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Great Idea....please do the honors!
50th anniversary of 1965 Indo-Pak War
- Thread starter cobra commando
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Alien
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1965 battle: A war of perceptions India won
The India-Pakistan war of 1965 was also a war of perceptions.
India, while defending its territory from Pakistani aggression, also had to slew its inner demons (like the memory of the 1962 debacle) to take the fight to the enemy's doorstep. India's new victory narrative may be debatable, but the country undoubtedly was successful in 1965 in fighting off the perception that it was a passive state with a passive military.
Yet all of it didn't happen in a flash; there was a lot of legwork that was done to boost the morale of the Indian Army, especially after its poor show against Pakistan in the latter's Kutch offensive. The then army chief, general J N Chaudhury, is rarely given any credit for his leadership in that war but it was he who had realized the need to seize the initiative from the Pakistanis. As a result, on the intervening night of May 16 and 17 at Kargil, 34 years before a conflict there redefined Indo-Pak relations in 1999, two companies of the 4th battalion, Rajput Regiment, surprised and overwhelmed the Pakistanis perched on top of Black Rocks and Point 13620—two commanding heights from where Pakistan's Karakoram Scouts had been firing on the Srinagar-Leh Road.
The Rajputs won the day, but lost their company commander who was given the Maha Vir Chakra posthumously. Yet the significance of this operation was lost to the Pakistanis — that the Indians wouldn't remain passive defenders.
Indian army officers with a captured Pakistani tank.
Military historian Mandeep Singh Bajwa, whose father General (then Colonel) K S Bajwa of the artillery had given fire support to the Rajputs, believes this was a pivotal moment. "When the Pakistanis launched Operation Gibraltar (sending infiltrators into Kashmir) in August, India once again quickly countered by capturing the 'jumping points' through which these infiltrations were done—Hajipir Pass is the more famous one now. India also conducted covert and overt ops across the Ceasefire Line (precursor of the LOC) and the Pakistanis knew about it. Yet they weren't alarmed. Later, when they had intel from two trustworthy sources about India's plans for launching a counter-offensive on September 6 across the Radcliffe Line, they chose to rubbish it, believing that the 'dhoti prasads' (a pejorative term used by Pakistanis for then PM Lal Bahadur Shastri and his generals) were incapable of such action," Bajwa said.
When India did cross the international border, it wasn't all too rosy for us. Pakistan had superior armour, guns and aircraft, and as troops on the ground soon found out, even better maps. Yet the grit and determination of the Indian troops eventually prevailed. Major General A J S Sandhu (Retd), who joined the Regiment of Artillery two years after the war, agrees with Bajwa. He believes Indian boots on the ground actually surmounted ominous odds to win this war of perceptions. "My father Lt Col Jaswant Singh was the CO of 7 Punjab. His battalion was tasked with the capture of the Ichhogil Canal, the Bhaini Dhilwal Bridge, and two Pakistani villages Ichhogil Hithar and Ichhogil Uttar. The bridge was first occupied by 1 Jat on September 6, but the Pakistanis retook it the same day. Then 6 Kumaon took it again at night, but was thrown back the next day. Again, 1 Jat and 6 Kumaon tried to capture it on September 7 and 8, but were unsuccessful and suffered heavy casualties. That's when 7 Punjab was deployed on September 12," Sandhu said.
The A and C companies occupied the two villages on September 12 and 13, and beat back all counter attacks by the Pakistanis. The Bhaini Dhilwal Bridge and the Ichhogil Canal were captured on September 16. Pakistan couldn't recapture them throughout the war. "The battalion won 42 gallantry awards—a record in the war, and my father won a VSM. In fact, the Western Army commander Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh, along with the corps and divisional commanders, visited 7 Punjab on September 23 (a day after the ceasefire) to personally congratulate the battalion on its excellent performance. Yet this action is never talked about as the focus remains on Dograi, Barki, Phillora, Asal Uttar and other more popular battles. The Indian Army prevailed despite ominous odds; we need to remember that," general Sandhu said.
