The making of the Kargil disaster

AMCA

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Only pt. 5353 remains under pakistani occupation. India was not able to take back pt.5353 as the approach was relatively difficult from indian side when compared to pakistani side. Also Pakistan army had vacated pt.5353 after Kargil war was over. Both the side had agreed to maintain pt.5353, 5240, 4251 and 4875 as no man's land. Few months later pakistan occupied pt.5353, built concrete bunkers and a motorable road connecting pt. 5353 to Benazir post. Pt. 5240 and pt.5310 were occupied by Indian Army 16 Grenediers and 14 Sikh respectively in the year 2000. 1/3 Gurkha Rifles was tasked with occupying pt.5353 but they never made it as the approach from indian side was nearly vertical and pakistani posts present on either side of the approach directed effective fire on the troops assaulting the position. 1/3 Gorkha returned with 19 casualties and it was decided not to take back pt.5353. Using air power was out of question as the Kargil war was over a year before pakistan occupied pt.5353.

June 1999: Indian Army under Brig. P. C. Katoch, Col. Konsam Himalaya Singh seized control of pt 5770 (Naveed Top/Cheema Top/Bilal Top) in southern edge of the Saltoro defense line In Siachen from Pakistan troops.



Also you must know that before 2003 ceasefire agreement positions on either side of LoC used to change from time to time. In the year 1989 indian army launched operation Ibex to capture pakistani posts overlooking chumik glacier. First attempt was unsuccessful. It was decided to to bombard pakistani logistic node at Kauser base using artillery which led to pakistan army vacating Chumik posts which were later occupied by indian army.

Similarly in 1992 pakistani troops assaulted indian Bahadur post in Chulung. On 1 August 1992 Pakistani Helicopters were attacked by Indian Igla missiles and Brigadier Masood Naveed Anwari (PA 10117) then force commander Northern areas and accompanying troops were killed which stalled momentum on pakistani side and the operation ended unsuccessfully for pakistan.

In 1995 Pakistani NLI attacked Tyakshi post on indian side. The attack was repulsed.

Also After Pakistan occupied pt. 5353 Indian army retaliated by occupying pt. 5165, pt5245 and pt.5240. Pt.5070 was occupied by Indian Army during operation parakram in May 2002.
https://books.google.co.in/books?id=zptCCwAAQBAJ&pg=PT130&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false
http://www.tribuneindia.com/2004/20040713/edit.htm#4


In the Year 2002 Indian soldiers on three posts, namely Point 5165, Point 5240 and Point 5100, guided their superior 155-millimetre Bofors howitzers with devastating accuracy. Pakistani troops on Point 5353 were first hit with smoke-filled mortar shells, to flush them out of their bunkers, and then with air-burst artillery, which showered down shards of metal at great speed. Well over 40 Pakistanis are believed to have died on Point 5353. Pakistan could not reinforce the troops since the Indian soldiers on Point 5165 and Point 5240 were in a position to hit their supply lines.

https://www.thehindu.com/2004/03/10/stories/2004031001731200.htm
 

AMCA

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Let's discuss the ground realities of what happened here:
Kargil peaks captured by Pakistan in 1999

Point 5353
Point Aftab-I
Point Saddle Ridge
Point Bunker Ridge
Shangruti
Tiger Hill
Dhalunag
Tololing
Batalik Peak
Point 5060,5100,4875

Kargil peaks still under Pakistani control as of 2018
Point 5353
Point Aftab-I
Point Saddle Ridge
Point Bunker Ridge
Shangruti
Dhalunag
India has sliced away significant area from PoK after 1948

Chalungka, Turtuk, Thyakshi and Thang villages
Point 18,402
Boudgam Village
Tootmar Khan Gali
Siachen Glacier


After Kargil war:
Pt.5310
Pt. 5240
pt. 5165
pt5245
Pt.5070
 

Mikesingh

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Let's discuss the ground realities of what happened here:

Kargil peaks captured by Pakistan in 1999
  • Point 5353
  • Point Aftab-I
  • Point Saddle Ridge
  • Point Bunker Ridge
  • Shangruti
  • Tiger Hill
  • Dhalunag
Just shows your lack of knowledge Mallah Zarvan. You seem to know squat and put spins to suit your silly arguments.

