Su-30 MKI

[rock45]

i still believe that this is more to do with the Australians wanting to get the f-22 and the Americans offering them the jsf.

I agree with you but if if Australian got the F-22 the below group would only complain about them for some reason.

These guys below still get paid by Air Power Australia so it doesn't surprise they write what they do.

WGCDR C. L. Mills (Retd), AM, BSc (Physics), MSc (USAFIT)
Air Combat Analyst, Air Power Australia

LETHALFORCE
you are right But Australians have also been very unhappy and critical of the Super Hornet they seem to be unhappy with anything they get., they are overpowered and dreaming of fighting in Asian wars where they'll stepped on like a bug.(no pun intended)

It's a mix topic because like the F-14 supporters nobody wanted the F-111 service to end. So that plays a part in the Hornet bashing which I'm tired of hearing about. A mid/short range light attacker will never replace a tactical bomber it can't and never will. Just same goes for the F-14 the Hornet isn't a large interceptor nor does have the fuel load, range, etc, it wasn't designed for that. Get past the AIM-54 which by far isn't battle tested unless you count Iran shooting down Iraqi's AF three times over and a Hornet will out turn a Tomcat.
You can find Australian Hornet pilots talking shop and you'll see they like there Hornets are are proud users. The USN likes there's and wouldn't be using them this many years if they suck. They are not F-14s and F-111s but people just can't stop comparing them in general. Your find most of the core Hornet bashing was at one point F-14 and F-111 supporter related.

The Hornet has:
Great maintenance records (one of the Tomcat's short comings)
Just about the second most modern fighter flying cockpit/system/weapons
A little easier to learn fly then some fighters
Two engines for safety
AESA radar which on the Block-II E/F might be 2nd generation AESA, some countries aren't even near 1st generation.
Nine users I think and all still use their Hornets, Malaysia might be the only one who don't currently fly them. I read some place that the Hornet pilots were pulled to learn how to fly the Flankers they bought but that's not confirmed.

 

[LETHALFORCE]

How to kill a Hornet Russian style?

http://www.strategypage.com/militaryforums/6-54648.aspx



Rock I agree with you with many points you made but the AWAC vulnerability will be very real with more AWAC -killer missiles in the works

http://www.defenceforum.in/forum/showthread.php?t=201


here is some more on this topic,written by a russian consulting firm(to market sukhois?)


Asian countries advise of being tired of loss-of-face from domination of air by Australia?s Hornet and F-111. New aircraft come onto Asian region and old Hornets and F-111 retire, so balance of power in air combat can change. American dollar is falling like broken lift, but even so Russian aircraft remain still much cheaper. Asian clients ask me - can Russian aircraft do the job over Super Hornet and F-35 JSF? Is acceptable by them to post APA NOTAM ? Asian clients say give back face.

Two seat combat aircraft better ? make space for some more Omega advisors to help fight. So, I offer basis of analysis by using Su-30MKI/MKM, Su-30MKK/MK2 or Su-35BM. Add Flanker upgrades as they come ? Sukhoi factory very quick at upgrades.

Grisha says «you can make a big fighter into attack aircraft, but find very hard to make medium attack aircraft into good fighter».

Need to depend on better radio-location system [Editor: RLS - Russian jargon for airborne radar] and weapons, but if get caught, maybe get run down and killed by enemy fighter. Much depend on fuel, range and payload. Long distances around Asia, so my advice to fit centerline conformal tank on Sukhoi ? holds 6,000 kg fuel and reduces radio-location reflections [Editor: radar signature] ? still plenty of space for weapons on wing and body. Also fly where Sukhoi own sky ? above 15,000 metres [Editor: 45 kft]. Have radio-electronic combat systems Khibiny-M [Editor: KNIRTI L175M defensive Electronic Support Measures receiver], Sorbtsiya [Editor: KNIRTI L−005 wingtip phased array jamming pods] and Lobushka [Editor: towed decoy] fitted to Sukhoi fighter.

To make analysis clear, break air combat in parts, from the time aircraft take off from Australia through to the end of combat in «battle space».

Start when aircraft assemble and take off. Difficult to hide many aircraft on combat mission. Sometimes have spies on ground with mobile phone [2]. Use MacDonald's code for types ? Big-Mak, Quarter-Pounder, Super Fries, Small Fries ? you get idea. Phone order to cut-out telephone number, or «Internet Cafe», then onto Network Centre in far away country so know Mak order coming. Have sea-ships in key points to read signals ? Russia been doing this for long time. Have new electronic reconnaissance complexes [Editor: ESM and direction finding receivers] and infrared sensors on ships. Find track and pass to Network Centre. Plenty time to load best weapons and fuel for «counter-air» mission.

