WAR 1971

EnlightenedMonk

Member of The Month JULY 2009
Senior Member
Joined
Mar 7, 2009
Messages
3,831
Likes
28
A great thread...

I saw a report on TV a few years ago about a military ceremony held every evening at a village in Belgium in honour of Indian soldiers who died trying to save their village from the Nazi onslaught.

It seems they died fighting but didn't yield an inch.

The Belgians honour our soldiers more than our own governments !!!

The life of a soldier doesn't seem to matter to our politicians at all... All they do is play politics... For them, the life of a soldier is just a mere statistic....

Shame on our politicians who don't give our soldiers their due and play around with their salaries with appalling setups like the Pay Commission.

Glory to the Soldiers !!! Glory to the nation !!!
 

EnlightenedMonk

Member of The Month JULY 2009
Senior Member
Joined
Mar 7, 2009
Messages
3,831
Likes
28
Different perspectives of the 1971 war

Hey there guys,

Started this thread so that the different perspectives of the 1971 war could be discussed here. We can discuss about the people, the skirmishes, the tactics associated with the war and what each side learnt from it.

I would request everybody not to give nationalistic rantings and try to keep the discussion civilized and as neutral as possible.

I am myself going to start this by posting two opinions.

  • One about the great Field Marshal Manekshaw by a Pakistani officer
  • Second about the little known General J F R Jacob. This one written by a Jewish Reporter.
 

EnlightenedMonk

Member of The Month JULY 2009
Senior Member
Joined
Mar 7, 2009
Messages
3,831
Likes
28
A view from Pakistan - Manekshaw's War

For 36 years now India’s first field marshal has been the icon of heroism.

“ALL QUIET ON THE EASTERN FRONT”, the melodious message continued ringing in the ears across West Pakistan (present-day Pakistan) by the state controlled media even on December 16, 1971 — a date which will live in infamy.

It is a reminder of the failure of leadership at the time as exemplified by Yahya Khan and his coterie in their handling of the worst crisis the country ever faced.

The Indo-Pak war of 1971 culminated in the creation of Bangladesh. Ironically, General Yahha Khan, Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army (re-designated as COAS in 1972) and President of Pakistan at the time of independence was a staff officer at Military Operations Directorate as a major and General SAM Manekshaw, the COAS of the Indian Army was posted as GSO-I as a Lt-Col. It was ordained that these two erstwhile compatriots would fight a full scale war against each other on 1971. Manekshaw showed uncommon ability to motivate his forces, coupling it with a mature war strategy and the war ended with Pakistan’s unconditional surrender.


Filed Marshal Sam Hormusji Framjee Jamsetjee Manekshaw MC, popular known as Sam Bahadur joined the first batch of 40 cadets at the Indian Military Academy, Dehra Dun, on October 1, 1932. He passed out in 1934 and was commissioned in the Royal Scouts and later to the 12 Frontier Force Rifles.

Manekshaw became the 8th Chief of Army Staff, Indian army when he succeeded General Kumaramangalam on June 7, 1969. In Indian Army the principle of seniority is an established norm since the appointment of General (later Field Marshal) Cariappa as the first C-in-C in 1949. When in April 1966 Mrs Indira Gandhi had informed Manekshaw that she had made up her mind to appoint him the next COAS after General Chaudri’s retirement, he declined the offer and later succeeded Kumaramangalam after his retirement.

General Manekshaw stood up to Mrs Indira Gandhi, the “Iron lady”, when asked to launch the offensive in East Pakistan in April, 1971. He even threatened to resign. He, at that point made it absolutely clear that he would not like any interference in his tasks and that he would guarantee her 100 per cent success. The Prime Minister let the COAS who by virtue of his seniority was also the chairman of Chief of Staff Committee to coordinate with other services.

Once the decision to undertake the operation was taken by the government, Sam set about it in earnest with his counterparts in the Navy and Air Force. He closely coordinated and integrated plans of all three services. On the contrary, the C-in-C Pakistan Navy heard the announcement of war on radio. The strategy as decided by Sam was to mount a multi-pronged attack, bypassing strongly held areas, with the aim of capturing maximum territory in the shortest possible time.

Sam set December 4, 1971 as the date for the launch of operation as the figure 4 was a lucky number. After having agreed upon D-Day the chief conveyed the decision to his army commander and the other two services’ chiefs. By an Indian account, “On December 3, 1971, at about 4:45pm, Pakistan Air Force jets attacked some forward airfields in India. The day and timing of these attacks left one wondering if our D-Day of December 4 had been compromised”.

Sam’s reaction to this was that Pakistan had taken the initiative and Indian operations would now be in response to these actions. Before the Indian troops marched into East Pakistan Sam ensured that the Indian Army did not resort to loot and rape. He also broadcast a message to the troops that, “When you see a Begum, keep your hands in your pockets, and think of Sam”.

Sam was the first Indian officer to reach at Delhi Railway Station to meet the Pakistani POWs. He shared a cup of tea and chatted with them for some time. The POWs were seen shaking their heads, saying that they wished they had generals like this in Pakistan, writes Major-General V K Singh in his book Leadership in the Indian Army.

General Manekshaw was conferred with the rank of Field Marshal on January 1, 1973, and thus became the first of the two Indian Army generals to be awarded this prestigious rank. For 36 years now India’s first field marshal has been the icon of heroism for his role in the creation of Bangladesh in 1971. Manekshaw proved beyond any doubt that the generals who leave their legacy through their varied experiences, failures and successes are those who combine military skills with a mastery of dealing with the civilian holders of power.
By Commodore (retired) Najeeb Anjum for The Dawn, Pakistan

http://parsikhabar.net/a-view-from-pakistan-manekshaws-war/
 

EnlightenedMonk

Member of The Month JULY 2009
Senior Member
Joined
Mar 7, 2009
Messages
3,831
Likes
28
Jewish General who led Indian Army to victory in the 1971 war

In the annals of modern warfare, the 1971 war between India and Pakistan is regarded as a template of brilliance. Within 13 days, the Indian army routed Pakistan in one of the swiftest campaigns of the 20th century.

