Favour Tejas to Meet IAF Needs | idrw.org
Winston Churchill, as the First Lord of Admiralty in 1911, is credited with "technological prescience" by British commentators for building the 12-inch gunned Dreadnought-class battleships. When the First World War began, the Royal Navy's Grand Fleet was the British force to keep Kaiser Wilhelm II's seaward ambitions in check even as an unprepared army was mowed down by the German juggernaut, in the opening phase.
Remarkably, the Churchillian kind of prescience was manifest in Jawaharlal Nehru's nursing a weapons-capable nuclear energy programme because he believed India could not afford to miss out on the "nuclear revolution" as it had done the "gun-powder revolution" consequenting in its enslavement. And, in the conventional military field, it was evident in his seeding an indigenous defence industry with combat aircraft design and development at its core. Nehru imported, not combat aircraft but, a leading combat aircraft designer—the redoubtable Kurt Tank, progenitor of the Focke-Wulfe warplanes for Hitler's Luftwaffe. Tank succeeded in putting an HF-24 Marut prototype in the air by 1961 and in training a talented group of Indian designers at Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL).
By the time the Tank-trained Raj Mahindra-led team designed the successor Marut Mark-II, Nehru was gone and neither Lal Bahadur Shastri nor his successor, Indira Gandhi, unfortunately had the strategic vision or technological prescience to provide political support for it. Indira permitted the purchase of the British Jaguar aircraft for low-level attack, leading to the termination of the Marut Mk-II optimised for the same mission. It ended the chance of India emerging early as an independent aerospace power in the manner Brazil and Israel have done in recent years. The inglorious era of importing military hardware was on. The resulting vendor-driven procurement system has decanted enormous wealth from India to arms supplier states—Russia, UK, France, the United States, Israel and Italy.
Arun Jaitley, the BJP finance minister-cum-defence minister, is saddled with the familiar problem of too many high-cost government programmes and too little money. He has an opportunity to reduce the huge hard currency expenditure involved in buying foreign armaments and reverse the policy of ignoring indigenous options and private sector defence industrial capability. He can give the lead to the Indian military as the British Treasury had done to the Admiralty in 1918-1938 by pushing for the development of aircraft carriers when the Royal Navy was stuck on the Dreadnought.
There are two far-seeing decisions he can take. With the US bid of $840 million for 150 M-777 light howitzers (without technology transfer) rejected as cost prohibitive, Jaitley can instruct the army to test and induct the modern, ultra-light heliportable gun, to outfit the new offensive mountain corps, produced jointly by a private sector company and an American firm, Rock Island Arsenal, that'll cost less than half as much. And he could terminate the Rafale contract and, importantly, restore responsibility for the Tejas programme to the IAF, which was kept out of it by the science adviser—SA—to defence minister V S Arunachalam in the 1980s. It will mean IAF funding further developments in the Tejas programme from its own R&D budget which, according to an ex-senior defence technologist, can be increased to any amount, and was the course of action recommended by the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) and SA. It will render IAF accountable to Parliament.
The choices before the BJP government are stark. Is it pragmatic to channel in excess of $30 billion to Paris that'll keep the French aerospace sector in clover and help amortise the multi-billion Euro investment in developing the Rafale, which has no customers other than IAF? Or, use the present difficulties as an opportunity to fundamentally restructure the Indian military aviation sector? This last will involve getting (1) HAL to produce the low-cost (`26 crore by HAL's reckoning) Tejas Mk-1 for air defence with 4.5 generation avionics, low detection, and other features, for squadron service, and to export it in line with prime minister Narendra Modi's thinking and to defray some of the plane's development costs, and (2) ADA and the Aircraft Research & Design Centre at HAL to redesign Tejas Mark-2 as a genuine MMRCA with the originally conceived canard-delta wing configuration (whose absence has made the Mk-1 incapable of meeting onerous operational requirements, like acceleration and sustained turn rates in dogfights) and having it ready for production by 2019—the dateline for Rafale induction.
With the Rafale potentially out of the picture and IAF left with only a limited-capability Tejas for air defence, security needs for the next 15 years until the Russian Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft enters IAF in strength, can be met by buying additional Su-30s and MiG-29s off-the-shelf and/or contracting for larger numbers of the Su-30s to be built by HAL with a deal to get the private sector to manufacture the required spares in-country, all for a fraction of the cost of Rafale. Some Service brass do not care for Russian aircraft but Su-30MKI and MiG-29 are already in IAF's employ, and are rated the two best warplanes available anywhere (barring the discontinued American F-22) for combat and air defence respectively. A new Su-30MKI, moreover, costs $65 million, which is slightly more than what India forks out for upgrading the 30-year-old Mirage 2000.
Had the design-wise more challenging canard-delta winged Tejas, recommended by four of the six international aviation majors hired as consultants, not been discarded and international best practices followed from when the Light Combat Aircraft programme was initiated in 1982, ADA (design bureau), HAL and IAF would have worked together. IAF would have inputted ideas at the design and prototype stages, HAL produced the prototypes, and IAF pilots flown them. The design validation and rectification, certification, pre-production, and production processes would then have been in sync and progressed apace. The Tejas air defence variant will have entered squadron service and the larger Mk-2, close behind, occupied the MMRCA slot. The lessons are that indigenous weapons projects demand integrated effort, weapons designers need to be less diffident and Indian military ought to helm indigenous armaments projects. Jaitley can ensure these things happen.
Edit:
@ersakthivel : I hope this is not written by you... lol...because it presents your and mine views
And this Article raises again an old question Can Tejas MK2 be a MMRCA
See my comments on the comments section of this article in the following link,
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Favour Tejas to Meet IAF Needs | Security Wise
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Effective combat range with effective weapon load will depend upon the criteria called fuel fraction, i.e weight of internal fuel/empty operational weight of the fighter.
