User trials of indigenous artillery gun today at Pokhran

shubhamsaikia

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Listen young man..
you want one gun to support one tank?
Then what is the use of having a range of 30 km plus?
what would be the frontage of advance of 45 tanks?
One one battery suffices to cover that.
you would demand next to have 45 Agni missiles to support 45 tanks !!
No assuming the role of the Artillery to change. And from defensive to offensive strike. Like the tracked Artillery attacks with the armored or tracked light regiments with the Mechanized Infantry. I am just throwing an idea. So please dnt batter me with absurdity.
 

shubhamsaikia

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What frontage is covered by an infantry battalion in an attack?
What is required to cover that by fire support?
How much armour strength is employed to cover an area where in a regiment is capable of delivering the fire vertically and spatially.
Remember artillery world over is a support arm and not fighting arm.
Artillary supports ... that is it....

You ask very disturbing questions....
The world does not fight at heights like India does. No other nation has had a war where the Artillery was used at such a scale. It is rumored that the shelling

done during Kargil was higher than that during the World War I and second only to the World War II. And yet we termed our war as limited conflict. So the

role of the Artillery has seen a change. Earlier rapid mobilization of the Artillery was not possible. However things are changing. Tracked and Wheeled

Artillery are being introduced so definitely not restricted to just supporting. You can shell an area without sending the Infantry and that is an offense i would

say.
 

shubhamsaikia

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Shell Shocked in Kargil

The Regiment of Artillery has covered itself with glory in numerous battlefields, the latest being Kargil. While during World War-I it earned fame at Mesopotamia and France, during World War-II its performance at Bir Hachiem, Gazala, Meiktila and Cassino has been legendary. During the post-Independence wars it also showed its mettle in the operations of 1948, 1962, 1965 and 1971. The battlefields of Chushul, Basantar, Khaki Tekri and Picquet 707, among many others, stand in mute testimony to the fury, zeal and the unflinching devotion to duty of the Gunners. With uncanny ability to rapidly switch from one target to another and, thus, neutralising large areas of the battlefield with heavy concentrations of fire in quick succession, the Artillery has truly lived up to its motto: sarvatra izzat-o-iqbal (everywhere with honour and glory).The performance of the Artillery units which fought heroically at Kargil in 1999 during operation Vijay was splendid. The Indian Artillery fired over 250,000 shells, bombs and rockets during the Kargil conflict. Approximately, 5,000 ordnance were fired daily from more then 300 guns, mortars and multi-barreled rocket launchers (MBRLs). During the peak period of assaults, on an average, each Artillery battery fired over one round per minute for 17 days continuously. Such high rate of fire over long periods had not been witnessed anywhere in the world since World War-II. The Gunners soon developed blisters on their hands from carrying and loading heavy shells and cartridges incessantly. Very few of them got more than a couple of hours� sleep in 24 hour-cycle.

After the pockets of enemy intrusion were discerned, it emerged that massive and sustained firepower would destroy the intruders� sangars (temporary fortifications made of rocks and boulders) and systematically break their will to fight through a process of attrition. Thus began a unique saga in the history of the employment of Artillery firepower in battle. Artillery fire reduced the enemy�s defences to rubble and gradually wore down the enemy�s resistance and ultimately broke his will to fight. Additional Artillery regiments were inducted into the Kargil sector to achieve a preponderance of firepower supremacy over the enemy. The Artillery units soon made and coordinated plans for high-intensity fire assaults with infantry battalion and brigade commanders. Counter bombardment (CB) and counter mortar (CM) plans were made and fine-tuned to silence the enemy�s guns. Maximum use was made of air photographs to accurately locate enemy gun positions and other key targets deep inside Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK). These were then fired upon relentlessly and damage assessment was carried out through aerial reconnaissance. Meanwhile, the Northern Light Infantry (NLI) troops holding defences on the Indian side of the Line of Control (LoC) were allowed no rest and were kept constantly on edge through continuous harassing fire.With one hundred guns in concert, Tololing was the first major ridgeline to fall on June 13, 1999 in the Dras sub-sector. Thereafter, Points 4590 and 5140 were captured after several weeks of bitter fighting and simultaneous multi-directional attacks. The 105 mm Indian field guns (IFGs) and 155 mm Bofors medium guns fired in the direct firing role, destroying all visible enemy sangars. The capture of the Tololing complex paved the way for successive assaults to be launched on the Tiger Hill complex from several directions. Within the space of a few days, Point 4700, Knoll and Three Pimples were captured. After a series of multi-directional assaults preceded by accurate and sustained preparatory bombardment by the Artillery, Tiger Hill was captured on July 5. Point 4875 another dominating feature to the west of Tiger Hill, jutting into the Mashko Valley, was captured on July 7. Once again, over one hundred guns delivered murderous fire assaults and over 1,200 rounds of high explosive shell rained down on Tiger Hill in five minutes, causing large-scale death and devastation.