Occasionally compared to Israel’s victory in the 1967 Six Day War, and studied at military academies as a textbook example of efficient planning, the Indo-Pakistan war gave rise to a new state, Bangladesh, and established India as a regional superpower.

The major general who masterminded and spearheaded India’s offensive, and who accepted Pakistan’s surrender, was Jack Frederick Ralph Jacob, the scion of an old Jewish family from Calcutta. A spry bachelor of 81 who retired in 1978 as the commander of India’s eastern army, he considers that war the highlight of a long and distinguished career as a soldier. Having written a book about it, Surrender at Dacca, published in 2001 by Manohar, he claims that the war was “surely the greatest military feat in our history.”

Although historians are acquainted with his resumé, Jacob is not exactly a household name outside India. As I prepared for my trip to India late last year, I ran across his name in my research. Intrigued by the possibility of interviewing a Jewish warrior from an exotic country whose Jewish community is rooted in antiquity, I asked to meet him.

When I arrived in New Delhi on my last day in India, following relatively brief flights from Cochin and Mumbai, B.B. Mukherjee, a helpful contact from the ministry of tourism, was at the terminal to greet me with the news that Jacob had consented to an interview. I was pleased, but the timing was hardly fortuitous. I was tired, coming down with a cold and a hoarse voice, and my flight back to Toronto was just hours away. Nevertheless, I told Mukherjee I would be ready to talk to Jacob at his home in New Delhi at around five o’clock.

After a shower and change of clothes, I met Mukherjee in my hotel lobby, and off we drove to Jacob’s flat in a non-descript gray apartment building in the centre of this sprawling city and capital of India. When we arrived, one of his Nepalese houseboys opened the door and ushered us into a dimly lit room filled with French furniture and crowded with original Mogul art on the walls.

Jacob, a surprisingly small man with a café au lait complexion and a formal manner, was smartly decked out in a blue blazer, creased pants, shirt and tie. He motioned me to sit down next to him on a narrow couch.

I began by asking him about his role in the war – the 33rd anniversary of which was marked shortly before my trip to India – and his decision to become a soldier. Jacob, whose Baghdadi family settled in Calcutta more than 200 years ago and whose father – Elias Emanuel – was a businessman, was quite effusive, enunciating his words in a posh upper-class Indian accent.

A brigadier-general by 1963 and a major-general by 1967, he was appointed chief of the Eastern Command in 1969 by Gen. Sam Maneckshaw, the Parsi chief of staff. Jacob’s immediate superior was Lt. Gen. J.S. Aurora, a Sikh.

Jacob joined the British army in the summer of 1941 while at university and when India was still a British colony. He did so, he said, “to fight the Nazis.” After graduating from officers training school in 1942, he was posted to northern Iraq in anticipation of a possible German thrust to seize the Kirkuk oil fields. He trained with Glubb Pasha’s Arab Legion, which would be the backbone of Jordan’s army. In the wake of Japan’s defeat, he was assigned to Sumatra. Returning to an independent India after taking a gunnery course in Britain, Jacob commanded a mountain battery and served in an armoured division. Then, in short order, he took artillery and missile courses in the United States and was a general staff officer at Western Command headquarters.

“I didn’t plan to be a career officer,” he said. “I liked the army and stayed on. I did everything I was supposed to do.”

During the mid-1960s, when India fought a war with Pakistan, he was the commandant of the School of Artillery. Subsequently, he was in charge of an infantry division in Rajasthan, where he wrote a much-praised manual on desert warfare. Promoted to chief of staff of the Eastern Command, based in Calcutta, Jacob was soon grappling with insurgencies in Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram.

The Eastern Command was a sensitive one. The partition of the Indian sub-continent in 1947 had led to the emergence of India and Pakistan, which was made up of two distinct and geographically disconnected areas. Although East Pakistan was more populous than West Pakistan, political power rested with the western elite, causing resentment, unrest and calls for autonomy in the other half.

By 1971, East Pakistan was in revolt, and Pakistan’s ruler, Yahya Khan, cracked down. As the violence escalated, with a massive loss of life and an exodus of millions of Hindu refugees into Indian territory, Indo-Pakistani tensions rose.

When India’s prime minister, Indira Gandhi, extended assistance to Bengali rebels who sought to break away from Pakistan and form their own country, Pakistan responded first by attacking rebel camps in India and then, on Dec. 3, by bombing nine northern Indian airfields. In a dramatic broadcast to the nation, Gandhi declared war on Pakistan.

Having watched these developments with mounting concern, Jacob realized that conflict was imminent. “We knew we would have to intervene, but we hardly had any infrastructure and had to build it up,” he recalled.

In consultation with his superiors, he refined his plan to engage Pakistan in a “war of movement” in difficult terrain with few bridges and roads, crisscrossed by rivers and broken up by swamps, mangroves and paddy fields. Jacob’s strategy was clear. Dacca – the heart of East Pakistan – would be captured and Pakistani forces bypassed. Pakistan’s communication centres would be secured and its command and control capabilities destroyed, while its forces would be drawn to the border. Some Indian commanders raised objections to the unorthodox plan, but it was finally approved.

“I planned for a three-week campaign, but it went faster than I expected,” said Jacob, who instinctively understood that speed was essential and that a protracted war would not be in India’s interests: The United Nations would apply pressure on India to halt its offensive, and the Soviet Union – India’s ally – might not be able to fend off calls for a ceasefire.

As fighting raged, Jacob flew to Dacca and wrested unconditional surrender terms from his opposite number, Gen. Amir Niazi, who would later accuse Jacob of having blackmailed him into submission.