Next phase in combat is first radio-location system contact. If radio-location signal from Big-Mak [Editor: Wedgetail AEW&C MESA radar emissions], Sukhoi go around Super-Fries, take big prize. Have Mak and Super-Fries killers in same bunch. Use K-100 [Editor: Novator R-172/KS-172/AAM-L] or R-37 [Editor: Vympel AA-13 Arrow] for 300 km to 400 km engagement, X-31A and P [Editor: Kh-31A/P / AS-17 Krypton] for close work.


Look for Quarter-Pounder [Editor: A330-200MRTT aerial refuelling tanker] on radio-location system ? N011M [Editor: Tikhomirov NIIP N011M BARS phased array radar on Su-30MK] can see a long way at this height as radio-location system horizon almost 500 km. Tankers only have 600 km/hr speed, while Sukhoi have top speed to 2,500 km per hour, so can run down and kill tanker quickly. Big centerline fuel tank help the Sukhoi fighter here. Might have only Super-Fries [Editor: tanker escort CAP] ? has good radio-location system so see Sukhoi first ? but Khibiny radar warner-receiver know [Editor: ESM receiver] Super-Fries coming. Cannot change physics laws. Give Super-Fries time to bug-out but not make mission success.

Soon close to time Sukhoi see Super-Fries with radio-location system. Minister Nelson say Super Fries stealthy, Russian Institute of Radio Physics and Electronics says not so, when Super-Fries carry weapons and tanks on pylons, see about 200 km with N011M radio-location system, much better with new Irbis-E radio-location system [3].


This is far away from AIM-120 range of about 80 km, so have lots of time for free shots at Super-Fries. Shoot pairs of R-77M with mixed self-guidance heads [Editor: GSN - Russian jargon for missile seeker] ? active radio-location missile go first, if scare him pretty good so he turn to beam, expose his pants to R-77M Infra-Red or Optical missiles [4].


Super-Fries ALE-55 radio-electronic combat complex [Editor: Russian jargon for towed decoy] good against radio-location guidance missile, not so good on Infra-Red or Optic. Can dance around outside Super-Fries' missile range and use Sukhoi radio network [Editor: TKS-2 intraflight digital radio datalink / network] to make sure no Sukhois in range of Super-Fries' missile. Omega advisor in back of Sukhoi help here as fighter controller. Stay until Super-Fries reach Bingo [Editor: only fuel remaining to get home] and run for home ? cannot escape at Mach 1.6 when Sukhoi make 2.35 ? take R-77 or R-27 in pants.

Next is guts fight ? close inside AIM-120 range. Still some tricks to use. Sukhoi OLS-30 [Editor: Infra-Red Search and Track set] sees flare of Super-Fries' missile launch at long range ? gives time to turn away and wait until Super-Fries' missile fall into sea. Then turn back to close again. Have lots of fuel and many weapons, so can play «cat and mouse» for some turns. Grisha likes upgrade to OLS-35, which looks all round Sukhoi aircraft all the time.


Maybe Grisha makes mistake and misses Super-Fries, and radio-electronic combat complex warning alarm start as Super-Fries' missile self-guidance head radio-location system switches on to transmit [Editor: AIM-120 seeker going active]. Break turn and use Khibiny, Sorbtsiya and Lobushka radio electronic combat complex [Editor: EW self protection suite]. Lots of G for minute or so. Not many missiles good at high G above 15,000 metres. Also fire nose first, then turn and guide missile with tail radio-location system. Not touch Grisha this way. Tail radio-location system watch to see no surprises [5].

 

[LETHALFORCE]

If Super-Fries go home and not die this time, then Grisha get Super-Fries next time.

Get closer for «knife fight» if missiles and radio-location system jammed by Super-Fries' radio electronic combat complex. Switch on own radio electronic combat complex to spoil radio-location system missiles. Can fly higher and turn much faster than Super-Fries so he have job getting it up.


Sukhoi have had helmet sight long time for R-73 shots, since 1980s. Even fire R-73 backwards on some Sukhois [6]. Here can turn quicker and get first shot, then move out of fight. Like guns very much ? video from gunsight alway good discussion in officer mess!

So, Grisha thinks the Sukhois have a good chance against Super-Fries but not other way round. Need to think tactics and fighter positions in combat situation. Sukhoi can fly higher, faster, longer, turn much better and have good radio-location system and radio electronic combat complex, plus Infra-Red sensors. Stay in area of superiority above Super-Fries and win almost all times.

Minister Nelson say Super-Fries decision «no-brainer». Seems right ? he makes big joke!

Footnote:


Col. Grisha Medved is a former retired fighter pilot.


Endnotes and Comments:


[1] Omega Services PMC is a Russian contractor specialising in the provision of experienced military personnel and consultancy, occupying a similar market niche to Blackwater and other US contractors. With access to a very large pool of highly experienced former Soviet and Russian military professionals, Omega provide highly capable consultancy services. URI: link


[2] Col Medved is describing a technique used very effectively by Australia against the Japanese during WW2, and more recently against the Argentinians by the British in 1982. Ground observers use covert channels to report on aircraft departures and geography permitting, outbound headings.


