U.S base in Guam a major threat to China

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I agree. The U.S.S.R. focused on attempting to win the ideological and military competition. China is focused on attempting to win the economic competition. Because the U.S. military advantage is essentially underpinned by what is (or was) a robust economic foundation, a serious economic challenger is, in some ways, a much greater threat than a mere military competitor.

In that sense, the U.S. is no less a threat to China than China is to the U.S. They are both competitors trying to win the same prize.
It has reached a point now with USA 15 trillion dollars in debt where interest will be close
To 1 trillion dollars annually and citizens demanding more government assistance and defecit
Out of control for last decade USA will have to do something drastic to preserve the economy.
What is the greatest leverage USA has over the world-military might.
 

Geoffrey R. Stone

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I agree with you. I am hoping for, and will do anything to support a peaceful outcome though.

I also have to clarify that not all of that 15 trillion dollars belongs to China.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_public_debt#Foreign_holders_of_U.S._Treasury_securities

10 trillion dollars of that debt is owned by the U.S. public. The part of the debt that is held by foreigners, is mostly held by U.S. allies and friends. Look at that long list of foreign holders and count up how many are friends and allies of the U.S. If you do the math, China only owns 8% of the total debt (including debt held by the U.S. public). If you look at only the 5 trillion dollars that is held by foreigners, China makes up 26% of that total.
 
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I agree with you. I am hoping for, and will do anything to support a peaceful outcome though.

I also have to clarify that not all of that 15 trillion dollars belongs to China.

United States public debt - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

You are riight but if an example is made out of one demanding creditor others will be automatically silenced.

Many people believe the second Iraq war was to preserve the dollar when saddam urged opec nations
To sell oil exclusively in euros like he decided for iraq.

,
 

Geoffrey R. Stone

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Yes. I suspect that was one of the reasons as well (one of many). The good news is that this debt is not held indefinitely. Different forms of debt are held in 5, 10, and 20 year increments, from what I understand. Which means that, if I were to buy some five year treasuries. I would be paid back in five years time with interest. No sooner, no later. If I understand correctly, it's not like the ownership of debt can be accumulated and wielded as a weapon, because it is constantly being paid back on a determined schedule. In a sense, ownership of the debt is similar to ownership of an asset that accrues regular (though pitiful) interest. More than anything else, it is treated as a store of wealth that is safe, reliable, and trustworthy. That is precisely the reason why I scoffed at any claims in the media that China could just "call" its debt in order to leverage influence over the U.S. That's just not how it works. To a great extent, this system is based on trust. And it is not in the U.S. interest (or any foreign holder's interest) to see that system break down.

In the long term, it is in everybody's interest for China to find more ways to invest all that money into developing productive global assets, rather than funneling it into the U.S. That way the U.S. need not fear that China will use the debt as a weapon, and China need not fear that the U.S. renege on it. That's precisely why, while some people panic and fear-monger about China's investments abroad, I see it as a necessity. The rest of the world needs capital, and China needs a safe and productive place to put it.

Another positive way to look at this whole situation is that China's portion of the debt ranges only from 1/15th to 2/15th of the U.S. national GDP. In theory, the U.S. could pay it all back relatively easily over a 5 to 20 year schedule, just as long as the U.S. balances its budget.

I agree with you. I am hoping for, and will do anything to support a peaceful outcome though.

I also have to clarify that not all of that 15 trillion dollars belongs to China.

United States public debt - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

You are riight but if an example is made out of one demanding creditor others will be automatically silenced.

Many people believe the second Iraq war was to preserve the dollar when saddam urged opec nations
To sell oil exclusively in euros like he decided for iraq.

,
 
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W.G.Ewald

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Another positive way to look at this whole situation is that China's portion of the debt ranges only from 1/15th to 2/15th of the U.S. national GDP. In theory, the U.S. could pay it all back relatively easily over a 5 to 20 year schedule, just as long as the U.S. balances its budget.
Barack
Just the reason Barack 0bama, Harry Reid and Nancy Pelosi have to go.
 
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CHINA CAN NOW DESTROY MAJOR US PACIFIC BASES « Prophecy Updates and Commentary

CHINA CAN NOW DESTROY MAJOR US PACIFIC BASES


A congressional report released days ago acknowledges that China can now destroy five of the six large American military bases in the Western Pacific region. The first two links [1, 2] discuss this report (thanks to a reader for sending the second link). The five bases which China can destroy are located in South Korea and Japan. The sixth one, which the report regards as safe, is the US military base on Guam. China has built so many cruise missiles that the report indicates that waves of them can destroy the five American bases in South Korea and Japan. The final report indicates that there is at least some awareness building in Congress that "something needs to be done" to defend US bases from Chinese attack.

These links deserve some commentary. To begin with, it has been known for years that China is building huge numbers of cruise missiles which have made the US bases in South Korea and Japan very vulnerable to attack. If the current and last few presidential administrations (GOP and Democrat alike) have not already implemented a crash program to deploy large-scale missile defenses to these bases, then one can only conclude that the last few administrations and congresses must be "brain dead." This Chinese threat is hardly a revelation. It has been obvious for many years! Is Congress so out of touch with reality that they have not seen this danger? Are Pentagon leaders so absorbed with political correctness issues (like ending "don't ask, don't tell" policies for homosexuals in the military and putting women on US subs) that they have neglected critical national security issues like protecting US military bases from Chinese (and Russian) missiles? Given that this Chinese threat has been obvious for years, it is a derelict bunch of leaders our nation has had if there is not already a fully-operational anti-missile defense network at each of these bases. The US Navy has Aegis missile-defense systems on US warships and it would not have been difficult to build and deploy land-based Aegis systems that could have been installed at these US bases years ago!

The first link below asserts the congressional report states that it would take 830 cruise missiles to take out each of the USA's South Korean bases and 430 missiles each to take out the US bases in Japan. I have a one-word reply to this assessment. Baloney!! What dullards did they find to come up with that assessment? I don't know how many runways each of these bases have, but it should take no more than a dozen Chinese cruise missiles to render each of these bases nonfunctional for an indefinite period of time. Chinese missiles which "cratered" each airbase's runways (especially where they intersect) would make it impossible for US aircraft to take off, effectively shutting down the base. The huge numbers of missiles supposedly needed in the congressional report's assessment may be what is needed to destroy every blade of grass on the military bases, but that would be a waste of Chinese resources (which China is far too smart to do). If Chinese cruise missiles cratered the runways at these US bases, there are "filler" materials to repair runways which have been attacked. China knows this. To counter repair efforts, China could send a few dozen runway-cratering missiles every other day for weeks or months to keep the bases nonfunctional. China could also send waves of dozens of cruise missiles to hit the US warplanes parked on the tarmac or in hangars to make sure they were destroyed while the runways were down. Chinese spies have, no doubt, sent to China the GPS coordinates of each location where US warplanes are parked on these bases so it wouldn't take many missiles to take out the parked US warplanes.

Also, the report assumes that China would only attack those bases with conventional warheads. In an all-out war, you can be sure those US bases could be hit with nukes. Then China only needs one missile for each base. Did the dummies who wrote the congressional report consider that obvious reality?

The idea that Guam is safe from Chinese missile attack is so laughable that one wonders how anyone could take such an assertion seriously. It is just as vulnerable as the other bases, for several reasons! Let's list a few of the reasons why this is so. The first link assumes that Guam is out of range of land-based Chinese cruise missiles. The first link includes this statement: "China is thought to have 1,150 short-range missiles with ranges between 180 and 375 miles, and 115 medium-range missiles with ranges between 1,000 and 1,900 miles (emphasis added)." Did you notice the italicized words which reveal that the congressional report's writers are merely guessing about the numbers and ranges of Chinese missiles? They really don't know for sure. I'll bet the Chinese leaders who read that congressional report will laugh with derision at these numbers. Given that China has military production facilities underground and buried into mountains (even as Iran has nuclear facilities hidden deep under Iranian mountains), who knows how many cruise missiles are being manufactured rapidly in hidden Chinese production facilities.