“It was a total victory over a formidable, well-trained army,” he observed. “Had Pakistan fought on, it would have been difficult for us.” Indian casualties were 1,421 killed and 4,058 wounded. “We expected higher casualties,” he admitted. The Pakistani figures were much higher, in India’s estimation: 6,761 killed and 8,000 wounded.

Jacob, who calls Surrender at Dacca the most authoritative and objective account of the war to date, ascribed his victory to a few factors – imaginative planning, flexibility of approach, the capacity to react to shifting and perhaps unforeseen events and, of course, luck. But for Jacob, a keen student of warfare, historical context was always of crucial importance. As he put it, “I’ve learned from every campaign since Alexander the Great and Napoleon.”

Looking back, he described his 37-year career in the army as “the happiest and most enjoyable period of my life.” Never once did he feel the sting of anti-Semitism in the Indian army. “But I had some problems with the British,” he said, declining to elaborate. “I don’t like to talk about it.”

Interestingly enough, Jacob – whose Hebrew name is Yaacov Rafael and who serves as president of New Delhi’s one and only synagogue – was not the only high-ranking Jewish officer in the armed forces. “There was another Jewish general, a chap named Samson, and he was in research and development and ordnance. And there was also a Jewish vice-admiral.”

Upon leaving the army, Jacob went into business. But in 1998, he was called out of retirement to be governor of Goa, a former Portuguese colony popular with Israeli tourists. He remained there until 1999, when he assumed the governorship of Punjab, a job he held until 2003.

A three-time visitor to Israel who was once invited there by Yitzhak Rabin when he was the prime minister, Jacob was also on friendly terms with Mordechai Gur, a former Israeli chief of staff. Jacob played an indirect role in India’s decision to establish diplomatic relations with Israel in 1992, but he refused to talk about his role in that diplomatic rapprochement.

Referring to himself as “a very private person,” he was likewise reluctant to speak about his family, apart from saying that his brothers and sisters are deceased.

Today, in his twilight years, Jacob is a writer and lecturer on military and political affairs. But he wryly described his current status as “unemployed.”
By SHELDON KIRSHNER

http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1344543/posts
 

EnlightenedMonk

Member of The Month JULY 2009
Senior Member
Joined
Mar 7, 2009
Messages
3,831
Likes
28
Report by Marine Corps - Part 1

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1984/KRG.htm

Author: KYLE, R.G., Major, Royal Canadian Artillery
Title: Indian-Pakistan War of 1971: A Modern War
Publisher: Marine Corps Command and Staff College


ABSTRACT

This paper examines the origins, conduct and results of
the war between India and Pakistan of 1971 from which the
nation of Bangla Desh emerged. The study compares the
development of religion, culture and economy in East and
West Pakistan which led to the frustration of Bengali
nationalism within the "Islamic Nation" founded in 1947.
The role of the military government from 1958 to 1971 is
also examined to show how its activities further alienated
the people of East Pakistan and contributed to both the
rebellion there and the weakening of its own military
capability.

The second part of the study examines the development
of guerrilla war in East Pakistan between March and December
1971. The Political and Military organization of the
insurgents is analysed along with the counter-insurgency
actions of the government forces. The effects of the war on
India and the policies that nation developed to deal with it
are also analyzed. The roles played by the United States,
China, the Soviet Union, and the United Nations in the
conflict are studied.

The study goes on the analyze the military operations
of India and Pakistan during the fourteen days of
conventional war between them. Finally, conclusions are
drawn concerning the conditions which precipitated the
conflict and the reasons for the success of the Bengali and
Indian forces.

No primary sources of information were available for
this study. Therefore, the author relied heavily on
articles in military journals as well as several books on
the subject.
 

EnlightenedMonk

Member of The Month JULY 2009
Senior Member
Joined
Mar 7, 2009
Messages
3,831
Likes
28
Marine Corps Report - Part 2

CHAPTER I​
ORIGINS OF THE CONFLICT​
When Pakistan was formed in 1947, it was a result of
Islamic nationalism of the Moslems of India. Islam had been
introduced to the Indian sub-continent following the Afghan-
Turkish conquest in the 13th century. A large part of the
native population in the area of East Bengal was peacefully
coverted from Hindu to Islam in the following two centuries.

In the 16th century the Moslem sultanate of Bengal was
absorbed into the north Indian Mughal empire. The Moslem
rulers of the empire were non-Bengali. Their culture was
based on Arabic and Persian influences, and the Urdu
language. Socially, Bengal was divided into a Bengali
Moslem peasantry and a Persianized Urdu speaking ruling
class. 1/

In 1764 the English East India Company succeeded the
Mughals as the government of Bengal. The British rule
encouraged the rise of the Hindu commercial class in Bengal
while the former Urdu-speaking Moslem rulers and landowners
were displaced from their positions of power. In this
climate Bengali culture during the 19th century developed in
a new direction led by the Hindu elite and influenced by the
emerging middle-class of Bengali-speaking Moslems. The
Bengali-speaking Moslems became increasingly conscious of
their ethnic identity and nationalism throughout the 19th
century. For their part, the British were gradually
loosening restrictions on local institutions and government:

Hindu dominated schools and the secular university of
Calcutta played their part in developing Bengali identity
among the Bengali-speaking Moslems. To counter the
continuing loss of position and status, in 1906 the Urdu-
speaking Moslems established the first modern political
movement among the Moslems of India called the All-India
Moslem League. 2/

The concept of a separate state of Pakistan did not
develop until the 1930's when India grew closer to self-
government. By 1937 there were two political parties in
Bengal which formed a coalition provincial government. The
first was a radical peasants and tenants party backed by
Bengali-speaking Moslems, while the other was the more
conservative Moslem League representing the Urdu-speaking
Moslems. This government proposed the "Pakistan Resolution"
calling for the regions of Northwest and Eastern zones of
India where there was a Moslem majority to be grouped into
independent states that would be autonomous and sovereign.