[3] The Irbis E is a block upgrade to the N-011M BARS on the Su-30MKI/MKM, or a retrofit option for the Su-27SKM/Su-30MKK/MK2. It is the baseline radar configuration for the Su-35BM.


[4] This is a standard evasive tactic when under attack by a radar guided missile. The aim is to cause a rapid change in Doppler which may cause a seeker lock to break, while also maximising the angle rate and G-load the inbound missile must sustain to track the target. NB Russian and previously Soviet policy was and remains to retrofit alternate seekers to long range / BVR missiles. The seekers used in the R-73 family of short range air combat missiles have been retrofitted to the R-27 / AA-10 Alamo and R-77 / AA-12 Adder BVR missiles. The 'Optical seeker' referred to here is the third generation imaging seeker in development for the R-74 series, similar to the ASRAAM, Python 5 and AIM-9X seeker. The play is to force the target fighter to turn and expose its hot end to the inbound heatseeking missile. If the fighter has to use afterburner to sustain the turn, then its heat signature is further increased aiding the second inbound missile in detection and tracking.


[5] A tail warning radar is an option for a number of Flanker variants, mounted in the centrebody tail bullet. Phazotron and Tikhomirov NIIP have offered several phased arrays for this application, including derivatives of inlet nose bullet radars designed for block upgrades of the MiG-21 / J-7 Fishbed fighters. While these radars lack the range of the nose mounted BARS and Irbis-E, they are significantly more powerful and longer ranging than active radar Missile Approach Warning Systems (MAWS) available for Western fighters, and double up as midcourse datalink transmitters for missile guidance. This allows the Flanker to take a BVR missile shot, perform a maxium G U-turn, and continue to provide midcourse guidance updates to the missile as it retreats from the missile engagement envelope of the target fighter. Target coordinates, where the tail warning radar lacks the required performance to maintain a track, would be relayed via TKS-2 datalink from another Flanker to cue the radar boresight. Readers should note that missile kinematic No Escape Zones (NEZ) are strongly asymmetric in relation to the direction the target is flying in - in a closing geometry with the missile and target heading toward each other, the NEZ footprint is large since the relative velocity is the sum of the missile and target velocities. Conversely, the kinematic NEZ footprint shrinks dramatically in a tailchase geometry, as the relative velocity is the difference in the velocities of the missile and target. In a scenario where the fighters initiate the engagement head to head at maximum missile kinematic range, if one of the fighters can turn away immediately after its opponent launches, the changed engagement geometry shrinks the missile NEZ. If the retreating fighter has a tail mounted radar, it can continue to guide its missile against the advancing fighter, but the latter can no longer hit the retreating fighter and must deal with an inbound missile.

 

[LETHALFORCE]

sukhoi analysis- Austraian air power

http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-Flanker.html

Sukhoi Flankers
The Shifting Balance of Regional Air Power

(many sections ommited see link for more info)

Background

It is unfortunate that since 911 the ongoing media spectacle of the Global War on Terror and Operation Iraqi Freedom have diverted the public and media focus in Australia away from happenings in the nearer region. In recent years several important developments have taken place, with Malaysia and Indonesia signing contracts for and taking delivery of, respectively, their first top-tier Sukhoi Su-30 fighters, and India establishing production of its first fully configured Su-30MKI aircraft. While these developments were expected, they represent an ongoing change in regional aerospace power and capabilities which Australia should not choose to ignore.

Some defence analysts in Canberra have argued vocally in the media that the Global War on Terror demands that Australia fundamentally restructure its basic strategic doctrine and indeed reshape its force structure. It is proposed that the needs of coalition warfighting in distant locations should take precedence over the Defence of Australia in the nation's force structuring and funding priorities. Media comments attacking established doctrine and ridiculing it as 'Fortress Australia Policy' suggest that this perspective is more popular than one might imagine.

Such reasoning is dangerous and ill informed - reflecting on the part of most protagonists of this view a weak if not wholly absent understanding of modern air power and its implicit strategic influence. To better understand how foolish this point of view actually is, we must explore more closely the capabilities of the latest Sukhoi fighters and their inherent longer term growth potential.

This analysis is an updated and greatly expanded derivative of the two part series published in 2003 (see Resources).