There are other glaring weaknesses in the congressional report which asserts Guam is safe from Chinese cruise missiles. I have a newsflash for the writers of that report. China has warplanes capable of carrying cruise missiles. These warplanes can carry large numbers of cruise missiles to within 200-300 miles of Guam and they can launch these cruise missiles at Guam without ever getting near the Guam military base. China also has modern submarines and warships which can launch many cruise missiles. These Chinese warships can fire their cruise missiles at Guam while they are a long distance away from Guam. This would be especially easy for Chinese subs to do. Also, China can place hidden cruise-missile launching gantries on civilian ships and fire cruise missiles at Guam from close range because US military planners are likely to ignore civilian ships as not being threats. How hard would it be to build a missile-launching gantry inside a merchant ship and raise it above the cargo-hold doors of a civilian merchant ship to fire cruise missiles at Guam (or any other target"¦including aircraft carriers)? China could get some of their allied Iranian jihadis to do suicide missions with such civilian merchant ships which would actually be warships traveling incognito. China is committed to winning an asymmetric war against the USA, so US war planners need to assume any Chinese ship (military or civilian) could be a threat to American military assets. I haven't even mentioned the long-range Chinese ICBMs which are being built to hit US aircraft carriers. These Chinese ICBMs can surely target Guam just as easily.

It is evident that Guam is no safer from Chinese attack than Pearl Harbor was safe from Japanese attack on December 7th, 1941. Also, it is obvious that it would only take a small number of Chinese cruise missiles to put the US military bases in South Korea and Japan out of action. They only need to crater the runways and then hit the warplane parking areas with cruise missiles while the runways are cratered. Then the bases are effectively useless. This shows why we urgently needed to have anti-missile defense systems deployed to all US military bases years ago (all US bases everywhere in the world are vulnerable to attack by cruise missiles fired by Russian or Chinese submarines). If Congress hasn't foreseen this need and met it already, it is my opinion they should be impeached for sheer negligence about critical US national defense issues.

Sheesh! I've never served in the military, but I truly believe I could have written a far more realistic report to Congress about the threats posed by Chinese cruise missiles than the bureaucratic drones who wrote that myopic congressional report. The congressional report is so shortsighted and sophomoric that I must assume it was written by the "kowtow to China" faction in the US government which is apparently seeking to hide and downgrade the real dangers posed to the USA by China's military build-up (this faction was discussed in a recent post).

China is on a rapid course to fulfill its role as one of the attackers in the prophesied Ezekiel 38-39 Gog-Magog attack against the USA, NATO nations and all their allies around the world. Meanwhile, it looks like US war planners, congressional report writers and elected leaders have their heads firmly stuck in the sand re: this Chinese threat. I'd like to use more graphic language about where their heads are stuck into but this is a Christian website so I won't do so to avoid giving offense to those with delicate sensitivities. Our nation is in major trouble. The greatest danger is that our leaders seem to be truly clueless to the obvious threats now posed to our nation.
 
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Agreement on Guam transfer reflects U.S. urgency to respond to China - AJW by The Asahi Shimbun

Agreement on Guam transfer reflects U.S. urgency to respond to China

The recent agreement to split up the package on realigning U.S. forces in Japan is part of a wider move by Washington to strengthen security ties in response to China's growing military might.

Specifically, the Japan agreement will transfer some U.S. Marines now based in Okinawa Prefecture to Guam even before any progress is made on the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma in the prefecture.

The transfer to Guam comes while the United States has also strengthened its relationship in recent months with such allies as Australia and the Philippines.

The joint statement issued on Feb. 8 about the new agreement only said the Marine transfer to Guam would be for "the maintenance of peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region."

However, in discussions that started in early January between officials of Japan and the United States, the Americans made clear their concerns about the future effects on U.S. national security due to moves made by China.

Sources said the U.S. officials pointed to the Philippines, Singapore and Australia within the bigger picture of realigning the U.S. military in the Asia-Pacific region.

A central role in the U.S. strategy will be played by the U.S. territory of Guam. Even as China makes efforts to improve the capability of its ballistic and cruise missiles, Guam is sufficiently distant from China, but close enough so that airborne troops can be transported within about three hours to such key locations as Tokyo, Okinawa, Taipei and Manila.

The Marines who would be moved from Okinawa to Guam would mainly be those working in command functions. Plans call for constructing a new command headquarters on Guam to have the island serve as the brain of the Marine deployment, while bases in Okinawa and other allies would serve as the arms and legs.

However, the U.S. Congress rejected all expenditures for the Marine transfer to Guam in the federal budget for the fiscal year running from October 2011 until September 2012. A major reason was the lack of progress on the Futenma relocation issue.

Following the 2006 agreement between Japan and the United States on the realignment of the U.S. military in Japan, U.S. officials insisted on a package deal that would have the Marines transferred to Guam only if progress was made on the Futenma relocation. The latest decision to break up that package reflects the urgency of U.S. officials to create a cornerstone of their strategy in Guam as a means of dealing with China.

It remains to be seen how Congress will react.

Senator Carl Levin, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, at a Feb. 9 hearing welcomed the splitting up of the package deal, but he also expressed dissatisfaction that no review was being done about the entire Futenma relocation plan.

The administration of U.S. President Barack Obama sent its budget requests to Congress on Feb. 13. It asked for $26 million (2 billion yen) for the transfer of Marines to Guam, much less than the request for $156 million made last year. Even with the smaller amount, Congress may ask for progress on the Futenma relocation before approving the figure.

The United States has been strengthening its military ties with nations in the Asia-Pacific region from last autumn when the Obama administration made clear its shift in security emphasis in line with the economic importance the region has for the United States.

Last November, the United States reached an agreement with Australia for the basing of a maximum of 2,500 Marines in Darwin in northern Australia. That base would make it easier for the United States to deploy troops to the South China Sea, where China has many territorial disputes with surrounding nations.

One such nation, the Philippines, will be provided with a second used patrol ship by the United States. Washington is also planning to expand joint military exercises with Vietnam, which has a similar dispute with China.

The United States has also deployed a littoral combat ship to Singapore, which is situated in a key location in terms of sea lanes. Ties with Indonesia have also been strengthened with a deal to sell the country 24 F-16 fighter jets.

China is not only intensifying efforts to secure its vested interests in what it refers to as the "first island chain" that encompasses the South China Sea and the East China Sea, but it is even showing signs of wanting to expand into the "second island chain" that links the Ogasawara islands with Guam and Indonesia.

That has raised concerns among Asia-Pacific nations who all want a greater U.S. military presence in that region.

Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard said having Marines based in her nation would allow for joint response to any unexpected development in the region.

Kurt Campbell, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, said all nations in Asia were asking for a U.S. presence in the region.

Meanwhile, Sheila Smith, a senior fellow for Japan studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, said that because the latest realignment plan has to take into consideration fiscal issues, the United States has not greatly increased its presence in the Asia-Pacific region. She added that demonstrating the ties between the United States and many nations in the region through a dispersed deployment of U.S. troops will serve as a warning to China.
 
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Guam central to Pacific military operations - Marine Corps News | News from Afghanistan & Iraq - Marine Corps Times

Guam central to Pacific military operations



WASHINGTON — Among the news media tracking the U.S. military buildup on Guam is the People's Daily Online, an organ of the Chinese Communist Party in Beijing.

On its "People Forum" earlier this month was a discussion of how facilities at Andersen Air Force Base on the island were being hardened and air defense systems were being moved in to protect against Chinese attack.

"The American island of Guam is getting bomb proof shelters for aircraft, fuel and ammo supplies and vital equipment," said one entry, which also pictured American B-52s sitting on a runway.

Guam would be central to American operations if the United States and China go to war because of miscalculations by either regarding Taiwan, developments on the Korean peninsula or access to the South China Sea, many defense and foreign analysts say.

"In the event of a conflict with (China), the United States will find a large portion of its relevant force structure located on Guam," said a May 2009 paper from the Naval War College in Rhode Island.

The South China Sea is the newest flashpoint in Sino-American relations that could cause both countries to "stumble" into a war if not careful, said John Pike, a defense and military expert who runs the website GlobalSecurity.org.

