US B-52 Bombers Challenge Disputed China Air Zone

ice berg

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China considers that 'international airspace' over the islands as Chinese ADIZ and none can enter it without Chinese sanction.

The fact that the US B52s did not bother, indicates that they don't take the Chinese seriously or recognises the so called ADIZ.

Or do you accept that the airspace over the islands are international airspace and not in the boundary of the so called Chinese ADIZ?
international airspace and ADIZ is not mutually exclusive. See Japan and US who also operate ADIZ.
 

ice berg

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The disputes involve land air and sea this is just one part of CCP hegemonic designs.
How can there be a dispute if one side dont aknowledge it? In what away is this a hegemonic design consider it has been ongoing for decades?
What is the "hegemonic design"? Fu manchu redux?:lol:
 

Ray

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international airspace and ADIZ is not mutually exclusive. See Japan and US who also operate ADIZ.
Why are you trying to get cute?

An Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) is airspace over land or water in which the ready identification, location, and control of civil aircraft over land or water is required in the interest of national security. They extend far beyond a country's airspace to give the country more time to respond to foreign and possibly hostile aircraft.

Assistant Chinese Foreign Minister Zheng Zeguang said that China's ADIZ aims to defend China's national sovereignty and its territorial and airspace security, stressing it conforms to the UN charter

China has stated that China had the ability to "effectively control the relevant airspace.".

Underscoring its disagreement with Beijing's ADIZ announcement, made on November 23, the State Department further said, "Freedom of over-flight and other internationally lawful uses of sea and airspace are essential to prosperity, stability, and security in the Pacific,"

Commenting on the latest advisory David Finkelstein, Vice President of the Centre for Naval Analyses and Director of the group's China Studies division, said to The Hindu that it might have been issued with an eye toward the safety of civilian air traffic given the current dynamic situation.

However, Dr. Finkelstein noted, "U.S. military operations will continue as usual and will not be providing advance notifications. So it is important to distinguish between the two."

The latest official comments on the ADIZ come in the wake of two U.S. B-52 bombers flying through the ADIZ for two hours and 20 minutes on November 26, a move that some said the U.S. may have made to underscore its non-acceptance of China's demarcation of the ADIZ.

Throughout the duration of their flight the U.S. military aircraft did not announce or otherwise identify themselves to Chinese authorities and no contact between the two occurred.

U.S. rejects China ADIZ, but asks airlines to comply - The Hindu

That is the US stance.

Now, if you claim that international airspace and ADIZ is not mutually exclusive, then what is this ballyhoo over the ADIZ?

All aircraft fly freely over international airspace. So if ADIZ and international airspace are not mutually exclusive, then none has to inform China!

QED!
 

Ray

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They are related to this topic because......?
Getting cuter? That is, trying to get clever in an underhanded manner

Or you don't understand English?

Here is the translation

除那外,让我做一简要的观察:我在从大多中国媒介的金融危机本周读数十篇用英语写的文章,一些和其他被翻译成英语。我今天突然体会的一件事:几乎每一他们中的一个开始 通过陈述实际,在更多或较少这些词, "全球性后退,是由美国的财政不负责任造成的"¦."åœ¨æ¯ç¯‡æ–‡ç« ä»¥åŽçš„点,与离奇的规律性,看来另一实际的参考,对把握的这次中国的情况是 现在改善,最坏是结束的,并且它现在是投入最后一笔问题在一个成功的刺激计划。
 
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Ray

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Also,,

当我首先听说书不快乐的中国,我认为它大概是关于被解雇的工作者怎样是不快乐的,或者关于丢失了他们的土地的农民怎样是不快乐的。可能它是关于搜寻工作的大学毕业生怎样是不快乐的,关于股市投资者怎样是不快乐的,关于毒奶粉丑闻的受害者怎样的r是不快乐的。[这将有道理],因为实际表示的这样不幸是进展中国的标记做了。反而,书的作者在远处熔铸了他们的视域中国的不幸的来源的。他们谈论汉语集体愤怒往西方国家,并且说中国愤怒要求英雄"带领我们的人民顺利地控制和使用更多资源,赶走[世界]恶霸和带来和平的一个小组的诞生给好人"ã€‚
 