Bajwa believes there were many such gallant actions even though the Indian armed forces didn't have strategic objectives. "This war was important because we learnt from our mistakes and in 1971 we achieved the strategic objectives we had set for us. That's why 1971 was such a resounding victory. General Chaudhury deserves applaud because he rebuilt the army after the 1962 debacle, and his good example was followed by his successors — general P P Kumaramangalam and general (later field marshal) Sam Manekshaw," he said.
It may not be wrong to say that 1965 actually helped India bury its ghosts, but raised new demons for Pakistan.
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/...erceptions-India-won/articleshow/49038413.cms
The India-Pakistan war of 1965 was also a war of perceptions.
India, while defending its territory from Pakistani aggression, also had to slew its inner demons (like the memory of the 1962 debacle) to take the fight to the enemy's doorstep. India's new victory narrative may be debatable, but the country undoubtedly was successful in 1965 in fighting off the perception that it was a passive state with a passive military.
Yet all of it didn't happen in a flash; there was a lot of legwork that was done to boost the morale of the Indian Army, especially after its poor show against Pakistan in the latter's Kutch offensive. The then army chief, general J N Chaudhury, is rarely given any credit for his leadership in that war but it was he who had realized the need to seize the initiative from the Pakistanis. As a result, on the intervening night of May 16 and 17 at Kargil, 34 years before a conflict there redefined Indo-Pak relations in 1999, two companies of the 4th battalion, Rajput Regiment, surprised and overwhelmed the Pakistanis perched on top of Black Rocks and Point 13620—two commanding heights from where Pakistan's Karakoram Scouts had been firing on the Srinagar-Leh Road.
The Rajputs won the day, but lost their company commander who was given the Maha Vir Chakra posthumously. Yet the significance of this operation was lost to the Pakistanis — that the Indians wouldn't remain passive defenders.
Indian army officers with a captured Pakistani tank.
Military historian Mandeep Singh Bajwa, whose father General (then Colonel) K S Bajwa of the artillery had given fire support to the Rajputs, believes this was a pivotal moment. "When the Pakistanis launched Operation Gibraltar (sending infiltrators into Kashmir) in August, India once again quickly countered by capturing the 'jumping points' through which these infiltrations were done—Hajipir Pass is the more famous one now. India also conducted covert and overt ops across the Ceasefire Line (precursor of the LOC) and the Pakistanis knew about it. Yet they weren't alarmed. Later, when they had intel from two trustworthy sources about India's plans for launching a counter-offensive on September 6 across the Radcliffe Line, they chose to rubbish it, believing that the 'dhoti prasads' (a pejorative term used by Pakistanis for then PM Lal Bahadur Shastri and his generals) were incapable of such action," Bajwa said.
When India did cross the international border, it wasn't all too rosy for us. Pakistan had superior armour, guns and aircraft, and as troops on the ground soon found out, even better maps. Yet the grit and determination of the Indian troops eventually prevailed. Major General A J S Sandhu (Retd), who joined the Regiment of Artillery two years after the war, agrees with Bajwa. He believes Indian boots on the ground actually surmounted ominous odds to win this war of perceptions. "My father Lt Col Jaswant Singh was the CO of 7 Punjab. His battalion was tasked with the capture of the Ichhogil Canal, the Bhaini Dhilwal Bridge, and two Pakistani villages Ichhogil Hithar and Ichhogil Uttar. The bridge was first occupied by 1 Jat on September 6, but the Pakistanis retook it the same day. Then 6 Kumaon took it again at night, but was thrown back the next day. Again, 1 Jat and 6 Kumaon tried to capture it on September 7 and 8, but were unsuccessful and suffered heavy casualties. That's when 7 Punjab was deployed on September 12," Sandhu said.
The A and C companies occupied the two villages on September 12 and 13, and beat back all counter attacks by the Pakistanis. The Bhaini Dhilwal Bridge and the Ichhogil Canal were captured on September 16. Pakistan couldn't recapture them throughout the war. "The battalion won 42 gallantry awards—a record in the war, and my father won a VSM. In fact, the Western Army commander Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh, along with the corps and divisional commanders, visited 7 Punjab on September 23 (a day after the ceasefire) to personally congratulate the battalion on its excellent performance. Yet this action is never talked about as the focus remains on Dograi, Barki, Phillora, Asal Uttar and other more popular battles. The Indian Army prevailed despite ominous odds; we need to remember that," general Sandhu said.