Here again, the Indian Gunners fired their guns audaciously in direct firing role, under the very nose of Pakistani Artillery observation posts (OPs), without regard for personal safety. Even the 122 mm Grad MBRLs were employed in direct firing role. In India�s first televised battle, hundreds of shells and rocket warheads impacted on the pinnacle of Tiger Hill in full view of TV cameras and the nation watched in rapt attention. In recognition of the significant contribution made by the Artillery regiments that participated in this battle, Point 4875 was re-named as Gun Hill � a unique honour bestowed on the Artillery. Due to the massive employment of all available firepower resources to decimate the enemy�s defences, 18 Grenadiers, the heroes of Tiger Hill, suffered only a handful of casualties during the final assault. While the nation�s attention was riveted on the fighting in the Dras sector, steady progress was being made in the Batalik sector. In this sector the terrain was much tougher and the enemy was far more strongly entrenched. The containment battle itself took almost a month. Moves to interdict the lines of communications of the intruders were extremely successful in this sector. Artillery OPs were established on dominating heights on the flanks of the intrusions and sustained Artillery fire was brought down on the enemy continuously.

Khalubar was occupied on July 6 after a daring assault led personally by the Colmmanding Officer of 1/11 Gorkha, Col Lalit Rai, and closely supervised by Brig Devinder Singh, a Gunner officer who was at that time Commander, 70 Infantry Brigade. Large quantities of arms and ammunition were captured. These again were significant as the enemy had built defences well and the upper reaches were still snow-bound. Once again Artillery firepower played an important part in softening enemy defences and destroying enemy�s battalion headquarters and logistics infrastructure.

Throughout the offensive phase of the Kargil conflict, the Indian Artillery was called upon to respond to emerging situations. The infantry battalions involved in the fighting were the first to acknowledge the immense debt of gratitude that they owe to their Artillery comrades. The then Army Chief, Gen VP Malik said: �An early military victory in the conflict thrust upon us by Pakistan in the Kargil Sector would not have been possible but for the overwhelming destruction caused by our Artillery and the heavy casualties that our Artillery firepower inflicted on the enemy. The entire artillery campaign, from planning at the inception stage, rapid induction and deployment, evolution of the 100-gun concept in the application of fire, meticulously coordinated fire plans, skilful ammunition management and sustained effort over a period of two months, was efficiently conducted.

Sainik Samachar
 

Bhadra

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No assuming the role of the Artillery to change. And from defensive to offensive strike. Like the tracked Artillery attacks with the armored or tracked light regiments with the Mechanized Infantry. I am just throwing an idea. So please dnt batter me with absurdity.
Do not invent theories and that too very absurd. You said Kargil was artillery victory ..... some one rightly said it - everywhere the gunner claimed it first. Keep those absurdities to yourself.... do not claim others victories. Victory lies under feet and not under balls.
 

lemontree

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No assuming the role of the Artillery to change. And from defensive to offensive strike. Like the tracked Artillery attacks with the armored or tracked light regiments with the Mechanized Infantry. I am just throwing an idea. So please dnt batter me with absurdity.
SP arty will remain a supporting arm and not a fighting arm, because they fire at the enemy from depth areas. Fighting arms are those that are in direct contact with the enemy.

Hence, infantry, armd, mech units are the fighting arms.
The Engrs and Signals although are support arms, but their role in combat makes them akin to fighting arms.

