U.S. Conducts subcritical nuclear test

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U.S. CONDUCTS SUBCRITICAL NUCLEAR TEST​

For OpEdNews: Andrew Kishner - Writer

On Wednesday, September 15, the United States Department of Energy conducted a subcritical nuclear experiment under the NNSS (Nevada National Security Site) facility in Nevada formerly known as the Nevada Test Site.

The subcritical test dubbed 'Bacchus' is the 24th such controversial subcritical nuclear experiment whereby plutonium is bombarded by conventional explosives, short of triggering a chain reaction that would create a nuclear bomb explosion.

Although the Department of Energy (DOE) conducts many experiments using plutonium and other bomb-trigger materials, those are generally called hydrodynamic tests and are different from subcritical experiments. Why? Subcritical tests entail 'Goldie Locks' amounts of plutonium - not too small to be a small physics-type experiment (hydrodynamic test) but no too big such that the plutonium experiment will go critical and create a nuclear explosion. However, the amounts of plutonium used in a subcritical test can begin to fission, just like a nuclear bomb. One Cold War era subcritical test conducted at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in 1963 slightly went critical, bombarded the surroundings with nuclear radiation, although a runaway chain reaction wasn't maintained.

Why does the DOE conduct subcritical tests? They say that they want to learn more about plutonium - how it acts, how it ages. And so bombarding with conventional explosives a similar but smaller weapons 'core' of plutonium (there are thousands of such cores in warheads in our nuclear stockpile) would teach them more about the physical conditions that fissile materials (i.e. plutonium) experience at the onset of a nuclear blast, they say. However, some scientists called this baloney. They note that plutonium's physical structure actually becomes more stable over time.

So, why REALLY is the DOE doing subcritical tests?

One reason is to prime and ready the test site. The most nuked place on Earth is the Nevada National Security Site (formerly Nevada Test Site). That area, which is home to 'Area 51' and 'Yucca Flat,' is the U.S. (and U.K.'s) primary nuclear proving grounds. It is still there to test our nukes because U.S. leaders won't surrender their rights to test nukes 'if they have to.' That is the only reason it is still open despite excuses that the area is 'useful' for other national security, firefighting, treaty verification purposes. The U.S. simply wants to retain the right to blow up nukes in Nevada when it wants to - even though it doesn't want the public to know this - and so it conducts these subcritical tests to keep the test site workforce employed, trained and primed in case a nuke test is needed in the future.

The first subcritical test was conducted by the U.S. in 1997 - just five short years after the U.S.'s very last nuclear test which was conducted underground also at the Nevada Test Site. The most recent subcritical test was in 2006, which was the same year that DOE was put to shame for its complicit role in attempting to irradiate Westerners with Divine Strake. The DOE is expected to give a 48 hour notice to the world community in advance of any full-scale subcritical test but it does not appear that this precedent was followed, and rather was completely disregarded, possibly because the DOE fears that the public would again kick their butt into not doing another test at the site. One Nevada activist group has indicated that they were on a list to get 48-hour notices but never received one.

The DOE's subcritical testing program, which is part of its Stockpile Stewardship program, is problematic because it is nearly impossible to know if any country has indeed conducted a zero-yield subcritical test or a very small yield nuclear blast. Why? Subcriticals are:

* conducted out of sight, so there would be no flash of light detectable via satellite imagery
* involve such small amounts of plutonium, so a tiny 'pop' would be too small to produce any seismic effect
* occur at deep depths, at about 1,000 feet underground, so radioactive hot gases would likely not reach the surface and wouldn't be picked up by the radiation monitoring network of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO).

Forty four members of Congress stated in a letter to President Clinton in 1997 that the depth (below ground) where subcritical experiments are conducted would set 'a precedent for conducting underground nuclear tests that a test ban treaty violator would find useful. Because the CTBT is not yet ratified, there are no existing verification standards nor methods by which to determine whether a nuclear weapons experiment violates the CTBT or not. The U.S. is unwisely creating a testing norm under which other nations could justify conducting similar underground nuclear weapons experiments at their test sites. An even more dangerous consequence is that countries with nuclear capability, but lacking the sophisticated testing technology of the declared nuclear weapons states, could be provoked to resume full-scale underground testing.'

