WAR 1971

[EnlightenedMonk]

Marine Corps Report - Part 5

In September more positive aspects of Yahya's plan
emerged. General Tikka Khan, who was the prime proponent
for military repression, was replaced as Governor of East
Pakistan by a civilian, and press censorship was officially
lifted. On September 5, a general amnesty was granted to
all civilians and members of the armed forces alleged to
have committed crimes since March 1. A number of detainees,
mostly politicians aligned with the Awami League were
released. 24/ These moves were countered by the government-
in-exile which remained committed to complete independence.
the Mukti Bahini intensified its propaganda aimed at the
Bengali population. As well, assassinations of candidates
standing for election were increased. For her part, India
would not provide assistance for refugees wanting to return
to East Pakistan. These actions were largely successful in
discouraging any popular Bengali support for the authorities
in Dacca and Islamabad. Candidates failed to stand for 18
out of 78 seats of the Assembly available and no significant
number of refugees returned from India. 25/

India also increased its support to the Mukti Bahini
military operations by providing artillery fire across the
border for the guerrillas and stopping the Pakistani army
from pursuing them into Indian territory. With their lines
of withdrawal more secure the guerrillas undertook deeper
raids into East Pakistan to destroy bridges, roads and army
posts. The increased military activity put further pressure
on the army to repress the actions and divereted effort from
rebuilding the economy and reestablishing civil order.

On October 12, Pakistan proposed to India mutual troop
withdrawals and posting of United Nations observers in the
border areas. Although India refused, Pakistan went ahead
and withdrew its army to stronger positions 10-12 miles
behind the border. 26/ This action was indicative of the
success of the guerrillas in their attacks against the
isolated Pakistani outposts.

At the same time Pakistani diplomacy emphasized the
requirement for United Nations action to restrain India from
supporting the rebels of East Pakistan. Pakistan continued
to argue that India was interfering in her internal affairs.
New Delhi's position was that the problem was not an "India-
Pakistan" problem, but strictly a Pakistani one for
Islamabad to correct. Therefore, United Nations' action was
inappropriate Pakistan had only to create conditions in
East Pakistan of peace and security for the refugees to
return home. 27/ While New Dehli's argument had a
legalistic logic, it must have been clear that Pakistan
could not create conditions of peace while fighting
guerrillas armed and trained in India. India obviously had
little desire to see East Pakistan survive as a province of
her rival in Islamabad.

While the Soviet Union consistently supported Indian
positions at the United Nations, in October Moscow pressured
New Delhi to soften her policy on Bangla Desh independence.
As a result, the Indian Foreign Minister announced that
India was committed only to a political solution acceptable
to the already elected representative of East Pakistan.
With many of these representatives in exile, their leader,
Sheikh Mujib, under arrest in West Pakistan it would have
been unreasonable that these representatives would demand
anything less than political automony for East Pakistan. In
any case, President Yahya refused to negotiate with them.
India returned to her previous position of demanding self-
determination for Bangla Desh. New Delhi had won a
propaganda victory and persuaded the Soviet Union to
continue to support her, all without any material or
political cost.

While Pakistan probably could have restored order
eventually in East Pakistan, President Yahya realized he had
little hope of prevailing without outside help if India
invaded there. He, therefore, tried to persuade China to
increase her commitment to the security of all Pakistan:
this the Chinese refused to do. Peking remained committed
to support Pakistan only to the extent required to ensure
the survival of West Pakistan as a nation. Despite public
pronouncements from Islamabad that China would supply all
the weapons Pakistan would need in a future conflict with
India, the Indians never appeared to be in any doubt as to
the true nature of China's commitment. When war came in
December, several Indian divisions were withdrawn from the
Sino-Indian border and moved into East Pakistan. 28/

As November drew to a close, Pakistan could no longer
tolerate Indian military actions in the border area.
Shelling and tank fire from the Indian army continued to
inflict casualties on Pakistani posts and provide support
guerrilla operations. Islamabad viewed the conflict as
India's responsibility and this was endorsed by the United
States who, on November 30, suspended licenses for arms
exports to India. 29/ On December 3, 1971, Pakistan struck
India with air and ground attacks across the border from
West Pakistan.

The period from March to September was marked by the
rapid deterioration of the political situation in East
Pakistan. When confronted by demands of the elected
representatives of the Awani League for economic and
political automony, the central military government in
Islamabad reacted with a ruthless and brutal repression
which ultimately failed. Islamabad appears to have
seriously underestimated the strength and the organization
of the Bengali nationalist movement embodied in the Awami
League. Faced with the arrest of over half its leadership,
the remaining Awami League leaders went into exile in India
with even firmer resolve to win independence. From there
they were able to quickly transform the party organization
into a credible government-in-exile with a military arm to
prosecute guerrilla warfare. The actions of the Islamabad
government worked to the advantage of the Bengali resistance
by providing the elements of a successful revolution.

By arresting and detaining Bengali leaders Islamabad
indicated to the world at large and the Bengalis, in
particular, that no political compromise was possible. The
ruthless and brutal purge of Bengalis from the armed forces
succeeded in sending a trained and dedicated cadre of
soldiers into exile in India where they were available to
the Bangla Desh government-in-exile as a cadre for the
guerrilla force. At the same time, Pakistani military
operations caused such destruction and intimidation of
civilians that millions also fled to India where they were
available and willing to support the Bangla Desh movement.
Little attempt was made by the Pakistan government to
encourage these refugees to return home. It is possible
that the Islamabad government consciously followed a policy
of forcing large numbers of civilians out of East Pakistan
in order to reduce the population to below that of West
Pakistan. This would ensure that in future governments West
Pakistan would hold a majority of seats in the National
Assembly and could protect its privileged position in the
nation. In any case, these destitute refugees provided a
large pool of manpower opposing the West Pakistani
government.