As the world's two largest economies and monumental trading partners, the incentives for the United States and China to avoid conflict remain considerable.

But there is no doubting a new bellicosity on China's part, experts say.

Earlier this month, for instance, The Global Times, another publication of the Chinese Communist Party, declared: "The time to use force has arrived in the South China Sea. Let's wage wars on the Philippines and Vietnam to avoid more wars."

It was a reference to its recent spats with those countries over rights to develop the South China Sea's oil and mineral resources, which are considered substantial.

And if an American company, such as ExxonMobil, were to announce new oil finds there, the Chinese "would not be happy," said Joshua Kurlantzick of the Council on Foreign Relations.

Indeed, the Global Times said a war would turn existing oil wells "into a sea of fire" and "Western oil companies will flee the area."

The Chinese, claiming historical precedents dating back centuries, have declared the South China Sea largely their own. They claim an area stretching 1,000 miles from their southernmost borders as an "exclusive economic zone."

Under international law, nations are supposed to claim no more than 200 miles out as exclusive economic zone, meaning they have sole rights to resources within that domain.

China is also declaring its exclusive economic zone to be sovereign territory, meaning other nations would have to request permission to enter it.

The United States, led by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, has been adamant in saying it won't accept China's sovereignty claims. Sovereign waters under international law are limited to 12 miles.

"The Chinese are clearly feeling their oats. There is always the danger they become too pushy," said Ted Carpenter, defense expert at the Cato Institute, a libertarian think tank. "Their territorial claims in the South China Sea are breathtakingly bold."

While China eyes the resources in the region, the South China Sea has been called the "world's highway" because of the amount of shipping from all nations that goes through it.

Pike calls the Chinese claims "insane." He said they are declaring they will operate under "a different set of rules" than the rest of the world." He said the United States, which regards freedom of navigation in international waters as sacrosanct, could only agree to such claims at its peril.

"If we do that, we might as well bottle up the U.S. Navy in the Gulf of Mexico," he said.

"I think it (the South China Sea) is our best chance to go toe to toe with the Red Chinese."

For the United States under such a scenario, Pike added: "Guam is a front-row seat. It is essential."

Similarly, Thomas Mahnken of the Naval War College said, "Guam is occupying an increasingly important role for the United States.'"

And Carpenter called it "a major (U.S.) military citadel" in the Western Pacific.

While most of the recent focus on Guam has involved the transfer of at least 8,000 Marines from Okinawa by 2014, the island's air base and naval facilities figure evermore prominently in Pentagon moves to counter China's growing threat to U.S. military hegemony in the Western Pacific, various defense studies and publications say.

"Guam plays a critical role in the maintaining stability in the Asia-Pacific region. All the proposed realignments and investments in military infrastructure on Guam will help ensure that our Armed Forces are appropriately postured to respond to a variety of interests in our region," Del. Madeleine Bordallo of Guam said in a statement.

The Government Accountability Office, a research arm of Congress, said in June the buildup of all facilities is projected to cost $7.5 billion by 2016. As part of an agreement with Japan to move the Marines off Okinawa, the Japanese are providing another $6 billion, plus $3.2 billion in loans.

The GAO also said the Air Force would have additional construction costs — for a "Guam Strike Initiative" — that would extend beyond 2016 that are not included in the $7.5 billion. The initiative involves developing a global hub for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, strike, and aerial refueling at Andersen Air Force Base.

In addition to strengthening defenses at Andersen, the U.S. has been moving B-2 Stealth bombers and drones to the island and making it a home for nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers.

By the 2020s, the Defense Department hopes to have a new generation of stealth bombers to penetrate Chinese airspace. They would also be able to control drones.(AT)

Air Force Magazine earlier this year described the Guam buildup as part of the U.S. "positioning forces which could threaten China's supply lines through the South China Sea. The oil and raw materials transported through those shipping lanes are crucial to a surging Chinese economy — an economy paying for Beijing's swiftly expanding military power."

The magazine added: "The pivot point of this emerging strategy is Guam, the U.S. territory in the central Pacific within striking distance of the South China Sea. The island is also 1,800 miles from the coast of China, and therefore, within range of Chinese missiles. Asked why the U.S. was expanding Andersen Air Force Base and other bases on Guam, sites that could be hit by intermediate-range ballistic missiles, a senior U.S. officer replied, 'The message to China is that we are here and we mean to stay.'"

A Congressional Research Service report in September said the Chinese "civilian and military commentators commonly have suspected that the U.S. defense buildup on Guam partly has been aimed at China."

In recent years, China has routinely dispatched submarines near Guam to show the U.S. Navy it cannot regard the island as a sanctuary, according to numerous accounts in the U.S. and foreign press, as well as defense journals.

In the event of a U.S.-China conflict, it would be essential for U.S. ships, including those possibly carrying Marines, to quickly depart the U.S. naval base at Apra Harbor, said a 2009 report from the Naval War College that discussed Guam's vulnerabilities.

"Guam's single harbor provides a hostile submarine force with a tradition of unconventional tactics an opportunity to transform Apra Harbor into a critical vulnerability that can be exploited to indirectly attack United States forces located there," it said.

Military history shows how surprise attacks by submarines can bottle up forces in such a base, the paper added.

And Guam's vulnerability to Chinese missiles was highlighted in an August Department of Defense report. On page 31 is a multicolored map that shows targets within reach of Chinese weapons. Guam is shown as within range of China's CSS-2 ballistic missiles and B-6 bombers with land-attack cruise missiles.

The Department of Defense report also shows how China regards Guam as a part of the outmost of two island chains in the Western Pacific that it considers extensions of the Chinese landmass even though it is a U.S. territory. Other parts of the chain include the Northern Mariannas, Palau and Iwo Jima.

The ultimate aim of the Chinese is to project power past both island chains and have the capability to deny the United States access within them if need be, many defense and foreign policy journals report. The new Chinese J-20 stealth fighter, a prototype of which was unveiled this year, is seen as part of that strategy, although the Defense Department estimates the plane will not obtain "operational capability" until 2018.

But such timetables regarding the Chinese have often proven wrong in the past.

"The Chinese military has moved forward faster than we've expected," Mahnken said.
 

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CHINA CAN NOW DESTROY MAJOR US PACIFIC BASES � Prophecy Updates and Commentary

CHINA CAN NOW DESTROY MAJOR US PACIFIC BASES


The first link below asserts the congressional report states that it would take 830 cruise missiles to take out each of the USA's South Korean bases and 430 missiles each to take out the US bases in Japan.
I would love to see how these Cruise Missiles can take out these bases with up to date early warning and C4I systems, How many of the launched Missiles would reach the target on first place after clearing layers of AD defenses..

besides Harden Underground facilities cannot be damage by Cruise Missiles, the base is going to be active after few minutes of attack, As long these bases are active, the tactical objective is not archived..
 

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I would love to see how these Cruise Missiles can take out these bases with up to date early warning and C4I systems, How many of the launched Missiles would reach the target on first place after clearing layers of AD defenses..

besides Harden Underground facilities cannot be damage by Cruise Missiles, the base is going to be active after few minutes of attack, As long these bases are active, the tactical objective is not archived..

You're talking about US land bases. How about USN tomahawk armed attack and boomer submarines in the Pacific (never mind their nuclear tipped missiles)... These assets cannot be taken out by Chinese cruise missiles and can lunch punishing retaliatory strikes.
 

Kunal Biswas

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You're talking about US land bases. How about USN tomahawk armed attack and boomer submarines in the Pacific (never mind their nuclear tipped missiles)... These assets cannot be taken out by Chinese cruise missiles and can lunch punishing retaliatory strikes.
That is a retaliation you are talking about, Which is after the attack or in mid of attack..

The fact is the primary objective to destroy or at least disable the base for long time, Which wont happen even if you throw 1000 cruise missiles even a tactical nuke..

So the first objective of this whole game plan is not archived than how so they are thinking about next steps of the whole game plan.. :)
 
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The new Guam doctrine

The new Guam doctrine

The new Guam doctrine will mark a significant stepping-stone in the creation of Asia's concert of powers. This ranks as a 'brave' prediction, because we don't yet have an Asian concert, and Barack Obama hasn't yet set foot on Guam to unveil a new doctrine. But both are approaching.