Subcritical tests are currently generating suspicion and distrust worldwide. In August 1997, after a full-testing ban was put into effect between the U.S. and Russia, a seismic event in Russia generated suspicion in the U.S. and around the globe that Russia conducted a nuclear test or critical-subcritical experiment! The U.S. Air Force later determined that the seismic event came from the ocean and was a small earthquake.

Each time the U.S. conducts a subcritical test, they fan the flames of fear in other countries, whose interpretation is that the U.S. is (still) testing and honing their nukes.

[See a sample of the website hits we are getting at Idealist.ws from China/Russia/etc.. here regarding Bacchus.]

Their logical conclusion is that until they become nuclear, militarily they are disadvantaged. What's to stop them from starting their own subcritical testing program now, or even when the CTBT, which won't ban subcritical tests, goes into effect? The same thing will happen. Suspicion of the deliberate conduct of, or a technical error that led to an accidental occurrence of, an underground nuclear test may force a resumption of underground nuclear testing by one country or a slew of countries. Note that the preparations as viewed by satellite for a subcritical test will end up looking exactly like the preparations for a full-scale underground nuclear test. This 'preparation' would create a global furor.

It is unlikely that the CTBT-in-force will change anything and remedy any of the problems the CTBT is designed to solve. The current not-in-force status of CTBT lacks any verification regime for these subcriticals. When in force, although any signatory can request that international monitors visit the country where a suspected test occurred, an on-site visit by international monitors may be too late by then (even if they can find the subcritical testing enclave to verify claims).

The CTBT is not comprehensive enough at preventing fear and distrust from spiraling towards a nuclear arms race.

And, so, we return to 'Bacchus.' Why isn't 'Bacchus' now causing a global furor? Is it because we 'trust' the nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons development in the U.S. and not from North Korea or Iran? Recall that neither of those two latter countries has ever used DU or nuclear bombs on other nations, or poisoned their own people with fallout under false assurances of 'There is No Danger.' Why is it that 'they' can't experiment underground but WE CAN? That adds new meaning to Obama's mantra "Yes, we can!'

It is my firm belief that subcritical tests are an extension of the 41-year-long nuclear testing program of the United States government at the Nevada Test Site that began in 1951 and 'ended' in 1992. A subcritical underground test - which I place in the same category as a nuclear test - is a break of the underground testing ban and these 'nuclear' tests may signal to other CTBT signatories the U.S.'s determination to not only keep its nuclear arsenal but one day resume full-scale nuclear testing.

For more info:

Please read more on our very comprehensive subcritical experiments page at Idealist.ws; there, you must read the 2 amazing letters written in 1997 by Rep. Cynthia McKinney and 43 other Congresspersons, and another by Greenpeace and dozens of other peace orgs; also view our 'Map of the global conversation about the U.S.'s subcritical experiment program' here

Action step



Idealist asks everyone concerned about these provocative subcritical tests to bring awareness to and protest this most recent subcritical nuclear test by observing an hour of silence everyday starting at 5:35 pm, the time of the 'Bacchus' test held on Sept. 15, 2010.

If asked 'Why aren't you talking?,' you can write on a notepad that you will conveniently carry around with you:

"I am observing an hour of silence to protest the U.S.'s subcritical nuclear test 'Bacchus."

 

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Japan alarmed at U.S. subcritical test​

Japan responded with dismay to the first U.S. subcritical nuclear test carried out under the Obama administration.

Survivors of the 1945 atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki said they had lost faith in the U.S. president, whom they had come to regard as a savior of sorts for his determination to chart a course for nuclear disarmament.

Experts pointed out that the test, conducted at an underground site in Nevada on Sept. 15, was the only way to ascertain the reliability and safety of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. They said it was in line with Washington's stance to maintain nuclear deterrence.

Japan, like many U.S. allies, depends on the so-called U.S. nuclear umbrella for its own security.

"It is extremely disappointing," said Toshiko Tanaka, a 71-year-old hibakusha from Hiroshima. Tanaka, who visited New York in May just as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty review conference was being held, said she recently started to believe that the drive to rid the world of nuclear weapons had "moved forward half a step."

"Now I feel anger that we have moved back to where we were," Tanaka said.

Koji Hosokawa, 82, whose younger sister was killed at age 13 by the Aug. 6, 1945, bombing of Hiroshima, and who has been giving talks about that day ever since, said he "believed (Barack) Obama to be a president with a totally different nuclear philosophy."

"I have to question what the Prague speech was all about," Hosokawa said, referring to Obama's epoch-making 2009 speech in the Czech capital declaring that "the United States will take concrete steps toward a world without nuclear weapons."

