Afghan reality: India may talk to ISI, Taliban

ajtr

Tihar Jail
Banned
Joined
Oct 2, 2009
Messages
12,038
Likes
720
JAi HO.This shows how out of touch GOI is.Or they are being realist?clap


Afghan reality: India may talk to ISI, Taliban

New Delhi: The top levels of the government are debating opening talks with Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) and the Afghan Taliban to ensure India remains relevant in Afghanistan.

CNN-IBN learns the precarious security situation in Afghanistan--highlighted by the terrorist attacks targeting Indians in Kabul on February 26--is prompting a gradual but significant rethink in New Delhi.

Sources confirm that the government is debating opening up a channel of communication with the ISI and engaging sections of the Taliban--an idea India abhorred till now.

India is also considering paring down its presence at reconstruction projects in Afghanistan. Projects underway may be wrapped up quickly and there may be even a freeze on undertaking new projects.

These policy options were debated at a meeting of the National Security Council, which Prime Minister Manmohan Singh chaired on February 12.

India won't scale down Afghanistan operations
The government has been forced to think to rethink its Afghanistan policy because of cold, hard reality. Indian officials acknowledge that the political and military situation has deteriorated in Afghanistan.

President Hamid Karzai is politically weak and Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Omar and his men could return to power in Kabul. Security analysts perceive Western powers have lost their will to stay in Afghanistan, and there's a tremendous increase in Pakistan confidence.

The advice to engage with sections of the Taliban and start a limited and regulated dialogue with the ISI came from the Prime Minister's Office.

The advice is controversial but stems from India's need to ensure Afghanistan is not handed over on a platter to Pakistan. In line with that thinking, India is also considering helping prop up a friendly political alliance and intensively engage with Russia and Iran.

Not everyone is convinced about India’s new Afghanistan policy. “It’s not the same Afghanistan--there's no Ahmad Shah Masood. It’s not the same old Iran either. It’s also not the old Soviet Union. We now have Russia and the Central Asian States, so we need a new way. What that will be, we don't know,” says former diplomat K C Singh.

Indian officials say there may be a change of approach but India remains determined to stay relevant in Afghanistan.
 

ajtr

Tihar Jail
Banned
Joined
Oct 2, 2009
Messages
12,038
Likes
720
Strategic recalibration

One of the problems with the US-Pakistan relationship over the decades has been that the two sides tend to fall in and out of love like a tempestuous couple, rather than maintain a steady bond. So it’s wise to approach recent talk about a new strategic breakthrough with some caution and skepticism.
In the upbeat US version, the first big success for its new Afghanistan policy has come not in the battle of Marja but in Islamabad. Officials cite Pakistan’s cooperation with the CIA in capturing and interrogating top leaders of the Afghan Taliban, and Pakistan’s new dialogue with India. Pakistani officials agree that the US has taken quiet steps to reassure Islamabad that it doesn’t want to grab Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, and that it isn’t trying to smuggle in covert operators disguised as US contractors.
But officials on both sides appear wary of overpromising what this new partnership can deliver. There’s greater confidence, they say, because officials know each other better. Even so, “there is a fair amount of residual mistrust,” warns Shuja Nawaz of the Atlantic Council, a think tank.
One key US official characterises the relationship this way: “We have narrowed the gap in terms of strategic outlooks and that has allowed a greater cooperation on the tactical level.” But he cautions that it would overstate this rapprochement to call it a “strategic recalibration,” as some White House officials have.
The up-and-down history of the relationship was examined by CIA analysts in a recent report. They noted that this ebb-and-flow was driven in part by the personalities on both sides, but that the Pakistanis always retained a focus on their strategic interests — starting with their rivalry with India.
Given the centrality of India in Pakistan’s security calculus, US officials are encouraged by the resumption of high-level dialogue between India and Pakistan. The US administration has been working behind the scenes to reassure both sides. The X-factor in the Indo-Pak contacts is Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, who has been a strong advocate of better relations with his neighbour. US officials have advised Pakistan that Singh is an unusually farsighted leader who may be able to open doors in New Delhi that have otherwise been closed. The Indians, for their part, insist that no real progress in the relationship will be possible unless the ISI curbs Lashkar-e-Tayyeba, that it helped create.
To address Pakistani security concerns, the US has taken several steps. One is to implicitly accept Pakistan’s status as a declared nuclear weapons State and thereby counter conspiracy theories that the US is plotting to seize Pakistani nukes.
Obama made an early move when he told Dawn last June, “I have confidence that the Pakistani government has safeguarded its nuclear arsenal. It’s Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.” There have been similar private assurances, officials say. The US is also trying to combat Pakistani fears about covert US military or intelligence activities.
The trickiest issue remains Afghanistan. The Pakistanis provided important help last month by capturing Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar. Because Baradar was the Taliban’s chief of logistics and had notebooks and computer records, the operation proved to be a “gold mine”, says one official.
But there’s always something new to worry about in this relationship. The Pakistanis are concerned of late that the US may negotiate a peace deal with the Afghan Taliban that cuts them out as an intermediary. “In reconciliation talks, Pakistan must have a seat at the table,” says one Pakistani. We should all be so lucky, if this proves the biggest problem.
 

Yusuf

GUARDIAN
Super Mod
Joined
Mar 24, 2009
Messages
24,322
Likes
11,632
Country flag
Its really sad, but a fact. The US is losing there and is looking for a way out. Pakistan is biding its time before it lords over Astan. All the billions India has spent there will go waste.

So India is basically taking stock of the situation to see if it will be worthwhile to stay put there or not. But what I dont understand is why India should talk with ISI and Taliban about it? They are not going to give us a millimeter of space. All we can do is pack our bags and leave along with the Americans, when the Americans leave that place. All hell will break lose then and we will find Karzai hanging on a pole castrated.

The world has to take steps that all this doesnt happen, but the way things are looking, it doesnt look likely.
 

ajtr

Tihar Jail
Banned
Joined
Oct 2, 2009
Messages
12,038
Likes
720
All the indian billions will go waste only if india allows.And indian politicians have mercantile mentality.They can be good in economy etc but they dont have appetite for strategic games.Indian polity has always been status-quoits-means path of minimal loss.They always way in loss and gain before moving forward on strategy.at maximum they avoid confontation .thats why india has always remain boxed-in indian subcontinent with periodic shrinkage of area of it power base through out its history.we have to see what india can offer pakistan for doing saving its investments in afghanistan.can any one like to guess.....


