An emerging India through Pakistani Eyes - threats and counter strategies

[Indx TechStyle]

Phati padi hai.
World needs to dissuade India from its war-mongering after Pulwama, Qureshi tells UNSC chief

 

[Indx TechStyle]

Pakistan downed an Indian jet — but the economy is the real battleground

 

[Indx TechStyle]

Going forward

The writer is the author of Brokering Peace in Nuclear Environments: US Crisis Management in South Asia.

IN every crisis is an opportunity. Indian and Pakistani policymakers must strive to identify what Pulwama may offer in that stead. They’d find that the situation isn’t hopeless.

The Pulwama episode damaged the quiet momentum that was being built towards constructive bilateral re-engagement after the upcoming Indian elections. Pakistan had been public about wanting a move in this direction. And while India hadn’t blinked, my sense is that the Indian government was also preparing to test the waters. I was in India in December and the feeling that India’s ‘isolate Pakistan’ policy had not worked was discernible. Even on Kashmir, the Delhi-based intelligentsia — usually reluctant to lower their guard — were convinced that the status quo was untenable and that Pakistan couldn’t be kept out of the equation.

The Pulwama crisis hasn’t changed these fundamentals. For the first time, I am convinced that the Pakistani civilian and army top brass has internalised that more of the same with India is a losing proposition for Pakistan. The power differential is growing at a pace that will force Pakistan out of India’s league. Any room for meaningful negotiations would be over thereafter. This doesn’t mean Pakistan can or will do what India wants, but it does imply a more forward-leaning attitude towards finding a workable way forward. They recognise that this will have to include some understanding on terrorism.

On the Indian side, the fate of the BJP government’s ‘isolate Pakistan’ policy would have helped to crystallise their compulsion to re-engage. With CPEC and the Afghan peace process in the mix, an attempt to isolate Pakistan globally was, at the very least, ill timed. But Pakistan has, in fact, been uncharacteristically deft in countering India’s effort by diversifying its option set in the Gulf and by opening up conversations with countries like Russia and ASEAN members like Malaysia.

Pakistan and India must agree on steps to manage crises.​

Also, the more India mishandles Kashmir internally, the more space Pakistan is bound to get to raise the issue internationally. Bilateral engagement with Pakistan would be a possible out for India: one of the first things that happens when India and Pakistan engage in dialogue is a tacit understanding on taking it easy on embarrassing each other.

Pulwama showed that there isn’t a military option left in South Asia. India’s deterrent doesn’t work at sub-conventional, limited-escalation levels. Major war — where India has an advantage — is both unacceptable to the world and ultimately suicidal.

So to the million-dollar question: what next?

The consensus is that everyone’s got to sit tight till the Indian elections are over.

No good. Not least because depending on electoral outcomes is never a safe bet. We’ve seen this mistake made before, as recently as 2014 when Pakistan pulled the plug on granting India the Most Favoured Nation status at the eleventh hour, supposedly because it was persuaded to wait for the Indian elections to produce a new government.

More importantly, India and Pakistan have immediate business to take care of. Whether Pulwama creates a breakthrough or ends up being the calm before the storm depends on how things transpire in Kashmir in the coming days. It’s no hidden secret that the current situation there presents a golden opportunity for any terrorist outfit looking to force India and Pakistan into yet another — and inevitably less manageable — crisis.

Not only that, but anti-Pakistan outfits in Afghanistan may be salivating at the prospect of creating a bang within Pakistan, knowing that it’ll inevitably lead to a blame game between New Delhi and Islamabad, and (ideally from their perspective) to a more serious escalation that’ll leave Pakistan distracted from its western border. India and Pakistan have much to talk about quietly, specifically to share intelligence on any leads that may lower the possibility of terrorists getting the better of them in the coming days.

The two sides also need to get real about handling the next crisis differently. Neither India nor the world expected Pakistan’s strike. There was a good 12-18 hour period after that when an Indian counter-response seemed more likely than not; and Pakistan would have fired back. No one was clear on how things were to be pulled back after that.

Pakistan and India need to agree on immediate, even if ad hoc, crisis management protocols in case tensions rise again. Some mechanism of deciphering the facts surrounding a crisis trigger event in real time must be put in place. This would require involvement of third parties like the US and China. India and Pakistan also need to ensure far better private and public bilateral communication during a repeat episode. And media narratives must not be allowed to get out of hand — especially in India.

Engaging on these issues may also give both sides a start for a more expanded bilateral conversation after the Indian elections.