India saw the conflict as an opportunity to weaken her
major rival in South Asia. Pakistan had humiliated India in
the war over Kashmir in 1965. India at that time had had to
divide her forces between East and West while maintaining
considerable forces on her northern border with China. New
Delhi was determined to not be defeated again by Pakistan.
Breaking East Pakistan from the remainder of the nation
would greatly simplify her defense problem. India,
therefore, adopted the policy of supporting the Bangla Desh
movement while preparing her own armed forces for war with
Pakistan should intervention be necessary. The independence
of East Pakistan was pursued consistently and with skill
throughout the period.

Indian public opinion largely supported New Delhi's
policy. The burden of millions of refugees in India's most
populous and impoverished region was costly and caused
social unrest. Furthermore, most Indians saw Pakistan as a
threat which would lead to war eventually in any case.
When India's goal appeared in danger of being thwarted
by United Nations' intervention, New Delhi quickly found the
necessary Security Council veto by concluding a treaty with
the Soviet Union. This treaty did not place any military
obligation on either party, but only pledged cooperation.
For the Soviet Union the treaty demonstrated to the world
its increasing influence in South Asia while for India the
treaty gave her what she needed most -- an ally with veto
power in the Security Council.

The Awami League which formed the leadership of the
Bangla Desh movement was thus provided all the essential
elements to prosecute its guerrilla war for the independence
of East Pakistan. The league had safe havens in India from
which to organize politically and militarily. The arrest
and detention of the popular leader, Sheikh Mujib, provided
tangible and symbolic evidence of the persecution of the
Bengalis by the West Pakistani. The widespread destruction
of personal property and the economic deterioration in East
Pakistan gave the Bangla Desh movement an enormous pool of
manpower willing to resist the Pakistani authorities. The
Bengali soldiers who had escaped formed a trained and
dedicated nucleus for a guerrilla force. Finally, the
support of India in form of arms and training allowed the
guerrillas to move to the offensive quickly and effectively.

By December, it became apparent to Islamabad that it
was not regaining control of East Pakistan. The guerrillas
were striking deeply into East Pakistan in greater strength.
India was deploying raids across her border with East
Pakistan to support the guerrillas. Pakistan, therefore,
mounted an attack on December 3 aimed at destroying as much
Indian combat power as possible before she herself was
attacked by India.

 

[EnlightenedMonk]

Marine Corps Report - Part 6

CHAPTER III
THE 14-DAY WAR: 3-16 DECEMBER 1971​

When general war opened on December 3, India and
Pakistan had unequal military capacities. India had
developed an arms industry with aid from the Soviet Union
and the West which was capable of producing major weapons
such as tanks and aircraft. India also had received and
continued to have access to military equipment from Moscow.
On the other hand, Pakistan's industry was much less
developed. She had been unable to get arms when cut-off by
the West and Russia in the summer of 1971. China had
provided military supplies, but these could not redress the
imbalance. 1/

The relative strengths of the armed forces of the two
countries are shown in Table 1. It must be noted that India
maintained considerable army forces guarding the Himalayan
border with China which reduced the forces available for
combat with Pakistan. 2/

Early in the counter-insurgency phase of the conflict,
Pakistan had purged Bangali units from the armed forces.
Many Bengalis who belonged to predominantly West Pakistan
units had defected: those who remained were not trusted and
the combat effectiveness of Pakistani units suffered as a
result. The Pakistan Air Force (PAF) was particularly
affected because many of the ground crew had been Bengali.
Click here to view image

The officer corps of all three Pakistani services had
been politicized, especially at the general officer level,
by years of military government. The need for political
balance in the government often overrode the requirements
for ability in many senior military appointments. This
resulted in poor leadership and incompetence as well as lack
of cohesion and trust. By 1971, the chiefs-of-staff system
had been modified so as to be almost unrecognizable. Yahya
Khan retained control of army operations in addition to his
duties as President and supreme Commander of all the
services. The structure was overly centralized and
dominated by the army. Not surprisingly, communications and
cooperation were poor between General Headquarters co-
located with the army at Rawalpindi, and the PAF and navy
located at Peshawar and Karachi respectively. 3/

The Indian system emphasized the distinction between
government and the armed services. Each service had equal
status and was controlled by a civilian minister of the
cabinet responsible to parliament. The service chiefs were
members of a chief-of-staff committee. A joint planning
staff provided coordination. This system was well-suited to
respond to civilian management. 4/

Pakistan's strategy tried to involve the United
Nations to prevent India from intervening militarily. But
when it became apparent that this strategy could not prevent
war, Pakistan attacked from the West. Yahya probably
considered East Pakistan indefensible in the long run, but
he hoped to gain sufficient Indian territory in the West
which could be traded for East Pakistan territory in the
negotiations following the cease-fire. The land battle in
the West was thus crucial for Pakistan.

Indian strategy was to act quickly in the East to
decisively defeat Pakistani forces there while defending
Indian territory in the West. This strategy reduced the
danger of China intervening as it clearly did not threaten
the existence of West Pakistan. 5/ A quick decision in the
East would ensure an independent nation in East Bengal
before international action could be mobilized to separate
the Indian and Pakistani armies there and preclude the
decision India sought.