A federation of 12 to 14 states with strong local
governments was envisioned.

Bengal became a war zone during World War II. As well,
in 1943 a famine took more than two million lives. The
destruction and sacrifices of these catastrophes increased
the nationalism and solidarity of the Moslem population in
Eastern India. Support for the "Pakistan Resolution" and
the Moslem League swelled. On August 14, 1947, the nation
of Pakistan was created from the regions of India having a
Moslem majority. Two states, Bengal in the East and Punjab
in the West, were divided into Hindu and Moslem regions.
Only the Moslem sections were included into Pakistan.
Pakistan itself had two wings separated by 1,000 miles of
Indian land.

The partition of Bengal led to the restoration of power
to the traditional Urdu-speaking Moslems who had led the
Moslem League. However, this elite could only be sustained
by the active support of the Urdu-speakers who controlled
West Pakistan. While the Moslem League had sustained Moslem
nationalism in Bengal during the previous decade, it could
not provide a focus and support for the nationalism which
continued to be a potent force among Bengali Moslems. 3/

In East Pakistan, the Bengali-speaking Moslem middle-
class was an important social force. This class comprised
small land owners, professionals and traders. They had a
deep loyalty to Bengali culture, and respect for
parliamentary tradition and the rule of law. In West
Pakistan, land holdings were larger and concentrated in the
hands of fewer people. Power was essentially vested in a
plutocratic and feudal system. West Pakistan had a
population of 42.9 million in an area six times larger than
East Pakistan: East Pakistan had a population of 50.8
million (1961 census). The two parts of Pakistan were
separated by about 1,000 miles and, because of hostilities
with India, it was impossible to maintain land or air
communications across the intervening Indian territory. Air
and sea communications routes were 3,000 miles around the
southern tip of India. The two wings of Pakistan had
a religious belief in Islam in common, but the significant
geographic and social differences increasingly divided the
two wings. 4/

When Pakistan was formed in 1947, it was to be an
Islamic nation. However, the political institutions of the
new nation and the way they would function were left
undefined. The East and West wings could not agree on a
constitution defining the political institutions before the
deadline date for independence. The constitution was left
to be sorted out by the new nation itself, but the different
political traditions and aspirations of the East and West
wings were to be the source of serious, continuing friction.

The British had ruled India (including the territories
making up Pakistan) with a strong central government under
the Viceroy. However, the province of Bengal had developed
a provincial democratic parliamentary system much more
advanced than that of the northwestern provinces. For a
viable constitution these two traditions had to be
reconciled within the concept of the Islamic nation. As
well, the British since 1905, had designed the provincial
representative institutions on the basis of separate
electorates for members of the main religious groups --
Moslem and Hindu. West Pakistan had the majority of Moslems
(42.9 million) in the new nation since about one fifth of
the population (10 million of 50.8 million) of East Pakistan
was Hindu. If Pakistan was to continue the tradition of
separate electorates, then West Pakistan would dominate.
But if a single electorate was constituted, then East
Pakistan would dominate while owing its control to its Hindu
minority. Thus, from the beginning, the Islamic nation
concept involved friction between the nationalism and power
of different cultural and social communities within the
state. 5/

For the next seven years, the National Assembly in
Karachi wrestled with the drafting of a constitution.
However, by 1952 Bengali nationalism was reasserting itself
in a number of political parties, the most important being
the Awami League led by Sheikh Mujib-ur Rahman.

In provincial elections in 1954 the conservative Moslem
League was swept from power in East Pakistan by a coalition
of Bengali nationalist parties. When the new government
leader, Fazlul Haq, of East Pakistan made a speech
supporting the reunification of the old province of Bengal,
the national government in Karachi dismissed the provincial
cabinet and imposed Governor's rule. Any large increase of
non-Moslem population in East Pakistan (such as that of West
Bengal) would have further unbalanced the power between East
and West Pakistan as well as brought a real threat of war
with India. With the endless constitutional debate and
steady deterioration of the cohesion of Pakistan, the
President of Pakistan dismissed the National Assembly.
Under threat of imposition of military rule a cabinet with
members drawn from various sections of political opinion was
appointed and tasked to frame a constitution.

By 1956 a constitution had been drafted which included
the concept of parity and equal status between the two
communities of East and West Pakistan. This concept had the
support of most leaders in East Pakistan. While the
arrangement did not go as far as the original resolution of
1937 which called for "autonomous and sovereign" states, it
did maintain a political balance between East and West.
However, West Pakistan comprised fourteen states of the old
India of which the Punjab was the largest it would dominate
the affairs of West Pakistan: the politicians in the West
could not agree to accept this arrangement. Although the
constitution was proclaimed law, elections were never held.
In 1958 the President, Islamabad Mirza, abrogated the
constitution, and he was soon deposed by the Army Chief of
Staff, General Ayub Khan, who proclaimed martial law. The
army had moved to fill the power vacuum created by the lack
of workable political institutions. 6/

The military government of General Ayub concentrated
power toward a central executive government. A new
constitution was proclaimed in 1962 replacing sovereignty of
the people with the sovereignty of Allah. Effective
electoral power was given to an equal number of nobilities
from both wings of the nation, but the national and
provincial legislatures were given only minor powers. Most
powers were concentrated in the presidential executive
located in Karachi. General Ayub had created an autocratic
government in the tradition of the Urdu-speaking Moslems.
The Bengali movement for autonomy of East Pakistan was left
virtually without influence or power.

