted and continual access to fuel supplies from firms in several nations. (b) To further guard against any disruption of fuel supplies, the United States is prepared to take the following additional steps: i) The United States is willing to incorporate assurances regarding fuel supply in the bilateral U.S.-India agreement on peaceful uses of nuclear energy under Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act, which would be submitted to the U.S. Congress. ii) The United States will join India in seeking to negotiate with the IAEA an India-specific fuel supply agreement. iii) The United States will support an Indian effort to develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply over the lifetime of India’s reactors. iv) If despite these arrangements, a disruption of fuel supplies to India occurs, the United States and India would jointly convene a group of friendly supplier countries to include countries such as Russia, France and the United Kingdom to pursue such measures as would restore fuel supply to India. (c) In light of the above understandings with the United States, an India-specific safeguards agreement will be negotiated between India and the IAEA providing for safeguards to guard against withdrawal of safeguarded nuclear material from civilian use at any time as well as providing for corrective measures that India may take to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuel supplies. Taking this into account, India will place its civilian nuclear facilities under India-specific safeguards in perpetuity and negotiate an appropriate safeguards agreement to this end with the IAEA.
ARTICLE 6 – NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE ACTIVITIES
In keeping with their commitment to full civil nuclear cooperation, both Parties, as they do with other states with advanced nuclear technology, may carry out the following nuclear fuel cycle activities:
i) Within the territorial jurisdiction of either Party, enrichment up to twenty percent in the isotope 235 of uranium transferred pursuant to this Agreement, as well as of uranium used in or produced through the use of equipment so transferred, may be carried out.
ii) Irradiation within the territorial jurisdiction of either Party of plutonium, uranium-233, high enriched uranium and irradiated nuclear material transferred pursuant to this Agreement or used in or produced through the use of non-nuclear material, nuclear material or equipment so transferred may be carried out.
iii) With a view to implementing full civil nuclear cooperation as envisioned in the Joint Statement of the Parties of July 18, 2005, the Parties grant each other consent to reprocess or otherwise alter in form or content nuclear material transferred pursuant to this Agreement and nuclear material and by-product material used in or produced through the use of nuclear material, non-nuclear material, or equipment so transferred. To bring these rights into effect, India will establish a new national reprocessing facility dedicated to reprocessing safeguarded nuclear material under IAEA safeguards and the Parties will agree on arrangements and procedures under which such reprocessing or other alteration in form or content will take place in this new facility. Consultations on arrangements and procedures will begin within six months of a request by either Party and will be concluded within one year. The Parties agree on the application of IAEA safeguards to all facilities concerned with the above activities. These arrangements and procedures shall include provisions with respect to physical protection standards set out in Article 8, storage standards set out in Article 7, and environmental protections set forth in Article 11 of this Agreement, and such other provisions as may be agreed by the Parties. Any special fissionable material that may be separated may only be utilized in national facilities under IAEA safeguards.
iv) Post-irradiation examination involving chemical dissolution or separation of irradiated nuclear material transferred pursuant to this Agreement or irradiated nuclear material used in or produced through the use of non-nuclear material, nuclear material or equipment so transferred may be carried out.
ARTICLE 7 – STORAGE AND RETRANSFERS
1. Plutonium and uranium 233 (except as either may be contained in irradiated fuel elements), and high enriched uranium, transferred pursuant to this Agreement or used in or produced through the use of material or equipment so transferred, may be stored in facilities that are at all times subject, as a minimum, to the levels of physical protection that are set out in IAEA document INFCIRC 225/REV 4 as it may be revised and accepted by the Parties. Each Party shall record such facilities on a list, made available to the other Party. A Party’s list shall be held confidential if that Party so requests. Either Party may make changes to its list by notifying the other Party in writing and receiving a written acknowledgement. Such acknowledgement shall be given no later than thirty days after the receipt of the notification and shall be limited to a statement that the notification has been received. If there are grounds to believe that the provisions of this sub-Article are not being fully complied with, immediate consultations may be called for. Following upon such consultations, each Party shall ensure by means of such consultations that necessary remedial measures are taken immediately. Such measures shall be sufficient to restore the levels of physical protection referred to above at the facility in question. However, if the Party on whose territory the nuclear material in question is stored determines that such measures are not feasible, it will shift the nuclear material to another appropriate, listed facility it identifies.
2. Nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components, and information transferred pursuant to this Agreement and any special fissionable material produced through the use of nuclear material, non-nuclear material or equipment so transferred shall not be transferred or re-transferred to unauthorized persons or, unless the Parties agree, beyond the recipient Party’s territorial jurisdiction.
1. Adequate physical protection shall be maintained with respect to nuclear material and equipment transferred pursuant to this Agreement and nuclear material used in or produced through the use of nuclear material, non-nuclear material or equipment so transferred.
2. To fulfill the requirement in paragraph 1, each Party shall apply measures in accordance with (i) levels of physical protection at least equivalent to the recommendations published in IAEA document INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 entitled “The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities,” and in any subsequent revisions of that document agreed to by the Parties, and (ii) the provisions of the 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and any amendments to the Convention that enter into force for both Parties.
3. The Parties will keep each other informed through diplomatic channels of those agencies or authorities having responsibility for ensuring that levels of physical protection for nuclear material in their territory or under their jurisdiction or control are adequately met and having responsibility for coordinating response and recovery operations in the event of unauthorized use or handling of material subject to this Article. The Parties will also keep each other informed through diplomatic channels of the designated points of contact within their national authorities to cooperate on matters of out-of-country transportation and other matters of mutual concern.
4. The provisions of this Article shall be implemented in such a manner as to avoid undue interference in the Parties’ peaceful nuclear activities and so as to be consistent with prudent management practices required for the safe and economic conduct of their peaceful nuclear programs.
ARTICLE 9 – PEACEFUL USE
Nuclear material, equipment and components transferred pursuant to this Agreement and nuclear material and by-product materialused in or produced through the use of any nuclear material, equipment, and components so transferred shall not be used by the recipient Party for any nuclear explosive device, for research on or development of any nuclear explosive device or for any military purpose.
ARTICLE 10 – IAEA SAFEGUARDS
1. Safeguards will be maintained with respect to all nuclear materials and equipment transferred pursuant to this Agreement, and with respect to all special fissionable material used in or produced through the use of such nuclear materials and equipment, so long as the material or equipment remains under the jurisdiction or control of the cooperating Party.
2. Taking into account Article 5.6 of this Agreement, India agrees that nuclear material and equipment transferred to India by the United States of America pursuant to this Agreement and any nuclear material used in or produced through the use of nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment or components so transferred shall be subject to safeguards in perpetuity in accordance with the India-specific Safeguards Agreement between India and the IAEA [identifying data] and an Additional Protocol, when in force.
3. Nuclear material and equipment transferred to the United States of America pursuant to this Agreement and any nuclear material used in or produced through the use of any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, or components so transferred shall be subject to the Agreement between the United States of America and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in the United States of America, done at Vienna November 18, 1977, which entered into force on December 9, 1980, and an Additional Protocol, when in force.
4. If the IAEA decides that the application of IAEA safeguards is no longer possible, the supplier and recipient should consult and agree on appropriate verification measures.
5. Each Party shall take such measures as are necessary to maintain and facilitate the application of IAEA safeguards in its respective territory provided for under this Article.
6. Each Party shall establish and maintain a system of accounting for and control of nuclear material transferred pursuant to this Agreement and nuclear material used in or produced through the use of any material, equipment, or components so transferred. The procedures applicable to India shall be those set forth in the India-specific Safeguards Agreement referred to in Paragraph 2 of this Article.
7. Upon the request of either Party, the other Party shall report or permit the IAEA to report to the requesting Party on the status of all inventories of material subject to this Agreement.
8. The provisions of this Article shall be implemented in such a manner as to avoid hampering, delay, or undue interference in the Parties’ peaceful nuclear activities and so as to be consistent with prudent management practices required for the safe and economic conduct of their peaceful nuclear programs.
ARTICLE 11 – ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
The Parties shall cooperate in following the best practices for minimizing the impact on the environment from any radioactive, chemical or thermal contamination arising from peaceful nuclear activities under this Agreement and in related matters of health and safety.