Your so called 'realities' are way off the mark. Pakis did NOT capture anything in Kargil. Your pussy army OCCUPIED posts that were abandoned temporarily as per the norms in place since decades due to winter redeployments. The posts were vacant and thus your NLI managed to walked in without any opposition. These posts weren't 'captured' by your Porki Army as you so proudly claim.

Your pussy army isn't capable of capturing anything except empty posts!
 
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Mikesingh

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In 2012, Musharraf's senior officer and retired major-general Abdul Majeed Malik maintained that Kargil was a "total disaster" and bitterly criticised General Musharraf, pointing out the fact that Pakistan was in no position to fight India in that area.

Lt Gen Kayani erstwhile commander Pak XI Corps in an interview said that Nawaz was forced to go to the US to press Clinton to ask India to cease operations and allow the Pak Army to withdraw from Kargil as, "PAKISTAN ARMY KA IZZAT KA SAWAL THA."

That, @Assassin, is the story of Pak Army's disaster in Kargil. Your Army's izzat was in tatters!

 

Berkut

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hey, I want something clarified some paki journalist say that kargil was similar to what we did in siachin,
I want to know do pakis have posts on siachin when we pre emptied them ?
I know that siachin was no man's land claimed by both sides while kargil was not disputed and had our permanent posts. so please clarify.
and also have there been any attempts from our side to capture strategic points since 2002 elsewhere on loc like pooch or krishnaghati sector where they dominate us.
Pakis can't even see the Glacier from their positions. Its the tri colour through n through on the Glacier.
I am reading a book called "From Kargil to Coup" written by Nasim Zehra. I recommend all Pakis here to read it. The book is written by your ayesha and plays bare the capabilities of the boys in Khaki(though she tries best to sugar coat the cowardice as best as she can)
Pak army is only good for killing fellow momins. They start downhill skiing at the sight of the first Dharmic.
Generations of inbreeding have rendered them useless as warriors.
I would think that that our police forces (with all their issues with morale n training) could take on the Pak army.
Converts run at the first swipe of cold steel. Pakis are offsprings of people who surrendered their dharma.
 
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Mikesingh

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hey, I want something clarified some paki journalist say that kargil was similar to what we did in siachin,
I want to know do pakis have posts on siachin when we pre emptied them ?
There are no posts on the glacier proper. Posts are on the Saltoro ridge which is far West of the glacier. Here's a map that will clarify things for you.

 

indus

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sir, I am talking about 1984 when we pre emptied them in operation meghadoot.
did Pakistanis have posts on siachin during that time?
if not then paki journalists and even some neutral voice like Hamid bashani are lying or they don't know.
Afaik Pak was also trying to occupy the Glacier but none of the forces had any pre existing post. Story goes that Pak ordered winter equipment from the UK vendor in large quantity whch was the same from whch India used to buy. RaW came to know abt the purchase and alerted the forces whch launched Opn Meghdoot to capture those heights.
 

Safir

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Remaining in denial won't help you we captured around 12 peaks on half we are still sitting and controlling them. All the sources used are Indian. So denial won't work here. After using 40000 soldiers against 2000 of ours and using 100 Fighter Jets and all kind of Artillery and fighting for 3 months position as of now we are still controlling half of the peaks in Kargil Janab. I really hope your Army show guts and tell the truth to its public.
I checked the region near tiger hill and gave it to my friend to find it's topography and contour. And what I found .There is only one peak which is 5300+ m which I suppose is pt 5353 and well ON the NO MANS LAND.

Your lie has been exposed you ISPR Pakistani fuck off now.
 
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The Ultranationalist

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It was mixture of both. Jihadis and NI boys combined. And we gave two of those who were martyred in Kargil Nishan e Haider the highest military award of Pakistan than around 100 got third highest Military Award called Sitara e Jurat
And what those hundreds of dead meat porkies whose bodies were not accepted by the pork govt? Did they get nisan i haider too for getting shot in their a**es?
 

