happy
Senior Member
- Joined
- Mar 12, 2013
- Messages
- 3,370
- Likes
- 1,454
Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited the White House Friday, probably for the last time. His visit passed almost unnoticed, much to the frustration of U.S. officials hoping to deepen U.S. engagement with India. Mr. Singh's quiet demeanor, in contrast to American enthusiasm, speaks volumes about the state of relations. Simply put, America wants it much more than India does.
In truth, Mr. Singh has been a good friend of the U.S., and his tone on the visit was upbeat. Yet his personal amity over the past nine years has not always translated to easy relations. Not a few U.S. officials have written off India as a potential partner by the end of their time in office. Nonetheless, the Obama administration would do well to persevere. Relations with India will get easier, and they will eventually bear fruit.
India has attained the status of an important world power – perhaps prematurely – while avoiding any deep alliances or conflicts with other big powers. And India's star is just beginning its ascent. Americans see this, perhaps through a lens colored by happy acquaintance with Indian-Americans, and easily build a case for great partnership, a goal as irresistible to us as an uncharted frontier.
This objective has advanced in fits and starts despite broad U.S. enthusiasm. Largely at America's initiative, the two countries launched four Cabinet-level dialogues and countless working groups during President Obama's first term. Noteworthy improvements in security cooperation have developed, but otherwise most of this engagement is yet to demonstrate significant outcomes.
India's various developmental challenges help explain some of the ponderous pace. Even the Indian government itself is under-developed relative to the demands of its economy and diplomatic stature. Reviving growth, managing active border conflicts, and addressing a seemingly never-ending series of corruption scandals limits India's capacity for new bilateral initiatives. Add on national elections next year, and it is no wonder the prime minister's visit was so underwhelming.
The balance of power in the relationship, ironically, has also impeded progress. In this contest of mutual consent, the U.S. has much higher ambitions for the relationship than India. That dynamic succeeds no more frequently in diplomacy than it does in romance.
Several things account for India's relative standoffishness, besides its broad foreign policy preference for "strategic autonomy." For one, while the U.S. can claim nearly universal support for closer ties with India – even the U.S. Congress is undivided on this issue – India cannot. Significant groups in the government and civil society do not support these policies. One might assume, for instance, that Singh's Congress Party backs his pro-U.S. overtures, but in fact unease with U.S. engagement remains strong in its substantial leftist factions.
India plays American enthusiasm to its advantage, having parlayed many U.S. overtures into unilateral gains. The U.S.–India Civil Nuclear Agreement won access for India to foreign suppliers of nuclear technology and fuel in 2008. The other side of the deal, giving access for U.S. firms to India's nuclear power market, only exists in U.S. talking points for the upcoming visit. And Obama's pledge in India in 2010 to support India's bid for a permanent U.N. Security Council seat yielded little of the hoped-for action on U.S. trade priorities.
Fortunately, we are playing a long-term game, and the field is tilting to our advantage. While near-term wins on trade issues would please U.S. interests, few items on the bilateral agenda are truly urgent. The goal should be positioning the U.S. to gain in the long run from India's future growth.
Accordingly, U.S. interests and methods should be aligned. Success in India requires the patience to make a long-term commitment and to advance at a strategic, measured pace. Four years of building bilateral processes and learning each other's systems is not exciting, but it should be a valuable investment.
Also in the U.S.'s favor, the pull of interpersonal ties will eventually erode India's remaining suspicion. A growing tide of Indian officials has personal or close family experience living in America. Generational shifts will replace memories of U.S. support for Pakistan with personal experience of American values.
The slowdown in the Indian economy further strengthens the U.S. hand. Desperate to increase foreign direct investment, the Indian government must prioritize completing negotiations for a Bilateral Investment Treaty. Access to cheaper energy, via waivers from Iran sanctions or via U.S. natural gas, help reign in India's bulging current account deficit. Thus far the Obama administration has taken the high road and not squeezed too hard in exchange for these concessions. Small kindnesses carry weight in the relatively new courtship with India.
Fortunately, the U.S. relationship with India has not become as politicized as the one with its neighbor, China, allowing greater flexibility in the administration's approach. Given this leeway, U.S. policymakers will find more success in the long run by not fretting if the bilateral agenda lacks headline material. Instead, occasionally letting the Indian government set the pace will set the right tone of American confidence rather than urgency. Time is on our side.