 

[Indx TechStyle]

Paki writer on an American propaganda magazine.
Lok Sabha Election 2019: Implications for Pakistan

 

[Aaj ka hero]

Paki writer on an American propaganda magazine.
Lok Sabha Election 2019: Implications for Pakistan

He atleast wrote sensible points according to me.
Fixated only on jammu and kashmir and not on PoK is a thing atleast we can expect from even sensible pakistanis.

 

[Indx TechStyle]

Lulz
Pak blinks, offers ‘moratorium’ on artillery firing to ease LoC tensions

 

[charlie]

Lulz
Pak blinks, offers ‘moratorium’ on artillery firing to ease LoC tensions

well the pressure must be kept on and this should hurt their economy, The very moment their economy is back on track these terror camps will be open again.

 

[Indx TechStyle]

Senate panel for clear-cut policy to counter Modi’s ‘fascism’

No brakes on Modi

Pakistan to take India's move to annex occupied Kashmir to UN Security Council: Qureshi

The wages of isolation

 

[Indx TechStyle]

Phati padi hai.
World needs to dissuade India from its war-mongering after Pulwama, Qureshi tells UNSC chief

World has responsibility to stop Indian aggression: PM
Coz you can't so sh!t.

 

[Jameson Emoni]

World has responsibility to stop Indian aggression: PM
Coz you can't so sh!t.

All it took was 5 years of BJP government to put these clowns in line.

 

[Mikesingh]

Pakistanis just like to quote NDTV and Rahul Gandhi: Arnab Goswami tells a Pakistani panelist on his show!!

After India's decision to strip Article 370 and bifurcate the state of Jammu and Kashmir into two separate UTs, Pakistan had repeatedly used the statements of Congress leaders to further its argument.

Arnab Goswami has developed a penchant for taking potshots at the Lutyens cabal. Often, the Republic TV anchor makes snide remarks that lay the hypocrisy of the five-star journalists and ‘aman ki asha’ brigade bare. In a similar segment, during the course of the debate recently, Arnab took a potshot at NDTV, a channel whose promoters are being investigated for fraud and often toe the Pakistani line.

During the course of the debate, a Pakistani panellist referred to the reportage by NDTV in order to help her spread the Pakistani agenda further and counter the position of India in Kashmir. Arnab lost his cool and said that Pakistani panellists and Pakistan in general loves to quote NDTV and Rahul Gandhi to further their propaganda.

https://www.opindia.com/2019/09/pak...is-show/?utm_source=onesignal&utm_medium=push

Anyone watches NDTV?

 

[aditya10r]

Anyone watches NDTV

I watched NDTV full day on 23rd May 2019.

__________________________________________

 

[Indx TechStyle]

Divide and bleed

The writer is an author.
KING Solomon has just reason for regret. His humane decision has been perverted by two modern mothers — India and Pakistan, each claiming the same child. Both countries are witnessing it being torn asunder. Jammu & Kashmir deserved a better parent.

By revoking Article 370 and Article 35A of its constitution, India had hoped to resolve the issue of held Kashmir decisively. It has done so instead ruthlessly and callously. Prime Minister Modi’s government and Indian parliamentarians decided that half a carcass was better than a whole one. That decision was taken a month ago, on Aug 5. Despite India’s attempts to embalm it in the formaldehyde of cosmetic diplomacy, that half-carcass (much to India’s discomfort) has begun to decompose.

Many nations — more for their own interests than India’s — ignore the reek. They have accepted against their conscience that the action taken by India should be regarded as its ‘internal matter’. Who among them can resist the power of 21st century politico-economics?

India has claimed victory internally but faces defeat internationally. The United Nations and now the European Union have cleared their tables to make room for a discussion on Jammu & Kashmir. India tried but has failed to sweep human rights abuses in held Kashmir under a bloodied Kashmiri shawl.

Many nations, more for their own interests than India’s, ignore the reek.​

Force of habit has made Pakistan regard every Indian setback as an advantage. Such ‘successes’ are Pyrrhic in nature. Foreign policy expects stronger foundations. Recent pronouncements by the Pakistan government, while dramatic in their declarations, need to be tempered with tact. The use of the words ‘Nazism’ and ‘Holocaust’ arouse memories that lie too deep for tears among nations which suffered both. The darker connotations of Nazism were accentuated particularly after the defeat of Hitler’s Germany. The word ‘Holocaust’ predates World War II. It has roots in the mass murder of Protestants in 16th century Netherlands, and in atrocities committed by Turks in the 1920s. However, time has not diluted their potency. They should be uncorked carefully.