1.kashmir
2.junaghad
3.hyderabad
 
Last edited:

Yusuf

GUARDIAN
Super Mod
Joined
Mar 24, 2009
Messages
24,322
Likes
11,632
Country flag
PAKISTAN’S General Kayani seems to be afflicted by the phenomenon that drowning men clutch at straws. His perspectives about his country appear contrary to what a high-profile Pakistani politician told me recently about that country currently confronting an “existential crisis”. General Kayani, however, evidently believes that Pakistan’s all problems will magically disappear once he re-establishes Afghanistan as a Pakistani client state and continues jihad against India in right earnest.

After a meeting in Brussels with fellow Generals from NATO member-states, General Kayani pontificated extensively on how 2273 of his officers and men had been “martyred” in operations against the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan. He revealed that he had told his NATO counterparts that Pakistan was ready to train officers of the Afghan National Army (ANA), claiming that “if we get more involved with the ANA there is more interaction and better understanding.”

Not surprisingly, he added: “We want strategic depth in Afghanistan.” He, thereafter, strangely suggested that unless this happened, a 250000-strong ANA could pose a security threat to Pakistan. The London Conference on Afghanistan had decided to increase the strength of the ANA to 171600 men by 2011.

If General Kayani was emboldened by what he believed was the credibility of his presentation in Brussels, his friends in the Pakistan Foreign Office waxed eloquent on the decision in London that efforts would be initiated to reach out to sections of the Taliban, to reintegrate them into the mainstream of Afghan national life. President Karzai has been advocating such an initiative for over five years now. Responding to the decision of the London conference, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Quraishi remarked: “Pakistan is perhaps better placed than any other country in the world to support Afghan reintegration and reconciliation.” Does Mr Quraishi seriously believe that people in Afghanistan have forgotten how Pakistan brought the Taliban to power and enabled its protégés to indulge in ethnic cleansing of Shias, Hazaras, Uzbeks and Tajiks? Moreover, does he think that the Afghans are so naïve as to trust a neighbour that still harbours and assists the Taliban political and military leadership in Quetta, Peshawar, Karachi and North Waziristan?

Pakistan’s highly respected political commentator and an expert on the Taliban, Mr Rahimullah Yusufzai, responded caustically to General Kayani’s and Quraishi’s observations. Reacting to General Kayani’s comments on training the ANA, Mr Yusufzai remarked that the Afghans would naturally fear that “the ISI would recruit Afghan army officers it they are sent to Pakistan, and would then use them for its strategic goals in Afghanistan”. He also noted: “India’s emphasis on building roads, hospitals, educational institutions, electricity systems and other projects of public welfare is paying rich dividends and earning it tremendous goodwill in Afghanistan.”

One of Mr Quraishi’s worthy officials earlier commented: “We do not see India playing any role in Afghanistan. Any role for India in Afghanistan can only be problematical.” Mr Yusufzai also remarked that the international community was hardly likely to trust Pakistan as an intermediary with the Taliban and added that the Taliban leadership had already rejected President Karzai’s offer of reconciliation.

The fact that Pakistan lives in a world of illusion on its role in Afghanistan and its image abroad was confirmed when America’s Director of National Intelligence, Mr Dennis Blair, testified before the National Intelligence Committee of the Senate on February 2. Mr Blair stated: “The Afghan Taliban, Al-Qaeda and Pakistani militant groups continue to use Pakistan for organising, training and planning terrorist attacks against the United States and its allies in Afghanistan.” More significantly, he added that Pakistan “still judges it does not need to confront groups that do not threaten it directly and maintains historical support for the Taliban. It has continued to provide support to its militant proxies such as the Haqqani Taliban, the Gul Bahadur group and the Commander Nazir group. Indeed, as is well known, the Al-Qaeda, Afghan Taliban and Pakistan militant safe haven for the insurgency in Afghanistan is in Pakistan. The safe haven is an important Taliban strength, and unless it is greatly diminished, the Taliban insurgency can survive defeat in Afghanistan”.

Alluding to Pakistan’s support for terrorism in India, Mr Blair noted: “Pakistan’s conviction that militant groups are still an important part of its (Pakistan’s) strategic arsenal to counter India’s military and economic advantages will continue to limit Pakistan’s incentive to pursue across the board efforts against extremism. Islamabad’s strategic approach risks helping sustain its safe haven, because some groups supported by Pakistan provide assistance to Al-Qaeda.”

While President Obama would like to pull out from Afghanistan before the next Presidential election in November 2012, he realises that the larger American interests may be seriously compromised by a precipitate pullout. Mr Arvind Gupta, a senior Indian diplomat, now with the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, perceptively noted: “The United States does not wish to get bogged down in Afghanistan and yet it cannot leave in the ignominy of defeat.” While the Americans knew that a defeat in Vietnam would not result in any threat to the security of their homeland, a perceived defeat in Afghanistan and a return of the Taliban to power would set the stage for increased radicalisation in the Islamic world and a threat to American homeland security.

The London conference and the consequent jubilation in Pakistan based on the belief that the stage was set for the early return of the Taliban to power raised some concerns in New Delhi. But there is realisation now that the situation is more complex than earlier envisaged. India has to invest in retaining the goodwill it has built by its imaginative and effective interaction with and assistance to the people of Afghanistan.

India should also realise that it is not going to be consulted as the Obama Administration fashions its policies. But as long as it is clear that the Americans do not intend to withdraw till the Afghan Government’s security apparatus is adequately beefed up, we need not get unduly concerned.

A senior American official, who was till recently intimately involved with national security policy making, perceptively noted: “It is correct that the Obama Administration does not see India as an intimate collaborator in Afghanistan, but it is also not near to turning Afghanistan over to the Taliban and the ISI.” Yet another well-informed American analyst termed the reactions of the likes of Mr Quraishi and General Kayani as “premature jubilation”.