If Obama had not tarried in Washington to deliver the health centrepiece of his first presidential term, we would by now have the new Guam doctrine on display. But for Obamacare, the president would have made his tour last month – Guam, Indonesia and Australia. That trip is now scheduled for June.

The Guam stopover will underline the point that the US is spending billions on the island as a fresh assertion of its continuing role as Asia's military guarantor. A previous column offered this translation of the doctrine that will be blessed when Obama makes his Guam touchdown: 'We're going to be here for a long time yet.'

But my translation sentence is deficient because it reflects only the military dimension of the new doctrine. The beauty of what Obama will offer is that it will have a second, multilateral (Concert of Powers) dimension, building on the military framework of the US bilateral alliance system in Asia.

A translation of both dimensions of the Obama doctrine would look like this: 'We're going to be here for a long time yet, but we are certainly ready to talk about new ways to run the neighbourhood.' Or to put it more formally: the new doctrine will link a continuing assertion of US military capability to a willingness to think new thoughts about Asia's security architecture and a concert of powers.

A new Guam doctrine resonates in Canberra because Nixon's original version had such a profound impact on Australian defence thinking. Heading for the Vietnam exit door, Nixon used a stop-over press conference in Guam on 25 July, 1969, to float a thought bubble about US allies needing to take care of themselves. In dealing with non-nuclear threats, Nixon said, the US would 'look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for defence.'

The rough translation of that at the time in Asia and Australia went like this: We're getting out of Vietnam. Good luck, everybody. We suggest a Do It Yourself kit for defence.'

Sitting back in Washington, Kissinger later wrote of his 'amazement' that what had been private White House musings had suddenly been unveiled in an unscripted, impromptu pronouncement on Guam. The off-the-cuff announcement meant there'd been no briefing, consultation or forewarning for allies.

The strategic shift via press conference caused all sorts of frissons across the region, not least in Canberra. It didn't equal the magnitude of the Nixon-goes-to-China shock, but it certainly made an impression. Indeed, it was the reaction of allies as much as Nixon's words that turned the Guam presser into the Guam doctrine.

After Guam, Australia was on notice that forward defence and reliance on the great and powerful ally did not amount to a defence policy. And as the US exit from Vietnam gathered pace, the Guam doctrine grew in significance. Every Australian Defence White Paper since 1976 has been, in part, a post-Guam document. The argument ricochets, rebounds and recurs: How much weight for the alliance versus spending on self reliance? Defend the continent or help the neighbourhood? Is it a regional capability or an expeditionary force?

The affirmation of the US commitment to its role as an Asian power has been a standard couple of paragraphs in most post-Cold War speeches by visiting US presidents and secretaries of State or Defence. Guam puts fresh dollars behind those words. The new superbase is a military statement of intent expressed in concrete.

What Obama can do is define the meaning of a new Guam doctrine in ways that reach beyond the military dimension. The Obama version of the Guam doctrine can be about conversation as well as concrete.
 

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350
So what sort of actions would China have to take in order to warrant that specific response? The situation would have to escalate really far in order for things to get that bad. Is it enough of a threat just that China is developing capabilities to push the U.S. farther out in the West Pacific?

I guess what I'm trying to say is, do you think it's reasonable for China to relinquish her security concerns to NATO/American good will? Is a competitive and modernized PLA inherently a threat? Is this about China not having a political system that you approve of? It seems that there are a variety of reasons for you to disapprove of China gaining strength, but would you not be just as suspicious of and hostile towards a hypothetical, future non-communist China that still overtakes the U.S. in economic and military strength? For argument's sake, let's say that the hypothetical political system is neither the current one, nor anything resembling a democratic system.

Is this really about you feeling that the rest of the world is not safe from China's developments? Or is this about a desire to uphold U.S. military and economic dominance? Or maybe this is about a belief that all good and acceptable governments should be democracies?
Indian members in this forum really enjoy bashing China, regardless of courses, reality and possibility. Just get used to it and ignore some of their posts. US will never launch a Nuclear war with China just try to default their couple trilion dollars debt."America is great because American is good". American people are not such insane. After all, US is still a democratic country. There are different way to repay the debt, Nuclear war is not the option. China's loan to US is working like US treasure bond, it is perpetuate itself. New bond issued when the old one retires.
 
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US Military Bases on Guam in Global Perspective  グアム米軍基地を世界的視野で眺める :: JapanFocus

US Military Bases on Guam in Global Perspective

Catherine Lutz
The island of Guam is a most remarkable place of cultural distinctiveness and resourcefulness and of great physical beauty. The Chamorro people who have lived here for 4000 years also have an historical experience with colonialism and military occupation more long-lived and geographically intensive, acre for acre, than anywhere else in the Pacific and perhaps even in global comparative scale (Aguon 2006). It is today embroiled in a debate over when, how, or if the United States military will acquire more land for its purposes and make more intensive use of the island as a whole.

This military expansion has been planned in Washington, with acquiescence and funding from Tokyo, in order to relocate some 8,000 Marines and 9,000 dependents from Okinawa, as well as US Navy, Army, and Air Force assets and operations to Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas (CNMI) (Erickson and Mikolay 2006). The plans are breathtaking in scope, including removal of 71 acres of coral reef from Apra Harbor to allow the entry and berthing of nuclear aircraft carriers, the acquisition of land including the oldest and revered Chamorro village on the island at Pagat for a live-fire training range, and an estimated 47 percent increase in the island's population, already past its water-supply carrying capacity. The military expansion is being planned with one-third of the island already in military hands and a substantial historical legacy of environmental contamination and depletion, external political control, and other problems brought by the existing military presence.

Pushback has been substantial, something that is particularly remarkable in a context in which many islanders consider themselves very loyal and patriotic Americans and many have military paychecks or pensions as soldiers, veterans, or contract workers (Diaz 2001). Dissent among a variety of Guam's social sectors rose dramatically with the appearance of a draft Environmental Impact Statement in November 2009 which first made clear how extensive Washington's plans for the island were (Natividad and Kirk 2010). It rose, as well, when it became clear that Guam's political leaders and citizens were to be simply informed of those plans, rather than consulted or asked permission for the various uses. That dissent received support from movements against simultaneous US base expansion plans in Okinawa and South Korea, as well as from the US EPA response to the draft EIS, which found it deeply inadequate as a fair and clear assessment of the environmental costs of the military's desires. The Final EIS, just released at the end of July, puts the aircraft carrier berthing plan on hold and draws out the buildup timeline to lower the population growth rate, but otherwise retains its scale and scope. A demonstration at a sacred site at Pagat on July 23, 2010 provided the most potent symbolic expression of resistance to the base plan.

My first exposure to Guam was in 1977, when I made a very brief stay over on my way to Ifalik atoll in the Federated States of Micronesia (then still a UN Trust Territory) for ethnographic fieldwork that was part of my graduate training as an anthropologist. My miseducation up to that point had been profound: I could come to that nation of islands without having first learned – through many years of education in US schools – the hard facts about the colonial status of the area to which I was coming. My anthropological training back then focused, as most such programs did, on the beauty of indigenous ideas and rituals, of kinship systems and healing practices. However helpful attention to such things was toward the goal of a humane and anti-racist understanding of the world, the cultural worlds that anthropology had tried to document were treated as if they occurred in a vacuum, outside of the influence of powerful economic and political forces and outside of history.

My miseducation led me to be surprised when my initial permission to travel to Ifalik was granted not by Chamorros and Carolinians, but by US bureaucrats, then operating as Trust Territory officials. I only then came to realize what this all actually meant – that Ifalik, like Guam, has had an deeply colonial history, and that the lives the people there have led were in some ways of their own creative making and in other ways they were the result of choices by people in other remote locations, most recently in Tokyo and Washington, DC.