When the PAF struck at 1747 on December 3, Pakistan
attempted to disable the superior Indian Air Force (IAF) by
a preemptive strike. Airfields at Amritsar, Srinagar,
Avantipur, Pathankot and Faridkot were attacked; however,
the strike failed to achieve any significant success. The
IAF had dispersed their aircraft to hardened shelters on a
large number of airfields where only a direct hit could
damage them. The late afternoon forced the attack to be
brief as it could not be sustained in darkness. Not only
were too few airfields struck for too short a time, but only
30 percent of the available aircraft were used. The
aircraft may have had a low serviceability or the PAF may
have attempted to save aircraft since they could not be
easily replaced. In any case, from this raid onwards, the
IAF dominated the air-war. 6/ On December 4, the IAF flew
over 500 sorties on tactical and strategic targets in
Pakistan. In 14 days of war, the Western Air Command of IAF
alone flew over 4,000 sorties. 7/ The IAF claimed 94
aircraft, while the PAF claimed 81. This air campaign
demonstrated again the value of mass and boldness: the IAF
influenced the war significantly with relatively small
losses while the PAF flew far fewer sorties with greater
losses and less effect. 8/

The border between West Pakistan and India followed no
natural topographical feature, but it had been inherited on
the basis of the old pre-1947 borders. There Pakistan
deployed ten infantry divisions, two armoured divisions,
various brigades and almost all its combat aircraft. The
general deployments are shown in Appendix I. The order of
battle of the Indians has not been disclosed, but it was
probably comparable. 9/

On December 3, the Pakistani 26 Infantry Brigade
attacked east from Kahuta toward Punch in northern Kashmir.
They had made virtually no progress against Indian ground
defenses and heavy air attacks when the offensive was
terminated two days later. On December 9, a second attack
toward Punch was again thwarted by IAF bombing. The Indians
then made a series of small attacks which secured several
Pakistani posts north and west of Punch. Further north in
the area of Kargil, the Indians secured all the Pakistani
outposts which overlooked the Zoji La Pass. These actions
were conducted at night at elevations above 16,000 feet at
sub-zero temperatures. 10/

To the south, the area of Chhamb was an important
communication link to all parts of Kashmir. The II (Pak)
corps attacked on December 3 with four infantry and one
armored brigade with eight artillery regiments in support.
After four days, they had succeeded in driving two Indian
infantry battalions out of their prepared defense to
positions across on the east bank of the Munnawar Tawi
River. Two days later the Pakistanis took the town of
Chhamb and established a bridgehead on the east side of the
river. On December 10 the Indians counter-attacked, sending
the Pakistanis back across the river. In the next two days,
units of II (Pak) Corps recrossed the river two more times
only to be forced to withdraw. By December 12, when the
sector stabilized, the Indians estimated they had lost 17
tanks and 440 men killed while the Pakistanis had lost 36
tanks and 1350 men killed. 11/

In the Punjab, the Sialkot-Shakargarh salient juts into
India. The Indians launched an attack there to relieve
pressure on the Chhamb area. They attacked the salient on
two axes: one from the north to cut the road between
Shakargarh and Zafarwal, the other from the east with
Shakargarh as the objective. Good Pakistani defensive
positions and extensive mining made progress slow, but by
the time of the cease-fire on December 16, the Indians had
secured about 1000 square kilometers of the salient. 12/

South of the Shakargarh salient in the area of Dera
Baba Nanak and Fazilka, the Indians expected a major
Pakistani offensive. Both sides fought local engagements in
effort to gain favorable position. However, no major
offensive was attempted. Although the 1 (Pak) Armoured
Division was available to strike, lack of air cover probably
kept it from entering the battle. 13/

Actions in the Sind-Rajasthan sector were aimed a
drawing strategic reserves of both sides down from the other
northern sectors. A Pakistani force of one infantry
brigade, supported by a reinforced armoured regiment,
crossed the border near Ramgarh on December 4. Without air
cover, the Pakistanis were caught in the open and lost an
estimated 34 tanks and 100 other vehicles in one day before
withdrawing. 14/ On December 5, while Pakistani armour was
being destroyed north in the desert, the Indians captured
Gadra and moved southwest on to Nagar Parkar and the Rann of
Kutch. This advance had possibilities of cutting the main
north-south lines of communication through Hyderabad to
Karachi. Indian progress was slow, but by the time of the
cease-fire 11 days later they had advanced to Naya Chor
and had captured 4,700 square kilometers of Pakistani
land. 15/ Its quite probable that the Indian advance in the
Rann of Kutch was deliberately slow in order not to
threaten seriously West Pakistan and thus arouse Chinese
military intervention.

At the time of cease-fire the Pakistanis had not
achieved any of their objectives. They had no large tracts
of Indian territory to use as bargaining chips for East
Pakistan. India had been able to deploy similar military
strength to a battle which, for them, was defensive. Indian
air superiority allowed them flexibility while negating any
Pakistani local ground concentration.

The 14-day war was the first full-scale Indian naval
war. India's fleet was much superior to that of Pakistan
and was well prepared when war came on December 3. The
Indian navy was able to defend the coast while blockading
East Pakistan and attacking shore targets in support of
ground operations. 16/

Pakistan's surface fleet had neither air cover nor
weapons to defend against India's missile boats. Therefore,
it stayed in Karachi harbour while submarines were given the
task of destroying India's aircraft carrier and cruiser.
They were unsuccessful: on December 4, Dafne-class
Pakistani submarine was sunk by a carrier escort in the Bay
of Bengal while a second submarine was sunk off Visakhapatna
harbour. The only Indian loss was the frigate Kukri sunk by
a sumbarine in the Arabian Sea on December 9. 17/

India's main naval support effort was in the Bay of
Bengal where a carrier task force blockaded the sea
approaches to East Pakistan. Six merchant ships and
"numerous" small craft were captured. Carrier based
aircraft struck assembly points of small boats in the Ganges
delta area, preventing the escape or reinforcement of
Pakistani army elements. The establishment of air
superiority early in the war allowed the ships freedom to
maneuver to attack shore targets at Chittagong, Cox's Bazar,
Chalna, Kulna and other economic and military targets. 18/
These actions had a significant effect on the collapse of
East Pakistan.