India should supplement its economic assistance with added emphasis on military training, if requested by the Afghan Government, while expanding consultations with Russia and Afghanistan’s neighbours like Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Iran. The London conference had endorsed a “regional approach” to handling the situation in Afghanistan
http://www.tribuneindia.com/2010/20100218/edit.htm#4
 

DaRk WaVe

Regular Member
Joined
Nov 20, 2009
Messages
809
Likes
97
JAi HO.This shows how out of touch GOI is.Or they are being realist?



Americans have to leave sooner or later & we undoubtedly having 'Pakistan Vs India - The Battle for Afghanistan '
 
Last edited:

ahmedsid

Top Gun
Senior Member
Joined
Feb 21, 2009
Messages
2,960
Likes
246
JAi HO.This shows how out of touch GOI is.Or they are being realist?

LOOOOL

Americans have to leave sooner or later & we undoubtedly having 'Pakistan Vs India - The Battle for Afghanistan '
And you ll bring back the Taliban, thats the only way you can supposedly WIN in Astan! Your country ruined these peoples life by helping create the Taliban, now you will go onto repeat it I feel!
 

DaRk WaVe

Regular Member
Joined
Nov 20, 2009
Messages
809
Likes
97
And you ll bring back the Taliban, thats the only way you can supposedly WIN in Astan! Your country ruined these peoples life by helping create the Taliban, now you will go onto repeat it I feel!
The 2nd in Command of Taliban will be handed over to Americans soon, so whats the problem, Operation Mushtarik is successful & now they are looking for a major offensive towards Kandhar & there is been exchange of tactical plans to stop flow of insurgents
Events are telling something else, Seems we are having gradual fall of Taliban :)

India wants a Pro India Gov in Afghanistan which is certainly not in our favour
 
Last edited:

Yusuf

GUARDIAN
Super Mod
Joined
Mar 24, 2009
Messages
24,322
Likes
11,632
Country flag
If the Taliban comes back to power in Astan, i think it would in the future create problems for Pakistan itself. In its short sighted policy of propagating the Taliban to gain strategic depth, the Pakistan will infuse fresh life into the Taliban which will be counter productive. They were openly challenging Pakistani sovereignty in the tribal areas not too long ago. So be careful. American short sightedness during soviet days is costing it today. It will in the future for Pakistan.
 

Vinod2070

मध्यस्थ
Ambassador
Joined
Feb 22, 2009
Messages
2,557
Likes
105
As K Subramanyam mentioned in a recent article:

Four alternative scenarios are possible. First, the US outsourcing the Taliban neutralisation and buying to Pakistan willingly. This is the one popular with our strategic establishment. Second, the Pakistanis are sincerely cooperating with the US. This is perhaps the least likely scenario. Third, the Pakistanis trying out a second deception on the US successfully, with as adverse consequences as happened in seven years of Bush gullibility. The deception proceeds halfway and the US wakes up to it resulting in confrontation between the US and Pakistan. Last, the US is aware of the deception and has its counter-plans ready. Pakistan has a history of being overconfident and launching misadventures and coming to grief as the history of the 1965, 1971 and 1999 wars against India and their own terrorists turning against them prove.

http://www.indianexpress.com/news/the-second-deception/586157/0
 

Vinod2070

मध्यस्थ
Ambassador
Joined
Feb 22, 2009
Messages
2,557
Likes
105
Pakistanis are on the whole quite supportive of the good Taliban, notwithstanding the recent drama of some arrests which as per the below article were likely just a way to save the Taliban.

Down the AfPak Rabbit Hole

The village of Marjah is a meaningless strategic backwater. So why are the Pentagon and the press telling us the battle there was a huge victory?

The release of Tim Burton's new blockbuster movie, Alice in Wonderland, is days away. The timing could not be more appropriate. Lewis Carroll's ironically opium-inspired tale of a rational person caught up inside a mad world with its own bizarre but consistent internal (il)logic has now surpassed Vietnam as the best paradigm to understand the war in Afghanistan.

The war in Afghanistan, as we have written here and in Military Review (pdf), is indeed a near replication of the Vietnam War, including the assault on the strategically meaningless village of Marjah, which is itself a perfect re-enactment of Operation Meade River in 1968. But the callous cynicism of this war, which we described here in early December, and the mainstream media's brainless reporting on it, have descended past these sane parallels. We have now gone down the rabbit hole.

Two months ago, the collection of mud-brick hovels known as Marjah might have been mistaken for a flyspeck on maps of Afghanistan. Today the media has nearly doubled its population from less than 50,000 to 80,000 -- the entire population of Nad Ali district, of which Nad Ali is the largest town, is approximately 99,000 -- and portrays the offensive there as the equivalent of the Normandy invasion, and the beginning of the end for the Taliban. In fact, however, the entire district of Nad Ali, which contains Marjah, represents about 2 percent of Regional Command (RC) South, the U.S. military's operational area that encompasses Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan, Zabul, Nimruz, and Daikundi provinces. RC South by itself is larger than all of South Vietnam, and the Taliban controls virtually all of it. This appears to have occurred to no one in the media.

Nor have any noted that taking this nearly worthless postage stamp of real estate has tied down about half of all the real combat power and aviation assets of the international coalition in Afghanistan for a quarter of a year. The possibility that wasting massive amounts of U.S. and British blood, treasure, and time just to establish an Afghan Potemkin village with a "government in a box" might be exactly what the Taliban wants the coalition to do has apparently not occurred to either the press or to the generals who designed this operation.

In reality, this battle -- the largest in Afghanistan since 2001 -- is essentially a giant public affairs exercise, designed to shore up dwindling domestic support for the war by creating an illusion of progress. In reporting it, the media has gulped down the whole bottle of "drink me" and shrunk to journalistic insignificance. In South Vietnam, an operational area smaller than RC South, the United States and its allies had over 2 million men under arms, including more than half a million Americans, the million-man Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), 75,000 coalition troops, the Vietnamese Regional Forces and Popular Forces (known as "Ruff-Puffs"), the South Vietnamese police, the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) and other militias -- and lost.

Yet the media is breathlessly regurgitating Pentagon pronouncements that we have "turned the corner" and "reversed the momentum" in Afghanistan with fewer than 45,000 men under arms in all of RC South (including the Afghan army and police) by fighting for a month to secure a single hamlet. Last year this would have been déjà vu of the "five o'clock follies" of the Vietnam War. Now it feels more like the Mad Hatter's Tea Party. "How can we have more success," Alice might ask, "when we haven't had any yet?"