The organisation of fighting units is in multiple of threes. This ensures better organisation and command and control. Eg.
3 sections = 1 platoon
3 platoons = 1 rifle coy
4 rifle coys = 1 infantry battalion (the 4th rifle coy is a reserve force to give the battalion commander flexibility in battle).
Other support platoons also make up the support coy of an infantry battalion like motor transport platoon, AT platoon, QM, Mortar platoon etc

So 3 battalions = 1 brigade
3 brigades = 1 division
3 divs = 1 corps
3 corps = 1 Army

Armd units have only 3 squadrons. Reason - their doctrine dictates attack from the flanks, hence the 3rd sqn is a reserve sqn for the regt commander.

Arty units have 3 gun batteries of 6 guns in each battery (each battery is made of 3 sections of 2 guns in each section).
Each battery is for supporting 1, 2 or 3 fire missions.
The firepower of one battery is sufficient to support an inf or armd battlion attack plan, hence there is no need to have more than 18 guns in each arty regt.

I hope this clears the concept for you.
 

Ray

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It looks a Bofors to me at least outwardly.
 

Ray

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M777 are for the mountains so they are definitely not going to the Artillery Divisions. All three Arty Divs (41, 40 and 42) are part of the desert strike corps. And M777s were tried at Sikkim, so I am quite sure they are going to the Moutnain Divisions of 33 Corps (Sukna), 4 Corps(Tezpur, Assam) and 15 Corps (Ladakh). Even the newly raised 56 and 71 Div in the NE might get them,
15 Corps is not in Ladakh.
 

Ray

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also a question of interest. armoured units have 45 tanks in regiment. why does a an artillery regiment have only 18. Our Units should be expanded..
They have different tasks and cannot be compared.

Or maybe I have not understood the background of the question.
 

Ray

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Why was Artillery used in the Direct Fire role in Kargil?

Good question.

Arty is an AREA weapon. In other words, it covers and area and does not have a pin point MPI. as would a rifle have.

Let me explain arty fire from some material that I have of WW II. Note: because it is WWII it does not mean that the behaviour of shells has changed.

Accuracy and Consistency

Errors are in one of two categories - accuracy or consistency. Accuracy means the closeness of the mean outcome to where it should be. For example the difference between the mean point of impact (MPI) of fall of shot and their aim point. Consistency means the size of the spread of outcomes (eg shells) around their MPI. In artillery this variability is called 'consistency' or 'dispersion' (the optimistic or pessimistic views of the world - do you call a glass half-full or half-empty?), elsewhere it is sometimes called 'precision'. Nevertheless in practical terms sources of inaccuracy may include mistakes as well as errors and in some cases the division is a fine one and routine human mistakes may be treated as errors.

For artillery fire there are two main components to accuracy, how close the aimpoint is to the actual target (sometimes called the 'target location error') and then how close the fire unit's shells' MPI is to their aimpoint. The first is a function of the accuracy and consistency of the target acquisition system and how accurate the target coordinates are, not just horizontally but also altitude because an error in altitude causes a horizontal error in fall of shot. The accuracy and consistency of the second is mostly a function of the data and methods used to 'fix' and orient (ie survey) the guns and to calculate their firing data. The purpose of ranging is to correct for these sources of inaccuracy. However, inaccuracy also arose from day to day variations from the calibrated muzzle velocity.

Figure 1 illustrates the concept in terms of the fall of shot around an aimpoint. Of course the apparent irregularity really reflects the small size of the sample.



The main driver of consistency is the extent of the round to round variation in muzzle velocity (MV), and this is mostly a function of the ammunition, both shell and propellant, and its design, manufacture and handling. The tightness of quality control in keeping it to its specifications (eg propellant energy, shell weight and shape) is a major factor. Other sources of variation are due to differences in ammunition storage and handling at the gun and how strongly the shell is rammed. Unpacked ammunition that has been sitting in the sun will perform slightly differently to that taken directly from its packaging. Nevertheless there are differences in the probable errors in the range or firing tables for different guns firing the same ammunition, look at the two 7.2 inch in Figure 4 below, and consider the different carriage stability characteristics in the gun data sheet. Of course in some cases this may reflect differences in national measuring and calculating methods. Consistency also deteriorates when a gun is well worn because barrel wear makes the shell less stable in flight.