Ray

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Zheng Wang. Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations. New York: Columbia University Press, 2012. xiii + 293 pp. $32.50 (cloth), ISBN 978-0-231-14890-0.:

Chinese Exceptionalism

As the title for his new book on historical memory and Chinese nationalism, Zheng Wang has chosen a phrase that first became popularized in China around 1915: "never forget national humiliation" (Wuwang guochi). This phrase aptly captures Wang's thesis: the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has bolstered its legitimacy in the post-Tiananmen era by using historical memory to cultivate a nationalistic and anti-Western victim mentality that provides young Chinese with an understanding of who they are and how to comprehend the rest of the world. Historical memory, Wang argues "is the prime raw material for constructing China's national identity" and it constitutes a powerful force in the way the Chinese understand and carry out foreign relations (p. 223).

Wang brings impressive credentials and an insider's perspective in his attempt to understand how historical memory informs Chinese foreign policy and why Chinese youth are so patriotic and nationalistic. A native of Kunming, capital of China's southwestern Yunnan province, he holds a Ph in conflict analysis and resolution from George Mason University and now teaches at Seton Hall's Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International Relations. Before taking up his professorship, he spent nearly a decade as a researcher at the Chinese People's Association for Peace and Disarmament in Beijing.

A timely and well-researched book, Never Forget National Humiliation qualifies as a landmark in the study of Chinese nationalism. Despite the minor reservations detailed below, it offers a comprehensive exploration of Chinese identity and the politics of history education in the People's Republic of China. Anyone interested in modern China or U.S.-China relations should read this book.

"To understand a country," Wang writes, "one should visit the country's primary and high schools and read their history textbooks" (p. 7). Through his study of Chinese textbooks and education policy, Wang reveals how the CCP has used history education to glorify the party, consolidate national identity, and justify one-party rule in the post-Tiananmen era. After the 1989 Tiananmen protests and the Soviet bloc collapse, China's leaders concluded that the CCP's greatest failure in the 1980s was not focusing enough attention on ideological education. Shortly afterward, the party launched its patriotic education campaign. By selecting which parts of Chinese history to remember and which parts to forget, the CCP has used historical memory to cultivate a national consciousness and what Wang calls a "Chosenness-Myth-Trauma (CMT) complex." Wang argues that this CMT complex and historical consciousness "are the dominant ideas in China's public rhetoric and bureaucratic procedures" (p. 240).

Inspired by a letter CCP leader Jiang Zemin wrote to the Education Ministry, the party officially launched the patriotic education campaign in August 1991 with two documents: "Notice about Conducting Education of Patriotism and Revolutionary Tradition by Exploiting Extensively Cultural Relics," and "General Outline on Strengthening Education on Chinese Modern and Contemporary History and National Conditions." The patriotic education campaign jettisoned the Mao-era class struggle narrative in favor of a framework for teaching history that focused on China's struggle with outside forces. A 1994 CCP directive stated that the party initiated the campaign in order to "boost the nation's spirit, enhance cohesion, foster national self-esteem and pride, consolidate and develop a patriotic united front to the broadest extent possible, and direct and rally the masses' patriotic passions to the great cause of building socialism with Chinese characteristics" (p. 99). The patriotic education campaign--the driving force behind contemporary Chinese nationalism--is thus "an elite-led, top-down political movement" (p. 140).

Central to the patriotic education campaign are the CCP's chosen glories and traumas--Wang's CMT complex. Wang shows that when looking to the glories of China's past, party-approved textbooks engage in selective remembering and forgetting. For example, China's standard history textbooks praise Ming Dynasty admiral Zheng He's naval expeditions as "voyages of peace and friendship," yet recent scholarship has shown that Zheng's voyages were often accompanied by violence against local populations (p. 46). These textbooks emphasize that China has always been a "peace-loving country" while overlooking military campaigns various dynasties have undertaken against China's neighbors. History education in China also glorifies the CCP's achievements while downplaying or ignoring the suffering that many ordinary Chinese have experienced at the party's hands. In China's textbooks, most suffering comes at the hands of foreigners and brings national humiliation.