So here we are in the AfPak Wonderland, complete with a Mad Hatter (the clueless and complacent media), Tweedledee and Tweedledum (the military, endlessly repeating itself and history), the White Rabbit (the State Department, scurrying to meetings and utterly irrelevant), the stoned Caterpillar (the CIA, obtuse, arrogant, and asking the wrong questions), the Dormouse (U.S. Embassy Kabul, who wakes up once in a while only to have his head stuffed in a teapot), the Cheshire Cat (President Obama, fading in and out of the picture, eloquent but puzzling), the Pack of Cards army (the Afghan National Army, self-explanatory), and their commander, the inane Queen of Hearts (Afghan President Hamid Karzai). (In Alice in Wonderland, however, the Dormouse is "suppressed" by the Queen of Hearts, not the White Rabbit or the Cheshire Cat, so the analogy is not quite perfect.)

For his part, as the Economist noted this week, Karzai has made fools of all the Western officials who sternly admonished him to begin a new era of transparent democracy, seizing control of the Electoral Complaints Commission to dismiss its independent members. Like the Queen of Hearts, Karzai has literally lost his marbles, according to our sources in the presidential palace. Or, as U.S. Ambassador Karl Eikenberry more diplomatically phrased it in his leaked cable, his behavior has become "erratic." He hasn't started shouting "off with their heads" yet, but the legitimacy thing is toast. Only the massive public relations exercise in Marjah kept Karzai's kleptocracy out of the media spotlight in February.

The military and political madness of the AfPak Wonderland has entered a new chapter of folly with the detention of a few Taliban mullahs in Pakistan, most notably Mullah Baradar, once the military strategist of the Quetta Shura, the primary Taliban leadership council headed by Mullah Omar. Like the Mock Turtle and the Gryphon in Alice in Wonderland, this has the Washington establishment dancing the whacked-out Lobster-Quadrille: Instant Afghanistan experts at the White House and pundits at august Beltway institutions like the Brookings Institution are absurdly calling the detentions a "sea change" in Pakistani behavior.

In fact, it is no such thing. Pakistan has not abandoned overnight its 50-year worship of the totem of "strategic depth," its cornerstone belief that it must control Afghanistan, or its marriage to the Taliban, and anyone who believes that is indulging in magical thinking. What has happened is, in fact, a purge by Taliban hard-liners of men perceived to be insufficiently reliable, either ethnically or politically, or both. It is well-known that there had been a schism in the Quetta Shura for months, with hard-liner and former Gitmo prisoner Mullah Zakir (aka Abdullah Ghulam Rasoul) coming out on top over Mullah Baradar. Baradar sheltered fellow Popalzai Hamid Karzai in 2001 and possibly saved his life after an errant U.S. bomb in Uruzgan province killed several men on the Special Forces team that was escorting him. Baradar later became a confidant of the president's brother, paid CIA informer Ahmed Wali Karzai, and met occasionally with the president himself in the tangled web of Afghan politics.


The core Ghilzai leadership of the Taliban had long suspected Baradar of being too willing to negotiate and too partial to his kinsmen in making field appointments. Indeed, this suspicion led to the creation of the Quetta Shura's Accountability Council in late 2009, whose job apparently included removing many of Baradar's excessively Durrani and Karlani appointments.

This explains why when Mullah Zakir, the hard-line military chief of the Quetta Shura along with Baradar, was detained near Peshawar two weeks after Baradar was detained, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) - Pakistan's powerful military spy service -- released him immediately. Meanwhile, all of the other lesser figures currently in detention (including Abdul Kabir, aka Mullah Abdul Kahir Osmani, the RC East regional commander; Mullah Abdul Rauf Aliza, an Alizai Durrani, former Gitmo prisoner, and Taliban military chief for northern Afghanistan; and Mullah Ahmed Jan Akhundzada, former shadow governor of Uruzgan province and Ishaqzai Durrani) are known moderates and allies of Baradar.

In other words, the Quetta Shura has used the ISI, its loyal and steadfast patron, to take out its trash. Those few mullahs suspected of being amenable to discussions with the infidel enemy and thus ideologically impure have now been removed from the jihad. This is not cooperation against the Taliban by an allied state; it is collusion with the Taliban by an enemy state. Pakistan is in fact following its own perceived strategic interests, which do not coincide with those of the United States. Pakistan has masterfully plied the Western establishment with an LSD-laced "drink me" cocktail of its own, convincing everyone that it is a frail and fragile Humpty-Dumpty that must not be pushed too hard, lest the nuclear egg fall off the wall. This is nonsense. In fact, what is needed against Pakistan's military leaders is a lever more powerful than "strategic depth" to force them into compliance and make them stop sheltering al Qaeda, destabilizing Afghanistan, and killing hundreds of Americans by proxy.

Unfortunately, in this AfPak Wonderland, there does not appear to be any magic mushroom to get back to normal. Instead, Afghanistan and Pakistan policy is trapped in an endless loop in a mad policy world operating under its own consistent internal illogic. Unlike Alice, the handful of Afghan analysts in the United States who actually understand what is happening cannot wake up or break through the corporate media noise. Far worse, thousands of brave U.S. Marines and soldiers are caught up in this deadly political croquet game where IEDs, not hedgehogs, are the game balls. The Duchess's baby really has turned into a pig, and there seems to be no way out of this increasingly insane rabbit hole.
 

DaRk WaVe

Regular Member
Joined
Nov 20, 2009
Messages
809
Likes
97
^^^

talk about conspiracy theories, Mullah Bradar will be handed over to US & ISAF is planning for a bigger Operation in Helmand & Quetta Shura, bwahhh my foot

The Afghan Taliban's top leaders

By Bill Roggio, LWJ, February 23, 2010 12:33 AM

Over the past two months, Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency has captured four senior leaders of the Afghan Taliban, including Mullah Omar's deputy who served as the head of the top shura, the leader of a regional shura, and two shadow governors. These captures, combined with the US-led offensive in Helmand which will expand into Kandahar and the Afghan East later this year, have given rise to reports of the potential collapse of the group.