Round to round variations also occur due to very small inconsistencies in laying causing the gun to be pointed in fractionally different directions for each round. To this can be added very small variations due to the continuously changing atmospheric conditions that affect the shells' flight, and shells at transonic speed are notably less consistent than those above or below this speed. There are also small variations in gun specific characteristics such as jump and droop. Finally there are residual factors that are not properly understood, see Calibration.

The main sources of lack of accuracy are mostly not an inherent characteristic of a gun, Table 1 and 2 later on this page show this. Only two of any size might the considered gun dependent, and they are dwarfed by others. The first of these is the graduation of sights, and this is basically the same for all guns, the basic unit of measurement, 5 minutes in UK, had specific distance on the ground depending on range, charge and the type of gun. There are also day to day variations and although these are about their mean, they can cause inaccuracy on an occasion to occasion basis. The most significant is again muzzle velocity, and trials demonstrated a day to day correlation between guns in a troop, ie the group of guns tended to be effected the same way each day. Apart from these it is really a matter of the quality of data in range tables, the quality of data about current non-standard conditions (meteor and propellant temperature, plus muzzle velocity) and the accuracy of the methods used to combine these to produce firing data. Not forgetting the entirely external sources of survey accuracy and target location error.

Of course to an observer there may be a perception of gun accuracy but this is probably a mixture of consistency and occasion to occasion error. Assuming an accurately located target and predicted fire then a single round from a consistent gun will usually appear more accurate than one from a less consistent gun because it will probably be closer to the target. However, the mean of several shells could be correct in both cases.

Probability

Both accuracy and consistency are measured in terms of 'Probable Errors' (PE) and exist throughout the artillery system. For example the MPI of the fall of shot from a single gun may or may not be at its aimpoint. The distance MPI to aimpoint is accuracy, the size of the fall of shot's spread around its MPI is its consistency. Similarly the MPI of the MPIs of each gun in a battery will be the battery MPI, and the MPI of the MPIs of the batteries in a regiment will give a regimental MPI (assuming they were all aimed at the same point). The measure of how far these MPIs are from their common aimpoint is their accuracy and is also defined in terms of PEs.

Conventional statistics defines variability in terms of 'standard deviations' from the mean with a 'normal distribution' (a 'bell curve'), such that all outcomes for a particular type of event will fall within about three standard deviations from the mean of them. Artillery does not use standard deviations, but 'probable errors' (PEs). In essence its just a matter of slicing up the spread of outcomes in a different way. Instead of them all falling within 6 standard deviations of the mean (3 either side) they fall within 8 PEs, 4 either side of the mean, the total distance is the same. Figure 2 shows the normal proportional distribution of outcomes for an event. The 2 PEs (one either side of the MPI) are called the 50% zone, because 50% of the shells fall there, the central 4 PEs give the 82% zone, and so on. The size of a PE will vary but their distribution does not, Figure 2 shows the distribution of PEs as a histogram, the horizontal axis represents the size of a PE. A small number, about 1 per 500, fall outside the 100% zone.



PEs occur throughout the artillery system. For example the spread of the fall of shot from an individual gun firing repeated shells at the same data, the size of these PEs are documented in Range Tables. For a 25-pdr firing charge 3 at 8000 yds range the PER was 30 yds (PE range - along the line of fire) and PEL was 4 yds (PE line - across the line of fire). Figure 3 illustrates the distribution of 100 shells when combining their range and line PE, (rounded numbers). Of course it's also possible, but unlikely, for a shell to fall at the extreme of both range and line PEs. Most properly conducted actions in the artillery system (eg plotting on an artillery board, the target location, laying) have a normal distribution of errors, some of them circular.



For fall of shot from an individual gun It must, of course be remembered that the PEL is much smaller than the PER, this means that in distance terms 50% of the rounds will fall within one PER of the target.

Figure 4 shows British WW2 guns and their dispersion PER as a percentage of range. For comparison a WW1 gun (6-inch Gun Mk 19) and 1960's design (155-mm L121 (FH70)) are also shown. The PEs, taken from Range Tables, are for the charge with the smallest at each range. However, British WW2 Range Tables only gave PER to the nearest 5 yards, which probably explains the slightly erratic data.



For some variables the PE could be circular around the mean (PEC), with 1 PEC (or CEP) all round being the 50% zone. PE for different things can be added together using the 'root mean square' rule (square the PEs, add them together and find the square root). This reflects the reality that errors on the same axis partially cancel each other out.

