The solution in Afghanistan: Get out

Ray

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The solution in Afghanistan: Get out

By James P. McGovern and Walter B. Jones
Friday, February 18, 2011; 12:00 AM

No one, it seems, wants to talk about the war in Afghanistan. This week the House debated a budget bill that is touted as reflecting new fiscal restraint, yet borrows tens of billions more for the war. In an hour-long State of the Union address last month, President Obama devoted less than one minute to the conflict. Given the investment and sacrifices our country has made for nearly 10 years, the phones in our offices should be ringing off the hook with calls from those who are tired of being told that the United States doesn't have enough money to extend unemployment benefits or invest in new jobs.

But by and large, Americans are silent. The war wasn't even an issue in the November elections, which dominated the political discussion for much of last year. Perhaps it is because there is no draft and only a small percentage of our population is at risk. Or maybe it's because no one feels that they are paying for the war, which is being charged to the American taxpayers' credit card.

Whatever the reasons, there is no excuse for our collective indifference. At 112 months, this is the longest war in our history. More than 1,400 American service members have lost their lives in Afghanistan; over 8,800 have been wounded in action. Tens of thousands have suffered other disabilities or psychological harm. The Pentagon reported in November that suicide rates are soaring among veterans; the backlog at the Department of Veterans Affairs had reached more than 700,000 disability cases, according to NPR, including post-traumatic stress disorder.

Meanwhile in Afghanistan, our so-called ally, President Hamid Karzai, is corrupt. Transparency International recently ranked Afghanistan as the world's third-most corrupt country, behind only Somalia and Burma The Afghan military and police are not reliable partners, and al-Qaeda is someplace else.

Vice President Biden said in Afghanistan last month that "we are not leaving if you don't want us to leave." At the NATO summit in Lisbon, the president said that we're in Afghanistan for at least four more years.

But for what? Why do we need to sacrifice more American lives? Why must we continue to align ourselves with a government that commits fraud in elections? Instead, why aren't we using all our resources to go after the terrorists that murdered so many of our civilians on Sept. 11, 2001?

The new Republican majority in the House came to power in large part by promising to control spending and reduce the deficit. This war has already cost us more than $450 billion; combined with the war in Iraq, it is estimated to account for 23 percent of our deficits since 2003. Where is the outcry from the Tea Partyers and the deficit hawks? Fiscal conservatives should be howling that this war is being financed with borrowed money. Those who support the war should be willing to pay for it.

And where is the liberal outrage? Those of us who are tired of being told that we can't afford green jobs, unemployment or health care should be screaming over our Treasury being used as an ATM when it comes to supporting the Karzai government.

To be fair, there are a handful of prominent critics on the left, center and right. But most Americans are silent about the enormous sacrifice our country has made in blood and treasure. They should be calling, writing or otherwise speaking out.

What are we giving up to maintain the status quo? Columbia University professor Joseph Stiglitz told the House Veterans Affairs Committee in September that the costs of Iraq and Afghanistan, including interest payments on the money borrowed for these wars and care for our wounded soldiers and veterans, is likely to total $4 trillion to $6 trillion.

Simply put, we believe the human and financial costs of the war are unacceptable and unsustainable. It is bankrupting us. The United States should devise an exit plan to extricate ourselves from Afghanistan, not a plan to stay there four more years and "then we'll see." This doesn't mean that we abandon the Afghan people - rather, we should abandon this war strategy. It is a failure that has not brought stability to Afghanistan and has not enhanced our own security. As the retired career Army officer Andrew J. Bacevich has written, to die for a mystique is the wrong policy.

It is easier for politicians to "go along" rather than make waves. But we were elected to do the right thing, not what is politically expedient. The discussion of Afghanistan shouldn't be about politics, which we acknowledge are difficult, but what is right for our country. And the right thing is to end this war.

James P. McGovern, a Democrat, represents Massachusetts's 3rd Congressional District in the U.S. House. Walter B. Jones, a Republican, represents North Carolina's 3rd Congressional District.

Washinton Post
I don't think the Republicans have the moral right to lament about the morass the US has landed itself in Afghanistan or talk about Karzai being corrupt. Afghanistan and President Karzai are but the Republican Party's brainchild.

If the Americans are not protesting about the futility of the War, it is because it strikes a chord with the American gung ho mentality of being the 'saviours of the world' and they revel at the idea that they are the most powerful nation in the world. It is only that they find the bodybags revolting since that aspect of war does not fit into the 'all guns blazing, firing from the hip' scenario that is the pet imagery of the American mindset.

What is important is the statement of the US Vice President - we are not leaving if you don't want us to leave. As I have stated on various fora that it is in US' strategic interest that they will not leave either Iraq or Afghanistan and instead will leave a sizeable presence to impose its will in the area, since these areas are strategical lynchpins to further US interest in containing the re-emerging Russia and China. They are very important 'listening posts' into the the two challengers of the US supremacy too.