The Afghan Taliban's leadership council and its regional shuras and committees have weathered the capture and death of senior leaders in the past. The Taliban have a deep bench of leaders with experience ranging back to the rise of the Taliban movement in the early 1990s. On prior occasions, younger commanders are known to have stepped into the place of killed or captured leaders. It remains to be seen if the sustained US offensive and possible future detentions in Pakistan will grind down the Taliban's leadership cadre.

This report looks at the Afghan Taliban's top leadership council, the Quetta shura; its four regional military councils; the 10 committees; and existing as well as killed or captured members of the shura. Because the Taliban is a deliberately opaque movement, it is difficult to gain real-time intelligence on the structure of the Taliban command. The following information on the structure of the Taliban and its key leaders has been gathered from press reports and studies on the Taliban, and from discussions with US intelligence officials.

The Afghan Taliban leadership council

The Afghan Taliban leadership council, or rahbari shura, is often referred to as the Quetta Shura, as it is based in the Pakistani city of the same name. The Quetta Shura provides direction to the four regional military shuras and the 10 committees. The Quetta Shura is ultimately led by Mullah Mohammed Omar, the ‘leader of the faithful,’ who is the top leader of the Taliban, but Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar directed the Quetta Shura. Baradar was the Afghan Taliban's second in command and the group's operational commander who was detained in Karachi sometime in January or February 2010. Over the past several months, members of the Quetta Shura have been reported to be relocating to Karachi to avoid potential US airstrikes.

Regional military shuras

The Afghan Taliban have assigned regional military shuras for four major geographical areas of operations. The shuras are named after the areas in which they are based; note that all four of the regional military shuras are based in Pakistan (Quetta, Peshawar, Miramshah in North Waziristan, and Gerdi Jangal in Baluchistan).

• Quetta Regional Military Shura - This military shura, like the Taliban’s top council, takes its name from its base in the city of Quetta in Pakistan’s Baluchistan province. The Quetta Regional Military Shura directs activities in southern and western Afghanistan. It is currently led by Hafez Majid.
• Peshawar Regional Military Shura - Based in the city of Peshawar in Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier Province, the Peshawar Regional Military Shura directs activities in eastern and northeastern Afghanistan. Abdul Latif Mansur is thought to currently lead the Peshawar shura. It was led by Maulvi Abdul Kabir before his arrest in Pakistan in February 2010.
• Miramshah Regional Military Shura - Based in Miramshah, the main town in Pakistan’s Taliban-controlled tribal agency of North Waziristan, the Miramshah Regional Military Shura directs activities in southeastern Afghanistan, including the provinces of Paktika, Paktia, Khost, Logar, and Wardak. The Miramshah Regional Military Shura is led by Siraj Haqqani, the son of Jalaluddin Haqqani.
• Gerdi Jangal Regional Military Shura - Based in the Gerdi Jangal refugee camp in Baluchistan, this regional military shura focuses exclusively on Helmand Province and perhaps Nimroz province. The Gerdi Jangal Regional Military Shura is led by Mullah Adbul Zakir.

The 10 committees

Along with the four regional commands, the Afghan Taliban have 10 committees which address specific issues. Some of the members of the committees are also members of the Quetta Shura.

• Military - This committee was led by Mullah Nasir, the former shadow governor of Ghazni. It is not clear who currently leads the military committee.
• Ulema Council - Also known as the religious committee, it is currently led by Mawlawi Abdul Ali.
• Finance - This committee is led by Abdulhai Mutma’in.
• Political Affairs - This committee is reported to have been led by Maulvi Abdul Kabir before his capture in February 2010. His replacement is not yet known.
• Culture and Information - This committee, which deals with Taliban propaganda, is led by Amir Khan Mutaqqi.
• Interior Affairs - This committee is led by Mullah Jalil.
• Prisoners and Refugees - This committee is led by Mawlawi Wali Jan.
• Education - This committee is led by Mawlawi Ahmad Jan, however it may have been disbanded.
• Recruitment - This committee was led by Mullah Ustad Mohammad Yasir before he was arrested in Peshawar in January 2009. Yasir’s replacement is not known.
• Repatriation Committee - This committee is led Mullah Abdul Zakir.

Known active members of the Quetta Shura

The list below consists of the known members of the Quetta Shura. There may be additional members who are not listed, while some leaders on this list may no longer be on the shura.

• Hafiz Abdul Majeed is the current leader of the Quetta Regional Military Shura. He served as the Taliban’s intelligence chief.
• Mullah Mohammad Hassan Akhund was the governor of Kandahar and the Minister of Foreign Affairs during Taliban rule in Afghanistan.
• Mullah Mohammad Hassan Rehmani is considered to be very close to Mullah Omar. Rehmani has been described as his "shadow." He was the governor of Kandahar province during the reign of the Taliban.
• Mullah Abdul Qayum Zakir is the head of the Gerdi Jangal Regional Military Shura (Helmand and Nimroz provinces) and the Taliban's ‘surge’ commander in the South. Zakir is a former detainee of the Guantanamo Bay detention facility in Cuba who currently serves as the Taliban’s ‘surge commander’ in the Afghan South.
• Amir Khan Muttaqi is the chief of the Information and Culture Committee.
• Siraj Haqqani is the leader of the Miramshah Regional Military Shura and the commander of the Haqqani Network. He is also the Taliban’s regional governor of Paktika, Paktia, and Khost.
• Mullah Mohammad Rasul was the governor of Nimroz province during the reign of the Taliban.
• Abdulhai Mutma’in is the chief of the Finance Committee. His served as a minister during the Taliban regime.
• Abdul Latif Mansur is the commander of the Abdul Latif Mansur Network in Paktika, Paktia, and Khost. He serves on the Miramshah Shura and was the former Minister of Agriculture for the Taliban regime. Mansur is thought to lead the Peshawar Regional Military Shura.
• Mullah Abdur Razzaq Akhundzada is the former corps commander for northern Afghanistan. He also served as the Taliban regime’s Interior Minister.
• Maulvi Hamdullah is the Taliban representative for the Gulf region. Hamdullah is considered to have been since 1994 one of Mullah Omar's most confidential aides. In addition, Hamdullah led the Finance Department in Kandahar during Taliban rule from 1994 until November 2001.
• Maulvi Qudratullah Jamal runs an investigative committee that deals with complaints from Afghan citizens against local Taliban personnel. Jamal also operates as a liaison to the Taliban's global supporters. He served as the Taliban’s chief of propaganda from 2002-2005.
• Maulvi Aminullah is the Taliban commander for Uruzgan province.
• Mullah Jalil is the head of the Taliban's Interior Affairs Committee.
• Qari Talha is the chief of Kabul operations for the Taliban.
• Sheikh Abdul Mana Niyazic is the Taliban shadow governor for Herat province.