Under Mao, history education emphasized national glory. The government suppressed writing about the Nanjing Massacre and used class struggle theory to explain the Chinese Revolution and foreign imperialism. Above all, history education during the Mao years emphasized that the CCP and Mao's brilliant leadership deserved all credit for victory over the Japanese and the Guomindang (GMD). Under Mao the party had redeemed the country after a century of national humiliation stretching from the First Opium War to the Communists' victory in the Chinese Civil War.

China's patriotic education campaign revised these Mao-era narratives. The new narrative blamed the West rather than class enemies for China's suffering. In teaching students about the War of Resistance against Japan, for example, the revised curriculum focused on ethnic conflict between Japan and China rather than class conflict between the CCP and the GMD. More than anything else it emphasized the foreign powers' brutality against the Chinese, forcing the younger generation to confront the atrocities of the century of humiliation. According to Wang, "this transition from China as victor to China as victim reveals a great deal about changes to Chinese national identity" (p. 103).

In order to cultivate the new China-as-victim identity, the patriotic education campaign reached beyond the classroom. Wang finds no parallel anywhere in the world for "the special effort made by the Chinese government since 1991 to construct memory sites and use them for ideological reeducation" (p. 104). In 1995 the party selected one hundred national-level demonstration sites for patriotic education. Nearly two-thirds were devoted to past wars and conflicts. The remainder featured ancient Chinese civilization and national heroes like Mao and Zhou Enlai. Taking their cues from the center, provincial and county authorities created patriotic education bases of their own. Wang counts more than 2,300 provincial- and county-level sites in Beijing, Hebei, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, and Anhui alone (p. 109). Visiting these sites, he notes, has become a regular part of the school curriculum.

Entertainment, too, has become a patriotic education tool. To encourage visits to patriotic education bases, the CCP launched a "Red Tourism" program in the early 2000s. Red tourism skillfully exploits China's domestic tourism boom by replacing the term "education" with "tourism." The results, as Wang shows, have been impressive: between 2004 and 2007 more than 400 million Chinese traveled to red tourism sites (p. 109). While at home, Chinese can watch movies and TV series about the War of Resistance and humiliation at the hands of foreigners. Nothing, of course, illustrated Chinese national greatness and rejuvenation like the opening ceremony at the 2008 Beijing Olympics.

Wang's excellent chapter on the Beijing Olympics reveals that the anxieties underpinning China's patriotic education campaign also inform its attitudes toward international athletic competition. In preparation for the games, the CCP's General Sports Administration drew up a strategy called "The General Outline for Winning Honor at the Olympics, 2001-2010." The document urged government ministries and provinces to win honor at the 2004 and 2008 Olympic Games by winning as many gold medals as possible--silver and bronze would not suffice. They targeted medal-rich disciplines that rely on athletes' long-term training and individual skillfulness--diving, weightlifting, shooting--rather than more popular sports emphasizing teamwork and contact, such as soccer or basketball. The strategy paid off handsomely in 2008 when Chinese athletes took home fifty-one gold medals.

But Wang argues that China's emphasis on gold medals "masks a lingering inferiority complex" (p. 153). In 2004 Chinese hurdler Liu Xiang won China's first track and field gold and became the country's most popular athlete. By winning gold in a sport traditionally dominated by Westerners, Liu, according to Wang, "became an instant symbol for China's ability to conquer the world in any new field that China wants to take on" (p. 153). Because of the lingering memory of national humiliation, the Chinese government can legitimize its rule through sports. To win more gold medals than the United States symbolized China's passage into the top tier of world powers. Yet Wang remains wary about such logic and urges Chinese elites to heed the words of historian Xu Guoqi: "A nation that obsesses over gold medals to bolster nationalist sentiment and its domestic legitimacy is not a confident government" (p. 162).

Wang's next chapter shows how this "culture of insecurity" influenced China's response to three crises in U.S.-China relations. The majority of China's top leaders interpreted the 1999 NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade as an open provocation and insult to the Chinese people. The government organized anti-American demonstrations outside U.S. diplomatic missions and demanded an official apology. Beijing had also demanded an apology after the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis. In 2001, Beijing blamed the United States for the collision between a Chinese F-8 fighter jet and a U.S. EP-3 spy plane and expected Washington to apologize and take full responsibility. According to Wang, each incident touched on the feelings of national humiliation cultivated by the patriotic education program. As a result, the Chinese government escalated each crisis through military maneuvers, rejecting American apologies, or sending students to pelt U.S. diplomatic facilities with rocks and debris. Because the CCP has built its legitimacy on righting the humiliations of the past, it cannot allow the country to be humiliated again. Each crisis thus becomes a test of the CCP's political credibility, and presses the government toward a more uncompromising stance.