 

[LETHALFORCE]

Resources

1. Irkut SPC (JSC), 125315, 68, Bldg. 1, Leningradsky prospekt, Moscow, 125315, Russia
2. KnAAPO (JSC), ul. Sovetskaya, 1, Komsomolsk-on-Amur, 681018, Russia
3. Sukhoi Company (JSC), 23B, Polikarpov str.,Moscow, 125284, Russia, p/b 604
4. РЛСУ "Ирбис-Э" - радар нового поколения - "Аэрокосмическое обозрение", №1, 2006, стр.20-22
5. "Ирбис" готовиться к прыжку - "Авиасалоны мира", №5, 2006, стр.22-25
6. Владимир Ильин - Рождение АФАР - "Аэрокосмическое обозрение", №4, 2005, стр.108-111
7. С.Д.Бодрунов, Ю.И.Белый, В.А.Таганцев, Ю.И.Зеленюк - «Панда» займет нишу многофункциональных БРЛС на период разработки радиолокационных систем пятого поколения" - "Мир авионики", №3, 2003, стр.19-20
8. Синани А.И., Белый Ю.И. - "Электронное сканирование в системах управления вооружением истребителей"- "Мир авионики", №1, 2002, стр.23-28
9. Su-35. Multirole Super-Maneuverable Fighter. The Booklet. KNAAPO/Sukhoi brochure (Zipped PDF 16 MB)
10. Australian Aviation - August 2003 -Asia's Advanced Flankers (Su-27/30)
11. Australian Aviation - September 2003 - Su-30 vs RAAF Alternatives (Su-27/30)
12. Australian Aviation - July 2004 - Asia's Advanced Precision Guided Munitions
13. Australian Aviation - August 2004 - The Sleeping Giant Awakens (PLA-AF/PLA-N)
14. Defence Today - Dec 2003 - Sukhois present new strategic risk for Australia
15. Defence Today - Sept 2004 - 2010+ Regional Futures
16. The International Assessment and Strategy Center - May 3rd, 2006 - The Flanker Fleet -The PLA's 'Big Stick'
17. Defence Today - January/February 2006 - Regional Developments 2005
18. Defence Today - January/February 2006 - Regional Precision Guided Munitions Survey
19. APA Analyses Volume II - APA-2005-03 - Carlo Kopp and Peter Goon - China's Rise as a Regional Superpower (PDF)

 

[LETHALFORCE]

 

[LETHALFORCE]

Air to Air Weapons

Air to air weapons are one area where the Russians have been very aggressively developing and marketing new products. The baseline Su-27S was armed with the R-27 (AA-10 Alamo) semiactive radar homing BVR missile and the R-73 (AA-11 Archer) WVR missile. The thrust vectoring R-73 (refer AA 4/97) was a trend setter and we have since seen an improved R-73M marketed, as well as a digitised seeker equipped R-74E variant credited with 75 degree off boresight capability and kinematics to kill 12 G targets. Indian press reports suggest the Rafael Python 4 has been offered to India and it is not inconceivable that this missile will find its way on to Indian and other regional Sukhois - India is currently negotiating for the Phalcon AEW&C system fitted to the Ilyushin A-50E airframe and has acquired ballistic missile defence radars from Israel.

The Vympel R-27 is the Russian equivalent to the late model US AIM-7 Sparrow series BVR missiles, but the similarity ends there since the R-27 is available in a plethora of variants. The basic airframe is supplied in long and short burn variants with differing range performance, and with heatseeking or datalink aided inertially midcourse guided semi-active radar seekers. The R-27R1 and R-27ER1 are the radar guided long and short burn versions, respectively, credited with F-pole ranges of 70 nautical miles and 43 nautical miles. The R-27T1 and R-27ET1 are the respective heat seeking equivalents, credited with slightly lower engagement ranges. The X-band anti-radiation seeker equipped R-27P/EP has been reported, designed to kill emitting fighters in the forward quarter by homing on their radar emissions. More recently Agat have offered new build or retrofit active radar seekers as the R-27A/EA, the AGAT 9B-1103M/9B-1348E, derived from the R-77 seeker.

The most recently exported missile in the region is the Vympel R-77 RVV-AE (AA-12 Adder), the AMRAAMski. This missile, with unique lattice controls, is a modern BVR weapon designed to kill 12G targets, and credited with an A-pole range of 54 nautical miles, although some reports suggest early production rounds are not delivering the kinematic performance advertised, not unlike early AIM-120A AMRAAMs. As the R-77 has AMRAAM-like capabilities, it permits an Su-30 to launch multiple rounds and guide these concurrently, engagement geometry permitting. As the R-77 matures, we can expect to see refinements in propellants, autopilot kinematics and seeker jam resistance.

We have yet to see reports of regional deliveries of the Vympel R-77M RVV-AE-PD (Povyshlenayya Dal'nost') ramjet adder, credited with an A-pole range around 80 nautical miles. This missile is a direct derivative of the R-77.

Alternate seekers for the R-77 have been advertised - the heatseeking R-77T using an MK-80M seeker from the R-73M and R-27T, and the antiradiation R-77P. The deployment of the new F/A-22A later in the decade will see significant pressure on Vympel to supply heatseeking, anti-radiation and electro-optical imaging seekers on the R-77/R-77M in an attempt to counter the combined kinematics and all-aspect stealth of the F/A-22A. While such seekers may do little to offset the overwhelming advantages of the supercruising F/A-22A, they are likely to prove quite effective against inferior types such as the JSF, F/A-18E/F, late model F-15E and F-16C/B50. If the Su-30 can close to a range where an advanced longwave IRST can track the target, an optical seeker equipped R-77 variant can be used to effect an engagement, defeating the RCS reduction measures on these aircraft. The anti-radiation R-77P could be used to engage at maximum missile range.