Nevertheless, Hosokawa said he now hoped even more that Obama will make a point of visiting Hiroshima when he visits Japan in November.

"I would like to tell him that young girls the same age as his daughters died along with their dreams and aspirations, and have him feel the horror of nuclear weapons for himself," Hosokawa said.

In a related development, the clock on the Peace Watch Tower at the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, which records the number of days that have passed since the last nuclear test, was set back Wednesday from 506, from the day North Korea conducted an underground nuclear test in May 2009, to 28.

"I cannot help but feel betrayed by Obama," said Koichiro Maeda, director of the museum.

Sumiteru Taniguchi, an 81-year-old hibakusha from Nagasaki, which was leveled by an atomic bomb three days after Hiroshima, blasted the test as "a major betrayal against global society and A-bomb devastated cities."

Taniguchi addressed the United Nations in May on the occasion of the NPT review conference.

Hirotami Yamada, secretary-general of the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Survivors Council, was particularly enraged that U.S. Ambassador to Japan John Roos laid a wreath at the A-bomb memorial in the city on Sept. 26, just 11 days after the test.

"I have to ask what kind of nerves would allow a person to offer flowers at the bombing site and call for nuclear abolition when that person's own country is conducting a nuclear test?" Yamada said.

Hideo Tsuchiyama, a former president of Nagasaki University, also condemned the test but said he felt it was likely "a result of a compromise in domestic politics" as Obama's Democrats face a tough battle in midterm elections scheduled in November.

While Obama lifted the hopes of countless people around the world with his Prague speech, he did mention that the goal "will not be reached quickly--perhaps not in my lifetime."

In the same vein, the Defense Department's Nuclear Posture Review 2010 issued in April spelled out the need to strengthen current U.S. nuclear deterrence capabilities.

Observers said the Obama administration may be trying to appease hawks in the U.S. military and Republicans opposed to sharp reductions of nuclear weapons.

The test also sent a message to Japan and other U.S. allies that Washington is resolved to continue providing deterrence, a senior Defense Department official said.

 

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Hiroshima, Nagasaki protest US nuclear test​

TOKYO (AFP) – Japanese officials from Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the world's only cities to have been hit by atomic bombs, expressed their outrage and regret Thursday at a US nuclear test conducted last month.
The US government said on Tuesday that it had carried out a subcritical nuclear test, which does not entail a chain reaction for a nuclear explosion, at a Nevada underground test site in September.
"I am outraged by your trampling on the expectations and hopes of the A-bomb survivors and the vast majority of the Earth's inhabitants," Hiroshima mayor Tadatoshi Akiba said in a protest letter sent to the US embassy in Japan.
"On behalf of the A-bombed city of Hiroshima, I vehemently protest."
Hiroshima has received no reply from the embassy, the officials said.
Nagasaki mayor Tomihisa Taue said in a statement on his website: "The experiment is a reversal from an international trend for a world without nuclear weapons. I feel extreme regret."
Taue also planned to send a letter of protest to the US embassy as early as Thursday, Nagasaki city officials said.
It was the first subcritical nuclear test since US President Barack Obama took office in January 2009. Obama has promoted his vision of a world free of nuclear arms, which helped win him last year's Nobel Peace Prize.
US Ambassador John Roos visited the two western Japanese cities separately this year as the nation commemorated the 65th anniversary of the World War II nuclear bombings that killed more than 210,000 people.
The United States dropped a uranium bomb on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, killing an estimated 140,000 people, and then three days later dropped a plutonium bomb on Nagasaki, killing another 70,000.
Japan surrendered to the Allies within days, bringing an end to World War II.

 

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Japanese Officials Complain as US Admits to New Nuke Test​

Nagasaki Mayor Expresses 'Extreme Regret' Over Nevada Test
by Jason Ditz, October 14, 2010
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Though the admission received very little attention in and of itself, the US Energy Department conceded this week that it had indeed conducted a "subcritical" nuclear weapons test underground in Nevada last month.

The test was the first of the Obama Administration, and will likely spark further questions about the president's much heralded "commitment" to disarmament. Yet in Japan, and particularly in the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the idea of continued nuclear weapons testing, even in limited forms, is of far more serious concern.