But the decisive theater of the war was East Pakistan
shown on the map at Appendix 2. The area is divided by
three major river systems into four parts with Dacca, the
capital, at the center. The Jamuna River runs north to
south cutting the country in half. West of the Jamuna the
Padma (Ganges) River flows west to east to join the Jamuna
west of Dacca. South of the Padma lies the South-Western
Sector with the major towns of Kushtia, Jessore, Khulna and
Chalna. To the north of the Padma the North-Western Sector
contains the towns of Rangpur, Dinajpur, Bogra and Rajshahi.
The Surma-Meghna River flows southwest from Sylhet joining
the Jamuna south east of Dacca and dividing the remainder of
the country into the Northern Sector and Eastern Sector.

India deployed six infantry divisions and various
supporting troops on all sides of East Pakistan. Supporting
the Indian force were eight battalions of Mukti-Bahini and
many irregular Bengali soldiers. 19/ To force a quick
decision, India had to strike deep toward Dacca. Since the
trafficability of most of the region is poor, the combat
forces were lightly equipped but they were well trained and
were reinforced with engineers to assist in river crossings.
The Indian forces were deployed as follows: II Corps
comprising of two infantry divisions was tasked to advance
eastward through the South-Western Sector in the general
direction of Dacca; XXXIII Corps with one infantry division
and two brigades was tasked to attack to the Bogra area in
the Northwestern Sector and then on to Dacca; 101
Communications Zone with one brigade was to strike south
through the Northern Sector toward Dacca; and, IV Corps in
the Eastern Sector had three divisions with missions to
advance westward to Dacca. 20/

Opposing the Indians, Pakistan deployed five divisions
with two armoured regiments and supporting artillery. The
forces were deployed forward in strong points based on towns
near the border with light forces screening to the border.

 

[EnlightenedMonk]

Marine Corps Report - Part 7

In the Southwestern Sector the Indian II Corps advanced
on three axes. Nine (I) Division struck southeast bypassing
Jessore to the south then moved on the Kulna, Chalna and
Barisal. A second element of 9 (I) Division passed north of
Jessore on December 5 and, moving cross-country, took
Jheneida two days later. A third column composed of 4 (I)
Division moved eastward on the right bank of the Padma and
took Kushtia with its important railway bridge after heavy
fighting on December 11. The Pakistani forces based in
Jessore withdrew piecemeal without a fight when they found
themselves cut-off by the advancing Indian columns. By
December 15, the resistance in this sector had
collapsed. 21/ The Indians had demonstrated that they could
move rapidly across the marshy ground and numerous streams.
Good training and assistance of Mukti-Bahini guides allowed
them to outflank the major strong points which then
crumbled.

In the Northwestern Sector, XXXIII (I) Corps advanced
southeast on three axes, bypassing strongly defended areas
at Hilli, Dinajpur and Rangpur. Bogra was capatured on
December 13, cutting-off the defenders further to the north.
In this sector the Indians again proved they could move
quickly around static defenses to cut the routes of
withdrawal and reinforcement. Even though the Pakistani
army continued to fight from their strong points they could
not stop or eject the Indians. 22/

The Northern Sector provided the best approach to
Dacca for there are no major river obstacles. However, the
Indians used only two brigades in this sector. This force
took Jamalpur early, but was held up at Mymensingh until
December 11 before moving south to Tangail, 46 miles from
Dacca. The Indians dropped a parachute battalion into
Tangail on December 11 to cut the withdrawal route of
Pakistani forces to the north. On December 12, resistance
at Tangail crumbled and by December 16 Indian units were in
the outskirts of Dacca. 23/

In the Eastern Sector three Indian divisions faced two
Pakistani divisions. The 8 (I) Division advanced southwest
from Karimgan, reaching Maulvi Bazar on December 6. The
Pakisani garrison at Mualvi Bazar withdrew to Sylhet where
the elements continued to fight for some days. Meanwhile,
the main force of 8 (I) Division continued to Ashuganj on
the Megna River. The 57 (I) Division struck west from
Akhaura reaching Ashuganj on December 9. The 23 (I)
Division bypassed Comilla with one column moving south
toward Chittagong while the main body proceeded west to
reach the Megna River. Four days later the Indians were
within 12 kilometers of Dacca. 24/ After artillery had
fired on Dacca on December 15, the Pakistanis requested a
cease-fire and, on December 16, General Niazi, commander of
Pakistan's forces in Dacca, signed an unconditional
surrender. The war ended and Bangla Desh was a reality.

At the beginning of December, Islamabad had realized
that the Indians were massing to attack into East Pakistan.
Although Pakistan had approximately 40,000 troops deployed
there, the preceeding months of guerrilla war had taken its
toll. The Pakistani army's morale there had been weakened
by terrorist activity and the consistent hostility of the
civilian population. The terrain itself reduced mobility
and forced the army to deploy in strong points near the
larger towns where they would control the major road and
railway networks. These strong points were not mutually
supporting and there were insufficient forces to fill the
gaps between them. At best the Pakistani forces could delay
the likely Indian attack to gain sufficient time for an
international intervention to pressure India to stop. If,
as was entirely possible, no international intervention
materialized, then Pakistan would need to take Indian
territory elsewhere which could then be traded for the
return of East Pakistan during cease-fire negotiations. To
do this Yahya had to mount a swift, violent offensive into
India from West Pakistan. In the 14-day conventional war
Pakistan's strategy completely failed for a number of
reasons.

Firstly, the Pakistani forces needed air superiority
and they failed to achieve it. The PAF tried a surprise pre-
emptive attack on the Indian Air Force (IAF), but through
poor intelligence and planning failed to strike Indian
airfields in sufficient numbers or depth. IAF operations
were never seriously challenged. In the following days of
the war, the PAF could not or would not provide sufficient
sorties to gain even local air superiority to support the
ground forces even though aircraft were available. It is
probable that the PAF command thought it necessary to avoid
loss of aircraft so they would be available to counter an
Indian offensive into West Pakistan should it arise. It
appears that the Pakistani high command were not aware of
Yahya's objectives of gaining Indian territory as a defense
for the integrity of Pakistan as a whole.