In the long range missile domain, the Vympel R-37 (AA-X-13) series of AIM-54 Phoenix look-alikes have been proposed - a developmental R-37 successfully engaged a target at 162 nautical miles of A-pole range in 1996. A more interesting proposal has been the use of the Novator R(KS)-172 RVV-L (AAM-L) missile, a 215 nautical mile range 1,650 lb launch weight long range AAM. The R-172 uses datalink/inertial midcourse guidance and an active radar terminal seeker, and Russian sources claim a snap-up capability to 100,000 ft and snap-down capability to 10 ft AGL. KS-172 mockups have been photographed on Su-30 displays but its production status is unclear at this time, although India is negotiating licence production.

Of no less interest is the Kh-31P (AS-17 Krypton) family of ramjet anti-radiation missiles, offered as a standard store on the Su-30/35 subtypes. This missile, in basic anti-radiation and dual mode seeker variants is often dubbed the AWACS killer and would be used to destroy opposing AEW&C aircraft, or surface based radars. Sukhoi advertise a load of up to six rounds, two on the inlet stations.

 

[LETHALFORCE]

Strategic Impact of Su-30 in the Region

We have yet to see the full strategic impact of the Su-30 proliferating in the nearer and wider region. India and the PRC will not have most of their Sukhoi force structures deployed until 2015 or later, and it is unclear how many Sukhois both Malaysia and Indonesia will ultimately operate. In the near term, both Indonesia and China will have difficulties with fully exploiting the aircraft as they have steep learning curves to climb in training and support - India and Malaysia are apt to fare much better with Western based training systems. We can expect to see regional users of the Su-30 maturing their capabilities to use the aircraft in the latter part of this decade. Much has been said about the PRC's difficulties in recruiting and training competent Sukhoi drivers - with a population base of over a billion it is however only a matter of time before they learn to do this properly. The view widely held in some Canberra circles that Asia's air forces will remain at current proficiency levels is not supportable in the longer term.

Much has been made of the serviceability and support problems experienced by the IAF and the PLA-AF with their initial Sukhoi aircraft, indeed the Indian government audit public report listed a litany of contractual problems and Su-30K/MK servicabilities as low as 50% in 2003. These problems should been seen in the proper context as they represent the transient state experienced when introducing a radically new piece of technology and supporting systems. The Sukhois are a generation beyond the MiG-29 Fulrcums flown by the IAF and two generations ahead of the 1950s technology which makes up the backbone of the PLA-AF. With HAL and Shenyang to perform domestic assembly and part production, in time both nations will have the ability to domestically manufacture high failure rate components, and perform factory/depot deep overhauls. As a result what we see now in the support base for the aircraft will not persist and should not be used as an indicator of the long term supportability of the aircraft. With large fleet sizes even a large proportion of grounded aircraft still leaves strategically significant numbers to cause mayhem with.

Another factor in time will be the availability of third party Indian and Chinese made spares to other Sukhoi users in the region. Bottlenecks in the supply of Russian made spares may not persist past 2010 since the commercial incentives to bypass Russian suppliers are considerable - and many regional Sukhois will use substantial fractions of Western avionic hardware. In time we can expect to see more bilateral deals, of the ilk seen between India and Malaysia for MiG-29 support, emerging between regional players and this will change the support environment seen by smaller regional users of the aircraft. With four sources of spare component supply rather than one - Irkut, KNAAPO, HAL and Shenyang lines and subcontractor pools - market forces will have their impact. To assume that historical case studies of Russian aircraft support will be representative of the longer term future in this region is arguably to misunderstand the developing dynamic across the region. The era of Cold War technology monopolies is long gone - only the US can sustain such due its commanding lead in stealth, propulsion and computing technologies. This model is not a valid one for assessing the longer term regional situation in Russian and third party hardware.

The Su-30s are 'honest' 700+ nautical mile radius class fighters, with plenty of combat gas to burn at shorter radii. This provides all of the Sukhoi operators with a much larger air defence footprint than we have ever seen before. India is now taking delivery of its six Il-78 Midas tankers and will be able to robustly project their Sukhoi force well beyond their borders - China ordered six Il-78MKKs in late 2005.

Even without a proper tanking capability, lesser regional players have the option of buddy refuelling Su-30s with the UPAZ hose/drogue pod - at the expense of half of the force committed to tanking sorties. On a buddy refuelling sortie the shooter gains around 200-250 nautical miles of radius - yielding a radius very close to 1,000 nautical miles. With a 200 nautical miles class standoff missile such as a 3M-54E or Kh-41 variant, both advertised on Sukhois, this provides a limited strike capability beyond a 1,000 nautical miles radius. While such a strike refuelling technique is not viable for sustained high intensity operations, it is feasible for nasty pinprick raids against very high value assets, such as airfields, petrochemical/gas plants, shipping, aircraft carriers and other targets the destruction of which could be highly politically embarrassing to the victim.