In the period 1960-1970, the Bengali's felt dominated
economically as well as politically by West Pakistan. East
Bengal lacked natural resources, was remote from main trade
routes, and was limited by a large expanding population
which was difficult to feed. The main exports were jute and
tea. Traditionally, these crops were exported to West
Bengal in exchange of manufactured goods. After partition
in 1947, the economic dependence on West Bengal was shifted
to West Pakistan. Here the central managers controlled the
foreign exchange earned by the exports as well as foreign
aid and foreign investment. In West Pakistan, the per
capita income was 61% higher than in East Pakistan. The
Bengalis resented the faster growth and higher incomes of
the West. They tended to blame the much higher proportion
of West Pakistanis in the civil and armed services and many
of the professions for diverting wealth to the West which
was generated in the East.

As resentment was growing, India and Pakistan went to
war over Kashmir in 1965. This conflict ended in stalemate
but it demonstrated the vulnerability of East Pakistan. The
complete cessation of economic activity with India hurt East
Pakistan and reinforced the Bengalis sense of economic
domination from West Pakistan. 7/

The resentment toward West Pakistan fed growing support
for the Awami League. By 1967 the League had adopted a six-
point manifesto aimed at economic and political autonomy for
East Pakistan. According to the manifesto the central
government should only retain control of foreign affairs and
defense while the provincial government should control
economic, taxation, trade and foreign aid policies.

The economic expansion in West Pakistan was also
producing social strains there. Radical socialists competed
with the traditional land-owning elites on which the
government and army were based. By 1968, strong support for
Ali Bhutto's radical Peoples Party emerged in the West wing.
The party's support was based on social justice for the
"common man" and hostility toward India. It was also
opposed to any action which would reduce the political and
economic status of West Pakistan.

In the rising tide of opposition to his policies,
General Ayub called a conference of political leaders to
resolve the most pressing conflicts. However, no settlement
was reached. General Ayub resigned on 26 March 1969 to be
replaced by General Yahya Khan, Commander-in-Chief of the
army. The constitution was again suspended. Pakistan had
reverted back to the position it was at in 1958.

General Yahya quickly promulgated a set of decisions
aimed at reducing political tensions in both wings of the
country. The first addressed the major grievance of East
Pakistan: national elections would be held by December 1970
based on a common electorate in both wings to give East
Pakistan a majority of seats. The second regrouped the 14
political regions of West Pakistan into four provinces more
equal in political power to the Punjab. Later General Yahya
expanded on these decisions with an outline for the transfer
of power from military government to constitutional
institutions.

a. A new constitution had to be prepared by
the national assembly within 120 days after being
called into session.
b. The constitution had to conform to certain
principles which included: a provision that the
territorial integrity and national solidarity of
Pakistan should be respected; and a federation
should be established in which provinces would
have maximum autonomy but, the federal government
would have adequate powers to carry out its
responsibilities for external and internal affairs
and to preserve the independence and territorial
integrity of the country.
c. To ensure that the constitution conformed
to the principles, it had to be approved by the
President.

With these decisions, General Yahya probably intended
to achieve some popular support for the military regime
after the long period of confusion of General Ayub's rule.
The guidelines for the constitution also gave protection to
the central power of armed forces. With the cooperation of
the Bengali members, the army could thwart Mr. Bhutto's
radical Peoples Party in West Pakistan. 8/
 

EnlightenedMonk

Member of The Month JULY 2009
Senior Member
Joined
Mar 7, 2009
Messages
3,831
Likes
28
Marine Corps Report - Part 3

These guidelines were generally acceptable to the
civilian political leaders in both the East and West. As
the election approached, the two most active parties were
Sheikh Mijib's Awami League and Ali Bhutto's People's Party.
The results of the election, however, sent shock waves
through the nation. Of the 313 total seats in the assembly,
the Awami League took 167, a solid majority, all from the
East. Mr. Bhutto's party took 85 seats, all in the west. 9/
The Islamic parties of the old elite were decisively
defeated in both wings, and with this defeat went any hopes
the old elite and the army had of influencing the actions of
the assembly. With a parliamentary majority the Awami
League did not need the army or the old traditional parties
to win support for a draft constitution reflecting the
Bengali concept of autonomy within Pakistani federation.
Admittedly, President Yahya would have final approval of the
constitution, but the results of the election clearly
reflected an overwhelming demand for reform. The President
could draw little comfort from the opposition of Ali Bhutto
in the Assembly. The Peoples Party was equally anxious to
draft a constitution which limited the traditional powers of
the army and the Moslem elites. Again power was split
between the two geographic regions of the nation. 10/

The strong position of the Awami League persuaded many
supporters that there need be no retreat from the manifesto
adopted four years earlier demanding virtual economic
sovereignty for East Pakistan. This degree of autonomy was
unacceptable to the military government as well as Ali
Bhutto's party. There was stalemate again.

The military government of General Yahya was highly
centralized but not particularly sensitive to the political
currents of the civil population. Senior officers held key
positions in both the civil and military administrative
systems. These systems were largely parallel and often
competitive for power. At the top, Yahya held the offices
of Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, Chief Martial Law
Administrator, President and Supreme Commander, Minister of
Defense and Minister of foreign Affairs. Yahya
theoritically had enormous scope for initiative, but the
elite of the army had considerable power which Yahya had to
take into account along with the political factions of the
country. Within the army, opinion generally belonged in one
of three positions: the center, including Yahya, hoped to
transfer power to a civil government headed by Sheikh Mujib
(Awami League) while retaining a special position for the
armed forces; the right, including many senior officers,
hoped to retain the power of the armed forces and opposed
any move toward more autonomy of the provinces and the
social policies of Mr. Bhutto's People's Party; finally, the
left, including many junior officers, combined a strong
nationalist feeling with social opinion leaning toward Mr.
Bhutto's party. The left and the right grew toward a
consensus opposed to any concession to the Awami League
which would weaken the power of the central government. 11/