Secondly, the Pakistani army attacked along a very
broad front of the western Indian border. But nowhere did
they mass sufficient forces to ensure a rapid breakthrough.
Generally, the points of attack were in terrain unsuited for
wide maneuver and hence mobility and speed could not be
developed to gain significant amount of Indian land.
Although battles were fiercely contested at battalion and
brigade level, the attacks were only loosely coordinated at
the corps and army level, and hence, lacked unity.

Thirdly, the effect of the Indian naval blockage was to
completely isolate West from East Pakistan. Combined with
Indian domination of the air, there was no possibility of
reinforcing or withdrawing army forces in East Pakistan.
This could only have further reduced morale and the will of
the soldiers there to resist. As well the Indian navy was
able to carry the war directly to Karachi while the
Pakistani navy could not venture out without risking
irreplaceable losses.

The Pakistani navy was simply not equipped to take on
the missiles and aircraft of the Indian fleet in order to
protect its own or commercial ships. Thus, West as well as
East Pakistan was isolated from its major sea supply routes.
The state of the navy was indicative of the neglect for
reality of the military government in Islamabad.

Lastly, the Army in East Pakistan underestimated the
ability of the Indians to move forces through the sodden
terrain of Bengal. The Pakistanis had deployed in strength
in the towns while leaving the rural areas relatively
unprotected. The Indian army, supported by Bengalis with
local knowledge, quickly outflanked these strong points.
With no strategic reserve available, the Pakistanis could
not block the Indian's advance. When the strong points were
surrounded, there was simply no place for the defenders to
go and they surrendered in thousands. 25/ The speed of the
Indian advance helped relieve Indian's logistic effort of
improving roads, bridges and railways necessary to move
large quantities of supplies for slower, more deliberate
operations. Their forces were lightly equipped to move
quickly through to Dacca.

In summary, the conventional phase of the war was one
of limited objectives by both sides. However, the
Pakistanis could not properly coordinate their strategy or
their forces to realize success. On the other hand, the
Indians produced a simple but flexible plan which they
executed with determination and skill. East Pakistan fell
much more quickly than Islamabad had anticipated and there
was no time for international intervention. In the West the
Indians defended successfully while making minor gains in
the South. Their actions were entirely consistant with
their objective of ejecting Pakistan from Bengal without
inviting intervention from other nations, particularly
China.

 

[EnlightenedMonk]

Marine Corps Report - Part 8

CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSIONS​

The course of events which shaped the conflict between
India and Pakistan in 1971 had their origins in history made
many years before. The concept of a single Islamic nation
on the Indian sub-continent had brought the peoples of East
and West Pakistan together in the aftermath of British
colonial rule. But the concept was not powerful enough to
hold the nation in the face of differing race, language,
culture and geography.

When the autocratic rulers in the western wing denied
the democratic aspirations of the Bengalis while continuing
a policy of apparent economic domination, resentment was
inevitable. The established rulers had fashioned a severely
centralized government which was incapable of harmonizing
the political and social forces emerging in the western as
well as the eastern wing of the nation. Consequently
military repression of the Bengalis was implemented without
a serious attempt to rectify the causes of the grievances.

The millions of refugees who poured into India caused
serious economic and social problems in one of her most
unstable slates, West Bengal. The Indian government, with
considerable support from the public, seized this
opportunity to decisively weaken her most dangerous rival.
By skillfully managing her diplomatic affairs, while
encouraging the Bangla Desh movement, India won time to
prepare for military intervention while preventing wider
international intervention damaging to her aim. And clearly
her aim was to reduce the power of Pakistan by promoting the
autonomy of East Bengal.

China considered Pakistan, in particular West Pakistan,
vital to restricting Soviet influence on the sub-continent.
Should both India and Pakistan be drawn into the Soviet
sphere, China's borders would be threatened on all sides.
With India and Pakistan rivals, the threat to China from
India would be much reduced. For similar reasons, the
Soviet Union was initially trying to steer an even course in
the India-Pakistan dispute. However, when rebuffed by Yahya
in July 1971, Moscow quickly saw the chance to increase her
influence with India.

When conventional war finally came in December,
Pakistan found herself unable to defend the east or
successfully gain in the west. Pakistan's complete failure
in the air was most damaging. Her armies and navy lacked
information available from reconnaissance. Both the army
and navy could not maneuver without incurring damaging
losses from the Indian Air Force.

In the end, India prevailed because she was able to
maintain the initiative both politically and militarily,
guided by a simple but realistic and flexible strategy.
Click here to view image

 

[Singh]

The following are excerpts from the book ‘Crisis of Leadership’ by Maj. General M. Khan of Pakistan about the bravery of the Sikh soldiers during the Indo-Pak war.

“…the main reason of our defeat was Sikhs fighting facing us. We were helpless to do anything in front of them. Sikhs are very brave and they have a great craving for martyrdom. They fight so fiercely that they are capable of defeating an army many times bigger than theirs.

….On 3rd December 1971, we fiercely and vigorously attacked the Indian army with our infantry brigade near Hussainiwala border. This brigade included Pakistan army’s fighter Punjabi regiment together with the Baloch regiment. Within minutes we pushed the Indian army quite far back. Their defence posts fell under our control. The Indian army was retreating back very fast and the Pakistani army was going forward with a great speed. Our army reached near the Kausre-Hind post. There was a small segment of the Indian army appointed to defend that post and their soldiers belonged to the Sikh Regiment. A few number of the Sikh Regiment stopped our way forward like an iron wall. They loudly greeted us with the ovation of ‘Bole-so-Nihal’ and attacked us like blood thirsty hungry lions and hawks. All these soldiers were Sikhs. There was even a dreadful hand-to-hand battle. The sky filled with roars of ‘Yaa Ali’ and ‘Sat-Siri-Akal’. Even in this hand-to-hand fighting the Sikhs fought so bravely that all our desires, aspirations and dreams were shattered.