The Ultranationalist

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Remaining in denial won't help you we captured around 12 peaks on half we are still sitting and controlling them. All the sources used are Indian. So denial won't work here. After using 40000 soldiers against 2000 of ours and using 100 Fighter Jets and all kind of Artillery and fighting for 3 months position as of now we are still controlling half of the peaks in Kargil Janab. I really hope your Army show guts and tell the truth to its public.
Bc at least 2000 porkies to mare hi gaye the, in reality their number was much higher. Another thing had we been sitting on those hieghts and pork army been trying to recapture those, i can guarantee you that the entire porky army would have been slaughtered with their objective remaining unachieved. Remember siachin ops? Your world best ssg(as you madarssachap bozos believe them to be) got their asses handed over to them by our regualar troops:biggrin2:
 

Kalki_2018

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Pakis got their asses handed to them by IA arty and IAF. If PA was to release the number of paki soldiers that died and whose dead bodies IA had to bury, there would be a revolt against paki army. PA and mushy were on all fours begging nawaz to run to USAand see if IA will stop killing paki army. Nawaz did what bhutto did for the hijra paki army in 71 and got some of their cowardly soldiers back home. But we know how the paki army thanks their politicians don't we?

The number of Paki dead is near 3000 not 2K. They are still hiding the numbers and a lot of those vermins are still rotting in pits in Kargil. Nawaz had slipped out 2.7K or so of the NLI dead.
 

AMCA

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Indian soldiers of 13 JAK LI burying pak NLI soldiers killed at pt.4875, Mushkoh valley in dras sector.
 

pruthvi24

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@Zarvaan @Assassin
Aukaat of General Mahmood of Pakistan army by the if I'm not wrong the guy in video was DG ISI during Kargil war and was not involved in Planning by the way the general mahmood they are talking about in video was ISI later became head of ISI and after 9/11 he told taliban that we are with America only for media cameras in reality we are actually with you and we all what heppened after that


 

12arya

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https://swarajyamag.com/politics/kargil-how-much-by-the-throat-did-the-pakistan-army-have-us


Kargil: How Much ‘By The Throat’ Did The Pakistan Army Have Us?
by Syed Ata Hasnain
Snapshot

  • Of course, Pervez Musharraf’s claims that the Pakistani army caught ‘India by the throat’ in Kargil in 1999 are wrong. Here, Lieutenant General (retd) Syed Ata Hasnain explains just how wrong they are.


Coming into the 16th anniversary of Operation VIJAY (Kargil 1999), the media is awash with analyses about the operations in Kargil in May-Jul 1999. This is aided no less by gung-ho statements by the likes of General Pervez Musharaf, the then Pakistan Army Chief and later dictator President. Considering that the 50th anniversary of the 1965 Indo-Pak conflict is also shortly going to be upon us, Pakistan is going to open the floodgates of psychological warfare to project to our people its military prowess. Informed military and other strategic analysts need to meet this projection head on lest the Indian people are left in self-doubt. This analysis is all about Operation VIJAY and suitable pieces on 1965 too will follow.

In 1995, I was in Leh and tasked to attend a wargame of the Kargil Brigade. In the course of doing so I happened to ask the very competent Brigade Commander, late Brig. Sandeep Sen, as to why a 120 Km frontage in the mountains was being held only by a brigade. He gave me an astounding answer which I quote –

“this is the concept of traditional gaps; it is a quid pro quo kind of understanding (unwritten) that deployment can be light on both sides and neither side will exploit an advantage”.

He further went on to explain that this being a Shia-dominated area we did not expect any irregular operations because the support base was firmly with India. In 1997, Pakistan commenced deliberate shelling of Kargil sector targeting even the road from Zojila leading to Leh. It was testing of the waters. The occupation of the heights vacated in winter across the LoC in 1998-99, even as the Peace Diplomacy was underway under PM Vajpayee, was ostensibly Musharraf’s brain child. I dare to say I share one thing in common with Parvez Musharaf; he and I are both alumni of the UK’s iconic institution, the Royal College of Defence Studies (RCDS).

Did Musharraf’s ploy really have the Indian Army and nation by the throat as he boastfully states, is the question under debate. Analysis of this has to begin with the presumed aim of the mission Musharraf undertook.

