1) The Indian Navy was all but immobilized. Even when the Indian Navy in the words of its own officers was humiliated by the sneek raid on Dwarka. A decision to not deploy, was not without its rationale though. Indian Navy budget was going down for last 4/5 years and a large portion of the Indian Navy was undergoing repairs.
2) While Indian Army did per the requirements, there were some low points also. The good officers did very well while the stupid officers made an absolute ass of themselves. Luckily the later kinds were not very many. Besides the Indian Army did not lack good fighters and officers, in quantities. There were some unbelievable personal heroism and personal fighting skills displayed. The post-62, rearmament was only half way through in the Indian Army. The then Army chief later mentioned that after the Kutch incident, he anticipated a Pakistani attack in Kashmir.
3) IAF managed better but they were not given enough time and the then ACM has complained about that. IAF modernization had only just been sanctioned and it is alleged that the prevailing understanding was that airforces are only an adjunct to the ground forces. Nonetheless the operations were very well managed despite the IAF having to keep significant assets out of the war to take care of the Chinese, should they too try to take the benefit of the Pakistani belligerence. The modernization of IAF really took off after the 1965 war.
4) The UN pressure was too much - even the USSR, that was helping arm us was diplomatically (in UN), not with us.
5) India esp.under LBS was never supposed to win 1965. Pakis had been armed well by their benefactors - US & Chiina. Pakistanis thought they had the best attack plan that could be executed under the most favourable strategic situations (62 loss) and I thinks Pakistanis also believed that 65 was their last chance at getting Kashmir. But the LBS+Chavan combo broke all anticipations and perceptions. The Defence Minster had both the confidence of the PM and the maturity to take quick decisions autonomously. Both acted calmly and with purpose. These two guys probably were the biggest weapon in our hands.
2) While Indian Army did per the requirements, there were some low points also. The good officers did very well while the stupid officers made an absolute ass of themselves. Luckily the later kinds were not very many. Besides the Indian Army did not lack good fighters and officers, in quantities. There were some unbelievable personal heroism and personal fighting skills displayed. The post-62, rearmament was only half way through in the Indian Army. The then Army chief later mentioned that after the Kutch incident, he anticipated a Pakistani attack in Kashmir.
3) IAF managed better but they were not given enough time and the then ACM has complained about that. IAF modernization had only just been sanctioned and it is alleged that the prevailing understanding was that airforces are only an adjunct to the ground forces. Nonetheless the operations were very well managed despite the IAF having to keep significant assets out of the war to take care of the Chinese, should they too try to take the benefit of the Pakistani belligerence. The modernization of IAF really took off after the 1965 war.
4) The UN pressure was too much - even the USSR, that was helping arm us was diplomatically (in UN), not with us.
5) India esp.under LBS was never supposed to win 1965. Pakis had been armed well by their benefactors - US & Chiina. Pakistanis thought they had the best attack plan that could be executed under the most favourable strategic situations (62 loss) and I thinks Pakistanis also believed that 65 was their last chance at getting Kashmir. But the LBS+Chavan combo broke all anticipations and perceptions. The Defence Minster had both the confidence of the PM and the maturity to take quick decisions autonomously. Both acted calmly and with purpose. These two guys probably were the biggest weapon in our hands.
. We can name it United States of South Asia if you like 
.