…..In this war Lt. Col Gulab Hussain of Baloch Regiment got killed. With him Major Mohammed Zaeef and Captain Arif Alim also died. It was difficult to count the number of soldiers who got killed. We were astonished to see the courage of those handful of Sikh soldiers. When we seized the possession of the three-storey defence post of concrete, the Sikh soldiers went onto the roof and kept on persistently opposing us. The whole night they kept on showering fires on us and continued shouting the loud ovation of ‘Sat-Siri-Akal’. These Sikh soldiers kept on the encounter till the next day. Next d ay the Pakistani tanks surrounded this post and bombed it with guns. Those handful of Sikhs got martyred in this encounter while resisting us, but other Sikh soldiers then destroyed our tanks with the help of their artillery. Fighting with great bravery they kept on marching forward and thus our army lost its foothold.

….Alas, a handful of Sikhs converted our great victory into a big defeat and shattered our confidence and courage. ….The same thing happened with us in Dhaka (Bangladesh). In the battle of Jaissur, the Singhs opposed the Pakistani army so fiercely that our backbone and our foothold was lost. This became the main and important reason of our defeat and the Sikhs’ fancy for martyrdom and mockery with death for the sake of safety and honour of the country, became the sole cause of their victory.

“The bravery and spirit of sacrifice of Sikhs were respected and honoured by one and all.”

http://sikhsangat.org/1469/2009/01/bravery-the-sikh-spirit/

 

[EnlightenedMonk]

1971 War: How the US tried to corner India

'India won a glorious victory against Pakistan in the 1971 war. It was the first decisive victory in a major war in centuries. And it was won singlehandedly, in the face of opposition and threats from a majority of the UN member-States, including a superpower. Every Indian patriot felt proud of this glittering chapter in the nation's history.'

-- Dr S N Prasad in his introduction to the Indian government's 'restricted' Official History of the 1971 War.

I am not usually a great defender of United States policies, but I have to admit that in the field of right to information, the US is far ahead of the Indian babus who obstinately block access to Indian archives under the lame pretext that this could 'endanger national security'.

A few months ago, the Office of the Historian at the US State Department released Volume XI of the Foreign Relations of the United States devoted to the 'South Asia Crisis, 1971': in other words, the Bangladesh War.

Flashback: 1971 War, 35 Years On

This 929-page publication groups together documents which were already known like the minutes of Henry Kissinger's secret visit to China in July 1971 as well as scores of freshly declassified material available for the first time to the public.

It throws light on a less known angle of the India-Pakistan conflict: The role of the nascent friendship between the United States and China. This is a welcome new piece in the puzzle of the history of the 1971 War.

Another piece is the Hamidur Rahman Report, ordered by the government of Pakistan after the war, which analyses the Pakistani defeat. 'Due to corruption... lust for wine and women and greed for land and houses, a large number of senior army officers, particularly those occupying the highest positions, had not only lost the will to fight but also the professional competence necessary for taking the vital and critical decisions demanded of them for the successful prosecution of the war.'

The US administration saw the unfurling events differently.

According to Kissinger, then American President Richard M Nixon's national security adviser, 'When the Nixon administration took office, our policy objective on the subcontinent was, quite simply, to avoid adding another complication to our agenda.'

But events in the subcontinent and the Chinese factor forced Nixon to change his stand. The new closeness between Washington, DC and Beijing [Images] and the involvement of the Pakistan president as a secret go-between greatly influenced US policy.

According to the State Department historian, 'When the fighting developed, the Nixon administration tilted toward Pakistan. The tilt involved the dispatch of the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise to the Bay of Bengal to try to intimidate the Indian government. It also involved encouraging China to make military moves to achieve the same end, and an assurance to China that if China menaced India and the Soviet Union moved against China in support of India, the United States would protect China from the Soviet Union. China chose not to menace India, and the crisis on the subcontinent ended without a confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union.'

The first US documents deal with the background of the conflict. Nixon's position was clear: 'We should just stay out -- like in Biafra, what the hell can we do?'

But everybody did not agree with him. In a telegram sent on March 28, 1971, the staff at the US consulate in Dhaka complained, 'Our government has failed to denounce the suppression of democracy. Our government has failed to denounce atrocities. Our government has failed to take forceful measures to protect its citizens while at the same time bending over backwards to placate the West Pak dominated government... We, as professional public servants express our dissent with current policy and fervently hope that our true and lasting interests here can be defined and our policies redirected in order to salvage our nation's position as a moral leader of the free world.'

When US Secretary of State Will Rogers received this 'miserable' cable, he informed President Nixon that the 'Dacca consulate is in open rebellion.' This did not change Nixon's opinion: 'The people who bitch about Vietnam bitch about it because we intervened in what they say is a civil war. Now some of the same bastards...want us to intervene here -- both civil wars.'

From the start, the Nixon administration knew 'the prospects were "poor"... the Pakistani army would not be able to exert effective control over East Pakistan.' Washington believed India was bound to support Mujibur Rahman. The CIA had reported that 'India would foster and support Bengali insurgency and contribute to the likelihood that an independent Bangladesh would emerge from the developing conflict.'

It is here that the Chinese saga began. In a tightly guarded secret, Nixon had started contacts with Beijing. The postman was Pakistani dictator Field Marshal Yahya Khan.

When on April 28 1971, Kissinger sent a note defining the future policy option towards Pakistan, Nixon replied in a handwritten note: 'Don't squeeze Yahya at this time.' The Pakistan president was not to be squeezed because he was in the process of arranging Kissinger's first secret meeting to China. The events of the following months and the US position should be seen in this perspective.

