Taller than the mountains, deeper than the oceans, sweeter than honey and all weather friends

[amoy]

No it doesn't when you have excellent transportation and favorable import regime with a giant like China which is wrestling with overcapacity issues.

Chinese industry while growing was not competing with another Chinese industry.

Pakistani population far exceeds central Asia it will be the primary target of cheap Chinese goods.

And oh Iran with an opening economy will create more robust industrial base than Pakistan could ever manage .If it joins cpec that means even more imports for Pakistan :bounce:

Overcapacity is relative. Steel for instance is over-supplied, overall speaking. Massive expansion in infra will boost consumption of steel, needless to mention steel industry is weak in many countries.

Industries normally opt for areas with better infra and logistics, plus proximity to raw materials sometimes. When inland improves in these respects compounded with other competitive advantages, industries would shift there from the coastal resulting in reduced regional disparity.

Directly bordering China, landlocked C. Asia needs Gwadar to exchange with other parts of the world than China. With rising costs Chinese have to transfer some of manufacturing capacity out to retain the competitive edge of being “cheap”.

No matter how open and industrial Iran gets, it is and will be an oil-dominant economy. CPEc is an additional route to reach its top destination i.e. China rather than solely by tankers.

 

[IndianHawk]

Overcapacity is relative. Steel for instance is over-supplied, overall speaking. Massive expansion in infra will boost consumption of steel, needless to mention steel industry is weak in many countries.

Industries normally opt for areas with better infra and logistics, plus proximity to raw materials sometimes. When inland improves in these respects compounded with other competitive advantages, industries would shift there from the coastal resulting in reduced regional disparity.

Directly bordering China, landlocked C. Asia needs Gwadar to exchange with other parts of the world than China. With rising costs Chinese have to transfer some of manufacturing capacity out to retain the competitive edge of being “cheap”.

No matter how open and industrial Iran gets, it is and will be an oil-dominant economy. CPEc is an additional route to reach its top destination i.e. China rather than solely by tankers.

how would Pakistan have better infra then Western china??
Iran will try to capture Pakistani market both for oil and goods . Iran is more Stable then Pakistan any given day . Industry will thrive their faster.
Central Asia will also look for international north south corridor.
But the fact of matter is that Pakistani industry is doomed any which way.
There is enormous security cost of cpec that will drive power tarrif and transmission costs thus rendering local industries incompetent.

 

[Mikesingh]

Can you please explain details about time taken originally and via CPEC. Also comparison about train transport.

Ok, I'm working on it! :biggrin2:

 

[HariPrasad-1]

This thread is dedicated to Taller than the mountains, deeper than the oceans, sweeter than honey and all weather friends; China and Pakistan.

On PDF, i replied to one porki who said this deeper than ocean etc. I told him that china has recently drop one deeper than ocean and taller than mountain friend North Korea. So when it comes to political and economic reality, deeper than ocean and taller than mountain friendship sucks. So enjoy your friendship till china loose interest in terrorist and beggar pakistan and that time is not too far.

 

[Mikesingh]

Can you please explain details about time taken originally and via CPEC. Also comparison about train transport.

Ok! Here you go!

Calculating Container Shipping Time

Let’s assume that a driver drives for 12 hour per day. It would take him 91.57 hours to reach Kashghar from Gwadar, which would be equal to 7.7 days or 8.7 days taking pit stops into account.

Let's assume that it takes only a day to transfer cargo from a Pakistani to a Chinese truck. That Truck would take 170 Hours to reach Shanghai from Kashghar. ie 14 days of driving and assuming two days for pit stops, 16 days.

Now if we assume that Gwadar is as efficient as the port of Karachi, it would take 6 days to clear import formalities.

Thus the total time it would need to transport goods from Dubai to Shanghai via Gwadar would be 37 days compared to 15 days it would take to reach Dubai from Shanghai via Malacca. Even reaching the China-Pakistan border would take more time (21 days vs 15 days) than transporting a container from Dubai to remotest part of the Chinese seaboard.

Demography and Growth Potential Calculation for CPEC

The following provinces are close to CPEC:

1. XinXiang: Area 1,664,900 Sq Km; Pop 22.09 million

2. Qinghai: Area 720,000 Sq km; Pop 5.58 million

3. Gansu : Area 425,800 Sq Km; Pop 25.64 million

4. Inner Mongolia: Area 1183,000Sq Km; Pop 24.82 million

5. Tibet: Area 1,228,400 Sq Km; Pop 3.145 million

Total area of these provinces = 5,222,100 Sq km. This is 54% of Total area of China, and an area 6.6 times that of Pakistan; while its population is just 81 million which is 6% of Chinese population and less than half (0.44 times) of Pakistan's population.