Wang concludes that Beijing must move beyond its victim mentality and allow discussion of the failures and catastrophes caused by the party. He sees the 2005 publication of the first joint history textbook in East Asia--written by Chinese, Japanese, and South Korean scholars--as a step in the right direction. But he also concedes that China has a long way to go: in 2006 the CCP shut down Bingdian (Freezing point), the weekly supplement to the national China Youth Daily newspaper, after Bingdian published an article criticizing a Chinese history textbook for fostering blind nationalism and providing one-sided historical accounts. Party officials also sacked the China Youth Daily's editors and barred all Chinese media from reporting on the suspension. Though China today is far more open than it was during the Mao years, the party retains its monopoly on interpreting controversial history.

Wang wrote Never Forget National Humiliation because he wanted to help Westerners better understand the Chinese people, their motivations, and their intentions. Here he succeeds admirably, and his task is no doubt an important one. Failing to understand Chinese nationalism in the past has caused and exacerbated problems in U.S-.China relations. Taiwanese scholar Ch'i Hsi-sheng, for example, shows that during World War II General Joseph Stilwell, commander of U.S. forces in China, needlessly angered the Chinese by treating them with disrespect and contempt. Stilwell assumed this was the best way to accomplish his goals, but Chinese president Chiang Kai-shek interpreted Stilwell's manner as evidence of the general's ignorance and racism. Ch'i concludes that Stilwell treated Chiang harshly and demanded control over Chinese military forces because he failed to understand the depth of Chinese nationalism.[1] Books like Never Forget National Humiliation go a long way toward giving non-Chinese a clearer understanding of how many Chinese see the world.

Although a first-rate study, Never Forget National Humiliation is not without its flaws. Wang's first chapter contains a literature review and theoretical framework that may put some readers off. That would be a mistake--the book is well worth reading. And though Wang argues that China's CMT complex and historical memory are the dominant ideas in the PRC's bureaucratic procedures, he proves his case only when discussing the Belgrade embassy bombing and EP-3 spy plane incident. But these minor shortcomings do not detract from this masterful book. One hopes it not only leaves non-Chinese with a clearer understanding of the PRC and its people but also encourages the Chinese to look more honestly at their country's recent past and see China as it truly is.

http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=36967
 
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Ray

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@iceberg,

Unhappy China and why it is cause for unhappiness

y David Bandurski — Unhappy China (中国不高兴), a now best-selling book by several Chinese academics arguing in Darwinian terms that China should carve out for itself a pre-eminent role in world affairs, has been the focus of much coverage outside China, and of fierce debate within China. [Homepage Image: A recent issue of Shanghai's Xinmin Weekly magazine deals with Unhappy China, its significance and its underlying commercial motivations.]

Some Chinese scholars and journalists have expressed concern about Unhappy China's pugnacious and even jingoistic tone. The following are two responses to the book. The first is an editorial by Nanjing professor Jing Kaixuan (景凯旋), which appeared in a recent issue of Southern Metropolis Daily; The second is an interview with Shanghai scholar Xiao Gongqin (萧功秦), part of coverage of the book by Shanghai's Xinmin Weekly.


[ABOVE: Unhappy China, written by Wang Xiaodong, Liu Yang, Song Qiang, Huang Jisu, and Song Xiaojun, has captured the imagination of many Chinese, and concerned others.]

Jing Kaixuan begins his critique of Unhappy China against a backdrop of the myriad domestic issues with which China must contend — a not-so-subtle suggestion that China has plenty of its own concerns, and does not need to strike a confrontational tone internationally. He also invokes Hu Jintao's term "boat-rocking," or zhe teng (折腾), suggesting the path marked by the book's authors is a dangerous loss of focus on the essentials.