Bajwa believes there were many such gallant actions even though the Indian armed forces didn't have strategic objectives. "This war was important because we learnt from our mistakes and in 1971 we achieved the strategic objectives we had set for us. That's why 1971 was such a resounding victory. General Chaudhury deserves applaud because he rebuilt the army after the 1962 debacle, and his good example was followed by his successors — general P P Kumaramangalam and general (later field marshal) Sam Manekshaw," he said.
It may not be wrong to say that 1965 actually helped India bury its ghosts, but raised new demons for Pakistan.
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/...erceptions-India-won/articleshow/49038413.cms
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According to other sources, Gen. Chaudhary was a moron and miscalculated everything.
He wanted to withdraw back to Beas and leave Punjab undefended. It was Western Army Commander Harbaksh Singh, who stood firm and decided the fate of battle. On top of that, LBS wanted to continue the war effort to teach Pak a lesson but Gen. Chaudhary came up with incorrect information about ammunition etc. to convince LBS for a ceasefire.
He wanted to withdraw back to Beas and leave Punjab undefended. It was Western Army Commander Harbaksh Singh, who stood firm and decided the fate of battle. On top of that, LBS wanted to continue the war effort to teach Pak a lesson but Gen. Chaudhary came up with incorrect information about ammunition etc. to convince LBS for a ceasefire.
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The only victory India got from 1965 was the war that followed in 1971
Alien
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1965 war hero 'Professor' reveals top IAF officer a Pak mole who bled India
Wing Commander (Retd) JM Nath (87) recalled the sordid saga which the IAF had to take in its stride in the run up to the war, when a senior level IAF officer who controlled all flight movements on the Indian side leaked flight plans to the Pakistanis.
Jugal R Purohit | New Delhi, September 21, 2015 | Posted by Dianne Nongrum | UPDATED 00:16 IST
Wing Commander (Retd) JM Nath was Flight Commander of strategic Photo Reconnaissance Squadron No. 106.
As an air force pilot, he flew his English Electric Canberra plane into territories like Aksai Chin, Tibet as well as Lahore at the very peak of hostilities with Pakistan and China. He fired not a single bullet and yet he 'shot' these places in a way that the nation, twice over, conferred upon him the Maha Vir Chakra (MVC), a distinction which is as rare as it gets. On Monday, he walked down the lawns of India Gate, where the government is celebrating efforts like his in the form of a commemorative exhibition and carnival titled Shauryanjali.
Wing Commander (Retd) JM Nath (87), a resident of Mumbai felt overwhelmed and said. "I am thankful for these efforts which are educating our people about a war which was long forgotten," he said.
Back then, as the Flight Commander of strategic Photo Reconnaissance Squadron No. 106, he had the unenviable task of flying unescorted on long missions into enemy territory during broad daylight to photograph enemy installations, armed forces formations and help prepare an informed response.
Recalling a sordid saga which the IAF had to take in its stride in the run up to the war, Nath said, "In the IAF there was a mole, that too at a very senior level in the form of an officer in Western Air Command who controlled all the flight movements of ours. He'd give Pakistanis all they wanted and that is how when our reconnaissance plane went over Pakistan on the morning of April 10, 1959, the pilot found the PAF Sabres actually waiting and obviously bombed him."
According to him, even before the war, reconnaissance flights over Pakistan had to be conducted. "The Pakistanis were creating some or the other trouble and the army had sensed something would come up so we were asked to help army prepare. Generally, our plane would fly at over 48,000ft, which was inaccessible to the Pakistani planes. However that day, at about 30,000ft the Sabres were waiting. When we found out, the said officer, a Group Captain was thrown out. This event helped us become tighter and more secretive. In fact, the then Air Chief, Marshal Arjan Singh gave me the code name 'Professor' and would directly assign to me missions."