In May, Indira Gandhi [Images] wrote to Nixon about the 'carnage in East Bengal' and the flood of refugees burdening India. After L K Jha, then the Indian ambassador to US, had warned Kissinger that India might have to send back some of the refugees as guerillas, Nixon commented, 'By God we will cut off economic aid (to India).'

A few days later when the US president said 'the goddamn Indians' were preparing for another war, Kissinger retorted 'they are the most aggressive goddamn people around.'

During the second week of July, Kissinger went to Beijing where he was told by then Chinese prime minister Zhou Enlai: 'In our opinion, if India continues on its present course in disregard of world opinion, it will continue to go on recklessly. We, however, support the stand of Pakistan. This is known to the world. If they (the Indians) are bent on provoking such a situation, then we cannot sit idly by.' Kissinger answered that Zhou should know that the US sympathies also lay with Pakistan.

On his return, during a meeting of the National Security Council, Nixon continued his India bashing. The Indians, he noted, are 'a slippery, treacherous people.'

The State Department historian says, 'in the perspective of Washington, the crisis ratcheted up a dangerous notch on August 9 when India and the Soviet Union signed a treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation.' It was a shock for Washington as they saw a deliberate collusion between Delhi and Moscow [Images].

During the following months, the situation deteriorated and many more refugees came to India. The Indian prime minister decided to tour Western capitals to explain the Indian stand. On November 4 and 5, she met Nixon in Washington, who told her that a new war in the subcontinent was out of the question.

The next day, Nixon and Kissinger assessed the situation. Kissinger told Nixon: 'The Indians are bastards anyway. They are plotting a war.'

To divert the pressure applied by the Mukti Bahini on the eastern front, the Pakistan air force launched an attack on six Indian airfields in Kashmir and Punjab on December 3. It was the beginning of the war.

The next day, then US ambassador to the United Nations George H W Bush -- later 41st president of the United States and father of the current American president -- introduced a resolution in the UN Security Council calling for a cease-fire and the withdrawal of armed forces by India and Pakistan. It was vetoed by the Soviet Union. The following days witnessed a great pressure on the Soviets from the Nixon-Kissinger duo to get India to withdraw, but to no avail.

The CIA reported to the President: 'She (Indira Gandhi) hopes the Chinese (will) not intervene physically in the North; however, the Soviets have warned her that the Chinese are still able to "rattle the sword" in Ladakh and Chumbi areas.'

For Kissinger it was clear that Indira Gandhi wanted the dismemberment of Pakistan.

On December 9, when the CIA director warned Nixon that 'East Pakistan was crumbling', Nixon decided to send the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise into the Bay of Bengal to threaten India.

Let me recount an anecdote related to me by Major General K K Tewari (retd), Chief Signal Officer, Eastern Command, during the 1971 War.

General Tewari was present at a briefing the three defence services held for Indira Gandhi. She was seated at a large table. On one side was General S H F J Manekshaw, the army chief, and on the other Admiral S M Nanda, the navy chief.

During the course of the presentation, the admiral intervened and said: 'Madam, the US 8th Fleet is sailing into the Bay of Bengal.' Nothing happened; the briefing continued. After sometime, the admiral repeated, 'Madam, I have to inform you that the 8th Fleet is sailing into the Bay of Bengal.' She cut him off immediately: 'Admiral, I heard you the first time, let us go on with the briefing.'

All the officers present were stunned. Ultimately, their morale was tremendously boosted by the prime minister's attitude. She had demonstrated her utter contempt for the American bluff.

On November 10, Nixon instructed Kissinger to ask the Chinese to move some troops toward the Indian frontier. 'Threaten to move forces or move them, Henry, that's what they must do now.'

This was conveyed to Huang Hua, China's envoy to the United Nations. Kissinger told Huang the US would be prepared for a military confrontation with the Soviet Union if the Soviet Union attacked China.

On December 12, the White House received an urgent message. The Chinese wanted to meet in New York. General Alexander Haig, then Kissinger's deputy, rushed to the venue, but was disappointed. Huang just wanted to convey his government's stand in the UN, no words of an attack in Sikkim or in the then North East Frontier Agency (now, the northeastern states).

The myth of the Chinese intervention is also visible in the secret Pakistani dispatches. Lieutenant General A A K Niazi, the Pakistani army commander in Dhaka, was informed: 'NEFA front has been activated by Chinese although the Indians for obvious reasons have not announced it.'

Until the last day of the war, Pakistan expected its Chinese saviour to strike, but Beijing never did.

In Washington, Nixon analysed the situation thus: 'If the Russians get away with facing down the Chinese and the Indians get away with licking the Pakistanis...we may be looking down the gun barrel.' Nixon was not sure about China. Did they really intend to start a military action against India?

Finally, on December 16, Niazi surrendered to Lieutenant General Jagjit Singh Aurora. Nixon and Kissinger congratulated themselves for achieving their fundamental goal -- the preservation of West Pakistan. They were also happy for having 'scared the pants off the Russians.'

Kissinger's South Asia policy upset many in the US, not only the American public, the press but also the State Department, and more particularly, Secretary of State Rogers who was kept in the dark most of the time.

It is worth mentioning an episode which, of course, does not appear in the American archives -- The Tibetan participation in the conflict. After the debacle of 1962, the Government of India had recruited some Tibetans youth in the eventuality of another conflict with China. The Special Frontier Force was trained in Chakrata in Uttar Pradesh under the command of an Indian general.

In 1971, nine years after its creation, the SFF was sent to East Pakistan to prepare for the arrival of regular Indian troops. Their saga is one of the least known parts of the Bangladesh war.