1. This Agreement shall be implemented in a manner designed:
a) to avoid hampering or delaying the nuclear activities in the territory of either Party; b) to avoid interference in such activities; c) to be consistent with prudent management practices required for the safe conduct of such activities; and d) to take full account of the long term requirements of the nuclear energy programs of the Parties.
2. The provisions of this Agreement shall not be used to:
a) secure unfair commercial or industrial advantages or to restrict trade to the disadvantage of persons and undertakings of either Party or hamper their commercial or industrial interests, whether international or domestic; b) interfere with the nuclear policy or programs for the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy including research and development; or c) impede the free movement of nuclear material, non nuclear material and equipment supplied under this Agreement within the territory of the Parties.
3. When execution of an agreement or contract pursuant to this Agreement between Indian and United States organizations requires exchanges of experts, the Parties shall facilitate entry of the experts to their territories and their stay therein consistent with national laws, regulations and practices. When other cooperation pursuant to this Agreement requires visits of experts, the Parties shall facilitate entry of the experts to their territory and their stay therein consistent with national laws, regulations and practices.
ARTICLE 13 – CONSULTATIONS
1. The Parties undertake to consult at the request of either Party regarding the implementation of this Agreement and the development of further cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy on a stable, reliable and predictable basis. The Parties recognize that such consultations are between two States with advanced nuclear technology, which have agreed to assume the same responsibilities and practices and acquire the same benefits and advantages as other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology.
2. Each Party shall endeavor to avoid taking any action that adversely affects cooperation envisaged under Article 2 of this Agreement. If either Party at any time following the entry into force of this Agreement does not comply with the provisions of this Agreement, the Parties shall promptly hold consultations with a view to resolving the matter in a way that protects the legitimate interests of both Parties, it being understood that rights of either Party under Article 16.2 remain unaffected.
3. Consultations under this Article may be carried out by a Joint Committee specifically established for this purpose. A Joint Technical Working Group reporting to the Joint Committee will be set up to ensure the fulfillment of the requirements of the Administrative Arrangements referred to in Article 17.
ARTICLE 14 – TERMINATION AND CESSATION OF COOPERATION
1. Either Party shall have the right to terminate this Agreement prior to its expiration on one year’s written notice to the other Party. A Party giving notice of termination shall provide the reasons for seeking such termination. The Agreement shall terminate one year from the date of the written notice, unless the notice has been withdrawn by the providing Party in writing prior to the date of termination.
2. Before this Agreement is terminated pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article, the Parties shall consider the relevant circumstances and promptly hold consultations, as provided in Article 13, to address the reasons cited by the Party seeking termination. The Party seeking termination has the right to cease further cooperation under this Agreement if it determines that a mutually acceptable resolution of outstanding issues has not been possible or cannot be achieved through consultations. The Parties agree to consider carefully the circumstances that may lead to termination or cessation of cooperation. They further agree to take into account whether the circumstances that may lead to termination or cessation resulted from a Party’s serious concern about a changed security environment or as a response to similar actions by other States which could impact national security.
3. If a Party seeking termination cites a violation of this Agreement as the reason for notice for seeking termination, the Parties shall consider whether the action was caused inadvertently or otherwise and whether the violation could be considered as material. No violation may be considered as being material unless corresponding to the definition of material violation or breach in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. If a Party seeking termination cites a violation of an IAEA safeguards agreement as the reason for notice for seeking termination, a crucial factor will be whether the IAEA Board of Governors has made a finding of non-compliance.
4. Following the cessation of cooperation under this Agreement, either Party shall have the right to require the return by the other Party of any nuclear material, equipment, non-nuclear material or components transferred under this Agreement and any special fissionable material produced through their use. A notice by a Party that is invoking the right of return shall be delivered to the other Party on or before the date of termination of this Agreement. The notice shall contain a statement of the items subject to this Agreement as to which the Party is requesting return. Except as provided in provisions of Article 16.3, all other legal obligations pertaining to this Agreement shall cease to apply with respect to the nuclear items remaining on the territory of the Party concerned upon termination of this Agreement.