Such is no less true now than it was in 1950 or 1977. It is the reason the people of Guam today wait to hear exactly how many more acres of their land will be taken for military purposes, how many tens of thousands of new people and new vehicles will be visited on the island, how many over flights and aircraft carrier visits, and toxic trickles or spills will be visited upon them. It is why they wait, not for rent payments for the land, but to hear whether there will be some US federal dollars allocated to cover some percentage of the externalized costs of the increased tempo of military operations on the island. That is Guam's colonial history and colonial situation. It is colonial even as many of Guam's residents take their US citizenship seriously and want to make claims to full citizenship on the foundation of the limited citizenship they now have. It is colonial even as Guam's many military members – those born on Guam and those born in the 50 United States – can and do see themselves as doing their duty to the US civilian leadership who deploy them to bases here and around the world. It is colonial even as many of Guam's citizens have been acting in the faith that they should be able to make and are making their own choices about whether Guam becomes even more of a battleship or not. But social science will call it nothing more than colonial when a people have not historically chosen their most powerful leaders and have been told to background their own national identity in favor of that of the power which has ultimate rule. The US presence in Guam is properly called imperial because the US is an empire in the strict sense of the term as used by historians and other social analysts of political forms.
Besides colonialism, another concept relevant to Guam's situation is militarization. It refers to an increase in labor and resources allocated to military purposes and the shaping of other institutions in synchrony with military goals. It involves a shift in societal beliefs and values in ways that legitimate the use of force (Ferguson 2009). It helps describe the process by which 14 year olds are in uniform and carrying proxy rifles in JROTC units in all of Guam's schools, why a fifth to a quarter of high school graduates enter the military, and why the identity of the island has over time shifted from a land of farmers to a land of war survivors to a land of loyal Americans to a land that is, proudly, "the Tip of the Spear," that is, a land that is a weapon. This historical change – the process of militarization or military colonization – has been visible to some, but more often, hidden in plain sight.

Guam's military bases are part of the expansive US military basing system around the world and on the US mainland. That system is vast in scale and impact and has a particular if contentious rationale. It is important to examine what it means to live next to military facilities for several reasons:
(1) To study them with the tools of anthropology and the perspective of social science allows us to question the common sense about them and to see invisible processes.
(2) Like most social phenomena, bases are often hidden in plain sight. They are normalized from day to day, but are partially denormalized when they grow or shrink. Even then, much remains invisible and accepted as the natural order of things.
(3) Like social phenomena in which power is involved, their effects can be systematically hidden by advertising, fear, and public relations work.
Military base communities are in many ways as distinctive sociologically and anthropologically as the military bases they sit next to, because they respond in almost every way to the presence of those bases. They are not simply independent neighbors, but over time become conjoined, although one is always much more powerful than the other.

Officially, as of late 2008 (the last date for which the DoD has made such data public) over 150,000 troops and 95,000 civilian employees are massed in 837 US military facilities in 45 countries and territories, excluding Iraq and Afghanistan. There, the US military owns or rents 720,000 acres of land, and owns, rents or uses 60,000 buildings and manages structures valued at $145 billion. 4742 bases are located in the domestic United States. These official numbers are quite misleading as to the scale of US overseas military basing, however. That is because they not only exclude the massive buildup of new bases and troop presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also secret or unacknowledged facilities in Israel, Kuwait, the Philippines and many other places.


Large sums of money are involved in their building and operation. $2 billion in military construction money has been expended in only three years of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. Just one facility in Iraq, Balad Air Base, houses 30,000 troops and 10,000 contractors, and extends across 16 square miles with an additional 12 square mile "security perimeter." The Guam build-up has been projected to cost between $10 and $15 billion, with much of that amount in contracts going to businesses in the U.S., Japan, South Korea, and, less significantly, Guam itself.
These military facilities include sprawling Army bases with airfields and McDonalds and schools, and small listening posts. They include artillery testing ranges, and berthed aircraft carriers.2 While the bases are literally barracks and weapons depots and staging areas for war making and ship repair facilities and golf courses and basketball courts, they are also political claims, spoils of war, arms sales showrooms, toxic industrial sites, laboratories for cultural (mis)communication, and collections of customers for local shops, services, bars, and prostitution.
The environmental, political, and economic impact of these bases is enormous. While some people benefit from the coming of a base, at least temporarily, most communities and many within them pay a high price: their farm land taken for bases, their bodies attacked by cancers and neurological disorders because of military toxic exposures, their neighbors imprisoned, tortured and disappeared by the autocratic regimes that survive on US military and political support given as a form of tacit rent for the bases.

The count of US military bases should also include the eleven aircraft carriers in the US Navy's fleet, each of which it refers to as "four and a half acres of sovereign US territory." These moveable bases and their land-based counterparts are just the most visible part of the larger picture of US military presence overseas. This picture of military access includes (1) US military training of foreign forces, often in conjunction with the provision of US weaponry, (2) joint exercises meant to enhance US soldiers' exposure to a variety of operating environments from jungle to desert to urban terrain and interoperability across national militaries, and (3) legal arrangements made to gain overflight rights and other forms of ad hoc use of others' territory as well as to preposition military equipment there. In all of these realms, the US is in a class by itself, no adversary or ally maintaining anything comparable in terms of its scope, depth and global reach.
These three elements come with problems: The training programs strengthen the power of military forces in relation to other sectors within those countries, sometimes with fragile democracies. Fully 38 percent of those countries with US basing were cited in 2002 for their poor human rights record (Lumpe 2002:16). The exercises have sometimes been provocative to other nations, and in some cases have become the pretext for substantial and permanent positioning of troops; in recent years, for example, the US has run approximately 20 exercises annually on Philippine soil. Recently (July, 2010) announced joint US-South Korean military exercises in the Yellow Sea, just off the coast of China, have produced strong protest from it and arguably will lead to increases in its military spending.

The attempt to gain access has also meant substantial interference in the affairs of other nations: for example, lobbying to change the Philippine and Japanese constitutions to allow, respectively, foreign troop basing, US nuclear weapons, and a more-than-defensive military in the service of US wars, in the case of Japan. US military and civilian officials are joined in their efforts by intelligence agents passing as businessmen or diplomats; in 2005, the US Ambassador to the Philippines created a furor by mentioning that the US has 70 agents operating in Mindanao alone.
Given the sensitivity about sovereignty and the costs of having the US in their country, elaborate bilateral negotiations result in the exchange of weapons, cash, and trade privileges for overflight and land use rights. Less explicitly, but no less importantly, rice import levels or immigration rights to the US or overlooking human rights abuses have been the currency of exchange (Cooley 2008).

Bases are the literal and symbolic anchors, and the most visible centerpieces, of the U.S. military presence overseas. To understand where those bases are and how they are being used is essential for understanding the United States' relationship with the rest of the world, the role of coercion in it, and its political economic complexion. We can begin by asking why this empire of bases was established in the first place, how the bases are currently configured around the world and how that configuration is changing.

What are bases for?
Foreign military bases have been established throughout the history of expanding states and warfare. They proliferate where a state has imperial ambitions, either through direct control of territory or through indirect control over the political economy, laws, and foreign policy of other places. Whether or not it recognizes itself as such, a country can be called an empire when it projects substantial power with the aim of asserting and maintaining dominance over other regions. Those policies succeed when wealth is extracted from peripheral areas, and redistributed to the imperial center. Empires, then, have historically been associated with a growing gap between the wealth and welfare of the powerful center and the regions it dominates. Alongside and supporting these goals has often been elevated self-regard in the imperial power, or a sense of racial, cultural, or social superiority.

The descriptors empire and imperialism have been applied to the Romans, Incas, Mongols, Persians, Portuguese, Spanish, Ottomans, Dutch, British, Germans, Soviets, Chinese, Japanese, and Americans, among others. Despite the striking differences between each of these cases, each used military bases to maintain some forms of rule over regions far from their center. The bases eroded the sovereignty of allied states on which they were established by treaty; the Roman Empire was accomplished not only by conquest, but also "by taking her weaker [but still sovereign] neighbors under her wing and protecting them against her and their stronger neighbors"¦ The most that Rome asked of them in terms of territory was the cessation, here and there, of a patch of ground for the plantation of a Roman fortress" (Magdoff et al. 2002).