What is 'going after terrorists' as the writers imply? The womb of terrorism is just next door to Afghanistan.

Now, what has the writers to suggest about the 'exit plan'? Another Vietnam type?
 

Ray

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* Posted on Thursday, February 17, 2011

Big gains reported in Afghan town that Taliban once owned

By Saeed Shah | McClatchy Newspapers

MARJAH, Afghanistan — Schools that the Taliban closed have reopened in this southern Afghan town, and some girls are even back in the classrooms. The wheat and cotton crops are flourishing, and poppy cultivation is way down.

A year after a major American-led operation to oust the Islamist insurgents from their onetime stronghold, security has improved dramatically, according to Afghan officials and U.S. troops, and townspeople say they no longer live in terror.

With some 2,000 Marines stationed in and around Marjah, the militants have been pushed to the fringe of the area, and the hustle and bustle of everyday life has returned, helped by a huge injection of aid and development projects by the Marines.

Marjah residents no longer fear meeting Americans, and they now routinely pass on intelligence about Taliban movements.

"Security is good now. Life is better," said Gul Ahmed, a 34-year-old wheat farmer in northeast Marjah, close to a U.S. Marine patrol base. "Bad people like the Taliban cannot come here now."

"The Taliban took money from us," he said. "They took food from us. They forced us to go with them to other provinces to fight."

If the relatively peaceful conditions hold, Marjah, in Helmand province, could become a symbol of counterinsurgency at work in Afghanistan. It also would bear out the claim by U.S.-led international forces that a "surge" of 30,000 additional American troops last year has stemmed the insurgency in its southern heartland, Helmand and the neighboring province of Kandahar.

There are plenty of doubters, who say the Marines have proved only that they can hold areas with massive U.S. forces. Locals appear to have little faith — as yet, anyway — in Afghan forces' ability to take over.

"If the Marines left, the Taliban would be back in two weeks," said Sidar Mohammad, the 25-year-old owner of a bakery in Marjah's Loy Chareh market.

This year will be a watershed one for Afghanistan. President Barack Obama is expected to make at least a token withdrawal of U.S. forces after July, and U.S. commanders are waiting for the spring fighting season to assess how much the Taliban and allied extremist groups have been able to rebuild after the U.S. offensive.

The Taliban still enjoy a haven in neighboring Pakistan's tribal areas, and serious questions remain about the capabilities of the Afghan army, not to mention President Hamid Karzai's corrupt and fragile government in Kabul.

"While the momentum achieved by the Taliban in recent years has been arrested in much of the country and reversed in some key areas, these gains remain fragile and reversible," said the unclassified version of Obama's December 2010 review of Afghanistan-Pakistan policy.

Marjah is the test ground for the U.S. strategy of protecting the population with huge numbers of soldiers, and success or failure here will have far-reaching consequences for the American mission in Afghanistan.

U.S. forces have driven the Taliban out of territory west and north of Kandahar city, securing an important part of Kandahar province. Marjah, in central Helmand, appears promising. A tough fight remains, however, in northern Helmand.

Marjah is now being compared to Nawa, a town in Helmand east of Marjah that's the current poster child for the claims of a successful counterinsurgency. Marjah is bigger, however, and had been a more significant Taliban haven. It also has a much higher profile, as it took on near-iconic status thanks to the promotion of the original offensive a year ago.

"Marjah is critically important," said Maj. Gen. Richard Mills, the Marine general who's in charge of southwest Afghanistan, including Helmand province.

"Firstly, psychologically it is the center of the insurgency within Helmand province. It was his (the Taliban's) capital. It was where he ran this place from. He lost it. Secondly, it was his bankroll. Marjah was basically drug trafficking. It produced narcotics, which were sold to fuel the insurgency. He lost that."

Mills, a 60-year-old from Huntington, N.Y., said central Marjah was now in the "build" phase, the final step of the three-phase clear-hold-build counterinsurgency model used by U.S. forces.

Last year, more than 7,000 international and Afghan forces swept in to clear the town of Taliban in the biggest operation since the 2001 U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan. After initial success, the Taliban staged a comeback, and the promise to deliver "government in a box" didn't materialize, leading the then-commander of the international forces, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, to dub Marjah a "bleeding ulcer" last May.

The turnaround came by last autumn, after the U.S. military made a tactical shift from defending the center of Marjah to aggressively chasing down Taliban on the outskirts of town. New officials were named, and the Marines have high regard for Abdul Mutalab, the district governor, who was appointed last summer, and for the district police chief, Ghulam Wali. Elections to choose a district council will be next week.