General Yahya appears to have been unable to reconcile
the widely differing views both within the armed services
and the various political factions. Although Sheikhs
Mujib's party had decisively won the election and therefore
felt it had the right to form the national government, it
could do nothing until the President called the assembly
into session. This Yahya refused to do until the Sheikh
softened his stand on autonomy as stated in the Awami
Leaguer's manifesto. The League, sensing power, refused to
give any concession. Talks between President Yahya, Bhutto
and the Sheikh continued through January 1971, but no
agreement was reached. Finally, on February 13, 1971 Yahya
summoned the Assembly to meet on March 3, 1971. Bhutto
immediately announced his party, with 85 seats, would
boycott the session unless all parties reached a consensus
on an outline constitution before the Assembly met. On
March 1, 1971, President Yahya agreed with Mr. Bhutto and
announced that the Assembly session was postponed
indefinitely. 12/

The postponement of the Assembly session was followed
by widescale rioting and demonstrations throughout East
Pakistan. Sheikh Mujib called a series of general strikes
to demonstrate that East Pakistan would be ungovernable
unless the Assembly was called into session. 13/ It is
unlikely that the civil disorder came as a surprise to the
government for it had been reinforcing the military
garrisons in East Pakistan since mid-February. However,
throughout March, Yahya and Mujib engaged in a complicated
series of negotiations in which some concessions were made.
But on March 25, 1971, Yahya suddenly broke off talks and
left for Islamabad. At the same time the army, which had
been brought up to strength of 40,000 in the East, moved
against the Bengali police, Bengali-manned army units and
other paramilitary forces. Sheikh Mujib was arrested along
with many other Awami League leaders. Newspaper offices
were seized and university halls attacked and occupied. It
seemed that Yahya had used the last session of negotiations
as pretext to allow time for the army to be brought up to
sufficient strength to overwhelm Bengali opposition. 14/
The drive for political and economic autonomy of the
Bengali people entered a new phase. The efforts to win
power through the election process and parliamentary system
were a complete failure. The central military government
was incapable of reconciling the aspirations of the Bengalis
with social reform pressures of the West Pakistanis and the
traditional elitism of the Urdu-speaking Moslems. Military
repression of the Bengali nationalist movement followed.
The Bengali Moslems had a common religion with the Urdu-
speaking Moslems of the West, but social and political
traditions, as well as language and economic base, were
quite different. When Pakistan was formed as an Islamic
nation in 1947, there was no consensus on the form its
political institutions should take. The Moslem states in
the West were governed by traditional elitists who
considered strong federal government essential to preserve
Islamic ideals. The Bengali Moslems' aspirations for more
democratic institutions responsive to regional politics
would not be accommodated by those in the West. At the same
time, demands for social reform in the West by lower-classes
went unheeded.

After more than ten years of political stalemate, the
armed forces, in particular the army, seized power to break
the political deadlock. The officers of the army were
largely drawn from the traditional Moslem elite of the West.
Their administration was highly centralized and emphasized
the economic development as well as the social welfare of
the West and the Urdu-speaking traditional Moslems. This
administration only added to the frustration of the Bengalis
who increasingly saw East Pakistan as an economic and
cultural colony of the West. Indeed, the poorer classes of
people of the West also became increasingly disaffected as
they received little benefit from the economic and social
policies of the army administration. By 1971, after 12
years of military rule, Pakistan was even further from
political unity than it was in 1958.

The years of military rule also had a deleterious
effect on military capability. Government administration
detracted from the professional education of the officers as
well as the combat training of the army as a whole.
Political factions appeared in the army which probably
detracted from the cooperation and trust essential to an
effective military force. When open conflict erupted in
March 1971, the armed forces were forced to disarm and
remove Bengali officers and men. These actions must have
had a serious negative effect on the efficiency of the
services' war fighting capability.

In summary, the common religion of Islam could not
overcome the deep divisions of geography, culture and
political goals. Pakistan moved toward insurrection and
war.
 

EnlightenedMonk

Member of The Month JULY 2009
Senior Member
Joined
Mar 7, 2009
Messages
3,831
Likes
28
Marine Corps Report - Part 4

CHAPTER II
REBELLION AND REPRESSION

When Pakistan's army struck on the night of March 25,
1971, all Awami League leaders were arrested, killed or fled
into exile to India. Sheikh Mujib was arrested and flown to
West Pakistan to await trial on unspecified charges.
President Yahya stated in a radio broadcast the next day
that the Sheikh's "action of starting his non-cooperation
movement is an act of treason." 1/ Disorder and confusion
reigned in Dacca and other parts of East Pakistan. Many
civilians were killed as the army struck violently to clear
barricades in the cities. The Dacca University was shelled
and occupied; this resulted in many casualties. Police and
Bengali soldiers in Dacca were disarmed and detained. 2/
The army became an army of West Pakistanis and was viewed by
Bengalis as an occupying force.

Outside Dacca the army attacked Bengali officers and
men of the armed forces. The army then moved against other
paramilitary organizations such as the police, border
security forces and the militia. In some cases, the attacks
lasted several days but almost everywhere there were heavy
Bengali casualties and destruction. The Bengali military
and police units were scattered throughout the country and
many members began to withdraw toward the borders sabotaging
bridges and rail links where possible. The actions were
brutal and had elements of a cultural war: the army
attacked Bengalis, while Bengalis murdered members of the
Urdu-speaking minorities. By the end of April 1971, the
army had secured the major towns in East Pakistan and
organized resistance ceased. However, the nucleus of an
armed and trained guerrilla force had escaped into India and
to remote areas on the border. At the border Indian units
welcomed the fleeing Bengalis but India played no part in
the resistance at that time. 4/ As April drew to a close,
the attack by West Pakistan on the Eastern wing had
successfully stopped the immediate possibility of armed
revolt. However, the population was subdued but remained
passively hostile. The army reacted to this hostility with
increasing brutality and destruction of civilian property
continued. Civilian refugees began to pour into India.