5. The two Parties recognize that exercising the right of return would have profound implications for their relations. If either Party seeks to exercise its right pursuant to paragraph 4 of this Article, it shall, prior to the removal from the territory or from the control of the other Party of any nuclear items mentioned in paragraph 4, undertake consultations with the other Party. Such consultations shall give special consideration to the importance of uninterrupted operation of nuclear reactors of the Party concerned with respect to the availability of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes as a means of achieving energy security. Both Parties shall take into account the potential negative consequences of such termination on the on-going contracts and projects initiated under this Agreement of significance for the respective nuclear programmes of either Party.
6. If either Party exercises its right of return pursuant to paragraph 4 of this Article, it shall, prior to the removal from the territory or from the control of the other Party, compensate promptly that Party for the fair market value thereof and for the costs incurred as a consequence of such removal. If the return of nuclear items is required, the Parties shall agree on methods and arrangements for the return of the items, the relevant quantity of the items to be returned, and the amount of compensation that would have to be paid by the Party exercising the right to the other Party.
7. Prior to return of nuclear items, the Parties shall satisfy themselves that full safety, radiological and physical protection measures have been ensured in accordance with their existing national regulations and that the transfers pose no unreasonable risk to either Party, countries through which the nuclear items may transit and to the global environment and are in accordance with existing international regulations.
8. The Party seeking the return of nuclear items shall ensure that the timing, methods and arrangements for return of nuclear items are in accordance with paragraphs 5, 6 and 7. Accordingly, the consultations between the Parties shall address mutual commitments as contained in Article 5.6. It is not the purpose of the provisions of this Article regarding cessation of cooperation and right of return to derogate from the rights of the Parties under Article 5.6.
9. The arrangements and procedures concluded pursuant to Article 6(iii) shall be subject to suspension by either Party in exceptional circumstances, as defined by the Parties, after consultations have been held between the Parties aimed at reaching mutually acceptable resolution of outstanding issues, while taking into account the effects of such suspension on other aspects of cooperation under this Agreement.
ARTICLE 15 – SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
Any dispute concerning the interpretation or implementation of the provisions of this Agreement shall be promptly negotiated by the Parties with a view to resolving that dispute.
ARTICLE 16 – ENTRY INTO FORCE AND DURATION
1. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date on which the Parties exchange diplomatic notes informing each other that they have completed all applicable requirements for its entry into force.
2. This Agreement shall remain in force for a period of40 years. It shall continue in force thereafter for additional periods of 10 years each. Each Party may, by giving 6 months written notice to the other Party, terminate this Agreement at the end of the initial 40 year period or at the end of any subsequent 10 year period.
4. This Agreement shall be implemented in good faith and in accordance with the principles of international law.
5. The Parties may consult, at the request of either Party, on possible amendments to this Agreement. This Agreement may be amended if the Parties so agree. Any amendment shall enter into force on the date on which the Parties exchange diplomatic notes informing each other that their respective internal legal procedures necessary for the entry into force have been completed.
ARTICLE 17 – ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENT
1. The appropriate authorities of the Parties shall establish an Administrative Arrangement in order to provide for the effective implementation of the provisions of this Agreement.
2. The principles of fungibility and equivalence shall apply to nuclear material and non-nuclear material subject to this Agreement. Detailed provisions for applying these principles shall be set forth in the Administrative Arrangement.
3. The Administrative Arrangement established pursuant to this Article may be amended by agreement of the appropriate authorities of the Parties.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized, have signed this Agreement.
DONE at , this day of , 200 , in duplicate.
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
FOR THE GOVERNMENT
During the negotiation of the Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of India Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (“the Agreement”) signed today, the following understandings, which shall be an integral part of the Agreement, were reached.
For the purposes of implementing the rights specified in Articles 6 and 7 of the Agreement with respect to special fissionable material and by-product material produced through the use of nuclear material and non-nuclear material, respectively, transferred pursuant to the Agreement and not used in or produced through the use of equipment transferred pursuant to the Agreement, such rights shall in practice be applied to that proportion of special fissionable material and by-product material produced that represents the ratio of transferred nuclear material and non-nuclear material, respectively, used in the production of the special fissionable material and by-product material to the total amount of nuclear material and non-nuclear material so used, and similarly for subsequent generations.