Marjah is currently benefiting from ideal conditions. The traditional winter lull in fighting, when the Taliban lie low or leave Afghanistan, has dampened violence. An attempted resurgence is expected in spring or summer, when security will face the acid test. The huge concentration of U.S. and Afghan forces, blanketing the area with an overwhelming security presence, can't be sustained long term.

"I feel a lot more comfortable walking around there (Marjah) than Baltimore after 8 o'clock at night," said Lt. Col. Robert Schwarz, 42, of Salmon, Idaho, the executive officer of the Marines' Regimental Combat Team 1, which oversees an area of Helmand that includes the two Marine battalions in Marjah. "The intent is to make the population resistant enough during wintertime so the bad guys cannot get back in."

Marines from 3rd Battalion, 9th Marines, stationed in and around central Marjah, arrived at the end of December for a seven-month tour. At their Turbett combat outpost, in the middle of town, the Marines from Lima Company appear relaxed as they patrol the Koru Chareh market just outside their base, wandering across the road to buy a kebab or being mobbed by local children, who are after candy, as they stride down the street.

The population is providing plentiful tips about Taliban movements in the town and the locations of homemade bombs buried in the ground, known as improvised explosive devices, Marines say. Across central Marjah, residents appear happy to speak with the Americans, a change from the wariness or even hostility that greeted their arrival in town a year back. Many residents spoke openly against the Taliban to a McClatchy reporter, an act that would have been life-threatening not long ago.

Thousands of Marjah residents who fled to avoid the military offensive a year ago are trickling back to their homes. Schools are opening, allowing hundreds to attend class once more, including some girls. The Taliban had closed down education in Marjah.

Poppy cultivation has been cut to minimal levels in central Marjah, and the drug bazaar shut down.

The bustle of the Koru Chareh and Loy Chareh markets, both in central Marjah, and the sight of farmers busy with their cotton or wheat crops are signs of "business as usual" that are a strong indicator of stabilization, said Capt. Nathan Dmochowski, the commander of the Turbett outpost, where 230 Marines and 220 Afghan security forces are stationed

"Back in July or August, you'd get into a firefight just walking out the gate of Turbett," said 32-year-old Dmochowski, who's from East Lansing, Mich. "The situation has transformed."

Perhaps the most revealing indicator of progress is a new militia of armed volunteers, known as Interim Security for Critical Infrastructure. It consists of about 800 townspeople who've volunteered to guard neighborhoods within Marjah against Taliban encroachment.

Marjah, more a string of villages surrounded by farmland than a town, benefits from an extensive canal irrigation system installed with American aid in the 1950s, making it an oasis in the desert. The U.S. military estimates the population at around 100,000.

"The bubble of security has pushed the insurgency further and further from the people," said Maj. Zeb Beasley, 33, who's from Lumberton, N.C., and is the operations officer of the 3/9 Marines. "We will push further and further out."

The Taliban have largely been relegated to sparsely populated desert east and west of Marjah. Separating the insurgents from the population is an important goal of modern counterinsurgency.

The Taliban still have a presence, however. The 3/9 records two or three enemy incidents a day, such as an IED find or small arms fire, said the battalion's commander, Lt. Col. David Hudspeth. He said the pattern being followed was a two-year stabilization campaign, after which security could be transitioned to Afghan forces. Nawa has been through the two-year cycle.

"We're halfway through the 24-month model. If it stays on this trajectory, I'm confident that Marjah will be ready to transition a year from now," said Hudspeth, 39, who's from Hamptonville, N.C.

Hudspeth said "decisive operations" would be carried out in areas where the Taliban remained, including Trek Nawa to the east and Sistani to the west. Two more Marine battalions are slated to rotate in for successive seven-month tours in Marjah after the 3/9.

Hudspeth's battalion is stationed in the most populated parts of Marjah. Another unit — 2nd Battalion, 8th Marines — guards the desert north of the district. Two Afghan army battalions also are deployed in the Marjah district, along with 300 Marjah police officers, a contingent of Afghan National Civil Order Police — a highway patrol force — and the new town militia.

The dividing line is stark: Where Marjah's irrigation canal network runs out, Taliban influence still asserts itself.

Lima Company's patrol base Saipan, on the eastern fringe of Marjah, is close to the remaining Taliban hideouts, with the population there noticeably more cautious about associating with the Marines.

Saipan's commander, Staff Sgt. Jesus Medina, a 31-year-old from Elizabeth, N.J., who was out on patrol heading east, pointed further east.

"This is the edge right here. Three hundred yards to the east is Indian country," he said. "When we go over there, we know we're going to get into a fight."