"The experiment is a reversal from an international trend for a world without nuclear weapons. I feel extreme regret," said Nagasaki's mayor, Taue Tomihisa. Officials with the Nagasaki city government intend to send a formal letter of protest. Hiroshima's mayor, Akiba Tadatoshi, is said to have already submitted such a letter.

Japanese officials also expressed anger at US Ambassador John Roos attending a memorial ceremony in Nagasaki for the 65th anniversary of the nuclear attack, just 11 days after the test took place. US officials say the test is "in line with Washington's stance to maintain nuclear deterrence."

 

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Where is US media coverage of US nuclear test?​

leave a comment »

This is off topic for this blog. USA conducted a 'subcritical nuclear test' last month in Nevada. What gets me is that this is completely below the radar in North American news coverage, especially given the presidents views on nuclear. Social media though is all over it.

USA CONDUCTS NEW SUB CRITICAL TEST – NEVADA, SEPT 20, 2010

September 20, 2010 – U.S. CONDUCTS SUBCRITICAL NUCLEAR TEST


by Andrew Kishner

On Wednesday, September 15, the United States Department of Energy conducted a subcritical nuclear experiment under the NNSS (Nevada National Security Site) facility in Nevada formerly known as the Nevada Test Site.

The subcritical test dubbed 'Bacchus' is the 24th such controversial subcritical nuclear experiment whereby plutonium is bombarded by conventional explosives, short of triggering a chain reaction that would create a nuclear-bomb-explosion. Although the Department of Energy (DOE) conducts many experiments using plutonium and other bomb-trigger materials, those are generally called hydrodynamic tests and are different from subcritical experiments.

The opposite is the case in Japan which is how I heard about this.

Nagasaki, Hiroshima criticize U.S. for subcritical nuclear test

Hiroshima, Nagasaki protest US nuclear test

It seems there is a double standard in North American news reporting on this one. A search of various North American news sites shows no record of this.

 

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NPT loving Japan better not protest too much, while enjoying the luxury of USA's nuclear umbrella.

 

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CTBT ratification and fact-twisting arguments​

On Friday, February 5 the EastWest Institute (EWI) held a seminar at their office in New York to discuss its recently released report on the CTBT, entitled, "The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: New Technology, New Prospects?" Speaking at the event for the pro-CTBT ratification camp was Ambassador Robert T. Grey, Jr. (Director, Bipartisan Security Group and U.S. Representative to the Conference on Disarmament from 1998-2001) and against was Stephen Rademaker (Senior Council, BGR Government Affairs and Assistant Secretary of State from 2002-2006). The seminar also hosted many representatives of the NGO disarmament community as well as several diplomats from UN missions, including from Iran, Egypt, and South Korea.

Mr. Rademaker articulated familiar reasons for opposing U.S. ratification of the CTBT: it won't ensure entry into force of the Treaty; the Treaty is unverifiable; the U.S. may need to test in the event the nuclear weapon stockpile becomes unreliable; there is no agreed definition of a "zero yield" nuclear test; and Russia (and possibly China) does not conform to the U.S. definition of absolutely zero yield, enabling them to benefit from such tests while the U.S. adheres to a stricter standard and (presumably) falls behind in knowledge. The fact that each of these assertions has been proven untrue does not stop these talking points from surfacing at every turn. These arguments have been debunked by various sources, including: NAS(1) and JASON studies (2); the successful tracking and identification of the very low-yield DPRK nuclear tests of 2006 and 2009 by the CTBTO's verification system; and the public record of Russian statesmen. Such facts continue to be ignored by those who want to keep open the option of designing and testing nuclear weapons – namely some of the people running the national labs, and those politicians and military personnel who are stuck in Cold War thinking. These people are among the loudest voices trying to hold ratification of the CTBT hostage to an outdated concept of the usefulness of nuclear weapons and the prestige of nuclear weapon research and development.

One argument against CTBT ratification that cannot stand is the misuse of the Strategic Posture Review Commission's (SPRC) report that was submitted to Congress on May 6, 2009. The argument goes as follows: because certain assertions by Commissioners that were against Treaty ratification were included in the final report without rebuttal from Commissioners that were for ratification, those assertions must be taken as true – as given facts. As a staff assistant to one of the twelve Commissioners, I would like to put to rest some of what are at best misconceptions about the SPRC's CTBT section, and at worst deliberate manipulations of the facts.