In the past few weeks, there has been a curious inversion of postures in New Delhi and in Islamabad. Indian defence minister Rajnath Singh hinted broadly (the breadth of a nuclear warhead) that India will reconsider its nuclear strike option. It is prepared to strike first. Prime Minister Imran Khan has said that Pakistan won’t initiate a military conflict. The common man is finding it hard to distinguish between peaceable hawks and aggressive doves.

This sort of shadow-boxing was a feature of US-Soviet relations until the collapse of the Soviet Union under the weight of its military pretensions. US president Ronald Reagan upped the ante by elevating the debate into the cosmos with his Star Wars doctrine. The Soviet Union had managed to launch the first dog, the first man and then the first woman into space. It could not afford to combat the United States in outer space.

India has the same advantage that the US did. Its economy has the resources and the resilience to arm itself without having to examine the bill. For India, Pakistan is an irritant, a nuisance, but not a competitor. Its true rival — economically, diplomatically, strategically — is a militarised China. In the Eurasian zone, three countries are determined to retrieve territory history forced them to forfeit — Russia, its satellite states; China, the island of Formosa; and India, the Indus plateau from which it derived its name.

Interestingly, of late, PM Modi has changed tack in his recent speeches. In them, he addresses the people of Pakistan. He exhorts them to question their leaders and to demand explanations from them why India is progressing so rapidly and Pakistan is palpably not. Insidiously, he is inserting a stiletto between the Pakistani public and its leadership. He is attempting to extract a dividend from the dissatisfaction Pakistanis are feeling (and expressing) at the failure of the PTI government to govern.

Anyone with sense knows that India and Pakistan are not equals. They also admit the truth that India cannot annex Pakistan. It does not need over 200 million more ungovernable Muslims. That is why in 1971 it preferred the creation of Bangladesh rather than have a reunified Bengal. And it cannot incinerate Pakistan in a nuclear conflict without singeing itself. Pakistan cannot compete indefinitely with India’s plans to improve its defence superiority. At best, Pakistan can use, as it has done in the past, operational expertise to correct the technical imbalance.

What should both countries do? The only answer is a mature, reasoned and arms-less dialogue without preconditions from either side. The mothers must talk. Even King Solomon would find no cause to regret such a judgement.

 

[aditya10r]

Divide and bleed

The writer is an author.
KING Solomon has just reason for regret. His humane decision has been perverted by two modern mothers — India and Pakistan, each claiming the same child. Both countries are witnessing it being torn asunder. Jammu & Kashmir deserved a better parent.

Many nations, more for their own interests than India’s, ignore the reek.​

Bhai isko spoiler me daalkar RANDI RONA bhi likh sakte the

That would have saved my 3 minutes.

 

[Indx TechStyle]

:biggrin2::biggrin2::biggrin2::biggrin2::biggrin2::biggrin2:
Pakistan strongly condemns India's remarks about 'having control' of AJK one day

 

[Indx TechStyle]

The BJP’s designs
30 char 30 char 30 char

 

[aditya10r]

The BJP’s designs
30 char 30 char 30 char

Isko toh indian politics wale thread me daalna chahiye tha.

_________________________________________

 

[Indx TechStyle]

India, Kashmir & deterrence

The writer is an author and a former foreign secretary of Pakistan.

KASHMIR is generally described as a nuclear flashpoint. Reference to Pakistan and India being nuclear-armed neighbours is often cited in times of heightened tension between the two countries and as a reminder that they must avoid an all-out conflict. The Aug 5 Indian move to annex India-held Kashmir (IHK), the draconian lockdown in the Valley since that date, and reckless Indian claims to Azad Kashmir have created a radically new and dangerous situation which has been the subject of extensive comment.

In a recent Dawn article, my respected senior colleague ambassador Ashraf Jehangir Qazi pointed to an impending genocide in the Valley and suggested that “if the people of the Valley are threatened with genocide, as indeed they are, Pakistan’s [nuclear] deterrent must cover them”. The concept of nuclear deterrence has an inbuilt ambiguity, but given the gravity of the subject matter, it needs further scrutiny.

Two questions readily come to mind. Will the post-Aug 5 conditions in IHK morph into a genocidal crisis and how should Pakistan respond to such a situation? Second, what broadly underpins Pakistan’s thinking on resort to its nuclear deterrent and how will it apply to Kashmir?