"When Pakistan initiated trouble in J&K in August 1965 and followed it up with Operation Grand Slam, attacking Chamb-Jaurian sector in Jammu, we had to open a second front. But how do you decide where to do so? That is where I got involved in the '65 war," he said.
Recalling his days, "My task was to fly into Pakistan and shoot pictures to help army know what they were up against. One day, I was asked to fly to Pathankot and into Pakistan to take photos of Lahore, Icchogil canal and Sargoda to see how their army was deployed and find their weakest spot. Decision to hit Burkee came from that."
On that day, since the air war hadn't fully begun, the IAF positioned two MiG21s near Amritsar to help Nath in case the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) crossed over. However, in the Pakistani skies, he was on his own. And he did fare well.
"I would fly at tree top level and climb up to shoot and would remain so for about 5-10 minutes and again drop down to evade radar. So the window to hit me was quite small," he said. To his own surprise, he completed his task and was happily going back when he picked up four Pakistan Sabre fighter jets on his tail. "I did multiple manouvres and evaded them and reached Indian skies in a way that our MiGs thought I was an intruder and almost shot me!" he remarked.
Since Nath had actively participated in the 1962 war with China, he had some harsh words for the government of that day. "I flew over Aksai Chin and right up to the far east and could remain air borne for three, four hours. The Chinese saw me but could not do a thing. That is because they did not have an air force to speak of. We had asked our big bosses that India should step in with the air force to hit them but our politicians were scared that China would bomb Delhi! They never cleared us. They had no faith in armed forces," he added.
The octogenarian, an alumni of the Government College in Lahore and origin inhabitant of Layyah in Pakistan said what he did would be done and bettered if things came to such a pass. "We need to keep an eye over that country especially its army," he said.
Who is Wing Commander (R) JM Nath?
-> Twin Maha Vir Chakra (MVC) awardee for actions in 1962 and 1965 wars
-> Canberra plane pilot, was flight commander of 106 photo reconnaissance squadron
-> Flew unescorted in day light over enemy territory for images of installations, formations etc
-> Images he brought back were used by Army and IAF for planning attacks
-> One of the most decorated IAF officers of all times
-> Upon retirement, flew commercial flights
Writer is a senior special correspondent and can be followed on Twitter @JRPUR
http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/...ficer-a-pak-mole-who-bled-india/1/479256.html
Wing Commander (Retd) JM Nath (87) recalled the sordid saga which the IAF had to take in its stride in the run up to the war, when a senior level IAF officer who controlled all flight movements on the Indian side leaked flight plans to the Pakistanis.
Jugal R Purohit | New Delhi, September 21, 2015 | Posted by Dianne Nongrum | UPDATED 00:16 IST
As an air force pilot, he flew his English Electric Canberra plane into territories like Aksai Chin, Tibet as well as Lahore at the very peak of hostilities with Pakistan and China. He fired not a single bullet and yet he 'shot' these places in a way that the nation, twice over, conferred upon him the Maha Vir Chakra (MVC), a distinction which is as rare as it gets. On Monday, he walked down the lawns of India Gate, where the government is celebrating efforts like his in the form of a commemorative exhibition and carnival titled Shauryanjali.
Wing Commander (Retd) JM Nath (87), a resident of Mumbai felt overwhelmed and said. "I am thankful for these efforts which are educating our people about a war which was long forgotten," he said.
Back then, as the Flight Commander of strategic Photo Reconnaissance Squadron No. 106, he had the unenviable task of flying unescorted on long missions into enemy territory during broad daylight to photograph enemy installations, armed forces formations and help prepare an informed response.
Recalling a sordid saga which the IAF had to take in its stride in the run up to the war, Nath said, "In the IAF there was a mole, that too at a very senior level in the form of an officer in Western Air Command who controlled all the flight movements of ours. He'd give Pakistanis all they wanted and that is how when our reconnaissance plane went over Pakistan on the morning of April 10, 1959, the pilot found the PAF Sabres actually waiting and obviously bombed him."