The twelve Commissioners on the SPRC could not agree on a common position on the CTBT. Chairman William Perry decided that, although the Commission strived for consensus, this issue was too important to water down, and the divisions were too deep to even try. Hence, the report contains the separate arguments by the proponents and opponents of CTBT ratification, along with "specific recommendations" to the Obama administration (after acknowledging its previous commitment to actively pursuing Treaty ratification) as to how it should proceed in assessing the benefits and risks associated with Treaty ratification.

In their argument, the opponents of ratification make this point:

Third, the treaty remarkably does not define a nuclear test. In practice this allows different interpretations of its prohibitions and asymmetrical restrictions. The strict U.S. interpretation precludes tests that produce nuclear yield. However, other countries with different interpretations could conduct tests with hundreds of tons of nuclear yield—allowing them to develop or advance nuclear capabilities with low-yield, enhanced radiation, and electro-magnetic-pulse. Apparently Russia and possibly China are conducting low yield tests. This is quite serious because Russian and Chinese doctrine highlights tactical nuclear warfighting. With no agreed definition, U.S. relative understanding of these capabilities would fall further behind over time and undermine our capability to deter tactical threats against allies.(3)


In his remarks to the EWI seminar last week, Mr. Rademaker used the arguments in this paragraph as proof that ratification of the CTBT contained more risks than rewards for the U.S. First, he said that because the proponents of ratification on the Commission did not dispute the claim that Russia and possibly China were currently engaging in low-yield nuclear tests, this in and of itself was proof that these tests were in fact happening and that the U.S. would indeed "fall further behind over time" and become less capable of deterring "tactical threats." Having attended a few meetings of the SPRC where debate over CTBT ratification took place, I pointed out during Q & A that the assertion Russia and possibly China were conducting low-yield nuclear tests was made by one of the Commissioners at one meeting late in the process, and when asked to substantiate that claim and say where this information came from, that Commissioner could not. The fact that this assertion was included in the SPRC is surprising on a factual level, but not surprising to those of us that sat in on those meetings. That is, the argument over the CTBT went down to the wire of the second past-due deadline on finalizing the report (not to mention several additional "final edit" internal deadlines), at which point the Chairman insisted that each side of the debate formulate its opinions and recommendations and submit them – without the ability of the other side to comment whatsoever – so that the report could finally be finished without further back-and-forth between the irreconcilable sides. The fact is that the Commissioners were not permitted to comment at this last, late round of paper shuffling in order to meet the already delayed deadline for finishing the report and submitting it to Congress.

Before leaving this subject, it is also important to note that the U.S. conducts subcritical nuclear tests at the high-tech DAHRT facility at the Los Alamos National Lab in New Mexico. Subcritical nuclear tests are presumably similar to any tests in which the Russians (and perhaps the Chinese) are engaging, although – according to the anti-CTBT ratification talking point – they are conducting tests that go just over the critical threshold, and the data generated will somehow put the U.S. nuclear weapon complex and arsenal at an intellectual and tactical disadvantage.

According to the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, subcritical tests are:

"¦ a component of the U.S. Department of Energy's Science Based Stockpile Stewardship Management Program (SSMP) and are intended to show whether nuclear weapons components such as Plutonium and Uranium will develop problems as they age. The blasts will not produce a nuclear chain-reaction explosion. They are called "subcritical" because they never reach "critical mass."(4)

Here, Los Alamos National Lab describes their subcritical testing program:

Deep underground—nearly 1,000 feet down"¦ tunnels and chambers make up what is called the U1a complex, which scientists use to conduct subcritical experiments. These experiments test the basic properties of plutonium driven to high pressures using conventional explosives. These experiments do not generate sustained nuclear chain reactions and thus do not produce nuclear explosions—that is what is meant by subcritical.(5)

Without the entry into force of the CTBT, there is not even a chance that either the U.S. or Russia would allow the installation of radiation/neutron detectors at their test sites to verify experiments are kept at the subcritical level. If the fear is that the Russians will cheat – and the way to prevent them from cheating is to ratify the Treaty so that it might enter into force and actual on-site monitoring could take place – then ratifying the Treaty is clearly in the best interest of the U.S., as it will further the process that will overcome this point of contention.(6)

Another point that is important to mention is that there is indeed an agreed upon definition of "zero yield" nuclear test in the context of the CTBT. Article I (1) of the Treaty states:

Each State Party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control.(7)