This is the extent of how sparsely populated the Western part of China is. Highway and Economic corridors bring prosperity when Economic depression of a region is due to that region being cut off from rest of country. But In this case, underdevelopment is due to geographical factors, not due to infrastructure factors.

Deserts, cold arid regions and mountains reduce economic potential (unless you harness them for tourism like Switzerland). You cannot put up factories in deserts. You cannot build cities in deserts (Las Vegas would not count as that city exists because of the Hoover dam).

An area with such low population density does not have a consumer base to build a consumption driven economy. You cannot build service industries in deserts or any other low population density areas because there is not enough qualified labouravailable as well as well as non availability of access to ports/land terminals.

The CPEC is connecting China in the North-West corner of China ie Western corner of Xinjiang. The only provinces that it could affect are Xinjiang and its neighbours Tibet, Qinghai, Gansu in Western China, and Inner Mongolia in Northern China. Xinjiang itself is so large that CPEC has no chance of affecting even its neighbours.

People usually cannot fathom the fact that some provinces (mostly in Western China) are many times larger than even Pakistan itself. Xinjiang is 2.1 times larger than Pakistan, Tibet is 1.54 times larger, Inner Mongolia 1.48 times larger, Qinghai equal to Pakistan, and Gansu half of Pakistan.

It needs to be understood that the Eastern part of Western China is further away from Pakistan than even Europe! For example capital of Shaanxi (Taiyuan) is as far away from Islamabad by air (3559 Km) as Ankara (3600 Km). Thus it is difficult to understand this optimism of serving Eastern part of Western China.

Let's do some analysis. All distances henceforth are by road.

(Shaanxi), Capital (Taiyuan)

Distance of capital from Islamabad = 4904.3 Km
Distance of capital from nearest Chinese seaport (Tianjin)=943 Km
Distance of capital from Gwadar = 6644 Km

(Ningxia), Capital (Yinchuan)

Distance of capital from Islamabad = 4337 Km
Distance of capital from nearest Chinese seaport (Tianjin)= 1200 Km
Distance of capital from Gwadar = 6077 Km

(Chongquing) , No capital

Distance of Chongquibg from Islamabad = 5069 Km
Distance of Chongquing from nearest Chinese seaport = 0 Km. After construction of Three Gorges Dam, barring largest cargo Ship, Ocean going ships could sail upto Chongquing.
But still distance between Chongquing and Shanghai is 1689 Km
Distance of Chongquing from Gwadar = 6843 Km

(Guzihou) , capital (gulyang)

Distance of capital from Islamabad = 5459 Km
Distance of capital from nearest Chinese seaport (Beihai) = 796 Km
Distance of capital from Gwadar = 7199 Km

(Yunnan) , capital (Kuming)

Distance of capital from Islamabad = 5859 Km
Distance of capital from nearest Chinese seaport (Beihai) = 1024 Km
Distance of capital from Gwadar = 7635 Km

(Sichuan) , capital (Chengdu)

Distance of capital from Islamabad = 4976 Km
Distance of capital from nearest Chinese seaport (Chongquing) = 326 Km and (Shanghai) = 1968 Km
Distance of capital from Gwadar = 6716 Km

It is therefore seen that all these Western provinces of China are farther away from Gwadar than Western Europe is from Pakistan by Road. Distance between Islamabad and Berlin by road is 6353 Km, and of Paris is 7300 Km; nearly of the order of distance of Gwadar from any of Eastern provinces of Western China.
Anyway, China does not even intend to use Gwadar for these provinces. It already has a corridor via Myanmaar (Yunnan border Myanmar) for redundancy.


So the question is, what does Pakistan intend using the CPEC for? Trade through this route is a nonviable option due to lack of markets, time, distance and most importantly cost constraints.

I have yet to find a single Pakistani economist explaining Pakistan's growth predictions and demand projections justifying CEPC. It looks like another ghost city like project where Pakistan is paying the hefty interest.

Spot on! As above.


Thanks to the person who has helped me calculate much of this.

 

[tsunami]

^^Thanks bro. Do you have time and money data when transport is done by Rail route??