According to him, even before the war, reconnaissance flights over Pakistan had to be conducted. "The Pakistanis were creating some or the other trouble and the army had sensed something would come up so we were asked to help army prepare. Generally, our plane would fly at over 48,000ft, which was inaccessible to the Pakistani planes. However that day, at about 30,000ft the Sabres were waiting. When we found out, the said officer, a Group Captain was thrown out. This event helped us become tighter and more secretive. In fact, the then Air Chief, Marshal Arjan Singh gave me the code name 'Professor' and would directly assign to me missions."
"When Pakistan initiated trouble in J&K in August 1965 and followed it up with Operation Grand Slam, attacking Chamb-Jaurian sector in Jammu, we had to open a second front. But how do you decide where to do so? That is where I got involved in the '65 war," he said.
Recalling his days, "My task was to fly into Pakistan and shoot pictures to help army know what they were up against. One day, I was asked to fly to Pathankot and into Pakistan to take photos of Lahore, Icchogil canal and Sargoda to see how their army was deployed and find their weakest spot. Decision to hit Burkee came from that."
On that day, since the air war hadn't fully begun, the IAF positioned two MiG21s near Amritsar to help Nath in case the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) crossed over. However, in the Pakistani skies, he was on his own. And he did fare well.
"I would fly at tree top level and climb up to shoot and would remain so for about 5-10 minutes and again drop down to evade radar. So the window to hit me was quite small," he said. To his own surprise, he completed his task and was happily going back when he picked up four Pakistan Sabre fighter jets on his tail. "I did multiple manouvres and evaded them and reached Indian skies in a way that our MiGs thought I was an intruder and almost shot me!" he remarked.
Since Nath had actively participated in the 1962 war with China, he had some harsh words for the government of that day. "I flew over Aksai Chin and right up to the far east and could remain air borne for three, four hours. The Chinese saw me but could not do a thing. That is because they did not have an air force to speak of. We had asked our big bosses that India should step in with the air force to hit them but our politicians were scared that China would bomb Delhi! They never cleared us. They had no faith in armed forces," he added.
The octogenarian, an alumni of the Government College in Lahore and origin inhabitant of Layyah in Pakistan said what he did would be done and bettered if things came to such a pass. "We need to keep an eye over that country especially its army," he said.
Who is Wing Commander (R) JM Nath?
-> Twin Maha Vir Chakra (MVC) awardee for actions in 1962 and 1965 wars
-> Canberra plane pilot, was flight commander of 106 photo reconnaissance squadron
-> Flew unescorted in day light over enemy territory for images of installations, formations etc
-> Images he brought back were used by Army and IAF for planning attacks
-> One of the most decorated IAF officers of all times
-> Upon retirement, flew commercial flights
Writer is a senior special correspondent and can be followed on Twitter @JRPUR
http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/...ficer-a-pak-mole-who-bled-india/1/479256.html
Alien
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Sure, will do that. Thanks for merging the threads. I had overlooked this one.
pmaitra
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You won't believe, I merged seven threads. Now, seven threads merged into one thread turns out to be merely three pages long. This is ridiculous. We can't have threads with two or three posts per thread. Please keep it consolidated.
Thank you for your cooperation.
thethinker
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India has still not learnt that single lesson of 1965
http://www.rediff.com/news/column/india-has-still-not-learn-that-single-lesson-of-1965/20150924.htm
Last updated on: September 24, 2015 11:57 IST
50 years after the 1965 War India still thinks we can have a 'limited war' when our opponent has time and again shown it does not believe in a limited war, says Colonel Anil A Athale (retd).
India has traditionally elevated old is gold to the level of an ideal.
In 1965 India failed to read the impact of the 1962 defeat. In 1965 it failed to achieve a decisive victory that was within its grasp. No sooner has Pakistan put behind its 1971 defeat as betrayal by Bengalis, it has begun a re-run of its game in Kashmir.
It is difficult to site an exact date, but sometime in the 1980s it began to call Kashmir an occupied territory. Simultaneously it began to call the international border in the Samba sector as a working boundary.
Around the same time China began calling Arunachal Pradesh as Southern Tibet. These are not mere rhetorical flourishes, but change of approach by these two adversaries.