Russell A. Green, Ph.D., is the Will Clayton Fellow in International Economics at Rice University's Baker Institute and a former U.S. financial attaché to India.
An unequal quiet in U.S.-India relations | Baker Institute Blog | a Chron.com blog
In truth, Mr. Singh has been a good friend of the U.S., and his tone on the visit was upbeat. Yet his personal amity over the past nine years has not always translated to easy relations. Not a few U.S. officials have written off India as a potential partner by the end of their time in office. Nonetheless, the Obama administration would do well to persevere. Relations with India will get easier, and they will eventually bear fruit.
India has attained the status of an important world power – perhaps prematurely – while avoiding any deep alliances or conflicts with other big powers. And India's star is just beginning its ascent. Americans see this, perhaps through a lens colored by happy acquaintance with Indian-Americans, and easily build a case for great partnership, a goal as irresistible to us as an uncharted frontier.
This objective has advanced in fits and starts despite broad U.S. enthusiasm. Largely at America's initiative, the two countries launched four Cabinet-level dialogues and countless working groups during President Obama's first term. Noteworthy improvements in security cooperation have developed, but otherwise most of this engagement is yet to demonstrate significant outcomes.
India's various developmental challenges help explain some of the ponderous pace. Even the Indian government itself is under-developed relative to the demands of its economy and diplomatic stature. Reviving growth, managing active border conflicts, and addressing a seemingly never-ending series of corruption scandals limits India's capacity for new bilateral initiatives. Add on national elections next year, and it is no wonder the prime minister's visit was so underwhelming.
The balance of power in the relationship, ironically, has also impeded progress. In this contest of mutual consent, the U.S. has much higher ambitions for the relationship than India. That dynamic succeeds no more frequently in diplomacy than it does in romance.
Several things account for India's relative standoffishness, besides its broad foreign policy preference for "strategic autonomy." For one, while the U.S. can claim nearly universal support for closer ties with India – even the U.S. Congress is undivided on this issue – India cannot. Significant groups in the government and civil society do not support these policies. One might assume, for instance, that Singh's Congress Party backs his pro-U.S. overtures, but in fact unease with U.S. engagement remains strong in its substantial leftist factions.
India plays American enthusiasm to its advantage, having parlayed many U.S. overtures into unilateral gains. The U.S.–India Civil Nuclear Agreement won access for India to foreign suppliers of nuclear technology and fuel in 2008. The other side of the deal, giving access for U.S. firms to India's nuclear power market, only exists in U.S. talking points for the upcoming visit. And Obama's pledge in India in 2010 to support India's bid for a permanent U.N. Security Council seat yielded little of the hoped-for action on U.S. trade priorities.
Fortunately, we are playing a long-term game, and the field is tilting to our advantage. While near-term wins on trade issues would please U.S. interests, few items on the bilateral agenda are truly urgent. The goal should be positioning the U.S. to gain in the long run from India's future growth.
Accordingly, U.S. interests and methods should be aligned. Success in India requires the patience to make a long-term commitment and to advance at a strategic, measured pace. Four years of building bilateral processes and learning each other's systems is not exciting, but it should be a valuable investment.
Also in the U.S.'s favor, the pull of interpersonal ties will eventually erode India's remaining suspicion. A growing tide of Indian officials has personal or close family experience living in America. Generational shifts will replace memories of U.S. support for Pakistan with personal experience of American values.
The slowdown in the Indian economy further strengthens the U.S. hand. Desperate to increase foreign direct investment, the Indian government must prioritize completing negotiations for a Bilateral Investment Treaty. Access to cheaper energy, via waivers from Iran sanctions or via U.S. natural gas, help reign in India's bulging current account deficit. Thus far the Obama administration has taken the high road and not squeezed too hard in exchange for these concessions. Small kindnesses carry weight in the relatively new courtship with India.
Fortunately, the U.S. relationship with India has not become as politicized as the one with its neighbor, China, allowing greater flexibility in the administration's approach. Given this leeway, U.S. policymakers will find more success in the long run by not fretting if the bilateral agenda lacks headline material. Instead, occasionally letting the Indian government set the pace will set the right tone of American confidence rather than urgency. Time is on our side.
Russell A. Green, Ph.D., is the Will Clayton Fellow in International Economics at Rice University's Baker Institute and a former U.S. financial attaché to India.
An unequal quiet in U.S.-India relations | Baker Institute Blog | a Chron.com blog
