- Mar 31, 2012
Most information about ECM is classified and such information regarding such system is rather sparse.
Such systems also keep evolving rapidly in response to the treat they might encounter, though most these changes are mainly software oriented; some information can be outdated
I will post the information I could find on internet and the things I deduced (will highlight the same).
DARE ASPJ pod is heavily influenced from ELTA El/M-8222 SPJ.
- Enhance survivability of fighters and other military aircraft by suppressing multiple threats in dense radar-guided weapon systems environment
- Protect the aircraft against all types of traditional and modern Air-to-Air & Surface-to-Air threats
Deployed mainly on Su-30MKI but can also be deployed on Jaguar, Mig-29 and Tejas.
Contains independent forward facing and rear facing; 16 Configurable Element Active Array Transmitter Receiver Units (deduced after looking at DARE ASPJ pod).
ELTA El/M-8222 SPJ provides full spectrum capabilities
- L-Band (1-2 Ghz) : Against long range surveillance radars, GPS and LOS communication
- S-Band (2-4 Ghz) : Against naval surveillance and fire control radars and LOS communication
- C-Band (2-4 Ghz) : Against surveillance and weather radar and LOS communication
- X-Band (8-12 Ghz) : Against aerial, naval and ground-based surveillance and fire control radars, missile seekers, satellite communication
- Ku-Band (12-18 Ghz) : Against aerial, naval and ground-based fire control radars, missile seekers, satellite communication
- Small size, lightweight (around 100 kg) and low drag
- Can be installed on outer WWR A/A missile weapon stations (R-73 station)
- Allow Su-30MKI full flight envelope (G load, velocity, etc.)
Jamming Modes I have read ELTA El/M-8222 SPJ supports
- Autonomous threat handling based on predefined large repository of jamming techniques maintained by IAI. IAI also continues to update the threat library. We pay substantial amount to IAI/Elta every year to update threat library. We have paid more to IAI/Elta than we have paid Russians for the support of MKI platform.
- Better utilization of jamming resources in time, frequency and direction compared to Russian alternatives
- Complete Automatic operation - minimal pilot workload feature not available in to Russian alternatives
- High RF sensitivity and high ERP compared to Russian alternatives
The first two are very important against A-A Missiles like AIM-120 C5 as when the missile is gammed the missile will encounter extreme difficulty to home on jam.
- Deceptive jamming
- DRFM jamming
- Barrage jamming
- Pulse jamming
Though Russian jammers have higher transmit power they use Blanket Jamming hence home on jam is effective against them.
Blanket Jamming also fails against AESA seeker or radar.
Properly designed AESA seeker or radar will significantly reduce the effectiveness of ELTA El/M-8222 SPJ.
JF-17s Block 3 with PL-15E are a significant threat to MKI.
During Operation Swift Retort PAF fired couple of AIM-120s on MKI; though the communication for MKI were jammed, ELTA El/M-8222 SPJ were able to autonomously steer off the missiles away from its host aircraft saving host aircraft. I tried to find more details but looking at the unavailability of information it seems IAF has made details surrounding the incident classified.
PAF is worried from the effectiveness of ELTA El/M-8222 SPJ has asked ISI to get more details on ELTA El/M-8222 SPJ and its weakens.
Thank you……. Now I am better educated.