The 1965 War for Pakistan was to liberate Kashmir, now it is to free occupied Kashmir, depicting it as a defensive war with India as the aggressor. Freeing occupied territory is legitimate jihad according to the Quran. Hence, Kashmir has now irrevocably changed from a geopolitical issue to jihad! Have we in India clearly understood the implications?
The 22-day 1965 War ended on September 23 when both sides accepted the United Nations proposal for a ceasefire. We marked 50 years of that event with tributes being paid to the martyrs, as they should be. But true to form, there has been scant analysis and it does appear that we learnt no lessons.
That should not surprise any perceptive Indians. Our history is witness to this. The last intellectual to analyse a war was Maharshi Ved Vyas who subjected the Kurukshetra war to a detailed study in the Mahabharata. That was around 1,500 BC. Since then Indians have fought numerous defensive wars, yet there is no literature or work dealing with it. Is it any wonder that time and time again Indians used war elephants when they were known to have been the root cause of many battles being lost.
Fifty years after the 1965 War, Kashmir is still referred to as the 'unfinished business of Partition,' the infiltration from Pakistan continues with the usual routine denial (as in 1965 and again in 1999 Kargil). India, it seems, has not understood the enemy's motivation, aims, strategy and tactics.
I was a member of the War Studies Division at the ministry of defence where under Dr B C Chakraborty, an official account of the 1965 War was completed. It must be emphasised that the official history is a compilation of facts and not an analysis. In our country we often confuse narration of facts for analysis. One does not need to be a general to do an analysis, basic military knowledge/experience and staff training is enough. A general's forte and importance lies not in analysis, but decision making. In fact the two are even contradictory, a successful general needs to be something of a risk taker, while an analyst needs to objective and calculating.
The late Lieutenant General Eric Vas (then a brigadier) was tasked with the job of studying the war. Subsequently he led an inter-services team that made presentations all over the armed forces institutions. He used to comment that Indians were 'fools,' but luckily for us the Pakistanis proved to be bigger fools.
Just two examples will suffice. On September 1, 1965 when Pakistani tanks crossed the Munnawar Tawi river they ran through Indian defences. The Indians had only light tanks (the French-made Chaffe) since the sole bridge over the Chenab river at Akhnoor (our only access to Chhamb) could only take their weight. India had no answer to the Pakistani M-47 Patton tanks in that area.
By the evening of September 1 (and despite valiant air force efforts to stop them) the Pakistanis reached within shouting distance of Akhnoor.
If the Pakistani forces were to take Akhnoor, the entire division in Rajouri area would be cut off. But the Pakistani armoured brigade inexplicably did not advance and instead went back to Jaurian, further 15 km to the rear. One possible explanation has been that the Pakistani infantry was left behind due to resistance by the Indian infantry.
At that time Akhnoor was totally at the mercy of the Pakistanis and a golden chance was lost. By the time the advance resumed next day, India had pumped in troops for the defence of Akhnoor overnight and Pakistan could never advance an inch.
But an even greater disaster was created for India on the Lahore front by a general who was unnerved by success! On September 6 when India attacked in the direction of Lahore, the Indian troops met no resistance and within a few hours reached the Bata shoe factory on the outskirts of Lahore. The bridge over the Ichhogil canal was captured intact as the Pakistanis did not even have time to blow it up.
Lahore lay within the grasp of the Indian Army. But the general instead of pumping in all available troops and consolidating India's hold over the bridge asked the troops to withdraw, since the advance on the flanks was slow. A General Patton would have said let the enemy worry about his flanks!
Once Pakistan got breathing time, it reinforced the defences to Lahore and Pakistani soldiers fought ferociously to defend their country.
The Indian Army could never again cross the Ichhogil canal in the three weeks of war. The episode was then rationalised, saying the capture of Lahore was never India's aim.
There was, of course, the Khem Karan disaster of Pakistani armour and India getting bogged down in the Sialkot sector. The rest of the war began to resemble the trench warfare of World War I.
One must mention another very bizarre incident of that war. On September 6, around 200 special forces commandos of the Pakistan army were airdropped close to the airfields of Pathankot, Adampur and Halwara. The last two being several kilometres inside Indian territory.