"'Unhappy China' is All for Show"

By Jing Kaixuan (景凯旋)
Southern Metropolis Daily
March 31, 2009
PG A31

When I first heard about the book Unhappy China, I thought it was probably about how laid-off workers were unhappy, or about how peasants who had lost their land were unhappy. Maybe it was about how college graduates searching for work were unhappy, about how stock market investors were unhappy, or about how victims of the poisonous milk powder scandal were unhappy. [This would make sense], because the actual expression of such unhappinesses is a mark of the progress China has made. Instead, the book's authors cast their sights much farther afield for the source of China's unhappiness. They talk about the collective anger of Chinese toward Western nations, and say that Chinese anger demands the emergence of a group of heroes to "lead our people to successfully control and use more resources, ridding [the world of] of bullies and bringing peace to good people."

No sooner do we drop our guard than we find others speaking once again on our behalf. But I wonder, if this is really about an invasion by foreign enemies, whether we shouldn't be furious rather than merely "unhappy." Relationships between nations are not like romantic relationships, which might demand a bit of petulance and coquettishness. If this [issue the authors are talking about] indeed amounts to an international dispute, it should be a matter for diplomatic negotiation to mutual benefit, not something handled with this sort of bluffing and spitting nationalism. When I read an interview with the authors at Sina.com, I found that the whole thing surged with naked Darwinism. The world works by the laws of the jungle, and if Western nations are insolently hegemonic, well then, we should behave like that too. China, therefore, must define its major objective as "first, to get rid of the bullies and bring peace to good people and, second, to control more resources than China currently has in order to bring blessings to all the people of the world." Even Hitler's old slogan about "using the swords of Germany to gain lands for the ploughs of Germany" was dragged out and given a new face with the Chinese term "conducting business with a sword in hand" (持剑经商).

Other than these [sentiments], I detect no other basic concepts in the authors' work . . . In the words of one of the authors, a former author of China Can Say No, Song Qiang (宋强): "Saying 'no' expresses the idea that 'China just wants to govern itself,' while 'unhappiness' expresses the idea that 'China is able to lead the world.'" If you want to rule this world, though, you must first suppose China already possesses both super powers and lofty ambitions in a number of [strategic] areas. Clearly, the "unhappy" authors don't see things this way — they believe China can already lead the world, and they object to the idea of "soft power." The net result is that they ring empty when they talk about China's internal affairs, and they come off as falsely proud when they talk about foreign affairs. Moreover, realizing their ultimate goal of overthrowing the global capitalist structure would mean not just a "qualified break" with the West, but could only be accomplished through [what they call] the "liberation of the whole world."

These authors hail from neither the left nor the right. Rather, they are modern proponents of realism . . . thinking about problems only from the standpoint of "power," hoping that some day the politicians will offer their good graces. In the pre-Qin, there was a school called the "political strategists" (纵横家), and unlike the Confucians and Moists, they subscribed to no clear value concepts. They spent all of their time stumping for this or that cause, using their tongues as weapons, maneuvering about, always changing sides, empty of knowledge but full of tactics. But the political strategists were at least able to size up the situation and to come up with positions to argue . . . In this way, they were quite unlike our "unhappy" authors, who disregard all facts and all logic and sink into their own fantasies, saying what they please without presenting an argument, subjecting themselves to fits of conspiracy theory, and remaining all the time entirely amused by their own boat-rocking ("zhe teng"/折腾) . . .

I hear that the book is selling well, and that it has caught the attention of the Western media — perhaps this is what they mean by a "qualified break." Generally, I don't like to speculate about others' motivations in writing this or that book, as this is something you can never be clear about. But [Phoenix TV correspondent] Luqiu Luwei (闾丘露薇) has revealed that: "On the day it was published, one of the books authors told me that this was a kind of method of (speculation) ("是一种(炒作)手法"), to publish a provocative book and then bandy it about. Having written this commentary up to this point, I confess I'm beginning to feel a bit thick — expostulating with such seriousness about [a book that is little more than] a circus of patriotism with its eye on the bottom line.

The writer is a professor at Nanjing University




I hope you now understand the meaning of "new patriotism" (新爱国主义)

This "new patriotism" (新爱国主义) that describe the popular sentiment of nationalism

It is what is making China belligerent so that they can wipe out the humiliation that was heaped on them with total elan glee and disregard by the Western powers and Japan, now that China is finding her feet!