As Jonathan Granoff of the Global Security Institute pointed out at the EWI seminar, during their deliberations on ratification of the Treaty, the Russian Duma acknowledged that nuclear explosions as per Article I meant "zero yield" explosions, with no nuclear reaction whatsoever. This interpretation is in full agreement with the U.S. position and interpretation of Article I of the Treaty. In 1996 then Russian President Yeltsin (8) and in 1999 then Secretary of State Madeline Albright (during her testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in October 1999) (9) both stated that the U.S. and Russia did indeed agree on the definition of "zero yield" as it related to the CTBT. In other words, the argument that Russia has a different interpretation of "zero yield" and will therefore conduct nuclear tests at low yields (for some presumed benefit and advantage over the U.S.) while the U.S. does not under a CTBT is completely baseless and has no place in the future debate about Treaty ratification.

Other points Mr. Rademaker made during the EWI seminar deserve to be similarly refuted – such as the "fact" that the Treaty is unverifiable – but those points have been made elsewhere better than I can make them.(10) It is interesting to note, however, that Mr. Rademaker was phoning in from DC and did not know exactly who was attending the meeting (having had too many people to go around the table for introductions at the start), so his remarks about the implausibility of Egypt and Iran ratifying the Treaty even with U.S. ratification were well addressed by the ambassadors present from those countries. It is time to stand up to Cold War politicians and those in the military opposed to U.S. ratification of the CTBT and confront the misrepresentations of the facts head on, and past time to stop letting some at the national labs dictate policy instead of carrying out policy in the national interest.

1. Committee on Technical Issues Related to Ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. "Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty." National Academy of Sciences. National Academy Press. Washington, D.C. 2002.
2. "Pit Lifetime." JSR-06-335. The MITRE Corporation. JASON Program Office. McLean, VA. November, 20, 2006. See also: "Lifetime Extension Program." JSR-09-334E. The MITRE Corporation. JASON Program Office. McLean, VA. September 9, 2009.
3. "America's Strategic Posture: The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States." William J. Perry, Chairman. James R. Schlesinger, Vice-Chairman. United States Institute of Peace Press. Washington, D.C. 2009.
4. http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/ke...ons/issues/testing/subcritical-what-is-st.htm
5. http://www.lanl.gov/natlsecurity/nuclear/current/subcritical.shtml
6. Annex II of the CTBT lists 44 States that must ratify the Treaty before it enters into force. As of 2010, nine of these Annex II States have not yet done so: the United States; Egypt; Indonesia; Islamic Republic of Iran; India; Pakistan; Israel; People's Republic of China (China); and Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). Of these nine countries, three have not yet signed the Treaty: India; Pakistan; and DPRK. Some use this entry into force requirement as an argument against Treaty ratification by the U.S., as ratification in and of itself would not bring the Treaty into force. However, the Treaty cannot enter into force without U.S. ratification, and Indonesia and China have already stated or implied they would follow U.S. ratification with their own, with other states likely to do the same. In addition, there have been discussions of a provisional entry into force of the Treaty before all nine Annex II States ratify if necessary.
7. http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/ctbt/ctbt-art01.html
8. David Hoffman and John F. Harris. "Yeltsin Agrees To Endorse Test Ban Treaty – Conciliatory Gesture Made At Moscow Nuclear Summit." Washington Post. April 20, 1996. A.01.
9. http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/ctbt/text/100799albright1.htm
10. http://www.ctbto.org

 

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Transparency Measures for Subcritical Experiments Under the CTBT​

This paper outlines transparency measures that could be taken to build international
confidence that "subcritical experiments" conducted underground by the U.S. or any
other country do not violate the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Our calculations suggest
that on-site measurement of the integrated radiation output from these experiments
should be adequate to verify that nuclear yields greater than grams of TNT
equivalent had not occurred, even allowing for the possibility of substantial shielding.
However, our calculations also indicate that a pure fission experiment that remained
strictly subcritical for its entire duration should have a yield no greater than 0.1 microgram
TNT equivalent, even given irradiation by an external deuterium-tritium neutron
source. Experiments involving chemical-implosion-induced deuterium-tritium
fusion could have yields above this limit, and may require fission product measurements
in addition to prompt radiation measurements to rule out a supercritical test.
INTRODUCTION
In October 1995, the Department of Energy (DOE) announced a series of
experiments which it said would help determine the impact that aging plutonium
and new methods of producing replacement plutonium components for
warheads will have on the reliability of the u.s. nuclear weapon stockpile.
This series of "subcritical experiments" is to be conducted underground at the
Nevada Test Site. In a 1996 article in The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, we
suggested that the need for each proposed subcritical experiment be reviewed
by an independent panel; that a study of above-ground alternatives be conducted;
and, in the event that any experiments go forward, that arrangements
be made for transparency measures sufficient to build international confidence
that the experiments are subcritical.l Subsequently, the DOE decided
that the need for the experiments had already been adequately reviewed by
the JASON group of consultants,2 but that it would support a study of
above-ground options by the JASONs.3 At the time of this writing, it has not
agreed to provide the international community with any physical data bearing
on the subcriticality of the experiments.