As news of the uprising and repression in East Pakistan
spread in India, there was considerable public pressure on
the Indian Government to intervene. On March 29, 1971, the
Indian parliament passed a resolution pledging sympathy and
support for the people of East Bengal in their struggle for
the transfer of power to their legally-elected
representatives. The parliament expressed confidence that

"... the historic upsurge of 75 million people of East
Bengal will triumph." 5/ This resolution represented a
change in Indian policy toward Pakistan. Previously, India
had respected the unity of Pakistan in order to protect her
own unity, which had been also threatened by regional
factions and demands for autonomy.

Indian support to the rebels in the following weeks
consisted of assisting voluntary efforts to help the East
Pakistan cause and of encouraging escaped Bengalis to form a
provisional government. India, however, withheld formal
recognition of this government-in-exile. These cautious
actions were probably the result of military advice that
India would not be prepared for military action till after
the monsoon season ended in September. 6/

In response to India's statement of support for the
Bengalis, Pakistan protested that India was interfering in
Pakistan's internal affairs. The apparent object of this
diplomatic effort was to gain international support to
oppose any Indian intervention. But on April 2, 1971,
Russia publicly appealed to Yahya to quickly put an end to
the repression in East Pakistan. Islamabad replied that the
situation was under control and normal routine was being
established. Also on that date, the United States expressed
concern for the human suffering and the need for multi-
national assistance. President Nixon was probably concerned
that the balance of power in Asia would be upset and he was
anxious not to jeopardize the effort to develop closer
relations with China. 7/ The U.S. needed a stable Asia and
support of China to implement the planned withdrawal from
Vietnam.

Although slow in coming, on April 13 China expressed
support for President Yahya's efforts. Chou En-lai stated
that should India attack Pakistan, China would fully support
the Pakistani people and government to safeguard "State
Sovereignty" and national independence. The phrasing was
important as it did not state full support for the unity and
integrity of the nation as Pakistan wanted. From April
onwards, China provided economic and military assistance
appropriate to their statement of support; that is,
sufficient to guarantee only that in a war with India the
Western wing would survive, but not necessarily the Eastern
wing. Both India and the Soviet Union had long standing
disputes with China. China's interests would be served by
continuing to have Pakistan interposed between the U.S.S.R.
and India. Should West Pakistan cease to exist, then China
would be surrounded by unfriendly neighbors. On the other
hand, continuing rivalry between Pakistan and India over
East Pakistan would divert India's attention away from her
border with China. Thus survival of West Pakistan was
important to China, while the dispute in East Pakistan would
add to the rivalry between India and West Pakistan to ensure
that India's attention would be diverted from her Northern
border with China.

At the United Nations, Secretary General U. Thant asked
Pakistan to allow United Nations relief agencies to act in
East Pakistan while recognizing that the situation was an
internal matter of Pakistan. President Yahya firmly refused
any outside intervention. 9/ He probably believed that his
policy of counter-insurgency was sufficient to reestablish
control.

By May 1971, organized resistance in East Pakistan had
been crushed. Pakistan diplomacy appeared successful as
most countries viewed the affair as an internal problem.
However, the flow of refugees into India had turned to a
flood. India claimed that the refugees (mostly Bengali
Moslems) were arriving at a rate of 60,000 per day and
now totaled 1.5 million. These people moved mostly into
West Bengal and were costly to India in food and clothing;
furthermore, they were causing a severe economic dislocation
in a province already impoverished. In this situation,
India could do little more than provide indirect support to
the Bengali government-in-exile and provide sanctuary,
training and arms for the guerrilla forces. Diplomatically,
India stressed that whether or not the problem was an
internal one for Pakistan, the refugees were becoming an
internal problem for India: Pakistan must be responsible
for developing conditions for the safe return of the
refugees. 10/

India's diplomatic efforts began to get results.
Britain and the United States declared no new aid would be
extended to Pakistan until the government in Islamabad
cooperated with international relief agencies; however,
United States aid already approved would continue.
Pakistan's economy was weak. There was a shortage of
foreign exchange and exports from East Pakistan had slowed
significantly. 11/ Pakistan needed aid and needed the
return of the economic base of East Pakistan.

Thus in mid-May Pakistan informed the United Nations of
its willingness to accept relief aid if the activity was
coordinated by Pakistani officials. Within a week Yahya
appealed to the refugees to return and announced he would
soon reveal a plan for the orderly transfer of power to the
representatives of the people. Refugee reception centres
were set up and a general amnesty announced on June 10,
1971. The shift in Pakistani policy eased tensions in East
Pakistan. Many influential members of the Awami League
signed a declaration accepting the concept of national unity
and supporting the reintroduction of separate electorates
for Hindus and Moslems. To gain support of the right-wing
factions of the army, Yahya proposed that a new constitution
be drafted by a committee of experts rather than the
National Assembly. Although India now reported more than
six million refugees, the flow slowed considerably and she
was being pressured to accept international assistance for
the repatriation of refugees. 12/

By June, India had become distrustful of United
Nations' actions to repatriate refugees. When Pakistan
shifted ground to accommodate United Nations' actions, India
rejected the proposal for posting United Nations observers
on her border. 13/ India was probably concerned that East
Pakistan would return to the pre-crisis situation with
little or no gain toward self-determination of East Bengal.
Public opinion in India's turbulent eastern provinces also
favored severing Pakistan's link with East Bengal as an
opportunity to weaken a dangerous enemy. India, therefore,
insisted that Pakistan must come to a political solution of
the crisis founded on self-determination for East Bengal
before social and economic aid should be extended. On the
other hand, the United Nations' approach was to put social
and economic recovery in place before a political solution
should be attempted. The United States clearly supported
the U.N. approach which would return the South Asian balance
of power to the pre-crisis condition.