Therefore, it is not OT, but an explanation as to why China is behaving the way it is behaving, to include having the ADIZ and demanding that all inform China if they enter this so called ADIZ, steaming their lone aircraft carrier to the SCS and so on!

China insist that even civil airliners not heading for China, but entering this ADIZ will inform China and obey the Chinese orders.

I might inform you that other countries too have ADIZ, but if an aircraft is not heading for that country but entering that ADIZ, they do not have to inform the country that has implemented the ADIZ.

Here is what the US states

the U.S. Navy's Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations states the ADIZ applies only to commercial aircraft intending to enter U.S. sovereign airspace, with a basis in international law of "the right of a nation to establish reasonable conditions of entry into its territory". The manual specifically instructs U.S. military aircraft to ignore the ADIZ of other states when operating in coastal areas:

The United States does not recognize the right of a coastal nation to apply its ADIZ procedures to foreign aircraft not intending to enter national airspace nor does the United States apply its ADIZ procedures to foreign aircraft not intending to enter U.S. airspace. Accordingly, U.S. military aircraft not intending to enter national airspace should not identify themselves or otherwise comply with ADIZ procedures established by other nations, unless the United States has specifically agreed to do so.
China on the other hand, insist that ALL aircraft entering the ADIZ that China has declared will inform China and obey Chinese orders, irrespective of whether the aircraft is heading to China or some other place!
 
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happy

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@Ray Sir, iceberg is just proving the official ccp stance i.e., to stoop to any level to prove that he is right.
 
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How can there be a dispute if one side dont aknowledge it? In what away is this a hegemonic design consider it has been ongoing for decades?
What is the "hegemonic design"? Fu manchu redux?:lol:
Claiming territory that belongs to neighbors.
 
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China media urges countermeasures against Japan planes

China media urges countermeasures against Japan planes


China's state media called Friday for "timely countermeasures without hesitation" if Japan violates the country's newly declared air zone, after Beijing sent fighter jets to patrol the area following defiant military overflights by Tokyo.

Japan and South Korea both said Thursday they had disregarded the air defence identification zone (ADIZ) that Beijing declared last weekend, showing a united front after US B-52 bombers also entered the area.

The zone includes disputed islands claimed by China, which knows them as the Diaoyus, but controlled by Japan, which calls them the Senkakus, and Beijing's ADIZ was condemned in Washington, Tokyo, South Korea and elsewhere.

China sent fighter jets and an early warning aircraft into the area Thursday, the official Xinhua news agency reported after Tokyo said its military and coastguard had both flown through it.

Washington has security alliances with both Tokyo and Seoul, and analysts say that neither China nor Japan -- the world's second- and third-biggest economies, and major trading partners of each other -- want to engage in armed conflict.

But Beijing is facing mounting internal pressure to assert itself.

The Global Times newspaper, which often takes a nationalistic tone, said in an editorial Friday: "We should carry out timely countermeasures without hesitation against Japan when it challenges China's newly declared ADIZ.

"If Tokyo flies its aircraft over the zone, we will be bound to send our plane to its ADIZ."

The paper, which is close to China's ruling Communist party, said: "If the trend continues, there will likely be frictions and confrontations and even tension in the air like in the Cold War era between the US and the Soviet Union. We are willing to engage in a protracted confrontation with Japan."

But it shied away from threatening Washington, which sent giant Stratofortress bombers inside the zone, issuing an unmistakable message.

"If the US does not go too far, we will not target it in safeguarding our air defence zone," the paper said, adding that Australia could be "ignored" and that South Korea "understands" as it has tensions of its own with Japan.

China's Communist Party seeks to bolster its public support by tapping into deep-seated resentment of Japan for its brutal invasion of the country in the 1930s.

The media rhetoric came after Chinese planes conducted air patrols on Thursday as "a defensive measure and in line with international common practices", Xinhua quoted People's Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force spokesman Shen Jinke as saying.

China first sent fighters, scouts and early warning aircraft into the zone on Saturday, Xinhua reported earlier, and the East Sea Fleet's air arm has also been flying in the area, according to state broadcaster CCTV.

The Chinese ADIZ requires aircraft to provide their flight plan, declare their nationality and maintain two-way radio communication -- or face unspecified "defensive emergency measures".

