To be frank, neither the BJP nor the Congress can come to power on their own steam.
Therefore, they will be in coalition and so long as that happens, there can be no religious politics upfront. The country is also tired of this secularism gimmick which sounds attractive, but in reality does nothing to translate what is stated. In fact, the continuous attempts to divide the country on religious and caste lines by the political parties is getting everyone’s goat since people are no longer illiterate and be taken for a ride.
It is time that India thinks of itself as one and not as a union of differences.
The Third or the Fourth Front has very little chance of coming to power, but will be a cashing in on the horse trading that will go on after the elections, when there will be a hung Parliament.
On Kargil, it was an area that was being guarded by four battalions and a two BSF companies. It used to be guarded by three battalions and two BSF companies. The review of threat perception indicated that this was adequate even though it left gaps. The threat perception was not incorrect as was proved by the failure of Op Badr. It was a calculated risk that had to be taken given the overall operational requirement of the Army as a whole. The premise was that while the Pakistan’s could infiltrate and hold heights, they would not be able to do for long since there was no axis of maintenance. Unless there is an axis of maintenance, no operation can sustain itself, more so if there is a violent reaction from the defender. When Pakistan did infiltrate and hold heights, the inevitable happened. India undertook the Kargil Operations and the Pakistanis were sent reeling back to their side of the LC.
The reason why a Division occupies what an Independent Brigade used to occupy is to ensure that even if the enemy cannot sustain operation should they have infiltrated, even that is now being denied to the enemy. This deployment is more for political reasons wherein not an inch of ground will be lost.
The reason why Op Parakrama was not taken to its logical conclusion was because the US and others felt that further escalation would be detrimental to actions being taken against Afghanistan terrorists and the US forces were on Pakistani soil. It maybe mentioned that one of the biggest hurdle for any operations against Pakistan was the Indian tardy mobilisation which required a month plus. That compromised the strategic surprise and since Pakistan cantonments were close to the border, they could launch first and thus seize the initiative, which is a material factor in the conduct of warfare.
As per Lt Gen Oberoi, the ex DGMO’s article, the concept of the Cold Start to beat the tardy mobilisation and instead have the initiative right from the start, was sent for approval of the Govt during the time when the Chief was Gen Bipin Joshi, who was a visionary person. However, the bureaucrats shot it down.