Indian Defence Forum
Washington hoped for a clean getaway from the two countries it invaded in the early 2000s. The Taliban, like the Islamic State, has other ideas.
Pakistan has long been accused of aiding the Afghan Taliban as a means of maintaining its influence in Afghanistan. Its primary strategic motive - which has survived many changes of leadership in Islamabad - is to limit India's role in the region. Indeed, few external analysts appreciate how deeply fear of Indian power runs among the Pakistani elite. In particular, this underlies the army's determination to expand Pakistan's nuclear force (a project now underway). In political and economic areas too, Pakistan is greatly concerned by the involvement of Indian organisations, both governmental and commercial, in Afghanistan's development.
In the wings
Taliban elements have been steadily encroaching on a swathe of territory across much of southern and southeastern Afghanistan. The final phases of the main western evacuation have been relatively quiet, though almost certainly this is because Taliban commanders calculate that there's little point in losing men to western troops when most of the latter are leaving.
The Taliban also benefit via revenues from opium production, which was at an all-time high in late 2013 (according to United Nations sources). The supply will probably hold at current levels, despite the United States and coalition partners having spent $7.5 billion on attempted eradication. Much of the opium is in areas of Taliban influence, thus making appropriate "taxation" of production and transport an easy source of income to finance the movement's activities.Most current Taliban violence is directed at the Afghan army and police rather than the departing westerners. Indeed, some districts quite close to Kabul are becoming no-go areas for government forces.
On the ground
The concerns raised by such attacks are increased by doubts about the capacity of the Afghan security forces. In early 2014, as the US withdrawal was being contemplated, it became obvious that the Afghan police and army could not cope.
The United States's intention is still to withdraw most of its deployed troops by 2016, though also to leave around 1,000 to protect diplomats and other officials. However, the endemic insecurity in much of Afghanistan makes this frankly implausible. In short, Washington will continue to fight a war in Afghanistan while also pouring troops into Iraq to combat the Islamic State. After eleven years in Iraq and thirteen in Afghanistan, neither war shows any sign of ending.
https://www.opendemocracy.net/paul-rogers/afghanistaniraq-back-to-future
Pakistan has long been accused of aiding the Afghan Taliban as a means of maintaining its influence in Afghanistan. Its primary strategic motive - which has survived many changes of leadership in Islamabad - is to limit India's role in the region. Indeed, few external analysts appreciate how deeply fear of Indian power runs among the Pakistani elite. In particular, this underlies the army's determination to expand Pakistan's nuclear force (a project now underway). In political and economic areas too, Pakistan is greatly concerned by the involvement of Indian organisations, both governmental and commercial, in Afghanistan's development.
In the wings
Taliban elements have been steadily encroaching on a swathe of territory across much of southern and southeastern Afghanistan. The final phases of the main western evacuation have been relatively quiet, though almost certainly this is because Taliban commanders calculate that there's little point in losing men to western troops when most of the latter are leaving.
The Taliban also benefit via revenues from opium production, which was at an all-time high in late 2013 (according to United Nations sources). The supply will probably hold at current levels, despite the United States and coalition partners having spent $7.5 billion on attempted eradication. Much of the opium is in areas of Taliban influence, thus making appropriate "taxation" of production and transport an easy source of income to finance the movement's activities.Most current Taliban violence is directed at the Afghan army and police rather than the departing westerners. Indeed, some districts quite close to Kabul are becoming no-go areas for government forces.
On the ground
The concerns raised by such attacks are increased by doubts about the capacity of the Afghan security forces. In early 2014, as the US withdrawal was being contemplated, it became obvious that the Afghan police and army could not cope.
The United States's intention is still to withdraw most of its deployed troops by 2016, though also to leave around 1,000 to protect diplomats and other officials. However, the endemic insecurity in much of Afghanistan makes this frankly implausible. In short, Washington will continue to fight a war in Afghanistan while also pouring troops into Iraq to combat the Islamic State. After eleven years in Iraq and thirteen in Afghanistan, neither war shows any sign of ending.
https://www.opendemocracy.net/paul-rogers/afghanistaniraq-back-to-future