What have military bases accomplished for these empires through history? Bases are usually presented, above all, as having rational, strategic purposes; the imperial power claims that they provide forward defense for the homeland, supply other nations with security, and facilitate the control of trade routes and resources. They have been used to protect non-economic actors and their agendas as well – missionaries, political operatives, and aid workers among them. Bases have been used to control the political and economic life of the host nation. Politically, bases serve to encourage other governments' endorsement of the empire's military and other foreign policies. Corporations and the military itself as an organization have a powerful stake in bases' continued existence regardless of their strategic value (Johnson 2004).

Alongside their military and economic functions, bases have symbolic and psychological dimensions. They are highly visible expressions of a nation's will to status and power. Strategic elites have built bases as a visible sign of the nation's standing, much as they have constructed monuments and battleships. So, too, contemporary US politicians and the public have treated the number of their bases as indicators of the nation's hyperstatus and hyperpower. More darkly, overseas military bases can also be seen as symptoms of irrational or untethered fears, even paranoia, as they are built with the long-term goal of taming a world perceived to be out of control. Empires frequently misperceive the world as rife with threats and themselves as objects of violent hostility from others. Militaries' interest in organizational survival has also contributed to the amplification of this fear and imperial basing structures as the solution as they "sell themselves" to their populace by exaggerating threats, underestimating the costs of basing and war itself, as well as understating the obstacles facing preemption and belligerence (Van Evera 2001).
As the world economy and its technological substructures have changed, so have the roles of foreign bases. By 1500, new sailing technologies allowed much longer distance voyages, even circumnavigational ones, and so empires could aspire to long networks of coastal naval bases to facilitate the control of sea lanes and trade. They were established at distances that would allow provisioning the ship, taking on fresh fruit that would protect sailors from scurvy, and so on. By the 21st century, technological advances have at least theoretically eliminated many of the reasons for foreign bases, given the possibilities of in transit refueling of jets and aircraft carriers, the nuclear powering of submarines and battleships, and other advances in sea and airlift of military personnel and equipment. Bases have, nevertheless, continued their ineluctable expansion.
States that invest their people's wealth in overseas bases have paid direct as well as opportunity costs, whose consequences in the long run have usually been collapse of the empire. In The Rise and Fall of Great Powers, Kennedy notes that previous empires which established and tenaciously held onto overseas bases inevitably saw their wealth and power decay as they chose "to devote a large proportion of its total income to 'protection,' leaving less for 'productive investment,' it is likely to find its economic output slowing down, with dire implications for its long-term capacity to maintain both its citizens' consumption demands and its international position" (Kennedy 1987:539).

Nonetheless, U.S. defense officials and scholars have continued to argue that bases lead to "enhanced national security and successful foreign policy" because they provide "a credible capacity to move, employ, and sustain military forces abroad," (Blaker 1990:3) and the ability "to impose the will of the United States and its coalition partners on any adversaries." This belief helps sustain the US basing structure, which far exceeds any the world has seen: this is so in terms of its global reach, depth, and cost, as well as its impact on geopolitics in all regions of the world, particularly the Asia-Pacific.

A short history of US basing
After consolidation of continental dominance, there were three periods of expansive global ambition in US history beginning in 1898, 1945, and 2001. Each is associated with the acquisition of significant numbers of new overseas military bases. The Spanish-American war resulted in the acquisition of a number of colonies, but the US basing system was far smaller than that of its political and economic peers including many European nations as well as Japan. In the next four decades US soldiers were stationed in just 14 bases, some quite small, in Puerto Rico, Cuba, Panama, and the Virgin Islands, but also, already, extending across the Pacific to Hawaii, Midway, Wake, and Guam, the Philippines, Shanghai, two in the Aleutians, American Samoa, and Johnston Island (Harkavy 1982). This small number was the result in part of a strong anti-statist and anti-militarist strain in US political culture (Sherry 1995). From the perspective of many in the US through the inter-war period, to build bases would be to risk unwarranted entanglement in others' conflicts.

England had the most during this period, with some countries with large militaries and even some with expansive ambitions having relatively few overseas bases; Germany and the Soviet Union had almost none. But the attempt to acquire such bases would be a contributing cause of World War II (Harkavy 1989:5).

From 14 bases in 1938, by the end of WW II, the United States had built or acquired an astounding 30,000 installations large and small in approximately 100 countries. While this number contracted significantly, it went on to provide the sinews for the rise to global hegemony of the United States (Blaker 1990:22). Certain ideas about basing and what it accomplished were to be retained from World War II as well, including the belief that "its extensive overseas basing system was a legitimate and necessary instrument of U.S. power, morally justified and a rightful symbol of the U.S. role in the world" (Blaker 1990:28).

Nonetheless, pressure came from Australia, France, and England, as well as from Panama, Denmark and Iceland, for return of bases in their own territory or colonies, and domestically to demobilize the twelve million man military (a larger military would have been needed to maintain the vast basing system). More important than the shrinking number of bases, however, was the codification of US military access rights around the world in a comprehensive set of legal documents. These established security alliances with multiple states within Europe (NATO), the Middle East and South Asia (CENTO), and Southeast Asia (SEATO), and they included bilateral arrangements with Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand. These alliances assumed a common security interest between the United States and other countries and were the charter for US basing in each place. Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) were crafted in each country to specify what the military could do; these usually gave US soldiers broad immunity from prosecution for crimes committed and environmental damage created. These agreements and subsequent base operations have usually been shrouded in secrecy.

In the United States, the National Security Act of 1947, along with a variety of executive orders, instituted what can be called a second, secret government or the "national security state", which created the National Security Agency, National Security Council, and Central Intelligence Agency and gave the US president expansive new imperial powers. From this point on, domestic and especially foreign military activities and bases were to be heavily masked from public oversight (Lens 1987). Many of those unaccountable funds then and now go into use overseas, flowing out of US embassies and military bases. Including use to interfere in the domestic affairs of nations in which it has had or desired military access, including attempts to influence votes on and change anti-nuclear and anti-war provisions in the Constitutions of the Pacific nation of Belau and of Japan.

Nonetheless, over the second half of the 20th century, the United States was either evicted or voluntarily left bases in dozens of countries.3 Between 1947 and 1990, the US was asked to leave bases in France, Yugoslavia, Iran, Ethiopia, Libya, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Algeria, Vietnam, Indonesia, Peru, Mexico, and Venezuela. Popular and political objection to the bases in Spain, the Philippines, Greece, and Turkey in the 1980s enabled those governments to negotiate significantly more compensation from the United States. Portugal threatened to evict the US from important bases in the Azores, unless it ceased its support for independence for its African colonies, a demand with which the US complied.4 In the 1990s and later, the US was sent packing, most significantly, from the Philippines, Panama, Saudi Arabia, Vieques, and Uzbekistan (Simbulan 1985).

At the same time, remarkable numbers of new US bases were newly built (241) after 1947 in remarkable numbers in the Federal Republic of Germany, as well as in Italy, Britain, and Japan (Blaker 1990:45). The defeated Axis powers continued to host the most significant numbers of US bases: at its height, Japan was peppered with 3,800 US installations.

As battles become bases, so bases become battles; the bases in East Asia acquired in the Spanish American War and in World War II, such as Guam, Okinawa and the Philippines, became the primary sites from which the United States waged war on Vietnam. Without them, the costs and logistical obstacles for the US would have been immense. The number of bombing runs over North and South Vietnam required tons of bombs to be unloaded, for example, at the Naval Station in Guam, stored at the Naval Magazine in the southern area of the island, and then shipped to be loaded onto B-52s at Andersen Air Force Base every day during years of the war. The morale of ground troops based in Vietnam, as fragile as it was to become through the latter part of the 1960s, depended on R & R at bases throughout East and Southeast Asia which allowed them to leave the war zone and be shipped back quickly and inexpensively for further fighting (Baker 2004:76). In addition to the bases' role in fighting these large and overt wars, they facilitated the movement of military assets to accomplish the over 200 military interventions carried out by the US in the course of the Cold War period (Blum 1995).

