EFFECT OF LSA ON AIR WARFARE - At the tactical level LSA will have a large impact in Beyond Visual Range and Within Visual Range air combat. Most recent analyses of relative air combat capabilities assume that BVR combat will arise much more frequently than WVR combat. The basis of this assumption is that opposing air combat capabilities are easily detected and tracked by ISR systems, permitting fighter aircraft to choose the time, place and type of engagements to an advantage. This assumption collapses if the opposing fighter has significant VLO capability, as the LSA will have. The result is that attacking LSA will have to be engaged at much closer ranges than existing non-stealthy threats, as they enter predictable geometries, when attacking high value targets such as AWACS/AEW&C platforms, tankers, or defended surface assets. Another important qualification is that the extreme agility of the LSA will significantly degrade the kill probability of all Air to Air Missiles, (AAM) especially though the AIM-120 AMRAAM, which will be challenged to sustain the necessary manoeuvres to defeat the LSA. Like the F-22A Raptor, the LSA will provide a significant capability for the kinematic defeat of inbound missile shots.
A radar cross section of only -20 dBSM would deny early Beyond Visual Range (BVR) missile shots using the AIM-120C/D AMRAAM to all current and planned fighters. Doing any better, like -30 dBSM or -40 dBSM, simply increases the level of difficulty in prosecuting long range missile attacks. The consequence of this is that missile combat will be compressed into shorter distances and shorter timelines, putting a premium on the stealth, supersonic persistence and close combat agility of fighters. A larger portion of engagements will be at visual range, and most BVR engagements will end up taking place inside 30 nautical miles. In Beyond Visual Range combat, the combination of supersonic cruise and competitive VLO performance will allow the LSA to emulate the tactics developed for the F-22A Raptor. The LSA can thus be expected to produce greater lopsided air combat exchange rates to those achieved by the F-22A Raptor when flown against legacy fighters. Even if the LSA was only to attain half of the effectiveness of the F-22A Raptor, it will still yield BVR exchange rates of the order of 50:1 against legacy fighters. The arrival of the LSA therefore irrevocably enforces the end of the operational usefulness of the 4th generation of fighter aircraft in the traditional fighter roles of air superiority, air defence and tactical strike in contested airspace. These aircraft will retain operational utility only in permissive environments, where neither the LSA is deployed nor is able to be deployed. No less interesting is the impact at a tactical level when the LSA is flown against the F-22A Raptor. Fights between the F-22A and the LSA will be close, high, fast and lethal. The F-22A will neither get ‘first look’ nor “first shot” with the APG-77, the Advanced Infra Red Search and Track (AIRST) sensor having been deleted to save money, but the LSA will get “first look” & ‘first Shot’ using its advanced infrared sensor. Then, the engagement becomes a supersonic equivalent of the Battle of Britain or air combat over North Korea. The outcome will be difficult to predict as it will depend a lot on the combat skills of the pilots and the capabilities of the missiles for end-game kills. There is no guarantee that the F-22 will prevail every time. The tactical impact of a low cost LSA is therefore a loss of the overwhelming advantage provided until now by the F-22A Raptor. Flown against the LSA, a decisive outcome can only be guaranteed by numerical superiority of the F-22A force in theatre.
The arrival of the LSA therefore also irrevocably enforces the end of the operational usefulness of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, defined around a 1990s technology threat spectrum, in the traditional fighter roles of air superiority, air defence and tactical strike in contested airspace. The F-35 will retain operational utility only in permissive environments, where LSA is not deployed. The operational impact of indecisive combat loss exchange rates between a low cost LSA and the F-22A Raptor, and very high F-35 Joint Strike Fighter loss rates against a low cost LSA will have major implications at an operational level, and consequently, at a strategic and political level. Once the LSA is deployed within a theatre of operations, especially if it is supported robustly by counter-VLO capable ISR systems, the adversary will no longer have the capability to rapidly impose air superiority, or possibly even achieve air superiority. This will not only deny the adversary access to an opponent's defended airspace, it also presents the prospect of adversary being unable to reliably defend in-theatre basing and lines of resupply. Should this occur, in-theatre basing and surface assets become exposed to air attack by aircraft armed with a wide range of accurate and highly lethal Precision Guided Munitions, with the potential for very high loss of life and equipment deployed in theatre.
The deployment of a low cost LSA into such an environment very significantly increases risks to adversary forces, as the aircraft can credibly challenge the F-22A Raptor in air combat. While the intended survivable strike/ISR aircraft may, eventually, provide a credible capability to penetrate advanced anti-access capabilities, and thus attack opposing airfields, it will need to be defended against the LSA, and airfields deploying this aircraft will also need to be defended against LSA tasked with counter-air strike missions. The adversary will be denied access to any operational theatre into which credible numbers of the LSA are deployed. In turn, the adversary will be deterred from the use of conventional forces in such a scenario. The consequence of this, in turn, is that significant pressure will be placed to threaten the use of, or operationally use, tactical nuclear weapons. The only practical low risk option available is to deploy over this decade large numbers of advanced fighter aircraft which are competitive against the LSA in air combat. The proposed “sixth generation fighter” is not a viable contender in this time frame. The F-35 is not competitive and cannot be made to be competitive due to basic design limitations in aerodynamic and VLO shaping performance. The only aircraft which can survive in airspace contested by the LSA is the F-22 Raptor, and given the time frame of interest, it is the only design which can be adapted to defeat the LSA. The LSA is by Western standards a low risk design, following the philosophy of “evolutionary” design, rather than the “Big Bang” approach currently favoured in the West, of trying to start from scratch with most or every key portion of the design.
LSA will be another marvel of frugal engineering skills of us Indians and will be remembered along with Mangalyaan mission as a low cost wonder of exceptionally high technical skills. It is derived from two well proven aircraft types which have been extensively used in India. LSA aircraft project is designed to address the need of high performance, affordable, low cost, light fighter which has capabilities of fifth generation fighters and can become an effective replacement for F-4, F-5, F-16, Mig-21, Mig-23/27, Mig-29 and Mirage series of fighters world over. There is a requirement of over 3000 such aircraft today and the aircraft in production are prohibitively costly to be acquired by any country in large numbers.