Shura and committee members killed or captured:

• Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar directed the Quetta Shura. Baradar was the Afghan Taliban's second in command and the group's operational commander, and was detained in Karachi sometime in January or February 2010.
• Maulvi Abdul Kabir led the Peshawar Regional Military Council before he was captured by Pakistani intelligence in February 2010. He served as the Taliban's former shadow governor of the eastern Afghan province of Nangarhar, as well as the governor of Nangarhar during the Taliban’s reign.
• Mullah Mir Mohammed served as the shadow governor in the northern province of Baghlan. He was detained in February 2010.
• Mullah Abdul Salam served as the shadow governor in the northern province of Kunduz. He was detained in February 2010.
• Mullah Dadullah Akhund was the Taliban’s top military commander in the South. He was killed in May 2007 by British special forces in Helmand province.
• Akhtar Mohammad Osmani was a member of the Quetta Shura and was the Taliban's chief of military operations in the provinces of Uruzgan, Nimroz, Kandahar, Farah, Herat, and Helmand, as well as a top aide to Mullah Omar. He also personally vouched for the safety of Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar. He was killed by Coalition forces while traveling near the Pakistani border in December 2006.
• Mullah Obaidullah Akhund was the Taliban Defense Minister during the reign of the Taliban from 1996 until the US toppled the government in the fall of 2001. He was close to Mullah Omar. His status is uncertain; he has been reported to have been arrested and released several times by Pakistani security forces. He was last reported in Pakistani custody in February 2008.
• Mullah Mansur Dadullah Akhund, who is also known as Mullah Bakht Mohammed, replaced his brother Mullah Dadullah Akhund as the top commander in the South during the summer of 2007. His status is uncertain; he was last reported to have been arrested by Pakistani security forces in January 2008 but is thought to have been exchanged as part of a hostage deal.
• Anwarul Haq Mujahid was a member of the Peshawar Regional Military Shura and the commander of the Tora Bora Military Front, which is based in Nangarhar province. He was detained in Peshawar in June 2009. Mujahid is the son of Maulvi Mohammed Yunis Khalis, a senior mujahedeen leader who was instrumental in welcoming Osama bin Laden into Afghanistan after he was ejected from the Sudan in 1996.
• Mullah Ustad Mohammed Yasir was the chief of the Recruitment Committee and a Taliban spokesman before he was arrested in Peshawar in January 2009.
• Mullah Younis, who is also known as Akhunzada Popalzai, was a former shadow governor of Zabul. He served as a police chief in Kabul during Taliban rule. He was captured in Karachi in February 2010.

Sources:

• "The Other Side,"Afghanistan Analysis Network
• "The Taliban Biography, The Structure and Leadership of the Taliban 1996-2002," George Washington University's National Security Archive
• "The Taliban: An Organizational Analysis," Military Review
• "Quetta-based Taliban move to Karachi," The Nation
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/02/the_talibans_top_lea.php#ixzz3pJyzJ7Bu
After Marja, ‘Kandahar Will be Next, Mullen

CORONADO, Calif., , March 4, 2010 – The nation’s top military officer today said the focus of American troops and their allies in southern Afghanistan would shift to Kandahar following an ongoing offensive in the former Taliban stronghold of Marja.

The comment by Navy Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, marks the first time the senior-most military leader confirmed what many believed would be the next phase in a series of operations that have been characterized thus far as an early test of the new U.S. strategy in Afghanistan.

“I think General McChrystal’s been pretty clear that the focus will turn to Kandahar,” he told reporters at the Naval Air Station North Island here, referring to Army Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan. Mullen added: “His main effort is really in the south, and Kandahar will be next.”

The chairman noted that operations are ongoing in central Helmand Province’s Marja section, where military officials this week said the mission had shifted from clearing out the enemy to holding the gains the operation has brought about.

“We’re not through Marja,” Mullen said. “It’s been a very tough operation, (and) will continue to be.”

For months before the operation in Marja, U.S. and NATO military officials noted the strategic importance of the southern Afghanistan region and the goal to clear the area of Taliban fighters. The rationale for such a declaration of intent before the Marja offensive was to allow low-level Taliban fighters the chance to flee, and to warn civilians of the impending attack, officials said.

But what at first appeared to be a rare glimpse at the military’s playbook may actually signal an intention on the part of defense officials to disclose operations in southern Afghanistan before they come to fruition. Gen. David Petraeus, the commander of U.S. Central Command, called Marja the “initial salvo” in a campaign that could last 12 to 18 months.

Marine Corps Lt. Gen. John M. Paxton Jr., director of operations for the Joint Staff, told lawmakers on Capitol Hill last month of the military’s intent to focus on Kandahar following the first phase of operations.

Asked by senators why the campaign began in Helmand instead of Kandahar, the birthplace of the Taliban, Paxton replied that McChrystal concluded in his assessment in September that Helmand was at the heart of the coalition’s four-point mission to protect the Afghan people, enable Afghan security forces, neutralize the insurgency and allow for governance.

“General McChrystal’s plan was for Kandahar to be a place we would go, but central Helmand is where the insurgency had the most-safe haven,” Paxton said during the Feb. 22 hearing before Senate Armed Services Committee. “I think you’ll see Kandahar will closely follow, but central Helmand had to come first.”

As the military operations of the roughly 15,000 NATO and Afghan forces that have been engaged in Operation Moshtarak since Feb. 13 begin to wind down, the focus in Marja has shifted from what the military calls the ‘clear’ phase to the ‘hold’ phase.

Marja has been characterized as representing the first test of President Barack Obama’s strategy to add 30,000 more troops in the fight against Afghanistan-based insurgents. As the initial phase of operations comes to a close, Deputy Defense Secretart William Lynn said this week that Marja has emerged as an area where hope is returning.

