Unobtrusive indicators of the "good [combat] officer"

[Ray]

Unobtrusive indicators of the "good [combat] officer":

* Distrust any officer with a perfect or near perfect record of efficiency reports. he is conforming to the existing value system and will have no interest in changing it.

* Look carefully at a man who gets low marks on "tact" and who "deviates from accepted doctrine." He may be creative.

* An officer who gets low marks on loyalty is especially valuable, for he is unwilling to acquiesce to his superior's policies without debate. He is likely to have an independent mind.

* Be suspicious of any officer who has accumulated awards for valour without having sustained physical injury. Trust a Purple Heart wearer.

* Distrust any officer who has had "all his tickets punched" and who sports an array of staff awards on his chest. He is likely to be a manager playing the system.

* Distrust all officers who use "buzz words" and have a poor vocabulary. they tend to be managers of the most obsequious type. True leadership is likely to be foreign to them.

* Trust a man who heads for the sound of the guns and has repeated tours of combat and command duty at all unit levels; it is preferable that he have only minimal exposure to staff work.

* Trust an officer who was seen by his men in combat and whose command performed well and showed low rates of drug use, fragging, body counting, etc.

* Search for the officer whose readiness reports indicate a high percentage of equipment which is deficient. He is a man addicted to the truth.

- Gabriel/Savage, Crisis in Command, 1978

Though this book has had received brickbats, yet, there is no doubt that it does some plain speaking.

Some of the traits the authors indicate above are worth mulling over, but could they be applied?

Would it not put the current evaluating system and criteria for postings totally on its head?

Can what has been suggested be implemented without tweaking the system too much to result in chaos for those who administer promotions and postings?

There are good officers who are great administrators, but not too good at combat.

While there are good officers who are good combat officers, but are not good administrators.

The ideal officer should be good at both!

How do we ensure that we get a good combat officer and yet a good administrator?

 

[Iamanidiot]

Brigadier this forum is scarce on army chaps so most of us will not be able to contribute much in this

 

[Ray]

Brigadier this forum is scarce on army chaps so most of us will not be able to contribute much in this

NO harm.

I have heard so much of complaint that this is a defence forum and so why have non defence issues.

Well, here is a defence issue.

So, no comments?

And any it also indicates that while so many comment so 'expertly' on defence matters, they don't read books on the military to understand the workings of the military.

If one has read 'Crisis in Command', which many have in foreign lands who are not from the military (and I suspect out in India too!), commenting would not be that difficult.

Have you not noticed expert comments on the COAS' age issue of chaps saying that the Army administration has no clue for x or y reason?

So, here is a good chance to prove one's knowledge in defence matters!

 

[Ray]

OK.

Even if one does not know of the workings of the Army, one could take a shy at the issue with logic and with comparison as to what happens in their profession in the civvy street!

 

[W.G.Ewald]

US Army officers come from US Military Academy (West Point), Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC), Officer Candidate School (OCS) and by direct commissioning. The first two categories are academic, the last two are non-academic. During my service, I did not perceive a significant difference among officers based on their route to a commission. The book cited by BG Ray was published in 1978 (I have not read it), a time when the Army was making policy changes following the Vietnam War. Prior to that year, the NCO corps was in need of improvement.

 

[Ray]

US Army officers come from US Military Academy (West Point), Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC), Officer Candidate School (OCS) and by direct commissioning. The first two categories are academic, the last two are non-academic. During my service, I did not perceive a significant difference among officers based on their route to a commission. The book cited by BG Ray was published in 1978 (I have not read it), a time when the Army was making policy changes following the Vietnam War. Prior to that year, the NCO corps was in need of improvement.

I agree it was written in that era.

But there were many home truths.

Including what I appended as also this 'ticket punching' syndrome!

 

[lemontree]

Sir,
I have read this book, and do believe that the most important characteristic of an officer is the presence of moral courage/ courage of conviction. This is what I believe the author has tried to bring out in his book.

There are officers who love administrative work as it keeps them in a warm heated bunker, pushing files, in contrast to being with a combat patrol, cold to the bones in snow and rain.

Men tend to trust those officers who have roughed it out with them on patrols/ missions/ operations. But they also expect the officer to carry out basic company level adm work to look after their well being. The officer should also take care of the equipment under his command and follow up on deficiencies.