In this area even tejas mk1 better than gripen C.
Then a question arises why range of tejas was often quoted less, it may be due to the reason that new super sonic center line fuel tank was not validated till IOC-2, Even without that The press information beruau release clearly stated that the combat range of tejas is 500 Km. It means a combat range in excess of 1000 Km in a low penetration fuel consuming flight into enemy territory, with extra fuel allocation for take off, a few minutes of high fuel consuming close combat and high fuel consuming After burner thrust .
But other fighter makers give misleading combat range figures with minimum weapon config and high altitude(less fuel consuming flight path) with no allocation for close combat and AB thrust and low penetration mode.
Roughly the fuel fraction above will give us effective combat utilization of the fighter.
Su-30MK: 34.9%(Empty weight: 17,700 kg,Internal fuel: 9,500 kg)
Rafale: 31.4% ~ 33.6%(Empty weight: 9,500 ~ 10,220 kg,Internal fuel: 4,680 ~ 4,800 kg)
JAS-39NG: 30.6%(Empty weight: 7,100 kg,Internal fuel: 3,130 kg)
MIG-35: 28.6%(Empty weight: 12,000 kg,Internal fuel: 4,800 kg)
Tejas: 27.0%(Empty weight: 6,500 kg,Internal fuel: 2,400 kg)
JF-17: 26.3%(Empty weight: 6,450 kg,Internal fuel: 2,300 kg)
JAS-39C: 25.0%(Empty weight: 6,800 kg,Internal fuel: 2,268 kg)
This is a fair comparison of fuel fractions with just internal fuel , and the same percentage will more or less reflect with external fuels also,
So Tejas mk-1(which still has 400 KG of flight test equipment on board, removal of them will lead to even better fuel fraction) itself has much better fuel fractions than grippen C/D with more TW ratio and lower wing loading,
Tejas mk-2 will easily compare to RAFALE which has just 4 percent more in fuel fractions than Tejas mk-1.
So in indian conditions there won't be no issues with range of tejas mk-1 or mk-2 in useful combat configuration if we take into account that four tejas can be operated for one RAFALE if we include total lifecycle costs and upgrade costs,
So there is no way Tejas can be faulted on weapon load or range. A full read of the link above will show how fighter makers abroad indulge in word play when it comes to range and load figures!!! , to fool the people.
Also indian hot atmospheric conditions sap close to 10 percent of engine thrust and 12 percent of wing lift.
So most of the fancy , combat specs ,pay load and range figure mentioned in the glossy brochure wont be achieved in indian climatic conditions.
All tejas specs are for indian hot climate, but other fighter maker's specs are for IDSA temp which is far less than indian atmospheric temp.
Close coupled canards are discarded in all fighters from latest fighters from Russia(SU-35) and F-35, F-22 from US, because of RCS concerns arising from latest gen ASEA radars,
the cranked delta of tejas also does the same job done by canards i.e vortex creation o delay flow separation.
And LEVCONS(like in PAKFA) can do the job of canards without giving extra radar reflection like canards.
anards also have may tricky control issues like force coupling and pilot induced oscillation which restrict the efficiency of wing.
And there are many types of canard arrangements like close coupled on rafale and long momentum arm like typhoon , each of them having their own tricky control issues.
canards were considered on F-35 and later dropped.
Even for the evolution of F-16 ino F-16 XL its designers chose cranked delta like tejas , with concerns over RCS emissions from canards. Also in canard arrangements canards are designed to stall before the main wing, so the main wing never achieves its full efficiency.
There are already some videos on the net with two gripen pilots facing the pilot induced oscilation problem peculiar to canards and let the plane crash unable to recover from it.
Eventhough later it was claimed that this problem was resolved, we don't know how it was done or whether any flight envelope restrictions were added because of this.
That is the reason why US and Russian fighter designs always rejected canards in their latest 5th gen fighters and are employing compound delta with levcons(same arrangement proposed for tejas mk2).
The Chinese J-20 was a copy of the rejected mig 1.44 delta canard stealth version(in favour of LEVCON , compound delta in pakfa exactly present in tejas mk2).
So redesigning tejas with canards will be an extremely job throwing its induction into jeopardy.
Also the reason cited by ADA for not including canards was,
1.it will add 3 feet to fuselage length,
2,It will add more weight .
3.During wind tunnel testing for the small airframe design of tejas , it did not give any considerable performance enhancement for the above two penalties it imposed.
It is pertinent to note that gripen C which had canards is 300 Kg more in empty weight in tejas and 3 feet longer in length.
In indian hot atmospheric condition which already saps 12 percent engine thrut and lift this added weight and drag will make tejas further underpowered.
Also in a quest to make gripen E more of an MMRCA new fairings were added to it further increasing drag and now it weighs more than 7 tons in empty weight.
But the path chosen for tejas mk2 is very simple. Add 0.5 meter in fuselage to smoothen the cross section increase between 4 and 5 meter lengths in fuselage and retain the same design and go for further weight reduction by increasing the percentage of composites to more than 50 percent.
It will make teja mk2 far more effective and developmental path would be very short and less complex with no time over run.
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The following is Mr. Bharath karnad's response to my above comments,
I am not technically proficient in these matters, but I have, I think, good intuition on most matters technological and strategic, and can grasp the basics fast. Should have mentioned the Levcons built into the navalized variant of Tejas as the most suitable Mk-2- AMCA option. Regret not doing so. But thank you for response(s) on this and other issues re: Tejas/MMRCA on earlier occasions. Between the contributions to this blog by you and @RV, have learned an awful lot about combat aircraft architecture and technologies — as no doubt have the other readers of this blog. Thanks again!