While speed of deployment is framed as an important continued reason for forward basing, equally important is that troops could be deployed anywhere in the world from US bases without having to touch down en route. In fact, US soldiers are being increasingly billeted on US territory, including such far-flung areas as Guam, which is presently slated for a larger buildup for this reason as well as to avoid the political and other costs of foreign deployment.

With the will to gain military control of space, as well as gather intelligence, the US over time, especially in the 1990s, established a large number of new military bases to facilitate the strategic use of communications and space technologies. Military R&D (the Pentagon spent over $52 billion in 2005 and employed over 90,000 scientists) and corporate profits to be made in the development and deployment of the resulting technologies have been significant factors in the growing numbers of technical facilities on foreign soil. These include such things as missile early-warning radar, signals intelligence, space tracking telescopes and laser sources, satellite control, downwind air sampling monitors, and research facilities for everything from weapons testing to meteorology. Missile defense systems and network centric warfare increasingly rely on satellite technology and drones with associated requirements for ground facilities. These facilities have often been established in violation of arms control agreements such as the 1967 Outer Space Treaty meant to limit the militarization of space.

The assumption that US bases served local interests in a shared ideological and security project dominated into the 1960s: allowing base access showed a commitment to fight Communism and gratitude for US military assistance. But with decolonization and the US war in Vietnam, such arguments began to lose their power, and the number of US overseas bases declined from an early 1960s peak. Where access was once automatic, many countries now had increased leverage over what the US had to give in exchange for basing rights, and those rights could be restricted in a variety of important ways, including through environmental and other regulations. The bargaining chips used by the US were increasingly sophisticated weapons, as well as rent payments for the land on which bases were established.5 These exchanges were often linked with trade and other kinds of agreements, such as access to oil and other raw materials and investment opportunities (Harkavy 1982:337). They also have had destabilizing effects on regional arms balances, particularly when advanced weaponry is the medium of exchange. From the earlier ideological rationale for the bases, global post-war recovery and decreasing inequality between the US and countries – mostly in the global North – that housed the majority of US bases, led to a more pragmatic or economic grounding to basing negotiations, albeit often thinly veiled by the language of friendship and common ideological bent. The 1980s saw countries whose populations and governments had strongly opposed US military presence, such as Greece, agree to US bases on their soil only because they were in need of the cash, and Burma, a neutral but very poor state, entered negotiations with the US over basing troops there (Harkavy 1989:4-5).

The third period of accelerated imperial ambition began in 2000, with the election of George Bush and the ascendancy to power of a group of leaders committed to a more aggressive and unilateral use of military power, their ability to expand the scope of US power increased by the attacks of 9/11. They wanted "a network of 'deployment bases' or 'forward operating bases' to increase the reach of current and future forces" and focused on the need for bases in Iraq. While the unresolved conflict with Iraq provides the immediate justification, the need for a substantial American force presence in the Gulf transcends the issue of the regime of Saddam Hussein. This plan for expanded US military presence around the world has been put into action, particularly in the Middle East, the Russian perimeter, and, now, Africa.

New U.S. Military Bases, 1991-2003
Pentagon transformation plans result in the design of US military bases to operate ever more as offensive, expeditionary platforms from which to project military capabilities quickly anywhere. Where bases in Korea, for example, were once meant primarily to defend South Korea from attack from the north, they are now, like bases everywhere, project power in many directions and serve as stepping stones to battles far from themselves. The Global Defense Posture Review of 2004 announced these changes, focusing not just on reorienting the footprint of US bases away from Cold War locations, but on grounding imperial ambitions through remaking legal arrangements that support expanded military activities with other allied countries and prepositioning equipment in those countries to be able to "surge" military force quickly, anywhere.
The Department of Defense currently distinguishes three types of military facilities. "Main operating bases" are those with permanent personnel, strong infrastructure, and often including family housing, such as Kadena Air Base in Japan and Ramstein Air Force Base in Germany. "Forward operating sites" are "expandable warm facilit[ies] maintained with a limited U.S. military support presence and possibly prepositioned equipment," such as Incirlik Air Base in Turkey and Soto Cano Air Base in Honduras (US Defense Department 2004:10). Finally, "cooperative security locations" are sites with few or no permanent US personnel, which are maintained by contractors or the host nation for occasional use by the US military, and often referred to as "lily pads." In Thailand, for example, U-Tapao Royal Thai Navy Airfield has been used extensively for US combat runs over Iraq and Afghanistan. Others are now cropping up around the world, especially throughout Africa, as in Dakar, Senegal where facilities and use rights have been newly established.

Are Guam's bases domestic or overseas bases? Are there racial underpinnings to the differences in how Guam's basing is handled?

The history just recounted mostly refers to US bases on other countries' sovereign soil. Is Guam's situation anomalous? Is Guam's Andersen AFB a domestic base or a foreign base? As Guam is a US territory, it is neither a fully incorporated part of the US nor a free nation. The island's license plate, which notes it is "Where America's Day Begins," also reads, "Guam USA." This expresses the wish of some, rather than the reality. It perhaps would better read, Guam, US sort of A. International legal norms make the status clear, however. Guam is a colony, and primarily a military colony, in keeping with the idea that the US' imperial history, especially in the second half of the 20th century, has been a military colonialism around the world.

Guam's status shifts by context, however. The DoDs Base Structure Report places Guam and its 39,287 "owned" acres (39 percent of the island's territory) between Georgia (560,799 acres) and Hawaii (175,911 acres). No Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) regulates the US forces on Guam, and as far as I know, the DoD does not need to report each day to the government of Guam on how many soldiers have been brought in or sent out of Guam, nor is it negotiating with Guam about its plans to grow its bases on Guam.

One very important and empirical index of the degree to which Guam's bases are foreign or domestic is the quality of care that has been taken with its environment and health (Castro 2007). Overseas bases have repeatedly inflicted environmental devastation. Unexploded ordnance killed 21 people in Panama before the US was evicted and continues to threaten communities nearby. In Germany, industrial solvents, firefighting chemicals, and varieties of waste have ruined ecological systems near some US bases. The Koreans are finding extremely high levels of military toxins in bases returned to them by the US from near the DMZ. Ebeye atoll suffers severe water quality and quantity problems due to the US military presence (Soroko 2006).

While Guam's environment has been treated carelessly through the years, environmental standards have not been high enough for domestic US bases either. Fort Bragg in North Carolina, for example, engaged in outdoor burning of very large numbers of its unwanted, old wooden barracks at one point in the 1970s, and an ancient water treatment plant was used on Fort Bragg up until quite recently. One can also point to the US Army Corps of Engineers' Formerly Used Defense Sites whose cleanup would be so expensive that they are termed "national sacrifice zones," or permanent no man's lands by some.

But activists have long considered the environmental and judicial standards that are negotiated into each country's SOFA as an index of how much respect their country is accorded. It is possible to measure the quantity of toxins variously introduced into the environment of Guam, Germany, the Philippines, California, and North Carolina, for example. The broad differences in that quantity roughly occur on a scale that appears quite racial, with the US mainland at the top, Germany next, and the Philippines and Guam at the bottom. If Guam's political status were truly domestic, we might expect Guam to look more like the mainland in terms of how the environment has been cared for. It does not.
But the internal racial history of the US itself demonstrates that the military base has been a booby prize for many of the internally colonized in the US as well: the distinction between domestic and foreign bases has been blurry on the mainland as well. All domestic military bases are in fact, of course, built on Native American land, and even after that land was taken, the bases were often intentionally sited on land inhabited by poor white, black and Indian farmers. Thousands of them lost their land in North Carolina alone in the buildup to WW II (Lutz 2001).
And there, too, we can ask, as we ask on Guam, who benefited then and who benefits now from base building and base buildups? What costs are externalized and borne by others? And how has a rhetoric of national security over all contributed to the notion that the military can be and should be excepted from environmental protection standards?

The externalized costs of bases
The people of Guam have been engaged in a several year exercise of trying to detail the impact of military bases in order to gain some relief from the expected continuing externalization of the physical and social costs of military basing onto the people of Guam. Among the health and environmental issues pertaining to base expansion are the long term maintenance of roads, the stressed and declining water supply, and the likely upswing in crime rates.