Late October 1971, an AN-12 airlifted nearly 3,000 Tibetans who later assembled at Demagiri close to the India-East Pakistan border. On the other side of the border were the Chittagong Hill Tracts. Armed with Bulgarian-made assault rifles, the SFF was given the task of organising guerrilla raids across the Chittagong Hill Tracts. Opposite the SSF, in thick jungles and leech-infested marshes, was stationed a Pakistan brigade, including a battalion of its elite Special Services Group.

The Indian army knew this brigade was a threat to one of its corps preparing to advance on Dhaka.

During the second week of November, Operation Eagle began. Leaving Demagiri in canoes, the Tibetans commandos entered East Pakistan. The SFF then started overrunning one Pakistani post after another.

By the time the war was officially declared, the Tibetans had already been inside East Pakistan for more than three weeks. Using both their Bulgarian rifles and native knives, they advanced swiftly. Their Indian commandaner, Major General S S Uban later said, 'They were unstoppable.'

On December 16, the SSF was 40 kilometers away from Chittagong port, having successfully managed to neutralise the Pakistani brigade.

After Pakistan's surrender, they paraded through Chittagong. Unfortunately, 49 Tibetans lost their lives for a nation which was not theirs.

The release of the State Department volume on the 1971 conflict is a posthumous homage to the courage of the Indian Army which despite heavy odds and the might of the United States freed Bangladesh from Pakistani clutches.

Some aspects are still missing to make the puzzle complete.

First, the Indian history from the Ministry of Defence does not detail the political compulsions of Indira Gandhi's government. Second, the secret operation involving the Tibetan Special Frontier Forces in the Chittagong Hill Tracts is virtually unknown. Lastly, the Chinese involvement from the Chinese point of view remains unexamined.

Like the Henderson Brooks' report on the 1962 border war with China, it may take a few decades more to be revealed.

http://www.rediff.com/news/2006/dec/26claude.htm

 

[EnlightenedMonk]

Indo-Pak 1971 war : Secret British report on US belief

Thirty years after the decisive Indo-Pak war which changed the political map of Indian sub-continent with the creation of Bangladesh, it has been made public now that the US believed in 1971 that India was trying to dismember Pakistan and had asked the then Soviet Union to restrain New Delhi.

According to secret British official papers released at the Public Record Office in London, the US feared that India was scheming to dismember West Pakistan.

The documents include transcripts of a meeting between US President Richard Nixon and British Prime Minister Edward Heath to discuss the issue in Bermuda as India and Pakistan were fighting their third war since gaining independence.

The BBC said that beyond South Asia, many people viewed the War of 1971 as a freedom struggle in which India played a helpful role against “an oppressive military hierarchy in West Pakistan led by General Yahya Khan”.

But transcripts of talks between then Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Heath and of the Heath-Nixon summit in Bermuda show it was more than that.

Gandhi, on a visit to Britain, told Heath of pressure from her cabinet colleagues to take over Pakistani territory and not return it. India, she said, had seen Pakistan tying itself to China and the US also was establishing links with China.

Nixon’s friendly overtures to the Chinese, and their closeness to Pakistan, she said, had made it necessary for India to sign a treaty with the Soviet Union.

Meanwhile, Yahya Khan was also seeking British support. He wrote to Heath outlining the Indian military build-up near Pakistani territory, which included seven Army divisions confronting West Pakistan and eight near East Pakistan.

He also wrote about the deployment by India of comparable air force and naval threats. The offensive posture adopted by India, he wrote, pointed in the direction of conflict, not of peace.

Other papers from the Bermuda summit reinforce that position and highlight US fears. They show that Nixon and his foreign affairs adviser Henry Kissinger suspected India of scheming not just the separation of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), but also the break up of West Pakistan.

Nixon reportedly told the British that Indira Gandhi was being steered by the Soviets in response to the building of ties between Pakistan and China. And, Kissinger said Nixon had secretly contacted the Soviet leadership to seek an assurance it would restrain India from breaking up West Pakistan. But it was only after the American Seventh Fleet took up a threatening posture offshore that the promise was forthcoming, said the papers.

http://news.indiamart.com/news-analysis/indo-pak-1971-war-se-2484.html

 

[Payeng]

Sikh soldiers in french postcards.
View attachment 151

 

[A.V.]

all news and discussions on the 1971 INDO-PAK WAR HERE PLEASE

 

[SATISH]

1971 South-Asia Crisis.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/45587.pdf

I would like to thank Deltacamelately sir for this valuable information. This is the original CIA declassified document. This was originally posted by him in WAB

 

[Vinod2070]

The Sunday Times of London had reported, “It took only 12 days for the Indian Army to smash its way to Dacca, an achievement reminiscent of the German Blitzkrieg across France in 1940. The strategy was the same: speed, ferocity and flexibility”. The Army, of course, was not alone. The Indian Air Force, the Indian Navy and the Mukti Bahini helped to shape the victory.

 

[SATISH]

That is how wars are supposed to be fought...not dragging your feet like Operation Parakram. It was good when it was planned but we didnt have the Mobility...

 

[Daredevil]

There was lot of preparation gone into 1971 BD liberation war and I think that has helped in achieving the results in such a short time. Moreover attacking East Pakistan during the winter was one of the key decisions made, as that would keep away the chinese during the war.

 

[SATISH]

Daredevil,
It was actually the floods that bothered us. Not the Chinese.

 

[Daredevil]

This I was not aware of and haven't read that this is the case. But Chinese threat was also one of the reason if I'm not wrong. Thanks for the info.

 

[SATISH]

Dare devil, That is why I posted the above link to clear all the doubts.

 

[Blitz]

Pictures and Videos from the KARGIL WAR

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zu5gzo_wXko

 

[Blitz]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wmehc8d0c08

 

[Blitz]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j80E1mHAohU

 

[Blitz]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c2IVCRWGhtw