“Because of our new strategy, and President Obama's deployment of additional troops,” Lynn told the American Legion in Washington, “Marja is one of many cities in Afghanistan that has begun to have hope.”
 

Vinod2070

मध्यस्थ
Ambassador
Joined
Feb 22, 2009
Messages
2,557
Likes
105
Pakistan was denying the very existence of Queta Shura till the other day!

There is obviously more to the recent events than meets the eye. The articles I shared above are a good starting point.

To Pakistan's credit I must say thay have mastered the art of bluffing the USA and extracting moolah in the bargain. You may likely succeed again.
 

Vinod2070

मध्यस्थ
Ambassador
Joined
Feb 22, 2009
Messages
2,557
Likes
105
I like the delicious irony of a Pakistani accusing an Indian of believing in conspiracy theories!

It has always been the other way round. Anyway I have posted an article from a respected journal and this concern is not limited to conspiracy theories by any means. It is quite widespread.
 

DaRk WaVe

Regular Member
Joined
Nov 20, 2009
Messages
809
Likes
97
here is the Bradar, Americans can take him & talk to him, we have already 'talked' to him & he 'talked'
Pakistan agrees to hand over Mullah Baradar

KABUL: Pakistan has agreed to hand over to Afghanistan captured Afghan Taliban number two, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, and other militants, the president's office said on Thursday.

Three senior Taliban officials were captured in Pakistan this month, including Mullah Baradar - the highest profile Taliban leader to be held.

“The government of Pakistan has accepted Afghanistan's proposal for extraditing Mullah Baradar and other Taliban who are in its custody and showed readiness to hand over those prisoners ... on the basis of an agreement between the two countries,” a statement from President Hamid Karzai's office said.

Baradar, second only to Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar, was captured in Karachi in what US media reports said was a joint raid by US and Pakistani intelligence agents, dealing a major blow to the movement.

Bashary said Baradar was one of 42 people, including other Taliban figures, Kabul wants returned from neighbouring Pakistan, which is under strong US pressure to crack down on militants in both countries.

Another Taliban commander, Mullah Abdul Kabir, is also believed to have been detained by Pakistani security forces in recent weeks, but Islamabad has yet to officially confirm his detention.

The prisoners “are accused of criminal acts”, it said.

The Taliban, who have made a steady comeback since being ousted by US-backed Afghan forces in late 2001, are under pressure in Afghanistan.

Nato is pushing ahead with one of its largest assaults in Afghanistan since the start of the war, aimed at driving the Taliban from their last big stronghold in the country's most violent province to make way for Afghan authorities to take over.
 
Last edited:

DaRk WaVe

Regular Member
Joined
Nov 20, 2009
Messages
809
Likes
97
Pakistan was denying the very existence of Queta Shura till the other day!

There is obviously more to the recent events than meets the eye. The articles I shared above are a good starting point.

To Pakistan's credit I must say thay have mastered the art of bluffing the USA and extracting moolah in the bargain. You may likely succeed again.
who care's about the past the fact is we got them & there is no bluffing going on, Actions speak louder than words, Quetta Shura is effectively liquidated ;)

Shura and committee members killed or captured:

• Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar directed the Quetta Shura. Baradar was the Afghan Taliban's second in command and the group's operational commander, and was detained in Karachi sometime in January or February 2010.
• Maulvi Abdul Kabir led the Peshawar Regional Military Council before he was captured by Pakistani intelligence in February 2010. He served as the Taliban's former shadow governor of the eastern Afghan province of Nangarhar, as well as the governor of Nangarhar during the Taliban’s reign.
• Mullah Mir Mohammed served as the shadow governor in the northern province of Baghlan. He was detained in February 2010.
• Mullah Abdul Salam served as the shadow governor in the northern province of Kunduz. He was detained in February 2010.
• Mullah Dadullah Akhund was the Taliban’s top military commander in the South. He was killed in May 2007 by British special forces in Helmand province.
• Akhtar Mohammad Osmani was a member of the Quetta Shura and was the Taliban's chief of military operations in the provinces of Uruzgan, Nimroz, Kandahar, Farah, Herat, and Helmand, as well as a top aide to Mullah Omar. He also personally vouched for the safety of Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar. He was killed by Coalition forces while traveling near the Pakistani border in December 2006.
• Mullah Obaidullah Akhund was the Taliban Defense Minister during the reign of the Taliban from 1996 until the US toppled the government in the fall of 2001. He was close to Mullah Omar. His status is uncertain; he has been reported to have been arrested and released several times by Pakistani security forces. He was last reported in Pakistani custody in February 2008.
• Mullah Mansur Dadullah Akhund, who is also known as Mullah Bakht Mohammed, replaced his brother Mullah Dadullah Akhund as the top commander in the South during the summer of 2007. His status is uncertain; he was last reported to have been arrested by Pakistani security forces in January 2008 but is thought to have been exchanged as part of a hostage deal.
• Anwarul Haq Mujahid was a member of the Peshawar Regional Military Shura and the commander of the Tora Bora Military Front, which is based in Nangarhar province. He was detained in Peshawar in June 2009. Mujahid is the son of Maulvi Mohammed Yunis Khalis, a senior mujahedeen leader who was instrumental in welcoming Osama bin Laden into Afghanistan after he was ejected from the Sudan in 1996.
• Mullah Ustad Mohammed Yasir was the chief of the Recruitment Committee and a Taliban spokesman before he was arrested in Peshawar in January 2009.
• Mullah Younis, who is also known as Akhunzada Popalzai, was a former shadow governor of Zabul. He served as a police chief in Kabul during Taliban rule. He was captured in Karachi in February 2010.
Pakistan’s decisive action to aid Afghan conciliation: US

WASHINGTON: Pakistan’s ‘decisive’ action against the Taliban is already showing results, says the US State Department, adding that such measures would encourage militants to seek reconciliation.

“This is expressly the kind of decisive action that we sought in our strategy from the outset, and that has been the basis upon which we have worked with Afghanistan, worked with Pakistan,” said the department’s spokesman P.J. Crowley.

Talking to reporters at the State Department on Thursday evening, Crowley, however, warned that it was too early to declare victory.

There has been a positive response in the US to Pakistani military and intelligence operations over the last several weeks that resulted in the capture of some key Taliban leaders, including the group’s military chief Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar.