However, this is only valid if all the errors are in the same dimension. The disparity in the size of PEL and PER, which are in different dimensions (axes), means that combining them to give a CEP is misleading because the two axes give an eliptical not circular shape (Figure 3 above). Where two dimensions are equal size then the CEP is 1.75 × PE. Where they are reaonably close, say PER25m and PEL20m, then the square root of the average of their squares is a reasonable appoximation, 32m CEP in this case. However, when they are far apart, eg PER25m and PEL5m, this method gives 18m CEP (or 21 yards CEP in the 25-pdr example above), a useful 'improvement' in PER but clearly an impossibility. Nevertheless, CEPs do appear in manufacturers' brochures and are quoted, and sometimes manufacturers add another layer of obfuscation by presenting this CEP as a percentage of range!


In the mountains, apart from the issues mentioned above, there is also the rarefied atmosphere as also the weather changes rapidly.

Therefore, as is routine, Datum shoots are fired to check accuracy in the changed conditions. It is normal done every 2 hours.

Mountain peaks being small where the enemy is entrenched, apart from the above issues, the area on which the shots are to fall are very small.

Therefore, quite a few shells fall "Over'" i.e. go beyond that small pinnacle or fall "Under" ie. fall short of the small target area.

Hence, a large number of shells or rounds have to be fired for the desired effect on the target.

Now, if the enemy post can be seen, it is easier to use the Arty gun like a rifle, if you will, so that the Overs and Unders are eliminated and accuracy and effect becomes better.

Hence, the Direct Firing was resorted to by Lucky Lakhinder.
 

Bhadra

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They have different tasks and cannot be compared.

Or maybe I have not understood the background of the question.
His intention is to expand the regiment of guns by more numbers, say 45 guns to the regiment.... like armoured regiment
 

Ray

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His intention is to expand the regiment of guns by more numbers, say 45 guns to the regiment.... like armoured regiment
And the rationale to do so?

The employment of Arty and Armour are quite different.

That way someone may want the numbers to be compatible to the number of soldiers in an Infantry unit!

No, the tactical employment is as diverse as chalk and cheese.
 

Parthy

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As per the Defence Acquisition Council decision of October 2011, Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) is to manufacture 155mm Howitzers as per the details given below:-
(i) Manufacturing of two prototypes of 155mm/39 calibre FH 77 B02 and two prototypes of upgraded 155mm/45 calibre Howitzer Gun.
(ii) Also simultaneously carryout electronic and mechanical upgrade (to 45mm calibre) on one 'in service' 155mm/39 calibre gun separately.

The time lines for OFB to offer indigenous Howitzers for trials are as follows:-

(iii) Two prototypes of 155mm/39 calibre guns by December 2012.
(iv) Two prototypes of 155mm/45 calibre guns by June 2013.


defence eXpress
 

nitesh

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good news:

The Tribune, Chandigarh, India - Nation

An artillery gun produced within India to replace the Indian Army's inventory of the 155 MM Howitzer supplied by AB Bofors, some 25 years ago, has reportedly performed well at the ongoing trials to test out the weapon in the heat of the deserts. The second round tests will be in winter in the mountains.

The India-made gun has been produced by the Ordnance Factory Board. The gun is presently being tested near Pokhran in Rajasthan and has done well. Source confirmed that yesterday, there were 12 rounds of firing from the gun and tests will continue till Saturday.

The 155 MM, 45 calibre Howitzer produced by the OFB looks similar to the Bofors and can reportedly fire at a distance in excess of 30 km. The accuracy reading will be out after tabulations at the end of trials. "All this delay and shortages of artillery guns could have been avoided had the OFB started work on the gun a year back," said an official.
 

Sam2012

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Beyond 2020 India will have good mixture of Howitzers .

M777 155 mm
OFB bofors gun 155mm 52 cal
FH-77 155mm upgraded gun
M-46 155mm upgraded gun
Tata vehicle mounted gun ( If selected)
Self propelled gun( track version , BHIM probably)
105mm Indian field gun towed & self propelled

:thumb::tea:
 

Kunal Biswas

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And no Photos..

Photos posted on 1st page are of BOFORS and Pegasus..
 

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