What this means in practical terms is that Su-30 users will have the potential to contest airspace up to 500 nautical miles or further from their runways, and launch limited strikes out to around a 1,000 nautical miles radius. While the latter is not the kind of heavy iron 1,000 nautical mile radius capability Australia possesses in its F-111 fleet, it is nevertheless enough capability to cause considerable mayhem, if used cleverly.

In the longer term the Sukhoi will have several strategic effects. The first is that it will provide its users with the ability to threaten or intimidate neighbours with lesser capabilities, if they fall within the footprint of the Sukhoi. The second is that the US Navy's CVBGs will lose much of their ability to intimidate by gunboat diplomacy - the ability to threaten a CVBG with a mixed package of shooter and escort Su-27/30s to radii essentially greater than that of the F/A-18E/F and JSF mix on a carrier deck drives up the risk for the US Navy in a nasty political stand-off. Unless the US is prepared to take the gloves off early in a dispute and deploy the F-22A centric US Air Force Global Strike Task Force, the US Navy may cease to be a viable tool for coercive diplomacy.

Even for the US Air Force the Su-30 presents some interesting challenges, since it has the radius to threaten both tankers and large ISR platforms in a shooting contest. While the F-22A would deal with the Sukhois quickly and effectively, in many scenarios the Sukhois could create genuine complications by forcing a relatively high ratio of F-22A escort sorties to F-22A strike sorties, thus diminishing the strike sortie rate - a major issue for the dual role tasked F-22A fleet.

Another factor to consider is the ongoing proliferation of advanced guided munitions and other hardware produced by competing Russian vendors. Just as we have seen Irkut and KNAAPO competing in the sales of Sukhois, we have seen a wide range of Russian weapon makers like Vympel, Zvezda, Raduga and others selling their products across the accessible market. Many of these products incorporate modern Western digital COTS technology, an example being the upgraded second generation 9B-1103M active radar seeker for the Vympel R-27A/EA missile, which is built around a Texas Instruments TMS320C44 digital signal processor chip and achieves a 25% acquisition range improvement over the baseline seeker, derived from the R-77's first generation 9B-1348E - a second generation '9B-1348ME' will almost certainly carry the same TMS320C44 digital signal processor.

Some of the air-surface weapons being offered for the Sukhois are genuinely capable. The Raduga Kh-41 Moskit (3M-80/82 SS-N-22 Sunburn) has been integrated on the Sukhois' centreline station (Su-33) and is considered to be one of the most lethal supersonic sea skimming anti-ship weapons in existence. The NPO Soyuz/Turayevo TKMB ramjet powered Mach 4 class Zvezda-Strela Kh-31 (AS-17 Krypton) is offered on Sukhoi variants, both in the active radar anti-shipping A model (PLA-N) and anti-radiation P model (PLA-AF). The latest advertised Kh-31 variant includes a dual mode air-air seeker, incorporating an active radar seeker and passive anti-radiation seeker, optimised for engaging 'nonmaneuvering airborne targets such as AWACS' out to 100 nautical miles. Both the supersonic OKB-52 P-800/3K-55/3M-55/Kh-61 Yakhont / Brahmos (SS-N-26) and Novator 3M-54 Club (SS-N-27) have been publicly discussed as options for the Sukhoi fighters, especially the Su-34 series, but it is unclear whether any integration work has taken place to date.

 

[LETHALFORCE]

Cruise missiles integrated on or proposed for the Flanker (Author).

For strikes against land targets, the 1,500 lb class Molniya Kh-29 (AS-14 Kedge) is available in television (Kh-29T), thermal imaging contrast lock homing (Kh-29D) and semi-active laser homing (Kh-29L) variants - the weapon is a direct equivalent to the very effective French Aerospatiale AS.30 series, with the television and thermal imaging guided variant seeker equivalent to the AGM-65 Maverick series. The smaller semi-active laser homing S-25LD and Zvezda Kh-25ML (AS-12 Kegler) are also on offer. An equivalent to the RAAF's AGM-142 is available in the 2,000 lb class 50 nautical mile range turbojet sustained Raduga Kh-59M (AS-18 Kazoo), which uses a conceptually similar TV/datalink guidance scheme, using an APK-9 Tekon datalink guidance pod carried on the left inlet pylon. An anti-radiation variant, the Kh-59 (AS-13 Kingbolt) is available but has not been advertised on the Sukhoi - the newer Kh-31R series appearing to be favoured by the market.