 

[sorcerer]

China And India To Build Sri Lanka's Colombo Financial City Together?


http://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshe...colombo-financial-city-together/#5666660e3891

 

[Bharat Ek Khoj]

I told him that china has recently drop one deeper than ocean and taller than mountain friend North Korea.

How did I miss such news. Any link to light on the subject please !

 

[sorcerer]

Ok! Here you go!

Calculating Container Shipping Time



So the question is, what does Pakistan intend using the CPEC for? Trade through this route is a nonviable option due to lack of markets, time, distance and most importantly cost constraints.


Spot on! As above.


Thanks to the person who has helped me calculate much of this.

As of now CPEC is one propaganda chinese gave to pakistan to nurture terrorists against India and create unrest in india.
china gave a propaganda that pak wanted to peddle their lies on kashmir

 

[HariPrasad-1]

How did I miss such news. Any link to light on the subject please !

Please search. N Korean dictator criticized china. China is drifting towards S. Korea.

 

[Mikesingh]

^^Thanks bro. Do you have time and money data when transport is done by Rail route??

Sorry bro, the tariffs and journey times for these rail routes have not been arrived at as yet as they are still in the planning stages. However, some details of the projected rail routes are as below.....

The Pak government has approved an $8.2 billion (Rs 85,000 crore PKR) project to upgrade the 1,872 km Karachi - Peshawar rail track, bridges, tunnels, and culverts, according to International Railway Journal.

It will be part of an international rail link that will connect Pakistan with China, Russia, Central Asia and Europe. It will extend south from the city of Kashgar in the Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region in Western China to Pakistan's deep-sea Gwadar Port on the Arabian Sea, according to Zhang Chunlin, director of Xinjiang's regional development and reform commission.

The new track will support increased axle load of up to 25 tons, up from 22.8 tons which is now the norm in South Asian countries. The higher axle load capacity will allow heavier freight trains carrying more freight per train for greater trade overland.

China will provide 85% of the financing for the project. It will be done in two phases, with the first due for completion in December 2017 and the second in 2021.

Seems these Chinese have unlimited funds seeing how they are splurging the moolah especially on Pakistan's infrastructure! But pay-back time is going to hurt the Pakis!

 

[amoy]

Please search. N Korean dictator criticized china. China is drifting towards S. Korea.

U were stating exactly the opposite.

China and Russia have been pissed off by S.korea. as a result China and N.Korea relations have bounced back just like a yoyo. S.Korea is worse off without a free will.

China and Russia jointly oppose THAAD deployment

China and Russia have jointly expressed their opposition to the imminent deployment of THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) system, claiming that it will not help the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and will offset the global strategic balance.

Lieutenant General Viktor Poznikhir from Russia's military's General Staff (L) and Major General Cai Jun from the Joint Staff Department of China's Central Military Commission (R) take questions from the press during a joint briefing on Oct. 11, 2016 on the sidelines of the 7th Xiangshan Forum. [Photo/Ministry of National Defense]
http://www.china.org.cn/world/2016-10/12/content_39471842.htm

 

[Indx TechStyle]

The Limits of China’s Influence in Pakistan

On October 6, Cyril Almeida, a veteran journalist with Pakistan’s Dawn newspaper, authored one of the more tantalizing news stories in recent Pakistani history: a fly-on-the-wall account of a contentious meeting between Pakistan’s civilian leadership and General Rizwan Akhtar, the head of its military intelligence bureau, the Directorate General for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). According to the report—since denied by the Prime Minister’s Office—Pakistan’s foreign secretary told General Akhtar that Pakistan faced growing isolation due to the activities of militant groups operating from its soil. Most importantly, close ally China was beginning to tire of blocking moves at the United Nations to place Pakistani militants on the list of global terrorists. As written, the article suggests that the mention of China finally shifted the mood of the delegates in khaki; following an accusation that the military had prevented civilian law enforcement from arresting militant leaders, General Akhtar announced that he would personally order regional ISI branches not to interfere with civilian law enforcement moves against Pakistan-based terrorist groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad. Almeida has since reported (via Twitter) that he has been placed on Pakistan’s Export Control List.

The events described in the article, which was unsourced, may be an invention meant to serve the agendas of any of the parties in the room (they make the civilians look tough but also place the onus on them to carry out future arrests). Or the conversation may in fact have taken place but with the implicit understanding that any terrorist arrested under this new dispensation would spend a short, comfortable stay in jail (or under house arrest) before being released on his own recognizance. This is a strategy that Pakistan has successfully employed in the past when international pressure became too great to resist.

