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C O N F I D E N T I A L
BERLIN 000140 SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/CE PETER SCHROEDER STATE FOR ISN/CB MARK HARTELL AND KRISTEN GASS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2035 TAGS:
PARM"‰[Arms Controls and Disarmament], ECON"‰[Economic Conditions], ETTC"‰[Trade and Technology Controls], PREL"‰[External Political Relations], GM"‰[Germany] SUBJECT: GERMANY SOLICITS US VIEWS ON AUSTRALIA GROUP EXPORT CONTROL POLICY TO
DISTRIBUTORS REF: BERLIN 1588 Classified By: Global Affairs Unit Chief Don L. Brown for reasons 1.4 (b).
¶1. (U) THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST. PLEASE SEE PARA 5.
¶2. (C) SUMMARY: Germany is in the process of defining its export control policy for highly-sensitive Australia Group (AG)-controlled items to foreign distributors and is seeking advice from US export control authorities. Specifically, Germany would like to know what the U.S. policy is regarding the export of AG-controlled items to specific foreign distributors that have an accompanying, pre-determined list of potential end-users. END SUMMARY
¶3. (C) On January 25, MFA Deputy Director of Export Control, Markus Klinger told Econoff that Germany recently received multiple requests for the export of highly lethal, AG-controlled virus sequencing technology to a US-based distributor with 70 listed potential end-users. Klinger said, normally, given the sensitivity of the items in question, Germany would deny the export to a distributor and would only issue export permits to individual end-users on a case-by-case basis. However, given Germany's robust cooperation with the USG on AG matters, it is investigating to see if a policy change would be appropriate for distributors in select countries. In addition to getting the USG policy on this type of export situation, Germany would like to solicit USG thoughts on the outcome if the situation were reversed; if there were a U.S. AG-controlled export to a distributor located in Germany with a pre-defined end-user list.
¶4. (C) Klinger referenced the AG "Common Approach to Controls of Exports to Distributors" (AG/May06/ExC/D/28) as the code of conduct that Germany is using for guidance, but said this "non-exhaustive" document alone is not sufficient for this complex, atypical case. In the document's "optional elements" section, Klinger highlighted the clause: "Exclusion of licenses to distributors for certain goods" as a potential reason to deny the export, but given the special case of a US-based distributor, there may be some room for further policy development. (COMMENT: &Optional elements8 in this document refers to measures AG members may take beyond the document,s &core elements8 guidelines. This was put in place to allow for increased flexibility; to handle AG exports to distributors on a case-by-case basis. END COMMENT)
¶5. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Post requests Department guidance in responding to the request posed in paragraph 3. Murphy
Cable Viewer
Cable reference id: #10BERLIN140
BERLIN 000140 SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/CE PETER SCHROEDER STATE FOR ISN/CB MARK HARTELL AND KRISTEN GASS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2035 TAGS:
PARM"‰[Arms Controls and Disarmament], ECON"‰[Economic Conditions], ETTC"‰[Trade and Technology Controls], PREL"‰[External Political Relations], GM"‰[Germany] SUBJECT: GERMANY SOLICITS US VIEWS ON AUSTRALIA GROUP EXPORT CONTROL POLICY TO
DISTRIBUTORS REF: BERLIN 1588 Classified By: Global Affairs Unit Chief Don L. Brown for reasons 1.4 (b).
¶1. (U) THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST. PLEASE SEE PARA 5.
¶2. (C) SUMMARY: Germany is in the process of defining its export control policy for highly-sensitive Australia Group (AG)-controlled items to foreign distributors and is seeking advice from US export control authorities. Specifically, Germany would like to know what the U.S. policy is regarding the export of AG-controlled items to specific foreign distributors that have an accompanying, pre-determined list of potential end-users. END SUMMARY
¶3. (C) On January 25, MFA Deputy Director of Export Control, Markus Klinger told Econoff that Germany recently received multiple requests for the export of highly lethal, AG-controlled virus sequencing technology to a US-based distributor with 70 listed potential end-users. Klinger said, normally, given the sensitivity of the items in question, Germany would deny the export to a distributor and would only issue export permits to individual end-users on a case-by-case basis. However, given Germany's robust cooperation with the USG on AG matters, it is investigating to see if a policy change would be appropriate for distributors in select countries. In addition to getting the USG policy on this type of export situation, Germany would like to solicit USG thoughts on the outcome if the situation were reversed; if there were a U.S. AG-controlled export to a distributor located in Germany with a pre-defined end-user list.
¶4. (C) Klinger referenced the AG "Common Approach to Controls of Exports to Distributors" (AG/May06/ExC/D/28) as the code of conduct that Germany is using for guidance, but said this "non-exhaustive" document alone is not sufficient for this complex, atypical case. In the document's "optional elements" section, Klinger highlighted the clause: "Exclusion of licenses to distributors for certain goods" as a potential reason to deny the export, but given the special case of a US-based distributor, there may be some room for further policy development. (COMMENT: &Optional elements8 in this document refers to measures AG members may take beyond the document,s &core elements8 guidelines. This was put in place to allow for increased flexibility; to handle AG exports to distributors on a case-by-case basis. END COMMENT)
¶5. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Post requests Department guidance in responding to the request posed in paragraph 3. Murphy
Cable Viewer
Cable reference id: #10BERLIN140