In 1999, Pakistan was concerned about the flagging militancy in Kashmir and the possibility of the international community losing interest in it. The nuclear test of 1998 had exploded the clandestine Pakistan capability and Pakistan was on virtual nuclear parity with India thus emboldening it to risk a conflagration. Considering the Pakistan Army’s diluting power within Pakistan’s polity and its ever-present desire to be the ruler, Musharraf could not allow the India-Pakistan peace process to seriously take off.

For the Pakistan Army, tension with India promotes its own political power and importance and Musharraf was not short on political ambition either. His perception was that a secured military advantage in a limited skirmish along the LoC in a remote area may not instigate India into launch of all-out war; the nuclear balance was anyway in place, as per his mind, thus probably enhancing India’s limit of tolerance by a few notches. He could thus play a few ‘games’ within that level of tolerance.

The area Musharraf chose was the same which late Brig. Sandeep Sen described as the sector with ‘traditional gaps’. As far as Musharaf was concerned, there was nothing traditional about it. It gave Pakistan the advantage of strategic surprise. The posts were vacated in winter by the Indian Army and only reconnoitered by air. Occupation of these would provide the distinct tactical advantage of domination; anyone who knows high altitude (HA) operations can assess that to dislodge a well-entrenched defender at these heights would need an advantage of 9:1. The Indian Army would have to push in reserve formations to achieve anything near that ratio and the reserves would be unacclimitized to HA operations thus elongating the response; besides of course, upsetting the order of battle of flanking formations. Most important of all, the main logistics route to Leh ran close to the LoC in the Dras-Mashkoh sub sector in the general area of Kargil sector. Interdicting this artery meant that winter stocking of Lima sector (Ladakh sector including Siachen) would be adversely affected. The alternate route from Manali via Upshi to Leh had limited capacity because of the nature of terrain and early closure for winter. Logistics choking of Lima sector in the perception of Musharraf would mean the inability to sustain deployment in Siachen thus forcing vacation without firing a shot.

Musharaf had other linked intentions too. One, to bring Jammu & Kashmir into limelight again and two, to trigger greater dynamism in the militancy in the Valley. Concerns of the international community would run high as there was little clarity on nuclear doctrines and protocols of the region. The forced movement of reserves from the Valley (immediate flank) would open vast spaces for conduct of militant operations and infiltration.

In discussions with Pakistani officers a year later in a strategic program abroad, I did admit that Musharraf’s plan was bold but just as the Pakistanis have always historically done, they ‘mastered the initiation and had no clue about termination’. Here is how I justify this statement.

Was the Indian Army taken by surprise? Admittedly it was but in conflict that is always possible. The more important issue is how it reacted thereafter. 15 Corps had an operational responsibility from Demchok to Gulmarg along the LAC, AGPL and LoC, with Siachen and the militancy in the Valley to contend with. It was not the best of arrangements with 3 Infantry Division in Lima sector at lower priority as the militancy in the Valley and ongoing infiltration grabbed all the attention. Initially, 15 Corps treated the intrusions as a local problem but as already explained, recapturing obnoxious heights in HA areas is virtually impossible unless you are prepared to fight attritional; for that you need troops.

The well acclimatized units de-inducting from Siachen were in different stages of rest and relief, strung out over the Lima sector. While they were available as unit entities there, bayonet strength hardly exceeded half the strength units usually deploy for offensive operations. There was no option but to induct 8 Mountain Division which was deployed on the counter insurgency (CI) grid in North Kashmir. Pulling a divisional size force from CI operations involves re-orbatting and reorientation. It is to the credit of the resilience of 8 Mountain Division under Maj Gen (later Lt Gen) Mohinder Puri, an astute Infantry officer, that the division could redeploy in such a quick time frame to the HA area of Dras. This move in driblets was under observation and shelling throughout, once Zojila was crossed. Space was a major constraint in the narrow corridor between the LoC and the Zojila-Kargil road. In the interim, the Indian Air Force had already stepped in followed by the redeployed artillery which kept the Pakistani positions under constant punishment.