****Author does not mention Supersonic Brahmos part of Indian sukhois****

GNPP KAB-500 and KAB-1500 guided bombs (Author)

The Russians are also actively marketing guided bomb kits for the Sukhoi fighters. The KAB-500L is a direct equivalent to the GBU-16 using the 27N series laser seeker, the KAB-500Kr is equivalent to a TV contrast lock guided 1,000 lb GBU-8 HOBOS fitted with a bunker busting or fuel air explosive warhead. The KAB-1500 is a family of guidance kits for 3,000 lb class dumb bombs, available with unitary or bunker busting warheads. The KAB-1500L is a semi-active laser homing kit, the KAB-1500TK a TV command link guided kit analogous to the GBU-15 but 50% bigger, and the KAB-1500Kr a TV contrast lock guided system. Either three of the 1,500 kg weapons, or six of the 500 kg weapons can be carried by an Su-27/30 with suitable avionics.

 

[LETHALFORCE]

Su-30MK loadout (Sukhoi).

To date most regional users have invested in Sukhois primarily to provide air superiority capabilities. The availability of a wide range of competitively priced Russian guided weapons is likely to result over time in an increasing broadening of the role of regional Sukhoi fleets. The principal impediment to the wider use of Russian laser guided bombs has been a shortage of good targeting pods - with suitable laser coding modifications third party pods are likely to evolve to fill this niche over the next decade. The impact of the US GBU-12 in Afghanistan and Iraq will not have gone unnoticed.

The television guided KAB-500Kr and KAB-1500Kr kits are also worth closer scrutiny, since they provide a fire-and-forget capability very similar to the long retired GBU-8, or a GBU-15 used in lock-on-before-launch mode - highly accurate and devoid of the need for a targeting pod. With the potential for a pre-programmed scene matching correlation capability (ie pre-loading the bomb with a digitised target image not unlike the early Tomahawk DSMAC), a technology the Russians do have, this presents the prospect of a JDAM like capability to attack multiple aimpoints on a single pass, albeit daylight limited. The large volume of the KAB series seekers would easily permit a lot of evolutionary growth in the design, and low cost commodity processing chips and QWIP thermal imagers would facilitate this. It is likely that we will see more of this family of bomb seekers in time.

Russian sources claim the PRC has ordered the Kh-59ME stand-off missile, the Kh-29T TV guided missile, the Kh-31R anti-radiation missile, and the KAB-500Kr electro-optically guided bomb kit. PLA-AF Su-27SKs have been seen carrying paired KNIRTI L005-S Sorbtsya wingtip jammer pods designed to defeat the APG-63/65/68/70/73 radars and Hawk/Patriot SAM systems.


Conclusions

For Australia the Su-30 presents the prospect of a more difficult to defend sea-air gap. While we might choose to argue ad nauseam as to whether a future Indonesian regime might opt to get into a fight with Australia, or debate the likelihood of PLA-AF Sukhois being based in the northern apporaches at a future date, or debate India's future role in the near region, the stark reality is that the tyranny of distance which has protected Australia for decades is being rapidly eroded by developing capabilities across the region.

In this context the 2002 JSF decision, and ongoing lobbying for F/A-18E/F interim fighters, seem both to be quite incongruous. Neither aircraft offers a decisive capability margin against the Su-30 series, especially longer term as the sensors, avionics and weapons evolve in the Sukhois and regional players acquire AEW&C aircraft and other supporting capabilities.

Indeed, one idea popular in some Canberra circles seems to be that the RAAF is now less needed and should be downsized to save money since Indonesia is in a state of chaos and all the RAAF is needed to do is participate in the odd US coalition force - of course if anything goes really bad in our neighbourhood the US will instantly assist!

This is a particularly lame argument insofar as the US Air Force is badly stretched with worldwide commitments, and is having genuine difficulties with a poorly ageing tanker and fighter fleet - in a crisis the US may not be in the position to deploy sufficient assets quickly enough, even if the then incumbent US administration wants to do so. There is of course no guarantee that a future US leadership group will have the kind of relationship with Australia which we observe today. The Americans may not solve their block obsolescence problems until later in the next decade, leaving a genuine window of strategic vulnerability should the more vocal proponents of RAAF capability reduction have their way in Canberra.

The belief in some Canberra circles that the JSF will somehow solve all of the RAAF's force structure problems does not stand up to scrutiny, in the light of the known capabilities and demonstrated growth potential of the Sukhoi Su-30 which is rapidly becoming the 'standard' fighter across the region. Similarly the belief that F/A-18E/F interim fighters will somehow address the capability gap in the F/A-18A HUG fleet is hard to accept. The belief that the F-111's heavyweight counter-air strike capability is now irrelevant also conflicts with the reality that the best way to fight an Su-30 without an F-22A is to shut down its basing from day one of a conflict - and if possible convert the Sukhois to scrap metal in situ - neither achievable with a handful of standoff missile shots.