Arguably, the lockdown of eight million Kashmiris represents a most reprehensible human rights violation that deserves the severest international condemnation, but despite the danger, in the general perception, genocide is tied to large-scale massacres, mass exodus and international outrage. The Indians appear to be avoiding that tipping point and are attempting to pursue calculated repression to tire the Kashmiris out and entice pliable Kashmiri individuals to acquiesce in the new diktat. They are embarked on a long haul.

The Aug 5 move has so poisoned the well that it is difficult to see a path to normal relations with India.

Pakistan, on the other hand, is waiting to see how Kashmiris react to repression when they find some breathing space. This policy dilemma is at play in Prime Minister Imran Khan’s warning to those intending to cross the Line of Control. The current impasse is fraught and nothing is clear about its denouement. If, however, the situation deteriorates and there is bloodshed and people start fleeing the Valley, Pakistan’s restraint will come under great stress and become untenable. A stage may come when beyond exhausting diplomatic options, Pakistan would be unable to withhold material assistance to the Kashmiri struggle.

That scenario can precipitate a conflict for which Pakistan must be fully prepared.

In all probability, conflict would draw international intervention and activate the United Nations Security Council to call for a ceasefire and dialogue for a political settlement of Kashmir. This could become a new basis for dialogue, since the heart of a meaningful dialogue on Kashmir provided by the Shimla Accords, the Lahore Summit Declaration and subsequent bilateral pronouncements has been knocked out by the Aug 5 move of the Modi government. This could usher in a period of tenuous peace and another status quo over Kashmir. But conflicts can have unpredictable trajectories and far worse, and disastrous consequences cannot be ruled out, which makes the talk of nuclear deterrent relevant.

Pakistan developing a nuclear deterrent was a necessary and understandable response to rectify the qualitative force imbalance created by India’s 1974 nuclear test. Pakistan obviously had no outside nuclear umbrella available and had to rely on its own capacity. Since 1998, Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine has maintained that its deterrent is entirely defensive and meant to be a shield against any intended aggression to destroy its territorial integrity.

India’s Cold Start Doctrine forced further fine-tuning of Pakistan’s thinking as to the practical applicability of its deterrent. Because the Cold Start Doctrine contemplated incursion and lopping off a vulnerable part of Pakistani territory, Pakistan responded by developing tactical nuclear weapons to be deployed against an invading force inside Pakistan. India has reacted by declaring that use of a nuclear weapon, however limited, anywhere (including inside Pakistan) would draw a massive nuclear retaliation. Regardless of the debates swirling around these scenarios, they provide the clearest indication of Pakistan’s determination to go to any extent to defend its territorial integrity.

How does all this apply to Kashmir? In practical terms, Pakistan’s deterrent cannot protect people in the Valley or prevent mayhem in IHK. But a genocide can lead to a conflict between Pakistan and India with its own dynamic and risks, thus Kashmir becoming a nuclear flashpoint. Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent must however cover Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan to thwart any Indian designs to capture any part of that territory. Many among the current BJP leadership mince no words about their covetous intentions and claims over the territory. It is imperative that we leave no one in doubt that we will defend Azad Kashmir and GB as we will defend any part of Pakistan. We cannot tolerate a repeat of Siachen.

Islamabad must also brace itself for Indian-sponsored subversion and disaffection in Azad Kashmir and GB, and, recognising their special status, ensure well-being, development, rights and opportunities for the people of these areas.

The Aug 5 move by the Modi government has so poisoned the well that it is difficult see a path to normal relations with India. Imran Khan’s Kartarpur initiative and his call to curb any jihadist impulse along the LoC are laudable. These measures, or any other similar gestures or initiatives, are unlikely to compel India to change course to some form of a policy reversal that respects Kashmiri sentiment and restores an environment for purposeful interaction with Pakistan. Much will depend on the Kashmiris and sensitivity of the international community to their predicament and to sane voices within India. Meanwhile, barring further deterioration, Pakistan has little choice but to maintain only a circumspect functional relationship with its eastern neighbour without expectations of normalisation any time soon.

 

[Hari Sud]

Pakistani view point in the above post. The author forgot to mention that all flashpoint have a reason. In this case the reason is sending military trained terrorist to Kashmir, who indiscriminately kill civilians. As regards to Kashmir, the issue was decided in 1948 when Maharaja Hari Singh signed the instrument of ascension over to india. Again Pakistan did not like it hence has constantly organized armed insurgents to undue ascension. India is too dam big and relatively prosperous hence Pakistan is not having its way around.

