Submarine Warfare Doctrine

[W.G.Ewald]

I have been thinking that the goals of submarine warfare have changed significantly since WWII, and I found this document to be a good description of tactics of that era. Note the class of submarines listed.

Current Doctrine Submarines (USF-25(A)) - Chapter 1

Doctrine may be defined as a compilation of principles, applicable to a subject, that have been developed through experience or by theory, that represent the best thought of the unit concerned, and that indicate and guide but do not bind in practice. Its purpose is to provide that understanding within a force that generates mutual confidence between the commander and his subordinates in order that timely and effective action will be taken by all concerned in the absence of instructions. It permits intelligent initiative on the part of the subordinate, the most desirable quality in all echelons of command.

The fundamentals of Submarine Doctrine are derived from the War Instructions, U.S. Navy; General Tactical Instructions, U.S. Navy; Current U.S. Fleet Doctrine and Tactical Orders. Nothing in this publication shall be construed to conflict with the above basic instructions.

The submarine is a weapon available to the naval command in the conduct of a campaign, designed and operated to attack or observe enemy surface or sub-surface craft without prior detection and without requiring support from other types. The essence of successful submarine attack lies in its unseen and unheard execution, resulting in surprise. The primary assets of the submarine are its ability to carry torpedo attacks to close range, objectively to point where enemy target can not successfully maneuver to avoid; to lay mines in waters controlled or under observation by the enemy where surface mine layers can not operate without hazard or detection; and to obtain positive or negative information regarding enemy locations or movements under conditions which take advantage of their inherent qualities. Any use of the weapon which does not take full advantage of these qualities when such are needed in the theatre of operations, is a sacrifice of available potentialities.

During probable long periods before fleet action occurs, submarines may be usefully employed in the following tasks:

Patrol. (Including commerce destruction).

Scouting.

Screening.

Mining.

Reconnaissance.

Services to aircraft.

Escort (under exceptional circumstances only).

Delivering important mail or personnel.

How many of the listed tasks are included in today's doctrine?

 

[W.G.Ewald]

World War II US Submarine warfare operations in the Pacific 1941 1945

Previously during peacetime, strict adherence to the London Treaty of 1930 was understood and absolute. As a result combat training concentrated solely on offensive operations against the swifter warships and not against the slower, lumbering merchant vessels which they were now permitted to target and engage. Untrained for waging this type of search and destroy mission, it is small wonder that the submarine commanders recorded poor initial tallies. Much can be attributed to the fact that caution seemed to be the watchword for the submarine fleet. Tactical peacetime doctrine demanded that attacks against enemy vessels were to be made from deep submergence and well below periscope depth using only sonar bearings in which to develop an acceptable firing solution. Surface attacks, which proved to be such an important tactic of the German U-Boats in the Battle of the Atlantic, were out of the question for U.S. submarines. In addition, it was discovered that from the air a submarine could be detected to depths of over one hundred feet during conditions of optimal visibility so all submarines were required by orders to remain submerged within 500 miles of an enemy airfield. This only tended to reinforce the belief that operational caution was critical, thus compounding the poor performance of American subs early in the war. Few skippers were willing to buck the pre-war rule book by coming to surface or periscope depth for an attack. All were career officers, generally older and thus much more conservative and cautious in combat. Consequently, most of the early offensive maneuvers were made from the safety of deep water by sonar, with predictably dismal results. The lack of offensive initiative and flawed doctrine however were just a part of the problem. Defective torpedoes was an issue that would severely reduce the submarine fleet's effectiveness during the first few years of the war. Additionally, the lack of a unified submarine command compounded the challenges. Infighting between the Pacific Fleet based in Pearl and the Asiatic Fleet in Manila for manpower and materials accounted for a schism in command that lasted throughout virtually the entire war.

 

[W.G.Ewald]

Modern submarine warfare

 

[debasree]

two words lethal ghost