Strategy has always been a game of positional advantage, and in the modern age this positional advantage lies largely in air power. If Australia is to retain its relative strategic position in the region it must start thinking realistically about its long term force structure and abandon the quick fix panacea solution mindset which seems to be so prominent in the current Canberra defence debate. There are no quick or cheap fixes in this game.

 

[rock45]

sukhoi analysis- Australian air power

Hi LETHALFORCE
Some of the information is interesting but it loses value with me the untested, not even close to production stuff like the AA-13. They mention the AA-10 this is a older missile and Russia couldn't produce anything better so they upgraded. The AA-11 for its time a great performer and trend setter has be been past in performance for years now. Still a good missile but just not as good as a Python V or 9X, again this is just my opinion which my base on reading different stuff in different forums. Most missiles specs are classified but Russia lacks the money over the years to really bring along their stuff like the AARAMS and 9X. Its very difficult just finding any upgrades at all done to the AA-12 in it's entire service life. Most of Russia's Su-27 can't fire the AA-12 so Russia difficult to figure out in this area. The latest ARRAMS is being test in New Mexico right now and it's very much made and not far from now go into full production, so the ARRAMS will get even better.

If you think about Australian air power is making a big deal out 18 Flankers, it's not there 90 of them and Malaysia harassing Australian shipping or aircraft? They sort of play out the whole region like its some melting pot of danger just waiting to boil over. And all of it falls on the hands of crappy Hornets Australia bought and they were against. I'll admit I would bought the F-15s because their better range and speed but who Australia fighting modern Hornets serve their needs. I take stuff like this with a grain of salt.

I remember seeing some of those radar and missile charts if there the same ones and some are dated.

Most countries armed forces cannot project power China can just about do now they building of their blue navy forces but Malaysia?

Russia aren't fielding the long range missiles yet or even the R-74 so we have time before these missile are massed produced and shooting down all the American built aircraft around the world. Hell the Meteor not entering service on the Typhoon until 2013 could be a years later I saw other dates as later 2015/17?

 

[LETHALFORCE]

They maybe paranoid for many reasons firstly they are the only Anglo nation in Asia, they are surrounded by Much bigger countries in terms of population while they have a big country with a very small population. They are a part of NATO with no real NATO members nearby (japan is pacifist and s. korea has N.korea problems)their fears are if anything happens they may not be able to handle it alone and second NATO/USA may not get to them quick enough or have the economic will to do so? All the countries surrounding them have Russian war planes and they are getting deadlier and deadlier though their fears seem to be overblown the next generation of Asian warplanes will be a lot deadlier and many missile issues for the russians will be resolved since it could lead to a loss of revenues; but if the australians are looking for a security blanket they will never have one. a lot of it maybe them being a cry baby for not getting the raptor.

 

[EnlightenedMonk]

If the CBU-105 performs exactly as shown in the video, I guess the effects on armour would be deadly.... A couple of those bombs could easily wipe out a whole armoured column !!!

Can only pity the unfortunate chaps who'd be inside those tanks...

 

[shiv]

how about putting an aesa up there...

and if we have full TOT on the engine and the planes then why cant we shift that tech to the kaveri engine and its solid crystal state blades

 

[LETHALFORCE]

i am sure Indian govt will ask for many things for the billions they are spending

 

[Atul]

If the CBU-105 performs exactly as shown in the video, I guess the effects on armour would be deadly.... A couple of those bombs could easily wipe out a whole armoured column !!!

Can only pity the unfortunate chaps who'd be inside those tanks...

Its a very potent weapon, in experienced & efficient hands. :vehicle_plane:

 

[EnlightenedMonk]

Its a very potent weapon, in experienced & efficient hands. :vehicle_plane:

I wonder what the strategic implications would have been if we had such a weapon during the Battle of Longewala ??? If I guess right, a single bomb like this could have wiped them out...

Maybe a military strategist could guide us better on the historic implications of such a bomb...

Anyways, how does it distinguish between friendly and enemy armour ??? Some sort of radar based guidance system or AWACS based ground tracking ???

 

[Singh]

how about putting an aesa up there...

afaik aesa is planned for in the future.. the bars will be replaced by irbis-e whose pesa component subsequently will be replaced by aesa in the future..

and if we have full TOT on the engine and the planes then why cant we shift that tech to the kaveri engine and its solid crystal state blades

kaveri for MKIs ? No way.

 

[shiv]

singh,not kaveris for MKI,but the TOT we have on the MKI engines...cant we take that tech and put it on Kaveri to speed up its completion

 

[EnlightenedMonk]

singh,not kaveris for MKI,but the TOT we have on the MKI engines...cant we take that tech and put it on Kaveri to speed up its completion

Well... I have no idea of this, but probably the ToT agreement prevents its use in other places??? Since its a legal document there many be many hurdles associated with it...

I dare say that such an option would have been considered and then discarded because they might have felt it to be either infeasible or against the terms of the contract / ToT agreement...

What does everybody else have to say about this ???