Both Japan and Washington have ADIZs of their own, and China accuses them of double standards, saying the real provocateur is Tokyo.

Defence ministry spokesman Yang Yujun said Thursday that Japan established its ADIZ in 1969, so Tokyo had "no right to make irresponsible remarks" about China's.

"If there are to be demands for a withdrawal, then we invite the Japanese side to first withdraw its air defence identification zone, and China may reconsider after 44 years," he said.

Tokyo denies that there is a dispute over the islands, and Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga declined Friday to be drawn on reports that a Chinese envoy had suggested setting up a mechanism to prevent mid-air incidents.

"Our country's principle is that we will assert our position firmly in a stern but calm manner," Suga said. "And we keep the window of dialogue open."

The Yomiuri Shimbun reported that the US and Japan planned to enhance military cooperation in the area, with Tokyo permanently stationing E-2C early-warning planes in Okinawa, and US Global Hawk unmanned drones expected to be operated from Japan soon.

US vice president Joe Biden is visiting the region next week, and administration officials said that while in Beijing he will raise Washington's concerns about the ADIZ, and China's assertiveness towards its neighbours.

The Philippines has voiced concern that China may extend control of air space over disputed areas of the South China Sea, where the two nations have a separate territorial dispute.

The islands dispute lay dormant for decades but flared in September 2012 when Tokyo purchased three of the uninhabited outcrops from private owners.

Beijing accused Tokyo of changing the status quo and has since sent surveillance ships and aircraft to the area, prompting Japan to scramble fighter jets hundreds of times.
 

W.G.Ewald

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@Ray Sir, iceberg is just proving the official ccp stance i.e., to stoop to any level to prove that he is right.
That is why any negotiation with Chinese anywhere over anything will never turn out well for anybody except Chinese.
 
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Ray

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@Ray Sir, iceberg is just proving the official ccp stance i.e., to stoop to any level to prove that he is right.
But he is becoming a pretzel.
 
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AVERAGE INDIAN

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Airspace row: Japan, US to discuss China's air zone expansion plans

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said on Sunday that he would discuss China's expansion of its air defence zone with US Vice President Joe Biden in Tokyo to coordinate their stance after apparently contradictory responses.
China raised regional tensions with its declaration last weekend of the zone, which covers islands in the East China Sea at the centre of a dispute between Beijing and Tokyo, and demands that aircraft submit flight plans when traversing the area.

Tokyo has stopped Japanese airlines from submitting flight plans to Beijing but Washington said Friday it generally expected US carriers to "operate consistent with" notification policies issued by foreign countries.

"We want to hold consultation with US Vice President Biden who will visit Japan this week and deal with the matter by coordinating closely between Japan and the United States," Abe said.

Biden is due to arrive in Tokyo late on Monday for a 34-hour visit as part of his East Asian tour which will also take him to China and South Korea.

The US State Department statement was widely taken in Japan to mean Washington had effectively advised US airlines to comply with the Chinese demand.

But Abe and Defence Minister Itsunori Onodera said Washington had not explicitly requested US carriers to submit flight plans to Beijing.

"We have confirmed it through diplomatic channels," Abe told reporters, according to Jiji Press news agency.

Onodera, speaking on public broadcaster NHK, said, "The US government is taking the same stance with Japan" over the air defence zone.

"The US side has rather been quicker than Japan in responding to this issue. It has issued a strong message," the Defence Chief said.

China's announcement last weekend that it was extending an air defence identification zone (ADIZ) over the Tokyo -controlled Senkaku islands, claimed by Beijing as the Diaoyus, was disregarded by several nations, and US B-52 bombers entered the area.

The Pentagon has indicated that American military forces would continue normal operations, despite China scrambling fighter jets to monitor US and Japanese aircraft in the zone.

Jiji said Abe and Onodera were possibly trying to deny any damaging difference between the Pacific allies over the air zone issue.

Onodera also cited press reports that China might "make similar moves in the South China Sea", where Beijing is involved in territorial disputes with several neighbouring countries.

"I think a sense of tension will run through countries within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)," he said adding that,"The international community as a whole should not condone such unilateral approach."

Airspace row: Japan, US to discuss China's air zone expansion plans - Indian Express
 

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