During May and June, leaders of the Awami League who
had fled to India continued to develop the Bangla Desh
movement (as they now called East Pakistan) politically and
militarily. The government-in-exile was nominally headed by
Sheikh Mujib, but because he was under arrest in West
Pakistan, the real head was Tajuddin Ahmid, the prime
minister. 14/

The stated goal of the movement was the independence
of East Pakistan; its unannounced objective was to gain
political power for the Awami League. 15/ To this end, the
government-in-exile tried to exclude Bengalis representing
left-wing and communist movements. The government-in-exile
remained composed principally of Awami League members but
its military arm, the Mukti Fanj, eventually incorporated
armed groups organized by other political factions. 16/

The government-in-exile pursued three broad strategic
programs to achieve its goal. These were:

(a) organizing the support of the population of East
Pakistan;
(b) gaining favorable international support; and,
(c) disrupting the economic strength of Pakistan
through attacks on the lines of communication in East
Pakistan.

To translate the disaffection of the Bengalis into
supportive action for the Bangla Desh movement, an
underground was organized to publicize its goals. Insurgent
propaganda emphasized the atrocities of the Pakistani army
and described the army as an occupation force restoring the
colonial rule of West Pakistan. This program succeeded to
get support in the form of volunteers as well as
information, supplies and concealment in the rural areas.
In the urban areas, the Bengalis were encouraged to boycott
schools, offices and factories to further disrupt the
economy. The insurgents also used terror tactics to
intimidate civil servants and factory managers to keep their
facilities closed. Furthermore, Bengali leaders who openly
supported Pakistan unity or collaborated with the army were
assassinated selectively to discourage others. 17/

To influence the international community, the main
effort emphasized recognition for the Bangla Desh government-
in-exile. Many Bengalis who were with Pakistani foreign
missions defected and set about publicizing the legitimacy
of the Bangla Desh movement. Although not initially
successful in obtaining formal recognition, these diplomats
developed popular sympathy for the Bangla Desh movement.

The Mukti Fanj was used primarily in an offensive role
to attack the lines of communication and to disrupt the
military and economic strength of East Pakistan. The
monsoon season of June to September favored guerrilla
tactics. Two-thirds of the country was water soaked
limiting mobility to roads, railways and river craft. The
roads and railways ran close to the border, crossing many
bridges vulnerable to attack. The India-East Pakistan
border itself was 1,400 miles long with no natural
obstacles. The interior of East Pakistan could be reached
easily by guerrillas from the border area by river and delta
channels. 18/

The Mukti Fanj mounted small, deep raids from their
sanctuaries in India and remote border enclaves.
Detachments of the Pakistani army were attacked causing
casualties which were duly reported by the foreign press.
These reports conflicted with Pakistani claims that the area
was under control and thus tended to undermine international
support for Pakistan. However, the attack on communications
was much more successful and had immediate effects.
Railways were largely inoperable beyond 30 to 50 miles from
Dacca. Roads were cut isolating the principal towns and
ports. The Pakistani army was left isolated in the urban
areas while the major export crops of jute and tea could not
be moved from the rural areas to markets. 19/

As July closed, the military situation in East
Pakistan was worsening. The monsoon was restricting army
mobility while the Mukti Fanj (renamed the Mukti Bahini)
mounted an increasing number of small raids aimed at
sabotage and terror. The army was forced to conduct
viscious counter-insurgent tactics which increased the
hostility of the disaffected population.

After a lull in June, refugees in large numbers again
poured into India. President Yahya continued to press for
the United Nations to force India to withdraw her support to
the Bangla Desh rebels and to decrease border tension to
induce more refugees to return home. He also stated that if
India tried to seize a base in East Pakistan for rebel
operations there would be general war. This was followed by
reports of Pakistani military build-up along the West
Pakistan border with India. 20/

Pakistani diplomacy at the United Nations, supported by
the U.S. was having an effect. U Thant recommended raising
substantial relief aid for East Pakistan. The resources
would be allocated for the refurbishment of transportation
systems as well as food and clothing. India remained
opposed to this plan as well as the U.N. proposal for
representatives on the border to facilitate passage of
refugees back to East Pakistan. It is now clear that India
was determined to see East Pakistan independence and would
not agree to any measures which increased West Pakistan's
strength there. By continuing to support the Bangla Desh
movement, India was becoming increasingly isolated at the
U.N. Her policy also implied eventual direct military
intervention since she could not support the enormous number
of refugees and ignore public support for intervention
indefinitely. 21/

Up to the end of July, the Soviet Union had tried to
maintain a balanced approach to India and Pakistan in an
effort to increase her influence on the sub-continent.
However, when the United States and China moved toward
closer mutual relations and both supported the Pakistani
position, Moscow concluded Treaty of Peace, Friendship and
Cooperation with New Delhi on August 9. The Treaty had
little effect on India militarily, but it gave support for
her position at the United Nations Security Council. The
Soviet Union opposed every proposal for any kind of
intervention which might allow Pakistan to get a political
settlement unacceptable to India, i.e., denial self-
determination for the people of East Pakistan. 22/

During August, President Yahya continued to try to win
some support within the population of East Pakistan as well
as satisfy the "hard-liners" in West Pakistan. On August 9,
Yahya announced that Awami League members who would support
Pakistani unity would be allowed to take their seats in the
National Assembly, while the remainder of the unfilled seats
would be filled by by-elections to be held at end-November.
About half the Awami League delegates elected in December
1970 signed a document agreeing to this move. Yahya also
announced that Sheikh Mujib would be tried by military court
on charges of "waging war against Pakistan." These two
proposals were a key compromise of the political factions of
Pakistan. 23/
 

Latest Replies

Global Defence

New threads

Articles

Top