In this final section, the economic impact of bases is examined, as this has been crucial in Guam and elsewhere for the arguments made for military expansion. Obviously the health and wellbeing of people affected by military basing are crucial, but the economic effects have been the primary thing that people in many base communities have focused on. This is so for two reasons. The first is that the military itself publicizes its arrival or expansion as an economic boon, noting the dollars brought in via soldier's salaries, civilian work on post, and construction and other sub-contracts that could provide jobs. So the First Hawaiian Bank published a Guam Economic Forecast that claimed "The military expansion is anticipated to benefit Guam's economy in the amount of $1.5 billion per year once the process begins."6

The second reason for the economic focus is that they appear overall to be positive, unlike the environmental, sovereignty, cultural, crime, and noise effects. But one of the reasons they look positive is because the powerful benefit and have the resources to convince others that they, too, benefit even when they palpably do not. Moreover, the military has large numbers of personnel, military and civilian, doing public relations work with media and communities to make their case for simple economic positives. In addition, those locals who are most likely to benefit financially have the funding and motivation to do similar public relations work. For example, the Chamber of Commerce funded a 2008 survey that found that "71 per cent of Guam residents supported an increase in the United States military presence, with nearly 80 per cent of the view that the increasing military presence would result in additional jobs and tax revenue; according to the poll, 60 per cent felt the additional Marines on the island would have a positive effect and would ultimately improve the island's quality of life."7 This poll was as much an attempt to create reality as to reflect it. It builds on an existing cultural narrative, one that is purchased with media time and power, a narrative that says "you will all benefit."
What are the economic effects of bases? Three major factors can be identified. First, the economic effects are primarily redistributional rather than generative (unlike, for example, manufacturing or education jobs). Certain sectors atrophy and others grow in military districts, often in very strong fluctuations. In 2007 in Guam, for example, "While employment in manufacturing, transportation and public utilities and retail trade decreased, increases were seen for jobs in the service sector and public sector; with the construction sector experiencing the largest increase, that is, 1,450 jobs, or 35 per cent."8 Usually, retail jobs are the main type of work created around military bases. Unfortunately, those jobs pay less than any other category of work, accelerating the growth of inequality in military communities.

Second, the military is a highly toxic industrial operation and it externalizes many of its costs of operation to the communities that host it and serve it. These costs include such things as environmental waste, PTSD in returning war veterans and high rates of domestic violence, rapid deterioration of roads and other public amenities, and, in many communities, decline in human capital development of populations that have gone into the military (Lutz and Bartlett 1995, Lutz 2001). JROTC, for example, only appears to add resources to school districts while it in fact draws on significant local education resources, while serving as recruiting devices. The math on these costs – the subtraction from the general welfare and general public funds – is rarely done.

Finally, military economies are volatile. While the "war cycle" is different than the business cycle, it also has booms and busts. For example, businesses in military personnel cities like Fayetteville, North Carolina regularly go under when service members are deployed to US war zones. Any major deployment from Guam's bases can be expected to significantly harm local enterprise dependent on military business. Moreover, a volatile real estate market catering to foreign military personnel sends property prices spiralling and forces local working families into more substandard housing.

Conclusion
There are legal questions in the Guam military buildup as well. In her testimony before the UN Committee of 24 in 2008, Sabina Flores Peres referred to the extremity of "the level and grossness of the infraction" of the UN Charter by the US in its further militarization of the island. This is not hyperbole, because Guam's militarization is objectively more extreme in its concentration than that found virtually anywhere else on earth. There are only a few other areas that are in similar condition – all, not coincidentally islands such as Okinawa, Diego Garcia, and, in the past, Vieques, Puerto Rico (see e.g., Inoue 2004, Yoshida 2010 and McCaffrey 2002). This was the product of an island strategy for the US Navy, developed in the face of decolonization and anxieties about the fate of continental US bases in that context in the 1950s and 1960s (Vine 2009).
Guam, objectively, has the highest ratio of US military spending and military hardware and land takings from indigenous populations of any place on earth. Here there might have been rivals in Diego Garcia or in some areas of the continental US if the US had not forcibly removed those indigenous landowners altogether or onto the equivalent of reservations, something the US had hoped to do in Guam as far back as 1945. The level and grossness of the infraction has to do with the racial hierarchy that fundamentally guides the US in its "negotiations" with other peoples over the siting of its military bases and the treatment they are accorded once the US settles in. As the military budget suddenly and intensely comes under scrutiny in the United States in the summer of 2010 during severe economic crisis, the hope must be that the project of building yet more military facilities on Guam will hit the chopping block. As a human rights issue, however, the US treatment of Guam's people should have no price tag.
 
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Armand2REP

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TLAMs don't even have the range to hit China from Guam. It is 3500km from Guam to Guangzhou so forget about it. The only threat is a forward base for the 7th Fleet. It is a good location being much closer than Hawaii and out of the range of China's projection power unlike Japan or Korea. It would cost $6.5 billion to build a port for carriers on Guam. I find that prohibitively expensive since there are countries that can base them with existing facilities and are happy to do so. There are advantages to clustering into a mega base, but then it is much more vulnerable to a nuclear strike with so many assets in one place.
 
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http://defensetech.org/2012/09/06/u-s-japan-agree-to-guam-drone-pact/

U.S., Japan consider Guam drone pact

Japan and the U.S. are considering plans to use Guam as a hub for spy drones to monitor Chinese naval activities in the Pacific, according to a report in the Japan Times.
The U.S. already has Global Hawks stationed at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam. The U.S. Air Force plans to expand the number of spy drones at Andersen and welcome Japan drones over the next decade as the Japanese military plans to buy its own drone fleet.
Japan's Self-Defense Force had planned to buy Global Hawks of its own before the deal was scuttled due to price concerns. The Japanese have remained confident in their plans to buy their own drones, especially as the Chinese naval fleet has stepped up their patrols throughout the Pacific.
Japanese military leaders currently fly the P-3C patrol aircraft to monitor Chinese naval movements. The investment in a Global Hawk or the U.S. Navy's version of the RG-4, the Triton, would be a considerable step up in Japan's intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capability.
U.S. and Japan air forces would share hangars and maintenance facilities for their drone fleets, according to the Japan Times report.
The U.S. Air Force's Global Hawk arrived at Andersen in 2010. It's the Air Force's largest drone, although it does not carry weapons like the Predator or the Reaper.
U.S. Global Hawks from Guam flew missions over Japan after the massive tsunami obliterated the country. The Global Hawks provided intelligence and imagery for humanitarian clean up.
Northrop Grumman unveiled the RG-4C Triton in June as part of the U.S. Navy's Broad Area Maritime Surveillance program. It's expected to fly a considerable chunk of it's missions over the Pacific monitoring the Chinese and North Koreans.


Read more: http://defensetech.org/2012/09/06/u-s-japan-agree-to-guam-drone-pact/#ixzz29KXQpESZ
Defense.org
 

Virendra

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While China cannot do much about where US already has boots, they sure want to have a good lead in places like the so called South China sea.
Obvisouly Americans would stop one step short of reaching that area. They'd rather want to have proxies in form of India , Philippines and Australia.
But it depends on how much these walk the talk for US.
Good that the Americans have an old alliance towards east in form of Japan. Less homework to do.

The next big war will be hosted in either Middle East or the Pacific. I see no other epicenters.

Regards,
Virendra
 

Ray

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What is the Chinese reaction?

What are the weaponry that the Chinese can unleash against US interest in the Pacific region?

I am sure they will have taken some action to ensure that they are not vulnerable.

Any reports on that?
 

Ray

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US values their being the No # 1 in the world.

As has been seen repeatedly they do not take this lightly.

To believe that the US will allow any country to upstage her because of some debt or the other, would be underestimating the US.

They will ensure after 'teaching' the adversary a lesson, the adversary forget that the US had a debt in the first place!

Bush was not called a cowboy for any ulterior motive.

He was a cowboy and their six shooter does the speaking!
 

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