As regards to nuclear war, it is entirely up to Pakistan. Usually the loosing side unleashes it (or revenge in case Of America for Pearl Harbour). The consequences are determined by other party’s response. Usually response in much bigger as much as that 180 million Pakistanis may not see the next sunrise.

So do not threaten India with nuclear war because you are unable to have your way by conventional means of military or diplomacy.

 

[Indx TechStyle]

Indian navy & Gulf
IT is unfair to draw lessons from the fate of a bankrupt Egypt in the 19th century and relate it to today’s economically vibrant Gulf states. Nevertheless one can detect a beep on the radar. In 1875, Britain purchased Khedive Ismail’s shares of the Suez Canal Company to become the majority shareholder — it already had its own shares.

The khedive’s reckless modernisation drive had made Egypt go broke. The loans he had secured from European powers, especially Britain and France, enabled the two, especially the former, to interfere in Egypt’s internal matters and tighten their economic stranglehold. The number of Europeans working in Egypt had gone up phenomenally. They were ubiquitous and were resented by Egyptians, especially army officers.

In 1880, there was a row between an Egyptian donkey cart boy and a European, and this led to a riot which killed a large number of people, including Europeans. While France was reluctant to act for reasons which do not concern us here, Britain used the opportunity to occupy Egypt. Thus, the Arab world’s most important country was to remain under British control till 1952 when Gamal Abdel Nasser and Mohammad Neguib overthrew the Albanian dynasty. The reader need not be told the moral of the story: the economic control of a country by a foreign power invariably leads to the former’s enslavement.

Against this background, Pakistan must carefully watch the economic and geopolitical developments in Gulf sheikhdoms and be alert to overt and covert moves that may in the long run affect its security. The people of Pakistan have still not recovered from the shock received from some Arab countries’ reaction to India’s annexation of occupied Kashmir. Saudi Arabia was neutral, but the UAE felt no qualms about calling the Aug 5 annexation decree India’s ‘internal matter’.

It is doubtful if Gulf nations are aware of India’s naval ambitions.

Various interpretations have since then been given about why Khalifa bin Zayed al Nahyan’s government behaved the way it did. One explanation is obvious: trade between the Emirates and India is estimated at $100bn. To this must be added the crucial role Indian expatriates have played and will continue to do so in building the UAE economy and the extraordinary control they have come to exercise over business and finance in the sheikhdom.

The number of Indian nationals — nearly two million — constitutes 27pc of the Emirates’ population of 9.4m. Taken together, all Gulf states have an Indian population of 9m, and let’s be clear that in a given geopolitical turmoil this population could be an extraordinary asset to India to help New Delhi advance its interests.

K.M. Panikkar’s India and the Indian Ocean is a much-quoted book, for it gives a clear indication of what Indian strategists think of their country’s role in relation to Asia and the Middle East. The gist of the thesis is that India must step into British shoes and play the role Britain did in the geographical mass between Aden and Singapore. He argued that the Indian Ocean must “truly remain Indian”.

No wonder the ‘Persian Gulf’ finds repeated mention in the post-Panikkar era. Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee told a military conference in 2003 that India’s “strategic frontiers” had grown beyond South Asia and that India’s “security environment ranges from the Persian Gulf to Straits of Malacca”. Similarly, former Indian navy chief Arun Prakash said India’s “strategic relevance” ranges “from the Persian Gulf to the Strait of Malacca.”

It is doubtful if the Gulf nations are aware of India’s naval ambitions. For reasons of history and geography Arab nations (and Iran) look west and seldom bother about developments in the east. In their worldview, the Pakistan-India relationship is a minor issue — a nuisance — and does not deserve the attention we think it must. Twice this year, the UAE has stunned us. In February, it invited an Indian foreign minister to a conference of Islamic foreign ministers, and it termed the Aug 5 villainy India’s internal matter.

The Asian Arab world has virtually no navy, even though 80pc of oil shipping passes through the Gulf of Hormuz. Pakistan has a vital interest in this crucial sea lane, and it is exactly for this reason that Gwadar port is an eyesore for many governments hostile to Pakistan.

The situation calls for Pakistan’s greater collaboration with Gulf navies in a manner that pre-empts any attempt by non-Gulf powers to penetrate what undoubtedly is Pakistan’s underbelly. Let Islamabad keep its eyes and ears open so as not get caught again by surprise. Bases are not begged for; bases are extorted or imposed. The host country has no choice but to follow the diktat of the economic hegemon. It is a pity that it is Pakistan that has to suffer because of the Arab ignorance of South Asian history.