Their task was to destroy Indian Air Force assets. In the actual event, none of them could reach the airfields and were hunted down by the villagers. It is a military axiom that paratroopers must have a link up within 48 hours, else they would be massacred.
It showed a clear lack of foresight and planning on the Pakistani side to recklessly sacrifice its elite troops. More than the tactical stupidity that it was, this also shows how reckless the Pakistani military leadership can be. The Kargil episode in 1999 again showed up this tendency.
As India and Pakistan again engage in a war of words in 2015 the thought uppermost in Indian minds ought to be what the next reckless step Pakistan will take.
A reading of 1965 shows that whenever Pakistan has perceived that it has an edge, it is prone to aggression. That this is despite its nuclear weapons is a matter of worry for not just India, but the rest of the world as well.
One enduring legacy of the 1965 War has been that after this war India no longer ever threatened an attack on Punjab as a retaliation for aggression in Kashmir. We modified our deterrence to 'a limited offensive' to punish transgression. It appears that we then shifted focus to the desert area to 'deter' Pakistani actions in Kashmir. In this deterrence, we failed.
What led to the failure of deterrence in 1965 and subsequently ought to have been a matter of deep concern and study. Fifty years after this event India still thinks we can have a 'limited war' when our opponent has time and again shown it does not believe in a limited aim.
The principle cause of our disasters at Panipat was not lack of bravery or modern weapons, but this lack of clarity in fighting a war. An enemy who is clear about his aim of total war will always triumph over an adversary who believes in 'limits.'
This single lesson of 1965 is still unlearnt.
http://www.rediff.com/news/column/india-has-still-not-learn-that-single-lesson-of-1965/20150924.htm
Last updated on: September 24, 2015 11:57 IST
50 years after the 1965 War India still thinks we can have a 'limited war' when our opponent has time and again shown it does not believe in a limited war, says Colonel Anil A Athale (retd).
India has traditionally elevated old is gold to the level of an ideal.
In 1965 India failed to read the impact of the 1962 defeat. In 1965 it failed to achieve a decisive victory that was within its grasp. No sooner has Pakistan put behind its 1971 defeat as betrayal by Bengalis, it has begun a re-run of its game in Kashmir.
It is difficult to site an exact date, but sometime in the 1980s it began to call Kashmir an occupied territory. Simultaneously it began to call the international border in the Samba sector as a working boundary.
Around the same time China began calling Arunachal Pradesh as Southern Tibet. These are not mere rhetorical flourishes, but change of approach by these two adversaries.
The 1965 War for Pakistan was to liberate Kashmir, now it is to free occupied Kashmir, depicting it as a defensive war with India as the aggressor. Freeing occupied territory is legitimate jihad according to the Quran. Hence, Kashmir has now irrevocably changed from a geopolitical issue to jihad! Have we in India clearly understood the implications?
The 22-day 1965 War ended on September 23 when both sides accepted the United Nations proposal for a ceasefire. We marked 50 years of that event with tributes being paid to the martyrs, as they should be. But true to form, there has been scant analysis and it does appear that we learnt no lessons.
That should not surprise any perceptive Indians. Our history is witness to this. The last intellectual to analyse a war was Maharshi Ved Vyas who subjected the Kurukshetra war to a detailed study in the Mahabharata. That was around 1,500 BC. Since then Indians have fought numerous defensive wars, yet there is no literature or work dealing with it. Is it any wonder that time and time again Indians used war elephants when they were known to have been the root cause of many battles being lost.
Fifty years after the 1965 War, Kashmir is still referred to as the 'unfinished business of Partition,' the infiltration from Pakistan continues with the usual routine denial (as in 1965 and again in 1999 Kargil). India, it seems, has not understood the enemy's motivation, aims, strategy and tactics.
I was a member of the War Studies Division at the ministry of defence where under Dr B C Chakraborty, an official account of the 1965 War was completed. It must be emphasised that the official history is a compilation of facts and not an analysis. In our country we often confuse narration of facts for analysis. One does not need to be a general to do an analysis, basic military knowledge/experience and staff training is enough. A general's forte and importance lies not in analysis, but decision making. In fact the two are even contradictory, a successful general needs to be something of a risk taker, while an analyst needs to objective and calculating.