(Shah is a McClatchy special correspondent.)

http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/02/17/108960/big-gains-reported-in-afghan-town.html
Notwithstanding the lament that all is lost in Afghanistan, there sure are reasons to believe that the US is able to make inroads and are not so disliked as is being made out by those who want to encourage the US to turn tail, including the US people's representatives as in the above post.

Where there is a Will, there is a Way!
 

Ray

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The 'Long War' May Be Getting Shorter

By NATHANIEL FICK and JOHN NAGL
Published: February 20, 2011

Washington
Related

*
Times Topic: Afghanistan War

IT is hard to tell when momentum shifts in a counterinsurgency campaign, but there is increasing evidence that Afghanistan is moving in a more positive direction than many analysts think. It now seems more likely than not that the country can achieve the modest level of stability and self-reliance necessary to allow the United States to responsibly draw down its forces from 100,000 to 25,000 troops over the next four years.

The shift is most obvious on the ground. The additional 30,000 troops promised by President Obama in his speech at West Point 14 months ago are finally in place and changing the trajectory of the fight.

One of us, Nathaniel, recently flew into Camp Leatherneck in a C-130 transport plane, which had to steer clear of fighter bombers stacked for tens of thousands of feet above the Sangin District of Helmand Province, in southwestern Afghanistan. Singly and in pairs, the jets swooped low to drop their bombs in support of Marine units advancing north through the Helmand River Valley.

Half of the violence in Afghanistan takes place in only 9 of its nearly 400 districts, with Sangin ranking among the very worst. Slowly but surely, even in Sangin, the Taliban are being driven from their sanctuaries as the coalition focuses on protecting the Afghan people in key population centers and hubs of economic activity, and along the roads that connect them. Once these areas are cleared, it will be possible to hold them with Afghan troops and a few American advisers — allowing the United States to thin its deployments over time.

A significant shift of high-tech intelligence resources from Iraq to Afghanistan, initiated by Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the former top commander, is also having benefits. The coalition led by the United States and NATO has been able to capture or kill far more Taliban leaders in nighttime raids than was possible in the past.

The United States certainly can't kill its way to victory, as it learned in Vietnam and Iraq, but it can put enough pressure on many Taliban fighters to encourage them to switch their allegiance, depriving the enemy of support and giving the coalition more sources of useful intelligence.

Afghan Army troop strength has increased remarkably. The sheer scale of the effort at the Kabul Military Training Center has to be seen to be appreciated. Rows of new barracks surround a blue-domed mosque, and live-fire training ranges stretched to the mountains on the horizon.

It was a revelation to watch an Afghan squad, only days from deployment to Paktika Province on the Pakistani border, demonstrate a fire-and-maneuver exercise before jogging over to chat with American visitors. When asked, each soldier said that he had joined the Army to serve Afghanistan. Most encouraging of all was the response to a question that resonates with 18- and 19-year-old soldiers everywhere: how does your mother feel? "Proud."

These changes on the ground have been reinforced by progress on three strategic and political problems that have long stymied our plans.

The first is uncertainty about how long America and its allies will remain committed to the fight. The question is still open, but President Obama and the NATO secretary general, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, have effectively moved the planned troop withdrawal date from July 2011 to at least 2014, with surprisingly little objection. Congress and the American public seem to have digested without a murmur the news that far fewer troops will be withdrawn in 2011 than will remain. NATO is not collapsing because of Afghanistan. In fact, the International Security Assistance Force continues to grow, with one-quarter of the world's countries on the ground in Afghanistan with the United States.

Two more vexing problems are the corruption of the Afghan government and the complicity of some Pakistanis with the insurgency. While it is safe to assume that neither the Afghan nor Pakistani leaders will fundamentally alter their policies any time soon, we are changing ours. Previously, our policy options with Presidents Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan and Asif Ali Zardari were limited to public hectoring and private pleading, usually to little effect.

Now, however, the coalition's military and civilian leaders are taking a new approach to the Afghan and Pakistani governments. We are establishing a task force to investigate and expose corruption in the Afghan government, under the leadership of Brig. Gen. H. R. McMaster. We are also shoring up the parts of the border that the Taliban uses by thickening the line with Afghan forces, putting up more drones and coordinating more closely with Pakistani border guards.

Not since the deterioration in conditions in Iraq that drew our attention away from Afghanistan have coalition forces been in such a strong position to force the enemy to the negotiating table. We should hold fast and work for the day when Afghanistan, and our vital interests there, can be safeguarded primarily by Afghans.

That day is coming, faster than many Americans think.

Nathaniel Fick, a former Marine captain, is the chief executive of the Center for a New American Security. John Nagl, a former Army lieutenant colonel, is the president of the center.

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/21/opinion/21nagl.html?ref=opinion]Shorter?
Another view of the Afghanistan issue as viewed by professional soldiers.
 

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