 

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NPT loving Japan better not protest too much, while enjoying the luxury of USA's nuclear umbrella.

Question is can india too use the same loophole in CTBT under self imposed moratorium on nuke tests and regularly conduct Sub critical tests????

 

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Sub-Critical Nuclear Tests:An Option for India?​

 

[LETHALFORCE]

Transparency Measures for Subcritical Experiments Under the CTBT​

India absolutely cannot this why an extra Hyde act was added to the Bush India nuclear deal.


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indo-U.S._civilian_nuclear_agreement#Hyde_Act_Passage_in_the_U.S.

Hyde Act Passage in the U.S.

On December 18, 2006 President George W. Bush signed the Hyde Act into law. The Act was passed by an overwhelming 359–68 in the United States House of Representatives on July 26 and by 85–12 in the United States Senate on November 16 in a strong show of bipartisan support.[55][56][57]

The House version (H.R. 5682) and Senate version (S. 3709) of the bill differed due to amendments each had added before approving, but the versions were reconciled with a House vote of 330–59 on December 8 and a Senate voice-vote on December 9 before being passed on to President G.W. Bush for final approval.[58][59] The White House had urged Congress to expedite the reconciliation process during the end-2006 lame duck session, and recommended removing certain amendments which would be deemed deal-killers by India.[60] Nonetheless, while softened, several clauses restricting India's strategic nuclear program and conditions on having India align with U.S. views over Iran were incorporated in the Hyde Act.

In response to the language Congress used in the Act to define U.S. policy toward India, President Bush, stated "Given the Constitution's commitment to the authority of the presidency to conduct the nation's foreign affairs, the executive branch shall construe such policy statements as advisory," going on to cite sections 103 and 104 (d) (2) of the bill. To assure Congress that its work would not be totally discarded, Bush continued by saying that the executive would give "the due weight that comity between the legislative and executive branches should require, to the extent consistent with U.S. foreign policy."[61]

 

[S.A.T.A]

The Hyde Act describes nuclear tests in general and does not get into the specifics of the tests.Besides the provision of the Hyde act would be deemed violated only if it can be 'verified' that India has acted upon terms that violated the act.since technically a sub critical test is a no yield test,it can never be conclusively verified.That means India per say is not prevented from carrying out such tests.The only question is do we have the technical wherewithal to carryout a sub-critical test,which is infinitely based on data and input derived from actual filed tests.

 

[LETHALFORCE]

The Hyde Act describes nuclear tests in general and does not get into the specifics of the tests.Besides the provision of the Hyde act would be deemed violated only if it can be 'verified' that India has acted upon terms that violated the act.since technically a sub critical test is a no yield test,it can never be conclusively verified.That means India per say is not prevented from carrying out such tests.The only question is do we have the technical wherewithal to carryout a sub-critical test,which is infinitely based on data and input derived from actual filed tests.

This is an excellent point SATA my answer to this is YES , for the simple reason US had denied us supercomputers which can be used for simulation testing, if we did not have data these computers could not be utilized for simulating nuclear tests.

 

[S.A.T.A]

Super computers capable of simulating actual tests can be developed(perhaps are being developed or already exits).the pertinent question remains about the data that would form the crux of such a test.since the BARC and AEC have already stated that we have enough data or such strategic experiments one trust that these officials know what they are talking about.However we must remember there are several members of this community who already have gone on record stating that we don't have enough data for the same.Besides there is a question about the quality of the data,remember India's Nuclear tests(in numbers and yields) pales in comparison to what the P5 states have managed to gather during the past decades,will that somehow depreciate quality of simulations and the resultant weapon system that we manufacture.

 

[The Messiah]

And obama talks nonsense in the media about "nuclear free world".

And he got the nobel peace price...what a farce.