The late Lieutenant General Eric Vas (then a brigadier) was tasked with the job of studying the war. Subsequently he led an inter-services team that made presentations all over the armed forces institutions. He used to comment that Indians were 'fools,' but luckily for us the Pakistanis proved to be bigger fools.
Just two examples will suffice. On September 1, 1965 when Pakistani tanks crossed the Munnawar Tawi river they ran through Indian defences. The Indians had only light tanks (the French-made Chaffe) since the sole bridge over the Chenab river at Akhnoor (our only access to Chhamb) could only take their weight. India had no answer to the Pakistani M-47 Patton tanks in that area.
By the evening of September 1 (and despite valiant air force efforts to stop them) the Pakistanis reached within shouting distance of Akhnoor.
If the Pakistani forces were to take Akhnoor, the entire division in Rajouri area would be cut off. But the Pakistani armoured brigade inexplicably did not advance and instead went back to Jaurian, further 15 km to the rear. One possible explanation has been that the Pakistani infantry was left behind due to resistance by the Indian infantry.
At that time Akhnoor was totally at the mercy of the Pakistanis and a golden chance was lost. By the time the advance resumed next day, India had pumped in troops for the defence of Akhnoor overnight and Pakistan could never advance an inch.
But an even greater disaster was created for India on the Lahore front by a general who was unnerved by success! On September 6 when India attacked in the direction of Lahore, the Indian troops met no resistance and within a few hours reached the Bata shoe factory on the outskirts of Lahore. The bridge over the Ichhogil canal was captured intact as the Pakistanis did not even have time to blow it up.
Lahore lay within the grasp of the Indian Army. But the general instead of pumping in all available troops and consolidating India's hold over the bridge asked the troops to withdraw, since the advance on the flanks was slow. A General Patton would have said let the enemy worry about his flanks!
Once Pakistan got breathing time, it reinforced the defences to Lahore and Pakistani soldiers fought ferociously to defend their country.
The Indian Army could never again cross the Ichhogil canal in the three weeks of war. The episode was then rationalised, saying the capture of Lahore was never India's aim.
There was, of course, the Khem Karan disaster of Pakistani armour and India getting bogged down in the Sialkot sector. The rest of the war began to resemble the trench warfare of World War I.
One must mention another very bizarre incident of that war. On September 6, around 200 special forces commandos of the Pakistan army were airdropped close to the airfields of Pathankot, Adampur and Halwara. The last two being several kilometres inside Indian territory.
Their task was to destroy Indian Air Force assets. In the actual event, none of them could reach the airfields and were hunted down by the villagers. It is a military axiom that paratroopers must have a link up within 48 hours, else they would be massacred.
It showed a clear lack of foresight and planning on the Pakistani side to recklessly sacrifice its elite troops. More than the tactical stupidity that it was, this also shows how reckless the Pakistani military leadership can be. The Kargil episode in 1999 again showed up this tendency.
As India and Pakistan again engage in a war of words in 2015 the thought uppermost in Indian minds ought to be what the next reckless step Pakistan will take.
A reading of 1965 shows that whenever Pakistan has perceived that it has an edge, it is prone to aggression. That this is despite its nuclear weapons is a matter of worry for not just India, but the rest of the world as well.
One enduring legacy of the 1965 War has been that after this war India no longer ever threatened an attack on Punjab as a retaliation for aggression in Kashmir. We modified our deterrence to 'a limited offensive' to punish transgression. It appears that we then shifted focus to the desert area to 'deter' Pakistani actions in Kashmir. In this deterrence, we failed.
What led to the failure of deterrence in 1965 and subsequently ought to have been a matter of deep concern and study. Fifty years after this event India still thinks we can have a 'limited war' when our opponent has time and again shown it does not believe in a limited aim.
The principle cause of our disasters at Panipat was not lack of bravery or modern weapons, but this lack of clarity in fighting a war. An enemy who is clear about his aim of total war will always triumph over an adversary who believes in 'limits.'
This single lesson of 1965 is still unlearnt.