Musharraf possiblly perceived that this would be the limit of our response. His troops could withstand this by occupying reverse slope positions by day and the nooks available in the broken terrain. However, once the virtual tactical pause, forced by the time required to redeploy 8 Mountain Division was over, there was no holding back. Waves of Indian Infantry undertook daring assaults in almost complete attritional mode, employing multi directional approaches simultaneously to divide reaction and exploiting success on any single approach to capture crucial objectives. In retrospect, could this have been done more smartly by isolating objectives and forcing surrender without contact battles?

Military prudence normally demands minimum application of force to achieve maximum gains. However, the Indian commanders were under pressure. The Nation was getting a little impatient and success in the capture of a few important heights visible to even the media would raise morale, reinvigorate confidence in the Army and most importantly send home the message to Pakistan that India would go to any length to restore the sanctity of the LoC. There is no doubt that the passion, courage and guile of the Indian infantry and artillery restored the situation living up to the then Army Chief’s statement that the Indian Army would fight with what it had. At no time during the approximately 10 weeks that the operations continued was the Indian Army so ham strung for options that it could be perceived that the Pakistanis had it by its throat.

Those unaware would need to be informed that by end of June 1999, the Dimapur based 3 Corps was already in Northern Command as was the strategic reserve mountain division. Their deployment gave Pakistan the shivers of the possibility of India broadening the frontage of contact thus preventing any reinforcement of the Kargil sector beyond the five Pakistan Northern Light Infantry units initially deployed. With the looming presence of these reserve formations and Pakistan ill prepared for a larger war because of the need for secrecy of its Kargil misadventure, it was actually Pakistan which had its throat in a noose. Masterfully, General Ved Malik’s responses and Prime Minister Vajpayee’s mature political handling kept Pakistan on tenterhooks forcing PM Nawaz Sharif to immediately head to Washington to plead President Bill Clinton for pressure on India for closure of operations.


General VP Malik in Kargil on July 19. (Credits: AFP)

While most analysts concentrate on the immediate Kargil front for analysis of effects, they rarely look at the Valley sector where the impact of Kargil operations was most felt. It is not known whether Musharraf ever contemplated the kind of effect he achieved or was even aware of it. The vacation of North Kashmir by 8 Mountain Division led to its takeover by the Victor Force of the Rashtriya Rifles, in addition to its own responsibilities in South Kashmir. While 8 Sector RR moved from the North East to fill part of the void as did a brigade of another North East formation, the resultant time needed for orientation and initiation of operations in the crucial Lolab-Handwara-Sopore belt led to the loss of operational space which took time to regain, giving a spurt to militancy in the Valley. For recall, it may be worth the while to remember that the first of the suicide terrorist attacks commenced at this time and the reinvigorated campaign was rumored to have been commanded by an SSG officer who had apparently infiltrated Handwara. It was the Rashtriya Rifles Kilo Force which was newly raised to replace 8 Mountain Division that ultimately regained control under Maj Gen (later Lt Gen) Nirbhaya Sharma, the current Governor of Mizoram.

Musharraf’s military maturity is questionable if he feels so gleeful about having his adversary by the throat and not having decapitated him. That the adversary could respond and defeat the entire effort is a display of poor operational and tactical acumen; the strategic acumen need never be debated in relation to Pervez Musharraf, if it takes an Indian Army General to tell him where he actually succeeded.

Lastly, it should be China which should be unhappy with Musharraf. His botched operations led to the separation of Lima sector from the operational responsibility of 15 Corps (Srinagar) and raising of HQ 14 Corps which is now dedicated to look after Eastern Ladakh, Siachen and Kargil, thus optimizing India’s military capability in these crucial areas, one of them being on the Chinese front.
 

HindaviSwarajya

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India has sliced away significant area from PoK after 1948

Chalungka, Turtuk, Thyakshi and Thang villages
Point 18,402
Boudgam Village
Tootmar Khan Gali
Siachen Glacier


After Kargil war:
Pt.5310
Pt. 5240
pt. 5165
pt5245
Pt.5070
Well said the goat fcukers pakis loose every time and then brag on false things.
 

12arya

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For the viewing pleasure of our not at all friendly neighbors who lurks here with their moronic claims.

Pakistan Army Surrender to Indian Army - Kargil War 1999





When there was protest in Pakistan, Pakistan army personal came to collect dead body of Pakistani soldiers..whom they initially denied.









 

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