The most plausible portion of the article, however, is the implication that everyone in the room fears the wrath of China and that China is increasingly striving to be, in essence, an offshore balancer in Pakistani politics. Recent events show that, while China is agnostic on Pakistan’s form of government, it understandably wants a quieter, more efficient, less divided Pakistan, one that keeps terrorists on a shorter leash, offers a better security environment for Chinese-funded infrastructure projects, and is less vulnerable to centrifugal forces. Given the size of China’s promised investment in Pakistan and Pakistan’s lack of alternative partners, no Pakistani leader, civilian or military, can afford to entirely ignore China’s wishes.

The meeting Almeida describes comes in the context of increasingly public Chinese pressure on Pakistan’s leaders to put internal divisions aside in order to place all of Pakistan’s resources at the service of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The Global Times reported that “the increasing cost of security is becoming a big problem in efficiently pushing forward” CPEC. Pakistan responded by proposing that the $220 million cost of raising a dedicated security force be incorporated into the eventual tariff for power from CPEC power projects. When civilian and military powers squabbled over who would control the CPEC security force, China’s Foreign Ministry responded with a well-timed press conference in which it expressed its confidence that “Pakistan will heighten precautions against security risks.” A Communist Party vice minister even told a visiting delegation from Pakistan’s main opposition party, the Pakistan People’s Party, that “that there are more chances of political division when there are multiple political parties” and that the execution of CPEC requires “unity.”

Given China’s prominent role in encouraging Pakistan to take action against militant groups in Operation Zarb-e-Azb—the joint military offensive conducted by the Pakistan Armed Forces against various militant groups—and its known distaste for cross-border terrorism, its increasing influence on Pakistan’s internal affairs could be seen as a positive development. China indeed offered a restrained response to Pakistan-based terrorists’ attack on an Indian army base in Jammu and Kashmir, indicating that it did not approve of the provocation. But Pakistan is a complex operating environment, and we should not assume that China possesses a secret to effectively exerting leverage that eluded the United States for 15 years.

There are many signs that China can exert pressure but not control outcomes in Pakistan. Operation Zarb-e-Azb was flashy and kinetic, but the military had given advance warning of the campaign to top terrorist leadership, allowing them ample time to escape to Afghanistan or Dubai. In a more recent example, China apparently failed to convince the Pakistan military to allow normalization of the status of Gilgit-Baltistan, the Pakistani territory that is home to the border crossing between China and Pakistan. A brief look at that imbroglio gives a clear portrait of the limits of Chinese influence.

Gilgit-Baltistan, part of the former princely state of Kashmir, is currently controlled by Pakistan but is not mentioned in the Pakistani constitution. Historically staunchly pro-Pakistan, Gilgit-Baltistan’s attempts to become a formal part of that country were always rejected by Pakistani leaders who wanted to ensure that the inhabitants would be able to vote in a future referendum on the status of Kashmir—hopefully tipping the vote count in Pakistan’s favor. Integrating all of Kashmir into the Pakistani state is part of the Pakistan army’s raison d’etre , and Gilgit-Balistan’s perpetual limbo is a key part of the military’s long-term strategy.

Thus it was surprising to see reports surface in the Pakistani media that the civilian government was considering granting Gilgit-Baltistan some sort of constitutional status. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s party does well in the territory’s rather meaninglesselections, so there is a clear political rationale for the project. But the true mover behind the proposal, it appears, was China, which was apparently leery of investing billions in a corridor whose lynchpin lies in legally contested territory that is claimed by India and controlled, but not claimed, by Pakistan. The drive to constitutionalize Gilgit-Baltistan thus found China allying with the civilian government against the military.

In an effective measure of where true power lies in Pakistan, the proposal appears to have gone nowhere despite its powerful advocates. Instead of constitutional status and representative government, Gilgit-Baltistan has been promised development projects, while Chief of Army Staff Raheel Sharif assured China that a dedicated CPEC security force would protect the route beginning at the Khunjerab Pass in Gilgit-Baltistan. Indian prime minister Narendra Modi’s specific mention of Gilgit during his Independence Day address probably put the nail in the coffin.

The United States has sought for years to use its considerable leverage—$33 billion in military assistance over 14 years—to effectively pressure Pakistan to abandon its support for militant proxies. It has had little success. China is now entering the fray, with similar, if perhaps more limited, ambitions. It has succeeded in convincing Pakistani leaders to pay lip service to its concerns, but whether it can achieve actual change remains to be seen.