The Parties agree that reporting and exchanges of information on by-product material subject to the Agreement will be limited to the following:
(1) Both Parties would comply with the provisions as contained in the IAEA document GOV/1999/19/Rev.2, with regard to by-product material subject to the Agreement.
(2) With regard to tritium subject to the Agreement, the Parties will exchange annually information pertaining to its disposition for peaceful purposes consistent with Article 9 of this Agreement.
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
Guidelines for Sensitive Missile-Relevant Transfers
1. The purpose of these Guidelines is to limit the risks of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (i.e. nuclear, chemical and biological weapons), by controlling transfers that could make a contribution to delivery systems (other than manned aircraft) for such weapons. The Guidelines are also intended to limit the risk of controlled items and their technology falling into the hands of terrorist groups and individuals. The Guidelines are not designed to impede national space programs or international cooperation in such programs as long as such programs could not contribute to delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction. These Guidelines, including the attached Annex, form the basis for controlling transfers to any destination beyond the Government's jurisdiction or control of all delivery systems (other than manned aircraft) capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, and of equipment and technology relevant to missiles whose performance in terms of payload and range exceeds stated parameters. Restraint will be exercised in the consideration of all transfers of items within the Annex and all such transfers will be considered on a case-by-case basis. The Government will implement the Guidelines in accordance with national legislation.
2. The Annex consists of two categories of items, which term includes equipment and technology. Category I items, all of which are in Annex items 1 and 2, are those items of greatest sensitivity. If a Category I item is included in a system, that system will also be considered as Category I, except when the incorporated item cannot be separated, removed or duplicated. Particular restraint will be exercised in the consideration of Category I transfers regardless of their purpose, and there will be a strong presumption to deny such transfers. Particular restraint will also be exercised in the consideration of transfers of any items in the Annex, or of any missiles (whether or not in the Annex), if the Government judges, on the basis of all available, persuasive information, evaluated according to factors including those in paragraph 3, that they are intended to be used for the delivery of weapons of mass destruction, and there will be a strong presumption to deny such transfers. Until further notice, the transfer of Category I production facilities will not be authorised. The transfer of other Category I items will be authorised only on rare occasions and where the Government (A) obtains binding government-to-government undertakings embodying the assurances from the recipient government called for in paragraph 5 of these Guidelines and (B) assumes responsibility for taking all steps necessary to ensure that the item is put only to its stated end-use. It is understood that the decision to transfer remains the sole and sovereign judgement of the Government.
3. In the evaluation of transfer applications for Annex items, the following factors will be taken into account:
A. Concerns about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;
B. The capabilities and objectives of the missile and space programs of the recipient state;
C. The significance of the transfer in terms of the potential development of delivery systems (other than manned aircraft) for weapons of mass destruction;
D. The assessment of the end use of the transfers, including the relevant assurances of the recipient states referred to in sub paragraphs 5.A and 5.B below;
E. The applicability of relevant multilateral agreements.
F. The risk of controlled items falling into the hands of terrorist groups and individuals.
4. The transfer of design and production technology directly associated with any items in the Annex will be subject to as great a degree of scrutiny and control as will the equipment itself, to the extent permitted by national legislation.
5. Where the transfer could contribute to a delivery system for weapons of mass destruction, the Government will authorize transfers of items in the Annex only on receipt of appropriate assurances from the government of the recipient state that:
A. The items will be used only for the purpose stated and that such use will not be modified nor the items modified or replicated without the prior consent of the Government;
B. Neither the items nor replicas nor derivatives thereof will be re transferred without the consent of the Government.
6. In furtherance of the effective operation of the Guidelines, the Government will, as necessary and appropriate, exchange relevant in formation with other governments applying the same Guidelines.
7. The Government will :
A. provide that its national export controls require an authorisation for the transfer of non-listed items if the exporter has been informed by the competent authorities of the Government that the items may be intended, in their entirety or part, for use in connection with delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction other than manned aircraft ;
B. and, if the exporter is aware that non-listed items are intended to contribute to such activities, in their entirety or part, provide, to the extent compatible with national export controls, for notification by the exporter to the authorities referred to above, which will decide whether or not it is appropriate to make the export concerned subject to authorisation.
8. The adherence of all States to these Guidelines in the interest of international peace and security would be welcome.