Crowley said that Pakistani actions were linked to a joint strategy for dealing with militants, which began with the recognition that they were an adversary of the United States as well as Afghanistan, and Pakistan.

“But as to what conclusions those who are associated with political violence will draw from this, that is expressly why we have included in our strategy the concept of reintegrating those who are currently engaged in the fight,” he added.

To join this reintegration process, the militants will first have to lay down their arms, disassociate themselves from Al Qaeda and accept the Afghan constitution or the rule of law in Pakistan, he said.

Responding to a question about a possible reconciliation with the Taliban leadership, the spokesman said the US and its allies were “not too far down that road at this point”.

Such decisions, he added, would ultimately be made by the Afghan leadership on their side, the Pakistani leadership on their side. “But certainly, I think we are encouraged by the broad trends that show the results of Pakistan’s decisive action.”

Crowley claimed that in southern Afghanistan, where the US was conducting a major military operation, the militants were already showing interest in the reintegration process.

“We’re now moving ahead with being able to bring more civilians into that region and demonstrate to the Afghan people that there are clear benefits to them in the immediate term and the long run.”
 
Last edited:

Vinod2070

मध्यस्थ
Ambassador
Joined
Feb 22, 2009
Messages
2,557
Likes
105
who care's about the past
Past is the surest indication of the future!

the fact is we got them & there is no bluffing going on, Actions speak louder than words
OK, I have seen this list and the foreign policy article gives a plausible reason for these arrests.

Who is right? We need to wait and see.

The past shows that Pakistan doesn't get rid of its proxies so fast and so easily. One doesn't know what has changed so suddenly and so significantly.
 

DaRk WaVe

Regular Member
Joined
Nov 20, 2009
Messages
809
Likes
97
Past is the surest indication of the future!
for now future seems dark for taliban & presence of India in Afghanistan ;)

Who is right? We need to wait and see.
agreed

The past shows that Pakistan doesn't get rid of its proxies so fast and so easily. One doesn't know what has changed so suddenly and so significantly.
hahahha, Told ya there is no bluffing going on, We got 'em, may be hard to believe but have 'em & Bradar is going to have some orgasms in CIA detention centers after some treatment by ISI & guess what it was Bradar who 'talked' to us ;)
 

ajtr

Tihar Jail
Banned
Joined
Oct 2, 2009
Messages
12,038
Likes
720
The 2nd in Command of Taliban will be handed over to Americans soon, so whats the problem, Operation Mushtarik is successful & now they are looking for a major offensive towards Kandhar & there is been exchange of tactical plans to stop flow of insurgents
Events are telling something else, Seems we are having gradual fall of Taliban :)

India wants a Pro India Gov in Afghanistan which is certainly not in our favour

Its not simple as you are trying to make.Afghanistan situation is like an onion,each layer you peel u get another new layer.there is a game of chess being played betwin various visible and invisible players .
Pakistan court blocks Baradar extradition

A Pakistani provincial high court yesterday blocked the extradition of captured Afghan Taliban leaders including Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, in an unexpected twist that threatens to undermine Islamabad’s commitment to hunt down islamist militants

Mullah Baradar, the Taliban military chief in Afghanistan, was captured by Pakistan’s intelligence agents assisted by the CIA, from the southern port city of Karachi earlier this month. On Thursday, a statement from the office of Afghan president Hamid Karzai announced an agreement with Pakistan for Mullah Baradar to be handed over to Afganistan.

The government - which has come under intense western pressure, especially from the US, to crackdown on Taliban militants in the country - could appeal to the supreme court to have the decision overturned.

Khalid Khawaja, a pro-islamist campaigner who has actively opposed Pakistan forging closer ties with the US and who filed the petition to the court said; “I feel encouraged as we can’t hand over our people to the US, Afghanistan or any other country”.

Judge Khawaja Mohammad Sharif issued his order in Lahore saying: “They [the Taliban] should not be handed over to any other country” and set March 15 as the next date for hearing the case.

In addition to Mullah Baradar, other Taliban militants named by Mr Khawaja among those arrested recently include Mullah Abdus Salaam, Mullah Kabir, Mullah Mohammad and Mullah Amir Muawiya.

Analysts said, Friday’s development underlined a tendency among islamists to use Pakistan’s increasingly robust civil society, the media and the courts to press their case.

“Whatever you might say otherwise, it is the case that Pakistan’s civil society, courts and the press are all among the freest in the developing world” said one western diplomat in Islamabad. “This is a strength which we may not like in this particular case because the islamists are using it to their advantage, but it is a strength”.

Lieutenant General (retired) Abdul Qayyum, a former Pakistani military commander, warned that handing over Taliban militants to a foreign country would provoke a backlash. “If these people are sent to Afghanistan, it is as good as sending them to America. We can’t hand over these people to an outside power. That will annoy Pakistanis even more so than before” he said.

Pakistan’s army chief General Ashfaq Kiyani earlier in February signalled the country’s interest in joining a new security arrangement for Afghanistan, indicating Islamabad’s determination to be closely associated with international efforts for securing a country which Islamabad considers central to its own interests.

Pakistan’s security establishment including the military and the intelligence services have a long history of protecting islamist groups, especially the Taliban. Recent arrests, however had raised the possibility that the attitude had changed.

“Within Pakistan, there are signs of the army at the top shifting its long term policy, but its too early to say if everyone is ready to completely abandon their links [with islamists] or simply loosen them up to bring them [islamists] to the negotiating table in Afghanistan” said a recently retired Pakistani general.

Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2010. You may share using our article tools. Please don't cut articles from FT.com and redistribute by email or post to the web.
 

Vinod2070

मध्यस्थ
Ambassador
Joined
Feb 22, 2009
Messages
2,557
Likes
105
for now future seems dark for taliban & presence of India in Afghanistan ;)
We will see, won't we?

I won't begrudge you that smile though. The game is on.

hahahha, Told ya there is no bluffing going on, We got 'em, may be hard to believe but have 'em & Bradar is going to have some orgasms in CIA detention centers after some treatment by ISI & guess what it was Bradar who 'talked' to us ;)
Baradar was always talking to ISI. I heard he had a hotline to the ISI headquarters. ;)
 

Latest Replies

Global Defence

New threads

Articles

Top